







THE REVOLUTIONARY
PERIOD IN EUROPE

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THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE

(1763-1815)

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BY

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PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD RÉGIME	3 0
II GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY	19 0
III CURRENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION	33
IV THE WORK OF THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS	48
V THE FRENCH MONARCHY AS A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM	62
VI THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION	76 0
VII THE FALL OF THE OLD RÉGIME IN FRANCE	88
VIII REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION	107
IX THE FINANCES AND THE CHURCH	125
X THE MENACE OF CIVIL WAR	137
XI THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE	150 0
XII THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY	169
XIII THE REIGN OF FORCE	194
XIV THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE REPUBLIC	218
XV IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY	232
XVI THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER	248
XVII A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP	267
XVIII BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY	286
XIX FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE	301
XX THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE	317
XXI THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM	340
XXII THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA	367

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
XXIII THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE	383
XXIV THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT	400
XXV THE LAST GREAT VENTURE	414
XXVI THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE	429
XXVII THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE	446
NOTES ON BOOKS	467
INDEX	485

LIST OF MAPS

	FACING PAGE
1 INEQUALITIES OF THE SALT TAX	8
2 EUROPE IN 1763	24
3 PARTITIONS OF POLAND	56
4 PARIS AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION	104
5 NORTHERN ITALY AT THE PERIOD OF NAPOLEON'S FIRST CAMPAIGN	240
6 GERMANY BEFORE THE REVOLUTION	296
7 CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1803	312
8 CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER 1815	456

THE REVOLUTIONARY
PERIOD IN EUROPE



THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE

CHAPTER I

THE PEOPLE AND THE OLD RÉGIME

THE close of the Seven Years' War brought only a lull in the great conflicts of the eighteenth century, and yet for a time men seemed less influenced by dynastic quarrels, and their attention was centered upon questions of social and political reconstruction. The policies of rulers were affected by these newer interests. They tried to make an end of crying abuses, or at least to simplify their administrative systems and to remove troublesome obstacles to the exercise of their authority. In the last years of the century the timid plans of monarchical reform in France were thrust aside by a popular revolution which aimed to reorganize society according to the principle of equality. The same principle of reorganization was carried beyond the ancient frontiers of France when war broke out and victorious French armies sought to enlarge the borders of the nation or to impose the national institutions upon dependent peoples. Before the period closed with the downfall of Napoleon and the settlement of 1815, these two forces of monarchical reform and revolutionary action had worked many changes in the structure of European society.

No brief description of the characteristic features of the old régime can be made altogether satisfactory, because within the limits of a single country, or even of a province, there existed such baffling diversity. Although the proportions of truth are difficult to fix, the impression grows irresistible that the classifications of men in the eighteenth century were outworn, rigid, and unfair, and that those who labored on the farm or in the shop were seriously hampered by restrictions laid upon them by law and custom. When Rousseau declared in 1762 that "Man is born free and is everywhere in chains," the second part of his statement was sufficiently exact in the economic and the larger social sense.

CHAP. I

1750-1789

Reform
and Revolution in
Europe

CHAP. I

1750-1789
Europe
Still Rural

The population of Europe was still mainly rural and its principal occupation was agriculture. Nine-tenths of the French people lived in the country or in small towns. Lyons was the only city besides Paris which had over one hundred thousand inhabitants. In Germany Berlin had just passed the one hundred thousand mark. Birmingham and Manchester, the great manufacturing centers of England, which now have a population of over five hundred thousand, had about thirty thousand. The inventions which created the modern factory system and have filled the towns with throngs of artisans had not been made. Industry was carried on much as it had been for generations.

Lord and
Peasant

In the country there were only two classes, lords and peasants. A middle class hardly existed except in England. In some parts of Europe the relations of lord and peasant were as primitive as on an English or French manor of the twelfth century. In Hungary the peasant could not even own land. He was in a sense the property of the noble and his rights were not recognized by law. Within the kingdom of Naples it is said that a thousand kinds of feudal dues might still be levied. Even where, as in France, a new social order had for centuries been displacing the feudal system, feudal survivals were apparent on every side in the structure of rural society. Nor was it a question merely of quitrents and other dues. The possession of a noble estate usually carried with it some governmental authority. The lord might be to all intents and purposes a petty sovereign or he might retain merely shreds of his former powers. Absolute rulers did not always interfere with the local sovereignty of their nobles. The kings of Prussia, for example, did not venture to curtail the powers which the lords exercised over their peasants.

Nobles in
France

Many of the nobles in France could hardly be said to belong to the rural population, because they usually resided in Paris or Versailles. They found life far from the sunshine of royal favor unendurable, and many of them could not pay their expenses without the aid of gifts and pensions. The religious wars of the sixteenth century had uprooted them from the soil, and Louis XIV had sought to increase the splendor of his Court by insisting upon their presence. He also hoped in this way to cure them of the rebellious mood into which they had fallen during the regency of Marie de' Medici and during the Fronde.

By the middle of the eighteenth century the court nobles formed a class of absentee landlords. Their estates were left in the hands of stewards, whose success was measured by the amount of dues they extracted from the peasantry. The ideal

of efficiency appealed to these stewards as to the other administrative officials of the time. They examined the seigniorial records containing statements of rights of lord or peasant in forests and common lands and of the dues which the peasant owed, in order that no part of their master's heritage might be lost by neglect or through patriarchal tenderness in enforcing collection. It seemed as if a feudal reaction were taking place.

Still later in the century a fashion was adopted which promised to correct the evil of absentee landlordism. The nobles imitated the English custom of spending several months every year in the country. Arthur Young, the English traveler, noted in his journal in September, 1787, that "at this time of the year and for many weeks past, Paris is, comparatively speaking, empty. Everybody that have country-seats are at them; and those who have none visit others who have. This remarkable revolution in French manners is certainly one of the best customs they have taken from England." The change, however, came too late to give the greater nobles any firm hold on the affections of the people or any large influence in local affairs.

Among the lesser or provincial nobles there were many who lived habitually on their estates, absorbed by the cares of country gentlemen. The Marquis de Mirabeau, the father of the more famous Count de Mirabeau, was one. These nobles were not rich, but neither were they poor. They were on good terms with the peasants, and if their position in the community was not altogether satisfactory, it was through no fault of their own. There were also many nobles whose income raised them scarcely above the situation of the neighboring peasants. Arthur Young heard of nobles in southern France who were obliged to live on twenty-five louis a year. In 1789 several Poitevin nobles came to their electoral assembly dressed as peasants and without money enough to pay their bills at the inn.

The noble's position was weak because his powers as seignior, mere remnants of what he once possessed, made him the principal creditor of his community, rather than its ruler, and, thereby, its natural leader and protector. The seigniorial court, where once the noble dispensed justice as a sovereign without appeal, possessed only a shadow of its former authority. The cases brought before it were chiefly fiscal, disputes between the seignior and the peasants about rights and dues, the obligations of lord and tenant. Other services which the medieval noble had rendered to the community had suffered a similar transformation. He had caused a mill to be built, and had provided a wine-press and a bakery or public oven. He also maintained a market and was

The Noble's Position Weak

CHAP. I

1750-89

often responsible for the local roads and ferries. Now these services had become privileges, giving him the sole right to let the contracts for grinding grain, pressing grapes, and baking bread. In his name tolls were charged on the roads and at the ferries and dues in the market-place. It was as seignior again, not as landlord in the narrow sense, that the noble could levy a *cens* or quitrent and other dues upon the peasant owners or renters of land within his jurisdiction. All these rights he prized as the basis of his social superiority. He would not have consented to abandon them for a sum equal to the capitalized value of their annual revenue. As the royal government did not usually entrust him with local administrative duties, he had little or no opportunity to gain political leadership. His social position and his financial privileges, therefore, lacked the ordinary means of defense.

The
Peasantry

If the position of the French noble was weak, that of the peasant was wretched. He has been called by Taine the "beast of burden" of the old régime. His miseries sprang from no single cause. They were due to the system of landholding, the weight of taxation, and to the backward state of agriculture. Only a million and a half peasants, and perhaps fewer, chiefly in the eastern and northeastern provinces, were serfs; the other nineteen or twenty million were owners of their farms, or renters, or agricultural laborers. In France more than in any other country of Europe the peasant was an owner of the soil. His ownership, however, was still burdened with charges, which were a heritage from the feudal system, for the country was covered by a network of noble or ecclesiastical seigniories. Nevertheless, the peasant who could sell, bequeath, or mortgage his property must be described as its owner. In this sense there were multitudes of peasant proprietors. They held nearly one-half of all the farm land. In some parts of the south they owned still more. In the north their share was smaller, falling as low as thirty-three per cent. in a few places.¹ The nobles owned from fifteen to twenty per cent., the middle class of the towns about as much, and the clergy considerably less. Besides the peasant proprietors there were many other peasants who cultivated the land for a part, usually half, of the produce, and who were furnished with house, half of the stock, and seeds. There were

¹ Exact knowledge of the extent of peasant property in France is due mainly to the researches of M. Loutchisky. See his *L'état des classes agricoles en France à la veille de la Révolution*, or the review of his conclusions in an article by M. Sée in the *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, XVIII. 257-267.

also prosperous peasants who rented large farms, especially in the north and northwest.

The feudal or seigniorial charges were vexatious rather than heavy. In addition to the cens or ground rent, the peasant had to pay dues called the *champart* or *terrage*, which amounted to a small percentage of the produce of the farm. These dues varied greatly throughout the country in name and character. Other dues commonly called *lods et ventes*, which must be paid if the land was sold, sometimes took as much as a third of the selling price and decreased the market value of the land. The seignior could offer the price and take the land, a possibility which also lessened its value. In one respect the situation of the peasants had distinctly improved. The right of the nobles to require personal labor had either been exchanged for a small money payment or had fallen into disuse. Even the money payments were growing less, because the value of money was steadily decreasing.

The greatest curse of the countryside was the hunting privileges, which except in a few regions belonged exclusively to the nobles. Restrictions were placed by law and custom upon the methods of agriculture, in order that the game might not lack for food. The nobles could ride across the growing crops. In many places the lord's pigeons were a pest. These evils were greatest in about four hundred leagues of territory treated as royal hunting preserves and called *capitaineries*. D'Argenson, one of Louis XV's ministers, wrote in his diary in 1753 that the inhabitants of "Fontainebleau no longer sow their land, the fruits and grain being eaten by deer, stags, and other game." Arthur Young, after a ride through the forest of Chantilly, which belonged to the Prince of Condé, remarked: "They say the capitainerie, or paramountship, is above 100 miles in circumference. That is to say, all the inhabitants for that extent are pestered with game without permission to destroy it, in order to give one man diversion." Seeing another princely estate he said: "Great lords love too much an environ of forest, boars, and huntsmen, instead of marking their residence by the accompaniment of neat and well-cultivated farms, clean cottages, and happy peasants."

The tithe which the Church demanded of the peasants was collected less rigorously than in England. It amounted to about a thirteenth of the produce. But as the things in which it should be paid were often specified, it restricted the freedom of the peasantry and was one of the causes of the backward state of agriculture. Moreover, the income often went to non-resident

CHAP. I

1750-89

Feudal
Dues

The Tithe

CHAP. I

1750-89

clergy or to nobles, while the parish priest was left to starve on a few hundred livres a year.

Taxation

It was neither the feudal noble nor the Church, but the State which was principally responsible for the peasant's heavy burden. His load of taxation was constantly increased, although privileges and exemptions were distributed with lavish hand to other classes. The evil was partly historical in its origin. The principal direct tax was the *taille*, which nominally fell upon non-noble persons in proportion to their ability to pay, whether their income was from agriculture or industry. The nobles were exempt because the tax originated in feudal times when they rendered military service to the King. The clergy as ministers of the altar were also exempt. In a few regions the tax rested on the land, rather than on the occupiers, and there a lord who occupied land classified as "peasant" was obliged to pay the tax. Peasants who rented land from the nobles were not exempt from the *taille*, although they were not taxed as high as peasant owners. The tax should have been paid by the townsmen as well as the peasants, but many of the towns were exempt, while others compounded for the tax by the payment of lump sums which they collected under the form of tolls or *octrois*. Thousands of individuals who held office were also exempt as a matter of privilege. The exemption of most of those whose voices counted in the formation of public opinion made the task of reformers difficult. When the government needed more money, the ministers instead of attempting to equalize the burdens of the tax, increased the amount the long-suffering peasants were forced to pay.

Two other direct taxes, the *capitation* or poll tax and an income tax called the twentieths, or *vingtièmes*, also were collected chiefly from the peasants. The great majority of the peasants paid the *capitation* not as a separate tax, but as an addition to the *taille*, increasing it by about fifty per cent. In the case of nobles, magistrates, and townsmen the assessment was light. When the first *vingtième* was established, the government intended that it should amount to five per cent. of the taxpayer's income, and that it should be paid by the privileged classes as well as by the common people. To render the levy more exact the sources of income were classified in separate schedules, and officials were appointed whose business it was to verify personal declarations of revenue. But the clergy, the nobles, and the judges sought on all occasions to defeat such attempts to equalize the burdens of taxation. The clergy purchased exemption both from this and the *capitation* by offering at the time of the first levy an unusually large "free gift." They made the "free gift"



every five years, which was equivalent to about four millions annually, while a single twentieth of their income would have been over five millions.

CHAP. I

1750-89

The question has often been asked, What part of the peasant's net income was absorbed by the three direct taxes? In Taine's opinion they took fifty-three per cent. This appears to be much exaggerated. The *taille* was supposedly levied on the net income of the peasant after the expenses of cultivation were paid, but as there were no statistics according to which such an estimate could be made the principle remained almost purely theoretical.

The evils which sprang from the management of the levy were even more oppressive than the size of the burden. This was especially true of the *taille*. The total amount was arbitrarily fixed each year by the King's council, and it was repeatedly increased until 1780, when Necker, director general of the finances, persuaded the King to declare that it should never be more than one hundred and six million livres.² Until that time, great as the individual peasant's burden might be, he had no assurance that it would not be increased in a year or two. The method of assessment and collection vexed the peasant with dangers still closer at hand. This task rested with the peasants themselves. All, the ignorant as well as the capable, were forced to take their turn at the ruinous duty, and obliged to obtain the amount assigned to the parish. In case of delay they were compelled to advance the money out of their own pockets. They were tempted to be lenient with their friends, harsh with their enemies, and timid toward the rich and influential. The only way in which a peasant could lighten the burden of taxation was by assuming the appearance of poverty or by making difficulties about paying.

Taxes Un-
fairly
Levied

The system of the indirect taxes was equally vicious. In the collection of these the country was not treated as a single whole, but was broken up into regions, some of which had valuable privileges and exemptions. The method of collecting the salt tax, which was a government monopoly, illustrates the evils of the system. One-third of the country, the north central provinces, the region of the *grandes gabelles*, paid two-thirds of the tax. There was a region of the *petites gabelles* where the rate was smaller, and still other "redeemed" or "free" districts. As Brittany was "free" and yet bordered on the region of the *grandes gabelles*, salt on the one side of the line cost from two to three livres a hundred pounds and on the other side from fifty-six to fifty-eight livres. The inevitable consequence was smug-

² This sum includes the capitation and accessories. It could be increased only by a law duly registered by the parlements.

CHAP. I

1750-89

gling, for the venturesome trader could carry salt across the frontier, sell it for a third of the government price, and still make an enormous profit. The expense of guarding the borders increased the cost of collecting the tax. In certain regions the amount which each family must use was fixed at seven pounds for each person seven years of age, and this at a time when salt cost in the region of the grandes gabelles about twelve cents a pound, without allowing for the difference in the value of money.)

(The peasants were required to work from eight to forty days upon the highways. This was called the royal *corvée*, and it was in effect a direct tax collected at a time and in a way which often interfered with the care of the crops. Arthur Young said the French roads would have filled him with admiration had he not known of the abominable *corvées*, which made him commiserate the "oppressed farmers, from whose extorted labour this magnificence has been wrung."

(French agriculture, like all European agriculture before the latter part of the eighteenth century, clung to methods centuries old. The tools were almost as primitive as in the days of the Romans and the Egyptians. There was no attempt to improve the species of grains or vegetables or to fertilize the soil. The culture of the vine alone had reached a high degree of development. Most of the domestic animals were inferior in size and quality. Draught horses and driving horses were an exception. Horse-racing was introduced in 1756 in imitation of the English. As yet there was little demand for beef, the poor not being able to buy it and the rich preferring venison or fish. To save the soil from becoming exhausted the peasant left a third or even a half of it fallow every year. The sale of grain, which was the principal crop, was hampered by the restrictions which the government threw about the grain trade. There were, nevertheless, reasons for hopefulness. Enlightened noblemen, like the Duke de Liancourt, a friend of Arthur Young, were intensely interested in making improvements. Many agricultural societies were formed, and a school of writers called the Physiocrats arose, which contended that real increase in wealth comes only from land.

The peasant had one resource beyond his agriculture. Mechanical industries were not rigidly restricted to the towns, but were carried on in the country, so that the peasant whose plot of ground would not support his family might become a spinner, a weaver, or a cutler, or pursue some trade connected with rural life. As he competed with other men working in their homes or

their shops in the cities, and not with a highly organized group of employees as in modern factories, his trade might furnish his principal support while his farm or garden was secondary in importance.

The burdens of the French peasant appear lighter when compared with the load carried by many of the German peasants, especially by those living east of the Elbe. Here the rights of the nobles did not have the sanction of antiquity, as in France, for until money replaced barter and personal services were transformed into perpetual rent charges the German peasant had been usually a free man, cultivating his share of the village lands or occupying a farm, the rent of which he paid in produce or in labor. When the noble ceased to be a knight obliged to furnish military aid to his territorial prince, he found it to his advantage to transform his ancient prerogatives into the rights of a seigniorial landed proprietor. Then, because he had the power, and because the territorial prince was more concerned with establishing his own position as a sovereign than with the condition of the peasants, he frequently added new rights to the old, until, by the eighteenth century, the peasant nearly everywhere in Germany had sunk into the condition of a dependent or subject of the noble, possessing few of the ordinary privileges of the free farmer.

The situation of the German peasant varied in the different provinces or states. In the valleys of the Rhine and the Main, in central Germany, on the slopes of the Alps, and in the Austrian duchies, not much actual serfdom existed, although the peasants were subject to dues and services. In the Prussian provinces of Cleves and Mark most of the peasants were free, while in other Prussian provinces west of the Elbe they had lost their freedom, and were subject to burdensome dues such as the *heriot*, which, at the peasant's death, gave half his personal property to the lord. But it was east of the Elbe—in Prussia proper, in Pomerania, and in the duchies of Mecklenburg—that serfdom was most widely extended. When Stein traveled through Mecklenburg, as late as 1802, he found "the whole laboring class under the pressure of serfdom," and the abode of the nobleman seemed to him "as the lair of a wild beast, who desolates everything round him and surrounds himself with the silence of the grave."³

Within the states of the King of Prussia the peasants on the royal domains were better off than the others, for the King's right over his property would support him in an attempt to im-

CHAP. I

1750-89

The
German
PeasantryPeasant
Reform in
Prussia

³ Quoted by J. R. Seeley, *Life and Times of Stein*, I. 132.

CHAP. I

1750-89

prove their condition, even against the protest of lease-holders. But the lords would invoke the same principle of property, if the King attempted to introduce changes in the condition of the peasants on their domains. The peasant could not be sure of being permitted to retain his farm nor did he possess the right to transmit his land to his heirs. The lord could select the son who should succeed to the farm. If the tenant was old or feeble, or incapable of cultivating his land, the lord might compel him to cede it to another more likely to fulfil the duties of a dependent. Without the lord's consent the peasant could not sell the land, nor put it in pledge, nor even borrow. There was danger also that the lords would use the power of eviction as a means of enlarging their own domains at the expense of the peasant. The result would be a reduction of the peasant population.

At this point the Prussian monarchs asserted their right of protection, in order to be sure of having recruits for the army. Frederick William I issued a decree guaranteeing the peasants of Prussia and Pomerania a better tenant right, but he required from them the promise not to leave their farms nor send away their children, and he made no change in their customary obligations. The decree was not carried out, even on the royal domains, for the local officials, many of whom belonged to the nobility, felt that it endangered their rights. Nevertheless, the monarchs were successful in preventing the nobles from adding much peasant land to their estates, insisting that if a peasant family was evicted, another should be found to take the vacant place. The peasant who was a soldier enjoyed in a special way the royal protection. Although he spent a large part of the year in time of peace on the lord's domain, he could not be treated tyrannically because he was in a sense the King's man.

Privileges
of the Ger-
man Lord

The German peasant was worse off than the French peasant in the amount of personal work he must perform for the lord or for renters of estates belonging to the royal domain. The situation in the Prussian territories was not uniform, but it was frequently the case that the peasant was not protected even by custom against an increase in the demands upon him. In addition, his children were liable to domestic service in the lord's manor house or castle at merely nominal wages.

Except on the royal domain, the local lords were the real rulers, and controlled the courts, in which they could not be sued without their own consent. They also controlled the administration of the villages lying within their domains. Only in the collection of taxes and the recruiting of the army was this species of seigniorial sovereignty abridged. The royal government in its

work of centralization had not gone as far as had the royal government of France, and chiefly for the reason that it had begun much later.

CHAP. I
1750-89

The Prussian peasant did not suffer as much from the burden of taxation as the French peasant, although the Prussian noble succeeded in obtaining exemption from most of the taxes. The peculiarity of the Prussian system was the sharp distinction made between the open country and the towns. The two principal taxes were the land tax levied mainly upon peasant farms and the excise or indirect taxes upon commodities brought into the cities or produced within them. In order to make the excise productive, the government permitted in the open country none but the most necessary industries such as brewing, carpentry, and building. In the western provinces the line between city and country was not so sharply drawn. The nobles in most of the provinces were exempt from the land tax. In many cases also they were free from the excise, their city residences being exempt as well as the industries practised on their estates. They paid a small tax in lieu of the feudal military service which they formerly rendered.

Taxation
in Prussia

The economic position of the Prussian peasant was also bad, for the line which the administration drew between town and country compelled him to purchase all except the simplest necessities in the town at a price enhanced by the excise. His cloths, tools, sugar, and tobacco paid high duties on entering the Prussian dominions in order to favor home manufactures or prevent coin from being exported. His own products had a limited market, for the exportation of wheat was generally forbidden; and in some quarters the exportation of raw material like wool was also checked, in order to keep supplies from being sold to rival countries.

In England the peasant farmer was apparently better off than in France. There serfdom had left no traces in the form of feudal dues and compulsory labor. The nobles bore their share of the burden of taxation. Many of the villagers earned a large part of their income by spinning, weaving, and other trades, for the guild system had broken down more completely in England than on the Continent, and industries were carried on throughout the countryside. In agriculture, also, medieval methods had been abandoned in many districts, although in others the division of the arable land into three fields, which were then sub-divided among the villagers, still persisted. There were, however, forces at work which were to put the English farmer in a more disadvantageous position than his French neighbor. Already in

The
English
Peasantry

CHAP. I

1750-89

the change from medieval modes of holding land the nobles had greatly increased their share. The petty nobles or landed gentry used their influence in parliament to carry through laws which destroyed customary rights of tenure, such as the copyholder had possessed. The nobles also fenced off parts of the common lands of the villages, and the small farmers or yeomen did not have money enough to defend the village rights in the courts. Before the century was over the class of yeomen almost disappeared.

The
Townsmen

French society was more complex in the towns than in the country because of the existence of an important middle class. The richer part of the middle class, or *bourgeoisie*, included the officials engaged in the management of the finances, the magistrates, and the wealthy merchants. Many of the magistrates, whose offices were their property and could pass from father to son, belonged to the "nobility of the robe," which was quite as proud of its position, and as jealous of its privileges, as the nobility of the sword. Wealthy *bourgeois* families lived in a style akin to that of the richer nobles. Below them was the *petite bourgeoisie*, made up of masters in the guilds and of ordinary tradesmen. The artisans and the laborers were simply "people." The richer bourgeois occasionally purchased the estates of ruined noblemen and acquired patents of nobility.

In Germany the divisions of society had been growing more rigid, and were even more complex than in France. The control of the imperial cities was in the grasp of a set of families, which regarded themselves as fractional parts of the princely authority. This was especially true of Nuremberg, Augsburg, and Ulm. Hamburg and Frankfort seemed to possess a more liberal atmosphere, and yet in Frankfort, which was Goethe's birthplace, there existed at the "bottom of the scale a great mass almost without legal protection." Above were the guilds, next, doctors and merchants, and, at the top, the nobility. "Each class was subdivided into manifold grades," so that the social and political structure of the city resembled a "tower broad at the base and growing narrower as it rose, each separate story divided into numerous cages, through the gratings of which it was almost impossible to pass."⁴ In the territories of Frederick the Great the duties of each class seemed appropriately arranged. The nobles commanded the army, the peasants furnished the recruits, the burghers enriched the State by trade, while the scholars and poets pursued their studies or dreamed their dreams undisturbed by the plainer cares of life.

⁴ Bielschowsky, Albert, Life of Goethe, I. 8.

The restrictions which the old régime in France threw about the industries of the townspeople were fewer than those which hindered the progress of agriculture. In most of the towns industries were still under the control of guilds or corporations of masters, which aimed to regulate the methods of manufacture and to preserve to the members the advantages of a local monopoly. The honor as well as the interest of the guild was involved in maintaining the reputation of the product. The masters naturally desired to lessen the numbers admitted to the guild, so that in some cases it was impossible for any except relatives of masters to become members, although they might have served their apprenticeship and their usual time as journeymen. This policy increased the value of the monopoly, but was likely to excite the indignation of the rest of the community. The government sometimes attempted to reduce the evil by offering royal letters of mastership, a practice which also brought in a little revenue. In 1755 a decree threw open all towns except Paris, Lyons, Rouen, and Lille to men who had completed their apprenticeship and the usual term as journeymen, waiving the rule that they should first be received as masters. The guilds were still powerful enough to prevent their monopoly from being destroyed in this way, and the decree served chiefly to mark the increasing liberality of the government. The spread of industry into the country undermined the monopoly of the guilds and was favored by the government, which after 1762 assured to the rural inhabitants the right to purchase tools, machines, and raw materials.

The selfish conservatism of the guilds was not the only obstacle to the progress of industry. Under the influence of Colbert's ideas, a mass of regulative decrees determined the exact amount of raw material which each piece of stuff should contain, as well as the manner in which it should be put together. The aim of these regulations was the protection of the consumer against bad workmanship or fraud, but they threw difficulties in the way of inventors, for it was not always easy to persuade a government council of the usefulness or practicability of a new production. The regulations were enforced by the guilds and by royal inspectors, whose seals were affixed to the goods. Offenders were prosecuted, their goods pilloried or destroyed, and their business ruined. Roland, the ill-fated minister of the interior in the Revolution, declared that when he was an inspector in Rouen he had seen as many as one hundred pieces of goods destroyed in one morning, solely because they were of an irregular weave. From the middle of the century masters and officers

CHAP. I

1750-89

Guilds

Regulation
of Indus-
try

CHAP. I

1750-89

became less severe in the enforcement of the regulations. This movement was specially due to the influence of the economist Gournay, who became intendant of commerce in 1751.

The word manufacture has a literal application to the methods of work under the old régime, for most of the machinery was run by hand and was of a type which had been used for centuries. A few large shops employed several hundred persons, but there was little division of labor. Most of the shops were small, with only the master, an apprentice or two, and a few journeymen. The goods were often sold by the master, who was a petty tradesman as well as a "manufacturer."

Employees

The ordinary workmen, who had little prospect of ever becoming masters, sought to improve their condition by uniting in secret organizations or brotherhoods. Towards the middle of the century so many strikes and boycotts occurred that the government issued a decree forbidding such organizations or any combinations of employees to bring pressure on the masters. The employees could not abandon the service of a master without a permit; and if another master received them without this permit, he, as well as they, was liable to a heavy fine.

In Germany and Austria the guilds had long been losing ground when the territorial princes vigorously undertook their reorganization. Labor troubles such as were the object of French legislation furnished the occasion. In the German states the situation was peculiar in that journeymen who got into conflict with their employers or with the administration had only to cross a near-by frontier in order to be welcomed with open arms. Each state was glad to swell its population of artisans at the expense of its rivals. In Germany, also, the journeymen had an organization of their own akin to the guilds. The state governments found no way to meet the difficulty except by resort to the outworn method of imperial legislation. With unusual energy the diet undertook the task and in 1731 seriously modified and weakened the powers of the organizations of journeymen, leaving them hardly more than their functions as charitable and religious bodies. No journeyman could be employed without a pass from the head of the guild, endorsed by his previous employer, even though this employer belonged to another state. The guilds were put under the control of the states, with the result that in Germany industry, like religion, became an affair of the state. The main purpose of the legislation which followed was to deprive the guilds of their petty monopolies and make the conditions of admission easier.

Trade as well as industry suffered from the restrictions thrown

about it in Europe. In France the process of destroying local barriers had been carried further than in Prussia or any part of Germany, but the system of customs and other indirect taxes was so complicated that Necker said scarcely two men in a generation succeeded in mastering it. The consequence was loss of trade. A load of wine from Roussillon paid twenty-two different charges on its way to Paris. These included customs duties collected by the government, octrois of the towns, and dues of seigniors. Sometimes these charges favored the importer of foreign products. For example, the cloths of Carcassonne before they reached the northern markets paid fifteen per cent. of their value, whereas similar English cloths in the same markets paid only eight per cent. The situation in Prussia and in the German provinces of Austria was worse, because the process of unification was far less complete. On the Rhine tolls were collected thirty times from Strasbourg to Holland. Moreover, the separate states had no incentive to break down barriers, but on the contrary many to make them higher.

No trade restrictions were fraught with greater future dangers than those which had grown up in France about the commerce of grains. These restrictions were suggested by the fear of famine, which in the days of poor roads and of little general commerce was not a mere figment of the imagination. The precariousness of the crop seemed to offer peculiar opportunities to the farmer or trader who wished to profit by the calamity of the community, and government officials and local magistrates were convinced that only through careful regulation could an adequate supply of grain be maintained in each province. The laws provided that all grain must be sold in the open market and that the farmers could retain only enough for their personal use. Merchants dealing in grain were registered, and the place and amount of their purchases were recorded. The provincial parlements or courts frequently forbade the transportation of grain beyond the borders of their own provinces. Its exportation from the country was also forbidden. Occasionally in time of famine the government or the courts fixed a maximum price.

The restrictions placed upon the colonial trade are also significant. They have been summed up by the descriptive term "colonial pact," which does not imply that the colonies ever agreed to them. According to the colonial pact the mother country gave protection and offered a market for the staple productions of the colony, and in return enjoyed the monopoly of the colonial market and commerce. In its more rigorous form the system was applied to the Spanish colonies, which were treated

CHAP. I

1750-89

Trade

Colonial
Trade

CHAP. I**1750-89**

as a part of the King's domain. Trade with these colonies was at first limited to a single port, emigration was hedged about with difficulties, and the foreigner was warned off on pain of death. At the opening of the eighteenth century England interfered with this monopoly, obtaining from Spain by treaty the right to import slaves into the Spanish colonies and to send two ships to the annual fair at Porto Bello. The English captains were not delicate in their observation of treaty limitations and they found smuggling too profitable to resist. Nor were the Spanish colonies the only ones to suffer from smugglers. The French could not keep the trade of their colonies altogether in their own hands. The English colonists in America were the most formidable interlopers. They exported fish, lumber, and cereals, articles which the French West Indians needed and for which they were anxious to give in exchange sugar, rum, and molasses. The English sugar islands complained that in this way French sugar was competing dangerously with English sugar, and parliament passed the Molasses Act, levying a prohibitive duty on these commodities; but the act remained a dead letter. When the French lost Canada and Louisiana the preservation of the monopoly of their colonial trade became impossible, for they had no food-producing colonies from which the sugar islands might draw supplies.

It is evident that many things characteristic of European social and industrial life in the eighteenth century needed the serious attention of reformers and statesmen. The only question is, Why were they unable to correct the evils in time to forestall revolution?

CHAPTER II

GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

IN the eighteenth century something more than the consent of a well-meaning ruler was needed to insure the success of plans of reform. Even in France, the land of absolute monarchy, the formula "As wishes the King, so wishes the law" was only a legal principle. The task of the reformer was merely begun when the King accepted his plans. Privileged classes and favored communities could often defend their advantages successfully by making a skilful use of the complicated structure of the old governments. They could confuse public opinion, even when they did not delude themselves, by raising the cry of "liberty" and "property." The institutions of the old régime were not the product of systematic minds, devising the articles of a paper constitution, but were the result of a long process of historic growth. They bore the marks of conflicts and compromises without number. Most of the European States had been pieced together at different times. When a prince annexed a province he was often obliged to promise to respect its ancient liberties, although they might injure, at least indirectly, other provinces under his rule.

This is more surprising in the case of France than of Prussia or Austria. The Prussian monarch had but recently assumed the crown, and, strictly speaking, was King only in eastern Prussia. His other lands he held by other titles — elector, count, or duke. As these lands lay within the Holy Roman Empire, separated from one another often by the States of other princes, it was difficult, if not impossible, to treat them all as parts of an absolute monarchical system. It was certainly impossible in the case of Austria. The Hapsburg monarchy received its royal standing from the two kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary, which Ferdinand, brother of Charles V, had gained by election in the sixteenth century. Upper and Lower Austria were only arch-duchies. The Hapsburgs possessed other lands in what is now the Austrian empire and in southern Germany. When the territories of Spain were divided in 1713 and 1714, they received Lombardy and the southern Netherlands. It would be difficult

CHAP. II
1750-89

Obstacles
to Reform

Make-up
of States

CHAP. II

1750-89

to imagine a group more diverse in race, in language, and in historical traditions. Two of the group, Lombardy and the Netherlands, were distant from the rest. The common subjection to the Hapsburgs was incidental, if not accidental. To adopt a policy of assimilation would be to invite trouble, as the Emperor Joseph was to discover.

Local
Privileges
in France

The situation in France was apparently different. In certain respects, however, the differences were only apparent. Many of the French provinces had been united under the crown for centuries, but others, especially Franche Comté, Alsace, and Lorraine,¹ had been held only a short time. The older as well as the newer provinces clung jealously to the privileges which the King had originally guaranteed to them. The promise of Louis XIV to Franche Comté was typical. He agreed to respect its "privileges, franchises, and immunities and to conduct himself in all things as a prince and count palatine of Burgundy is held to do." The rights of Brittany were secured both by the marriage contract between Anne of Brittany and Louis XII in 1491 and by the act of union of 1532. So it was with other provinces. The local rights and liberties were not altogether harmful. They could be used to check the tendency to unreasonable centralization which already characterized the French government.

Provincial
Assemblies

In the oldest provinces most of the earlier local liberties had disappeared. The monarchs in their struggle with the feudal nobles did not distinguish clearly between powers which the central government should exercise and those which should be left to each community. These provinces formed the great central region of the country and were called Lands of Elections because the districts into which they were subdivided were called elections. The border provinces, Burgundy, Artois, Brittany, Languedoc, and others, formed the Lands of Estates, because they retained their provincial estates or assemblies. Even in the eighteenth century, when a reasonable development of local self-government would have been an advantage rather than a danger, the royal administration kept such assemblies under strict control. No resolution of any importance, especially none touching the expenditure of money, could be carried into effect without the consent of the King's council. Nevertheless, the existence of the estates, the presence of the leading men of the province, representing the clergy, the nobles, and the official class of the towns, acted as a check upon administrative tyranny. Further-

¹ Lorraine was annexed in 1766, although it had been virtually a part of France since 1738, when Stanislas, ex-king of Poland, and father-in-law of Louis XV, became duke.

more, in some cases the assemblies undertook enterprises which the central government had no thought of attempting.

The provincial assembly of Languedoc was the most efficient of these bodies. It met every autumn at the call of the King and remained in session forty or fifty days. The deputies voted individually in a single hall, although they were chosen separately by the clergy, the nobility, and by the third estate. The deputies of the third estate were not popularly elected, and represented their town because they held its offices, but they understood the local needs. Through the power which the assembly was permitted to exercise the *taille* was distributed more fairly and was collected without so many acts of petty oppression. The expenditures for local purposes, which were mainly under its control, often ran as high as two million livres. Arthur Young commented on the excellent roads of Languedoc, which the provincial assembly provided for without the use of the *corvée*.

The provincial estates of Brittany were kept by their organization from accomplishing so useful a task. They were more suited to obstruction than progress. Every nobleman over twenty-five years of age had a right to a seat. Sometimes twelve hundred attended, while the third estate had only forty-two deputies.

The inclination to resist measures of reform when they seemed to encroach upon ancient local privileges was, however, present in Languedoc as well as in Brittany. The provincial assemblies attempted to drive hard bargains with the King, when they did not refuse altogether to agree to changes. In 1749 the government introduced the *vingtième*, or income tax, in order to equalize the burdens of taxation, and it was unwilling to permit provinces to offer a lump sum in lieu of the tax. Languedoc insisted upon its right to pay the tax only after formally giving its consent, appealing to the terms of the will of the last Count of Toulouse by virtue of which Languedoc had passed to the Crown, and to early royal edicts which had confirmed its privileges. When the King would not listen, the assembly refused the customary "free gift," which was Languedoc's share of the *taille*. The government in a spasm of vigor dissolved the assembly and collected the tax, but four years later the minister who was responsible for the reform lost his influence and the government yielded to the protests of the privileged classes. In Brittany resistance was equally successful. The ministry considered the advisability of decreasing the number of nobles in the provincial assembly, but sought the same end by calling together a small "extraordinary" assembly. Although it consented to the royal demands, the regular estates

CHAP. II

1750-89

which assembled soon afterwards clamored for the suppression of the tax. The spirit of resistance was so widespread that the government officials could not make the appraisements upon which the tax should be based, and finally agreed to permit the province to offer a stated sum instead. A more curious instance of the manner in which ancient liberties served as a defense for existing abuses occurred in the last days of the old monarchy at the Assembly of the Notables. When the King's brother recommended the ministerial proposal to substitute a land tax resting upon all proprietors for the unfair system in force, a Provençal nobleman declared that one of the rights of Provence, guaranteed by the will of King René, at the time when his kingdom was annexed to France, was exemption from any land tax.

In the levy of the indirect taxes many provinces possessed advantages which obstructed the progress of reform. These privileges were historical in origin. For example, the provinces in which no salt tax was collected before they were annexed remained free from the tax. Other annexed provinces continued to pay for salt at the rate which they had been accustomed to pay before annexation. Still others had in the sixteenth century advanced money to a needy King in return for a perpetual reduction of the rate.

Tariff
Barriers

The same evil affected the customs duties, which were not collected at the frontiers of the kingdom, but at the boundaries of provinces or groups of provinces. Certain provinces, like Alsace and Lorraine, were treated as if they were foreign countries and were given a tariff system of their own. Other provinces, though simply "reputed foreign," also had a separate system, while seventeen provinces in the north central region were under a single tariff system. This was called the region of the "Five Great Farms," because the collection of the indirect taxes had once been let or farmed to five separate companies. In order to gain an idea of the obstacles to commercial progress during the old régime, it is necessary to add to these various tariffs the transit dues which the lords collected. Necker called the complicated tariff system "monstrous in the eyes of reason."

The Courts
Obstruct
Reform

Nobody under the old régime defended local or class privileges more stubbornly than the courts. They included the parlement of Paris, which had jurisdiction over most of the older France, and twelve provincial parlements. Before a law became effective it was customary to send it to the courts to be entered upon their records. This act made it valid within their jurisdictions. They had a right to withhold registration of the law as a protest against its provisions. The King could meet their

protest by modifying the terms of the project or by holding what was called a "bed of justice" and with great ceremony expressly commanding them to register. It took Henry IV several years to procure the registration of the Edict of Nantes by all the provincial parlements. The courts, also, had a limited legislative capacity of their own, issuing regulations which they enforced within their jurisdiction unless these were annulled by the King. The judges in parlement, regarding themselves as the last barrier against the triumph of despotism, were in danger of over-emphasizing their political opportunity and forgetting that they were primarily courts of justice. As they represented the interests of a class, they were likely to obstruct the action of the royal government if it undertook measures seriously attacking the system of privilege.

The judges based their right to oppose specific acts of royal legislation upon their duty as interpreters of the constitution and the laws of the kingdom. They held that even the supreme legislator, the King, could not add laws which were in manifest contradiction to the long-established principles of royal legislation. If his ministers, acting in his name, attempted this, the courts must declare the edicts subversive of the constitution. Nor could their opposition be overcome by a bed of justice, which in such a case would be a vulgar act of violence. That France had no written constitution in which definite limitations were placed upon executive and legislative power, did not affect their attitude. The trouble with the theory lay in their idea of what the constitution was and what rights it protected. If its principal use was to safeguard the privileges and exemptions of the clergy, the nobility, and the office-holders on the ground that they could never be deprived of the advantages which they had inherited from their ancestors, the conclusion was inevitable that the way to adequate reform was closed.

One or two illustrations will make clear the practice of the courts on questions touching the rights of the privileged classes. When the first vingtième was created and the administration made a sincere effort to collect the information needed for a fair distribution of the burden, the parlement of Paris refused to register the edict. As the War of the Austrian Succession, which had offered an excuse for extraordinary taxes, was over, the judges concluded that the government was intent upon the establishment of a permanent "tribute," to be levied upon all property, and not merely upon the property of peasants or townspeople. They saw in the edict an insidious attempt to destroy exemption from taxation, but at this time they did not carry their resistance very

CHAP. II
1750-89

far. The administration held a bed of justice and the tax was registered.

At the close of the Seven Years' War the finances were in a still more desperate state and the ministry grimly resolved to put through an appraisal of all real estate in the kingdom, in order to make the two vingtièmes which then existed more productive. The parlement of Paris registered the edict only under compulsion. In the provinces resistance was more violent. The parlements of Toulouse and Grenoble attempted to arrest the governors who demanded the registration of the edict, and the governors were obliged to maintain a permanent guard to protect themselves from the court bailiffs. At Rouen all the judges left the court-room when the governor demanded registration; only the attorney-general and the clerk remained. The parlement declared the registration which these officials made null and void. After months of wrangling the government yielded, and arranged with the courts that the vingtièmes should be collected on the basis of the existing appraisements, which were notoriously unfair, and that individual assessments should not be raised. Such was the idea the judges held of defending the constitution and laws of France.

Local
Govern-
ment


The possibility of obstruction was not the only or even the principal evil from which the French government suffered. It contained positive defects. The organization of the towns is a notable example. Instead of using them as healthy organs of the spirit of local self-government, the administration kept them strictly under its tutelage. The municipal corporations were recruited from a few privileged families. Like the provincial assemblies, they could not raise money or expend it without the approval of the royal council. The same thing was true of the parish administrations. The records of the council show requests from parishes for the right to spend twenty-five livres. Several times within a century the government had treated town offices as a means of raising money. Louis XIV at one time made them venal, permitting the provincial assemblies to maintain freedom of elections by purchasing the offices as a whole. The same plan was tried in the reign of Louis XV. The right of election was restored in 1764, but it was again taken away in 1771, except for those cities which offered a lump sum for their liberties.

In structure the town governments were as a rule made up of a municipal body or *corps de ville*, the officers of which singly administered departments and together formed a council. There was also a general assembly, composed of the members of the

EUROPE IN 1763

0 100 200 300 400 500
Scale of Miles





notable families. Some of them had a right to seats, others were chosen by the professional men, the trade guilds, the parishes, or wards of the towns.

CHAP. II

1750-89

The government of Paris was a curious intermingling of medieval guild institutions and later royal agencies. At the Hotel de Ville sat the provost of the merchants, four aldermen, and the other officers of the municipal bureau. There were also twenty-four councilors, although no council in the proper sense of the word. The peculiar province of the Hotel de Ville was the river trade and everything that concerned it, including a part of the responsibility for the supply of food. The most important official of the city was the lieutenant-general of the police, who took his orders directly from the royal minister of the household. He not only controlled the police, who were supported by the regiment of the French guards, but directed all parts of the administration not reserved to the Hotel de Ville. He also issued ordinances similar to those commonly within the power of an American city council.

Paris

In filling the positions of provost and aldermen there was an elaborate semblance of election. The provost was actually nominated by the King, but each year two aldermen were chosen by a body partly composed of officials and partly of notable citizens. Almost the only valuable opportunity of gaining experience was offered by the parish organizations or *fabriques*. Two general assemblies were held each year for the election of a responsible churchwarden, and to pass upon the accounts of the retiring churchwarden. In order to vote in these assemblies it was necessary to be rated on the tax list for at least six livres.

The local agent of royal authority, whether in the Lands of Estates or in the Lands of Elections, was the intendant. His jurisdiction extended over a district called a *généralité*, an administrative subdivision of the kingdom which was of more uniform size than the province. Sometimes a province contained two or three generalities, while in one or two instances more than a single province was included in a generality. The intendant had charge of the levy and collection of the direct taxes and of the expenditure of money for improvements. Doubtful matters he referred to the King's council. He was also responsible in a measure for the public order and watched important cases in the courts, occasionally carrying them up to the council. He was an effective instrument of centralization, fashioned by Richelieu and Colbert, the prototype of the modern prefect. Like the prefect he was often an able and conscientious administrator. As he was brought into immediate contact with the suf-

Intendants

CHAP. II

1750-89

fering peasantry, he became anxious to remedy the evils of the tax system and promote the prosperity of his generality. Some of the most hopeful efforts for reform proceeded from these men, who, nevertheless, were complained of as the agents of royal or bureaucratic despotism.

The Royal
Adminis-
tration

The administration of France centered in the King's council and its subsidiary councils or committees. Besides the high council to which only officials qualified with the title of "Ministers of State" were admitted, and which, like a royal cabinet, was entrusted with questions of general policy, the important boards were the council of finances, in which the controller-general was the most influential member, the council of despatches, a ministry of the interior, and the council of parties, or privy council, which determined many questions of administrative jurisdiction. Through its councilors of State and masters of requests the council of parties investigated and prepared for discussion nearly all administrative questions brought before any one of the councils. There was generally a principal minister, but he might not be the most influential officer of the administration. As the financial problem became more urgent it was inevitable that the controller-general's word would become decisive. In addition to the finances he had charge of public works, agriculture, and commerce, and might have been called minister of the interior. Affairs of local administration were, however, distributed among the four secretaries of State,—war, marine, foreign affairs, and royal household,—each secretary receiving several provinces. According to the plan, provinces on the coast should have been assigned to the minister of the marine and frontier provinces to the minister of war, but this was not always done.

The Gov-
ernment
of Prussia

In the case of Prussia, where the process of territorial growth was of later date, and where no Alps or Pyrenees impelled towards unity, it is less surprising to discover how little the administrative system approached any ideal of formal organization. The King was bound to respect the privileges of his many territories, although since the days of the Great Elector the Hohenzollerns had been ready to attack privileges of estates or towns which stood in the way of the development of military power. The reformer of the royal administration had been Frederick William I, who, in 1723, organized the General Directory with the special aim of giving some unity to the management of the revenue. As in France, the work of the ministers was divided geographically rather than according to the character of the work itself. Frederick II had modified this plan by creating a ministry of industry and commerce and what was equivalent to a de-

partment of military affairs or a quartermaster general's office. When, however, Silesia was annexed, instead of subjecting its administration to the General Directory, he entrusted it to a special minister. Neither he nor his father had a prime minister, but conducted affairs personally with the different ministers. Frederick attended to the most minute details and frequently rendered decisions which concerned a particular minister without even informing him of the matter. His ministers sometimes seemed to be degraded to the level of mere clerks, without initiative or responsibility. He used as his agents the councilors, who served as intermediaries and reporters, so that not infrequently a cabinet councilor had the King's confidence and was in a position to influence the royal mind in a way impossible for the ordinary minister. Under a weaker master than Frederick the Great such a practice might become fruitful of cabals and lead to backstairs intrigue.

In local administration, as has been explained already, the nobility retained a large part of their feudal sovereignty, but the *Landrath*, head of the county or *Kreis*, had become a royal officer, chosen from a list of candidates named by the nobles. The towns were controlled by the tax commissioner known as the *Steuerrath*, for in almost all matters a financial question was involved, and the King desired to increase the revenues available for military purposes. Through this officer he watched every possible channel of outflow. In the eastern portion of the Prussian territories the provincial estates had ceased to have more than a formal function, but in the west they had important opportunities for advising the royal officers who formed the provincial chambers of war and domains. The towns had lost their old liberties, and were no longer centers of active political or administrative life. In this they resembled the French towns.

The government of Great Britain differed from the European governments in one significant feature; that is, in the development of rule through an elected assembly. In France the states general had not met since 1614. It had never succeeded in seriously limiting the powers of the King. Similar assemblies in other continental countries had played an even slighter rôle. But in England in the seventeenth century parliament had seized the reins of government, and a century later its supremacy was made effective by the development of the cabinet, or body of ministers, politically responsible to the majority of the members of the House of Commons. The leader of the cabinet was the prime minister. The King was supposed to accept as his official opinion the advice tendered him by his ministers. In this way the

CHAP. II

1750-89

The English Idea
of Representation

government of the country, its legislative as well as its administrative work, was controlled by public opinion which found expression in parliament, and particularly in the House of Commons. The plan of responsible ministries was not completely worked out until the early part of the nineteenth century, but it was characteristic of England from the days of Sir Robert Walpole.

The English system was, however, not free from defects. Representation in the House of Commons was based on a medieval distribution of seats and took no account of the changes in population. Too many seats were controlled by the great landowners. It has been estimated that out of the total membership of six hundred and fifty-eight, the landowners, most of whom were nobles, had the power to nominate four hundred and eighty-seven. One family influential in the Lake district controlled the elections to eleven seats. According to another way of reckoning the proportions of the evil, one hundred and fifty-four persons, including the King and many peers, nominated three hundred and seven members, or nearly one-half, of the House of Commons. "It is certain that the King by the use of national funds and the gift of places and pensions was able to keep a sufficient band of followers in the House of Commons from 1767 to 1781 to enforce his personal rule."² Fortunately the nobles did not use their power to shift the weight of taxation to weaker shoulders or to create a system of special privileges, although they did multiply sinecures in order to provide for their younger sons.

This method of choosing members for the House of Commons soon became a principal cause of quarrel between England and her colonies in America. In the course of a debate in 1793 upon a plan of reform, Mr. Grey, the Earl Grey of the Reform Bill of 1832, declared that had the defects of the English system been removed in time the American colonies would have been saved. Whether this assertion was anything more than a strong argument in favor of his scheme or not, it is true that the colonists were not likely to be treated fairly by such a parliament, nor could they feel inclined to accept its decisions. The English system of colonial government was in other respects far more liberal than either that of France or that of Spain. The French and Spanish colonies were governed by officials sent from the mother country and were without power to tax themselves or adopt laws of local application, while the English colonies enjoyed a large measure of self-government. In most of the North American

² Edward Channing, *History of the United States*, III. 72. See also J. Holland Rose, *William Pitt*, I. 10.

colonies, the governor was appointed by the Crown, but he was controlled by an assembly elected by the citizens or "freemen." The controversies between the governors and the assemblies stimulated the feeling of independence. As the governor's salary depended upon the grant of the assembly, there was an effective way of bringing pressure to bear upon him. In matters of industry and trade the colonies were subject to the decisions of parliament. The customs officials were officers of the Crown and paid by it, so that the colonial assemblies had no control over them. But the trade laws could not be enforced if colonial juries failed to convict offenders. From the point of view of the defense of the empire this local independence was a grave disadvantage, for it was difficult to persuade a dozen colonial assemblies to unite in any general scheme of defense or of taxation for imperial purposes, and an attempt of parliament to tax the people of the colonies directly might arouse resistance and even rebellion. This problem was forced upon the attention of the British government by the cost of the struggle with France in America and by the permanent needs of colonial defense.

The weakest spot in the French government was the financial system. The unjust distribution of the taxes by which the burden was placed mainly upon the peasantry prevented the government from raising money enough to meet its expenses unless it practised a severe economy and refrained from wars with its neighbors, two conditions unlikely to be fulfilled. The royal court was wasteful. Millions were squandered in gifts and pensions. At the end of the old régime the pension list amounted to over fifty million livres, or about a tenth of the revenues. A part of this vast sum was paid for actual services rendered to the country, but most of it was given to favored officials or to court nobles who knew how to beg. One minister of war upon his retirement had arranged for twelve pensions for himself or members of his family. Nevertheless, a parsimony as severe as that of Frederick the Great would not have remedied the financial situation. Even if war debts were forgotten, the normal development of civil expenditure made necessary an increase in the revenues. More money could be found only by abandoning the antiquated system of taxation, which failed to reach important elements of the national wealth.

In 1764 the French public debt amounted to two and a half billion livres, with an interest charge which took half the revenue. From time to time the King's ministers tried to balance accounts by suspending payments or by scaling down indebtedness. They had also fallen into the vicious habit of securing loans from

CHAP. II

1750-89

financiers under the form of "anticipations" of future receipts. For such loans the financiers charged a high rate. The practice also introduced another element of disorder into accounts already confused. There was no regular budget of receipts and expenses, although after a year was closed, occasionally many months afterwards, its accounts were made up in a formal statement called an *état au vrai*. Even then the nature of a particular expenditure might be concealed because it had been withdrawn from audit by royal order or order of the chief finance minister. For these reasons it was difficult even for government officials to ascertain the exact condition of the finances.

The method of collecting the indirect taxes, the salt and tobacco taxes, and the import and export duties, was unnecessarily expensive. The government farmed its right of collection to sixty financiers, called farmers-general, who advanced a million and a half livres apiece, part of the sum as a loan to the government and part as payment for the offices, storehouses, and stocks of salt and tobacco. The contract ran for a term of six years and the profits of the enterprise, which were the sums in excess of the amount paid annually to the government, were divided among the farmers-general. As the government paid the financiers a high rate of interest on the loans, their profits were increased. In addition they received many thousands as allowances and fees. It was discovered that the contract which ran from 1744 to 1750 produced for the farmers-general fifty-four million livres' profit, or nine million a year. According to Sénac de Meilhan, who wrote in 1787, the financiers connected with the "farm" divided more than seventeen hundred million livres in the fifty years which closed in 1776, enough to have extinguished two-thirds of the French national debt. Two of these financiers had gained thirty million apiece. The average cost of this method of collection to the government was twenty per cent. of what the tax produced.

Prussia's financial resources were astonishingly small for a State which supported an army of between one and two hundred thousand men. Before the close of Frederick's reign they were doubled, but amounted at most to twenty-seven million thalers. Of this sum twelve million were expended on the army. Frederick also accumulated a treasure of over fifty million. He had emerged from the long struggle of the Seven Years' War almost without debt but by means of expedients which would have compromised the honor of a less enlightened and powerful prince. He repeatedly debased the coinage and paid his creditors, including his officials, with promissory notes which he redeemed

in debased coin. When peace was made, he restored the coinage to its normal condition and took up the debased coin at one-fifth of its face value.

The income of Frederick's predecessors, the electors of Brandenburg, was derived from their domains and from such subsidies as the local estates of their various dominions would grant them. When the electors inherited Cleves and Mark in the west, the duchy of Prussia in the east, and Pomerania in the north, they struggled victoriously with nobles and cities for a permanent, independent revenue. The fruits of their triumph were the land tax, levied mainly upon peasant lands, and the excise which was a system of indirect taxes upon commodities brought into the cities or produced within them. There was no single system of import and export duties for the whole group, but each province was treated by itself, and customs barriers existed even in the interior of the provinces. Specific duties were levied to promote the export of one product or to prevent the importation of another. Frederick was influenced by the theories of the mercantile system, and wished to keep raw material from leaving his provinces and to hinder manufactured products from entering them. He wished to hoard his gold, partly that his state treasure might be large enough in case of sudden war. He treated the provinces west of the Weser as if they were foreign territory and would not permit their products to enter his other provinces. With these features Frederick's system of taxation could not produce the maximum revenue and its results were unfavorable to the healthful growth of agriculture, manufactures, and trade. The management of the royal domains was more satisfactory. They comprised nearly one-third of all the landed property. By careful husbandry and a successful plan of rentals their revenue was constantly increased.

Great Britain's financial system was far in advance of that of her neighbors. It enabled her not only to create an incomparable naval defense, but also to subsidize her allies on the Continent and hire mercenary armies. The most important feature of the system was the successful organization of credit, mainly through the Bank of England, which began its career in 1696 by lending its subscribed capital to the government. In return the government charged the interest to the "funds" due from the excise, and thus created the "funded" debt. The bank could issue notes redeemable in the coin which the government would pay as interest. By its loans it aided in the wise investment of capital and in the development of business. The growth of credit enabled the government to negotiate the loans rendered necessary

CHAP. II

1750-89

by enormous expenditures during the continental wars. The ministry learned early the necessity of providing scrupulously for the payment of the interest. As credit improved, the rate at which the government could borrow was gradually reduced from eight to three per cent.; but the amount of the funded debt grew rapidly. At the close of the Seven Years' War it was £122,600,000, with a floating debt of fourteen million more.

The sources of the British income were the land tax, the excise, and the customs. The inequalities of the land tax, which were complained of, were not due to any privileges belonging to the nobility, but to defects in the appraisement of property. The burden was increased by the general exemption of personal property. The system of customs, even after the improvements introduced by Sir Robert Walpole, was complex and clumsy, encouraging smuggling and other frauds. By 1759 the general rate had risen to twenty-five per cent. and there was in addition a multitude of special duties. By its unity, however, Great Britain was saved from the consequences of many different customs areas, each with a special set of duties — an evil condition which weighed heavily upon the progress of trade in all continental countries.

Within half a century each of these three countries, France, Prussia, and Great Britain, was to suffer disaster, partly at least in consequence of the weakness of their governmental system. France was to prove herself incapable of carrying through reforms in time to forestall revolution. Prussia's complicated methods of administration led directly to embarrassment and defeat under the weak successors of Frederick the Great. The misfortune which befell the English was the loss of their principal colonies in America.

CHAPTER III

CURRENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION

THE men whose writings influenced the tendencies of European thought in the eighteenth century were not mainly interested in reform. The assistance which most of them gave to this movement was incidental. Some were students of philosophy or science or of political and social theories. Others were engaged in discrediting the doctrines imposed upon their fellow-men by Church and State. Never has the antagonism been keener between what was taught by authority and what was advocated by thoughtful scholars and by brilliant, or merely clever, controversialists.

Churchmen, regarded throughout the Middle Ages, and even after the Protestant Reformation, as the special depositaries of truth, had lost prestige as intellectual leaders. This was the case particularly in France. No new Bossuet, interpreter of the divine right of kings and bishops, appeared to defend the established order. If a person of priestly title wrote, it was usually to join in the attack upon the teachings of the Church or the theory of the monarchy. The Abbé de Condillac, his brother the Abbé Mably, and the Abbé Raynal, whom the Church had unfrocked, are notable examples. Condillac's *Treatise on Sensations*, published in 1754, was a serious contribution to philosophy, but it undermined traditional views. The Abbé Mably's *Principles of Legislation*, which appeared twenty years later, criticised the rights of property, arguing for community of goods. Far more influential than either was the Abbé Raynal's *Philosophical and Political History of the Indies*, which appeared in 1772, and which included not only valuable information upon European colonization in the west and in the east, but also passionate denunciations of princes, ecclesiastics, and even employers. He declared that religion was the invention of priestly charlatans. It has been said that his *History of the Indies* was for two decades the "bible of the oppressed and of dreamers."

After the middle of the century many churchmen were notable for their sincere devotion to the welfare of their communities, but they were practical administrators rather than writers capable of correcting the prevalent tone of negation. The higher

CHAP. III

1750-89

Notable
Books

CHAP. III

1750-89

Weakness
of the
French
Church

clergy — bishops, abbots, and members of the cathedral chapters — were drawn almost exclusively from the nobility. The last bishop belonging to a family of the third estate resigned in 1783. The leaders of the Church possessed the defects as well as the qualities of the nobility. Several were men of evangelical piety, although not controversialists. Others were influenced by the liberal tendencies of the time. Of some the remark would have been true which Louis XVI made when he was asked to nominate Loménie de Brienne as archbishop of Paris, "The archbishop of Paris must at least believe in God."

The French Church had suffered in the controversy during the first half of the century over the enforcement of the papal bull *Unigenitus*, condemning the Jansenist doctrines of grace.¹ This controversy became violent in 1752 after the clergy began to refuse the sacraments to those who did not adhere to the bull. The parlement of Paris intervened in behalf of the rights of the dying, and the King annulled the decrees of the judges. The conflict was not ended until Pope Benedict XIV ordered that the sacraments should not be refused except to persons notoriously disobedient to the bull. Meanwhile the courts and the lawyers had been thrown into antagonism to the authorities of the Church.

The Ruin
of the
Jesuits

Another severe blow to the Church was the destruction of the Jesuit Order, composed of the most militant defenders of ecclesiastical authority. The Jesuits were detested by the magistracy which was now thoroughly committed to opposition to extreme views of papal power. They had once possessed great influence through their control of education, for the larger number of colleges or secondary schools was in their hands. But their method as teachers had begun to arouse criticism, on the ground that it produced only good Latin versifiers. The hatreds inherited from the Jansenist controversy were the cause of their ruin. They were compromised in the failure of a commercial company managed by P. Lavalette, formerly one of their officials in Martinique. This incident was the signal for an attack upon them by the provincial parlements and the parlement of Paris which alleged that the statutes of the Society contained principles hostile to the royal authority. At first Louis XV tried to protect the Order, but its enemies were strong, and in 1764

¹ Jansenism was a revival of Augustinian conceptions of Christian morals. The tendency of thought was named for Bishop Jansenius, of Ypres, who died in 1638. Pascal and the Port Royalists adopted it, and Quesnel embodied it in his *Reflexions morales*, one hundred and one propositions of which were condemned in the bull.

he signed an edict annulling it, while permitting the members as individuals to reside in their dioceses and continue their work as ecclesiastics under the control of the bishops. This attack in France had been preceded by one in Portugal, as a result of which the Jesuits were expelled as conspirators against the King. It was followed by their deportation from Spain. A few years later, upon the demand of the Kings of France and Spain, the Pope abolished the Order everywhere. The Jesuits found protectors only in the Protestant King of Prussia and in the Orthodox Empress of Russia.

Although the French Church was fast losing its ascendancy, sinister outbursts of intolerance still occurred. In 1762 the parlement of Toulouse condemned a Protestant merchant, Jean Calas, to be broken on the wheel upon the flimsy charge that he had murdered his son, who, rumor declared, was about to become a Catholic.² Three years later a nobleman, still in his teens, the Chevalier de la Barre, was condemned to death by the parlement of Paris for an insulting attitude toward a religious procession, an offense which he had aggravated by reading forbidden books.

In Germany, churchmen, whether Catholic or Protestant, were on the defensive. Lutheranism had emerged from the controversies of the sixteenth century with a dogmatic system as rigid as that of the medieval scholastics. In the latter part of the seventeenth century the Pietists — Spener, Francke, and their followers — strove for a more personal religious experience. Men of similar disposition, under the patronage of Count Zinzendorf, organized a new Church, that of the Moravian Brethren. But these movements, while exercising an important influence upon many communities, were not strong enough to counteract the force of the rationalistic attack on the Christian system.

In the German Catholic Church interest centered about the controversy over the limitations of papal power. Many of the German bishops and abbots were princes ruling over extensive territories, and were inclined to adopt an attitude of independence toward the papacy. In 1763 Hontheim, the coadjutor-bishop of the archbishop-elect of Treves, published a treatise upon the jurisdiction of the pope. The identity of the author was long concealed under the pseudonym Febronius. Hontheim acknowledged the primacy of the Holy See, but asserted that the papal claim of a right to confirm or depose bishops was drawn from

CHAP. III

1750-89

Intolerance

Religious
Controversy in
Germany

² The people of Toulouse approved the verdict. The Abbé Colbert, one of Hume's correspondents, wrote him, "In spite of all that has happened, they every man believe Calas to be guilty, and it is no use speaking to them on the subject." Quoted by John Rae, *Life of Adam Smith*, 186.

CHAP. III

1750-89

the False Decretals. He also said that the decrees of the Pope in regard to doctrine and conduct required confirmation by a general council. Nor were his conclusions merely historical and theoretical. He asked the popes to abandon their extreme claims and urged princes to compel them to do so if they refused. Three editions of the work were soon published. Hontheim was appointed the head of a commission, which met at Coblenz, a city belonging to the Elector of Treves, in order to prepare a statement of the grievances of the bishops. Although he was afterwards led to make a partial retraction, his views had an important influence upon legislation in Austria, where they were vigorously defended by the professor of canon law at the University of Vienna.

The Religious
Movement
in England

In England religion was becoming a positive force through the labors of George Whitefield and John Wesley. Both were clergymen of the state Church, but they had abandoned the conventional methods of ordinary churchmen. They were not concerned about the philosophical defense of Christianity; their task, as they understood it, was to preach repentance and salvation. The churches were too small to hold the throngs who were eager to hear them, even when the clergy did not refuse them admission to the pulpit. They preached ordinarily in the fields or in the streets. Wesley never considered himself a separatist from the Church of England, although in 1767 he abandoned his earlier view that salvation was impossible outside it. Wherever he went he organized chapels and started charitable work, in effect laying the foundation of the Methodist Church in England and America. Such a revival of religious enthusiasm counteracted the destructive influence of attacks on the established order far more than any formal arguments could have done. Wesley himself was a Tory in politics, although he freely criticised the abuses which he perceived in English life. He described the slave trade, so profitable to the English merchants, as that "execrable sum of all villainies."

The Press

To criticise the old régime in newspapers or books was beset with difficulties. England and Holland were the only countries where liberty of the press existed. The German newspapers until the time of Frederick did not often venture to discuss public affairs. He gave more freedom to two Berlin papers, and this opened a new era. By 1784 there were two hundred journals of which the best were Möser's Osnabrück *Intelligencer* and Schubarth's German *Chronicle*. The Leyden and Amsterdam *Gazettes* had a large sale outside of Holland, because of the freedom which they enjoyed. In France the number of newspapers increased

rapidly in the latter part of the century, but editors were forced to be cautious, otherwise they were lodged in the Bastille "during the King's pleasure." Many French books were printed in Amsterdam or Geneva, and smuggled across the French border. From 1750 to 1763 the royal censorship was under the control of a liberal, Lamoignon de Malesherbes, but this did not altogether remove the shackles from the press.

It happened that in France, where the defense of the established order was weakest, the attack upon it was strongest. The great names of the period are Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau. Not all that they said, nor the most important part of it, was destructive in tendency, but the total volume of their criticisms was such that respect for ancient institutions was undermined.

Montesquieu's influence was exerted mainly upon the course of political thought. In 1721 he had published the *Persian Letters*, which were full of biting satire masquerading as the naïve account of European society which two wealthy merchants sent home to their friends. In these letters the Pope was referred to as an old idol, who once deposed kings, but is no longer feared. The French King was represented as making money out of men's vanity by selling them titles, or as compelling them to receive promises to pay instead of coin. Montesquieu had visited England, residing there two years. He did not fail to note the corruption in the public life of the English, and yet he regarded them as the freest people in the world. It was in 1748 that he published the *Spirit of Laws*, the work which brought him lasting fame. What attracted immediate attention was his praise of the English constitution and his insistence upon the necessity of a separation of executive, legislative, and judicial functions. He thought this was characteristic of English institutions, although the cabinet system, by which the initiative in making law and the duty of enforcing it are entrusted to the same officials, was already partially developed. To him the chief requirement was an independent judiciary, which existed in England in the form of the ancient and undisputed sway of law. So far as his book increased the respect of Frenchmen for the English constitution, it acted as a solvent of reverence for absolute monarchy. His doctrine of the separation of the powers was to become a fundamental dogma of the Revolutionists.

This work eventually turned political thought away from abstractions to the study of actual conditions. Montesquieu taught that institutions are partly the result of physical environment and of the character of peoples. No single scheme of government is

CHAP. III

1750-89

therefore applicable everywhere. He thus gave a natural setting to government and "laicized the philosophy of history," undermining the authority of Bossuet's great exposition of the providential course of human events.

Voltaire

Voltaire's influence was not due to any single work of great power, but to a succession of poems, essays, pamphlets, histories, and philosophical books, extending over a period of more than fifty years. These writings possessed a marvelous clearness of statement and pushed every inquiry which reason and common sense could suggest into the dark corners of authoritative tradition and consecrated custom. He set forth in sentences sparkling with wit opinions which most educated men of his times were beginning to entertain. The strongest single impression which he sought to convey was that the Church was the enemy of progress and enlightenment, and that its power should be destroyed as an "infamous thing." He did not distinguish between the French Church and other Churches, but treated them all as the invention of self-seeking priests. He was not, however, an atheist. He held that God had implanted in mankind a sense of justice which would finally triumph over prejudice and vice.

Voltaire was not a revolutionist in politics. He wished to remove the abuses which he as well as other thoughtful men saw in European society, but he believed that a monarchy was the best form of government. The particular reforms which he desired were individual liberty, the equalization of the burdens of taxation, the abolition of serfdom, the suppression of feudal dues, and the organization of public education. In comparison with what France was to see within twenty years after his death this was a conservative program.

Voltaire's intellectual development was profoundly influenced by his residence in England from 1726 to 1729, almost at the beginning of his career. He made the acquaintance of the leading English writers, learned the language thoroughly, and studied the masterpieces of English literature, especially Shakespeare's plays. Locke's *Essay concerning the Human Understanding* made him a disciple of that philosophy, and Locke's *Letters on Toleration* gave him a cause. He also became one of the most convinced advocates of Sir Isaac Newton's theories against their French assailants. A few years after his return he published a volume of *Letters upon the English* in which he contrasted French and English society. He remarked that the English peasants could improve their dwellings or their cattle without fear of having their taxes raised in consequence. He noted also that the clergy and the nobles were not exempt from taxation. In

religion, he said that "An Englishman, like a free man, goes to Heaven by the road that pleases him best." As a consequence of this book he became the leader of a group of admirers of England. The authorities in his own country did not relish his criticisms, and the courts ordered his book to be publicly burned.³

For several years Voltaire seemed ambitious to be reckoned as a scientist. It was at this time that a French expedition to the Arctic Seas proved that the earth was flattened at the poles, as Newton had explained. Voltaire seized the occasion to publish an excellent popular treatise on the Newtonian system. Nevertheless, his proper field was not science but literature. For a short time he was received into royal favor, was chosen to the French Academy, and was even employed upon diplomatic missions; but Louis XV disliked the whole tribe of philosophers. Voltaire did not feel safe at Paris and ordinarily lived near the frontier. In 1749 Frederick the Great, with whom he had been long in correspondence, sent him an invitation to reside at the Prussian Court. He accepted the invitation, but his genius was too erratic to make him a good courtier, and three years later he returned to France. His fears still kept him away from Paris, and he finally purchased an estate at Ferney within convenient distance of the frontier of Switzerland.

It was at this period that his most active propaganda against the Church began. In 1756 he published his *Essay on General History*, which was really a voluminous history of civilization from the time of Charlemagne, the first work which presented that phase of history successfully. He filled it with thrusts at the ecclesiastical institutions which he detested. This was still more true of his *Philosophical Dictionary*. He was not content with the publication of books, but directed the attacking forces either through an agent whom he sent to stir the zeal of those who seemed to be lagging behind, or by means of letters and pamphlets. A clerk in the office of the controller-general of the finances forwarded them to all parts of the country. Voltaire finally concluded that the pamphlet was a better weapon than books, because it was read easily and was more likely to escape the attention of the police. The pamphlet also was more adapted to the style of attack which he thought effective. "It is," he said, "at once more sure and more agreeable to ridicule theological disputes and make people look upon them with disgust." His energy seemed inexhaustible. Although over sixty years old, he worked eighteen or twenty hours a day.

³ This account of Voltaire follows mainly that of M. Carré in Lavis, *Histoire de France*, VIII, 2, 170f., 298f.

CHAP. III

1750-89

Voltaire did not venture to return to Paris until near the close of his life in 1778. Several times during the reign of Louis XV he was thrown into paroxysms of fear by the mere possibility that his ecclesiastical foes might yet take vengeance upon him. One occasion was when his *Philosophical Dictionary* was burned on the pyre upon which the body of La Barre was consumed. In 1769 "he pretended to be in a dying condition and confessed and received the communion, taking the precaution of having these pious acts certified by a notary."⁴ As the clergy could procure no retractation from him at the time of his death, they caused the printing or sale of his books to be forbidden. But times were changing, and the King's principal minister permitted the publication near Strasbourg of a complete edition of his works.

The Encyclo-
pædia

For many years before his death Voltaire had been the most influential of a group of writers often called the Philosophers. To this group belonged the Abbé de Condillac, Buffon, author of the *Natural History*, D'Alembert, the great mathematician, D'Holbach, whose *System of Nature* taught materialistic atheism, and Diderot, a literary man almost as versatile as Voltaire. Diderot's special achievement was as editor of the Encyclopædia. In its large folios were brought together all that free inquiry had been able to learn about every imaginable topic. Its articles on the practical arts were of great value. It was outwardly respectful toward Church and State, because otherwise authorization to publish it would have been refused. Articles upon ecclesiastical matters were usually given to liberal churchmen, but references were added to other articles upon kindred subjects in which opinions altogether different were set forth. The fundamental philosophy of the work was hostile to supernatural religion. It was a formidable exhibit of the triumphs of human reason unhampered by the restraints of an orthodoxy which still revered the medieval theologians as authoritative teachers. The work was originally planned as a translation and revision of Chambers's Encyclopædia. The first volume appeared in 1751. Almost immediately alarmed orthodoxy began to raise obstacles to its progress. It was twice suppressed, but Diderot and his coadjutors went on with their work and by 1765 the seventeen volumes were ready to be delivered. There were also supplementary volumes, eleven of them filled with plates.

The principal weakness of the philosophical school was their simplified conception of man. They were misled by what Taine calls the classical spirit. They ignored the obscure and the un-

⁴ Carré, in Lavis, *Histoire de France*, VIII, 2, 304.

usual. Most of them used a vocabulary which was abstract, without a variety of words rich enough to describe the diversities of life, even if they had been capable of perceiving such things. They thought that to select the general and to name it exactly was the highest use of the reason and was truly scientific. But an adequate account of mankind cannot be made in that way. It is not surprising that the man they saw was a figment of their imaginations. If they observed an individual who was brutish and unreasonable, the inference was irresistible that his condition was the consequence of bad laws. Good legislation and good men, they contended, must go together. If the laws were improved they prophesied that men would become indefinitely perfectible.

CHAP. III

1750-89

Rousseau was for a time counted as a member of the philosophical party, although he was in reality one of the creators of Romanticism, which before the century was over destroyed the ascendancy of the rationalistic philosophers. His ideas of nature and of mankind were fundamentally opposed to their teachings. His most notable book, *The Social Contract*, was published in 1762. Its significance is not so much in the theory of political society which it taught as in the contrast between the author's positive declarations and the legal principles of the French State at that time. He confronted an absolute monarchy with the proposition that the people are sovereign, and that this sovereignty cannot be delegated. While the royal council drew up decrees on the theory that the King's will had the force of law, he declared that law is the expression of the common will. The government, be it monarchy or republic, is simply an intermediary body, possessed of a temporary commission, with the task of making the will of the sovereign people effective in relation to individual persons as subjects. Although he taught that the republican form of government was adapted only to the necessities of small states, he explained the evils of monarchical rule in such a way as to excite distrust of kings. He declared that it was for the interest of a prince that his people should be weak and wretched, for only thus was he safe from rebellion.

Rousseau

Rousseau's teachings were not dangerous to monarchical governments alone. Although he intended to defend individual liberty, he affirmed the ominous sophism that the citizen needs no guarantee against the tyranny of the democratic State, because a whole cannot injure one of its members. His doctrines could be, and in the event were, used to silence minorities suffering under the tyranny of a majority authorized for the time to style itself the agent of the sovereign will.

CHAP. III

1750-89

The Re-
turn to
Nature

A more striking instance of dubious reasoning was his attitude toward religious toleration. He would permit no intolerant religion within his ideal commonwealth, and yet he insisted that there was a "profession of faith which is purely civil . . . and that its articles are social sentiments without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject." No one can be compelled to accept them, but those who do not should be banished, and if any one who has accepted them should act as if he does not believe them, he should be put to death. The list of dogmas was short: God, providence, and immortality, the happiness of the just, and the punishment of the wicked. This idea of a civil religion enforced under pain of banishment or death was to play a sinister part in the coming Revolution.

The year 1762 also saw the publication of Rousseau's *Émile*, which had a more lasting effect upon educational ideas and methods than his *Social Contract* had upon political thinking. Under the form of a story of the development of a boy whose father was rich enough to obtain for him a special tutor, Rousseau expounded a plan of education according to nature, which took account of the spontaneous tendencies of the child and shielded the inner forces of his life from harmful contact with a corrupted and artificial social system. Until the boy was twelve his main business was to grow. He should be taught only what his senses and experience made him anxious to understand. When the time came for more formal instruction, its character should be determined by the stage of development which he had reached. At all times the nature of the child was to be the guide. This protest against submission to conventionality and appeal for a return to nature touched a chord which was ready to vibrate.

Rousseau had in the preceding decade written two Discourses in which he contrasted the artificialities of civilized society and the simplicity and virtues of primitive life. In the first he argued that the progress of the arts and sciences, in other words of civilization, had actually corrupted the original sound nature of mankind. In the second Discourse, which was upon the Origin of Inequality, he explained more at length "his legend concerning the primitive condition of mankind, in which man, strong, solitary, feeling in his heart a natural pity which is the germ of all the virtues, lived without quarrels and without passions."⁵ He declared that the first one who enclosed a piece of ground and called it his own, and discovered people blind enough to believe

⁵ Carré, *ibid.*, 310.

him, was the true founder of civilized society. Such ideas seemed repellent to the philosophers who regarded their century as peculiarly enlightened and who looked forward to the speedy triumph of reason. Voltaire wrote to Rousseau that reading his book made one feel like walking on all fours, and added, "As it is more than sixty years since I have done this, it is impossible for me to resume the habit."

CHAP. III

1750-89

Besides Rousseau and the philosophers, there were other men whose minds were of a more practical cast and whose opinions soon affected the policy of the government. They are sometimes grouped together as the Economists, and sometimes separated into two groups, one interested primarily in advocating freer trade, the other engaged in propagating the view that agriculture is the sole source of increase in a nation's wealth. This second group was occasionally referred to as the "sect of the Physiocrats." Its leader was Quesnay, physician in ordinary of the King. His principal work, the *Tableau économique*, was printed on the royal press at Versailles in 1758, and it is said that Louis XV took a personal interest in the enterprise. Quesnay divided society into three classes: the productive, or farming population; the proprietary, or owners of the soil; and the sterile, or artisans, traders, and professional men. He argued that industry did not add to the real wealth of the country, because it simply changed the forms of things which already existed. As land was the sole origin of riches, the net product of agriculture was the only thing properly taxable. Quesnay's chief disciple was the Marquis de Mirabeau. Another follower was a young man named Dupont de Nemours, who was to have a share in the reform movements of the next quarter century and of the Revolution. Quesnay said of him, "We must take care of this young man, for he will still speak after we are dead." The great service which this school of thinkers rendered was to call attention to the importance of agriculture as a source of national wealth.

The Econ-
omists

The most influential member of the other group of the Economists was the Marquis de Gournay, who purchased the office of intendant of commerce in 1751. He and his friends were opposed to the policy which Colbert, the great minister of Louis XIV, had carried out in regard to industry and commerce. Instead of minute regulation he advocated the policy of freedom. His maxim was "*Laissez faire et laisser passer.*" He believed that competition was the most powerful spur to industrial activity. One of his followers, and a disciple of Quesnay as well, was Turgot, who in 1761 became intendant at Limoges and thirteen years later the first great reform minister of Louis XVI's

CHAP. III

1750-89

Literary
Tenden-
cies in
England

reign.⁶ Gournay's influence was also felt through Trudaine, who was intendant of finances and had charge of the department of commerce.

In neither Great Britain nor Germany was any such sustained attack made upon the bulwarks of the old régime. The Revolution of 1688 and the successful defense of the Hanoverian kings against the Stuart Pretenders and their Jacobite followers had taken away the principal excuse for political agitation. Parliament was now supreme. The political writers were usually on good terms with the parliamentary leaders, in whose gift were desirable offices, and they were rarely tempted to put forth radical doctrines. The most significant tendencies in English thought, aside from the Wesleyan movement, were the new interest in nature and a clearer perception of human character. The one found its earliest expression in descriptive poetry, especially Thomson's *Seasons*, the other in Richardson's novels of sentiment, *Clarissa* and *Sir Charles Grandison*. A different phase was illustrated in Macpherson's *Ossian* and in Percy's *Reliques*. The interest which these poems excited proved that men were eager to please their imagination by contemplating persons and scenes altogether foreign to the narrow vision of the ordinary rationalistic philosopher of the century.

The intellectual relations between Great Britain and France were close throughout the century. Rousseau's writings strengthened the Romantic tendency in English literature. In economic thought the work of the Physiocrats was surpassed by Adam Smith, whose *Wealth of Nations* was published in 1776. Smith had resided in Paris for several months in 1765 and 1766. He was a frequent visitor at the apartments of Quesnay in the château of Versailles and he met Turgot often in the salon of Mlle. de l'Espinasse in Paris. As his own central ideas on economic life were already formed, and as he had actually begun to write his *Wealth of Nations*, he was not merely an interested listener. Dupont de Nemours regarded him as a follower of Quesnay, but though Smith's admiration for Quesnay was sincere, he did his own thinking, and his argument for freedom, assuring producers a fair field and no favor, proved far more convincing than the arguments of the French economists.⁷

The intellectual life of Germany showed the characteristics found everywhere in western Europe in the eighteenth century,

⁶ In 1769-70 Turgot published *Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses*, which is regarded as a forerunner of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*.

⁷ John Rae, *Life of Adam Smith*, ch. xiv.

and yet currents of thought and feeling were discernible which prophesied a more unique development. The country had been slow to recover from the wounds of the Thirty Years' War. Furthermore, the prestige which the brilliant age of Louis XIV had given to French ideas long kept the Germans under their spell. Many a German court was a diminutive, not to say pitiable, replica of Versailles. Slowly a spirit of revolt was aroused against imitation and conventionalism. Frederick's victory at Rossbach in 1757 over the French army gave to many Germans the feeling that they were a nation and had a future. Within his dominions this feeling could not take form in political activity, for Frederick was an autocrat. It did not express itself in factious opposition, because he convinced his people that he regarded himself as the first servant of the State. Outside of Prussia in the smaller principalities there was still less opportunity for the growth of political opinion. This did not preclude a vigorous intellectual development in other directions. The situation is illustrated in the work of Klopstock, the first great German poet of the eighteenth century. His poetry expressed at once religious idealism, a high conception of nationality, and a warm faith in the progress of mankind.⁸ His principal poem was the *Messias*, an epic, which was suggested by Milton's *Paradise Lost*. The first three cantos were published in 1748 and won him hosts of admirers. His German patriotism prompted him to attempt to revive the figures of German antiquity, striking the same note which appears in *Ossian* and in the *Reliques*. Meanwhile, Richardson's novels stirred German sentiment and Thomson's *Seasons* found imitators. In 1766 Wieland completed his translation of twenty-two of Shakespeare's plays, and the influence of the English dramatist began to supplant the authority of the French classical drama.

German thought was emancipated still further under the leadership of Lessing and Herder. Although as a rationalist Lessing rebuked the bigotry of the Lutheran theologians, he criticised with equal vigor the intolerance of the philosophers. He was one of the masters of the new Humanism, which decried the slavish imitation of ancient writers characteristic of the older classical teachers. He argued for a real comprehension of the Greek spirit which would stimulate the Germans to a full expression of their own nature. Winckelmann had emphasized the same idea in his *Thoughts upon Imitation of Greek Masterpieces*. The new university at Göttingen became a center of this Humanism.

CHAP. III

1750-89

The Intellectual Life of Germany

New Ideas of History and Civilization

⁸ Kuno Francke, *History of German Literature*, 235.

CHAP. III

1750-89

The Germans preferred to seek their classical ideals at the sources, rather than take them second-hand from the French. At this time they turned with a fresh interest to Homer for his matchless pictures of primitive heroes. Herder extended the application of Lessing's principle to the whole history of mankind. He was the first to make clear the fact that history is concerned with the progress of development. According to this view a national literature at each period is an expression of contemporary national life. He frankly took up the defense of the Middle Ages which the philosophers affected to despise as times of Gothic and Cimmerian darkness. They seemed to him ages of ferment, of energy, and of action. He once exclaimed, "Give us back for many reasons your reverence and superstition, your darkness and ignorance, your disorder and rudeness of manners; and take in return our light and our unbelief, our nerveless coldness and refinement, our philosophic flaccidity and human wretchedness!"⁹ Nor were revolutionary thoughts lacking in some of these writings. In Lessing's *Emilia Galotti* the vices of princely courts were held up to scorn. Fortunately Frederick's influence made such vices less fashionable among the great.

The newer tendencies of German thought were hostile to much that was of French origin, but not to Rousseau's teachings. His appeal for a return to nature found in their hearts a sympathetic response. "It is indeed impossible to conceive of the 'Sturm und Drang' movement without Rousseau's *Nouvelle Héloïse* and *Emile*."¹⁰ In his system of ideas the emphasis was placed upon man. His second Discourse exerted a decisive influence upon the intellectual development of the great German philosopher Kant. To him Rousseau seemed the philosopher of the microcosm, who had "replaced Newton, the philosopher of the macrocosm." Kant's mind was henceforth turned aside from finespun theories of the universe and his attention was concentrated upon problems of conduct and human welfare.¹¹

Northern Italy was also awakening to new intellectual life under the influence of a group of men in Milan, the most notable of whom was the Marquis Cesare Beccaria. Lombardy since 1714 had belonged to Austria and the mild rule of Maria Theresa gave the Lombards a period of unwonted prosperity. Beccaria and his friends for a short time published a newspaper which discussed the legislative, economic, and literary questions of the day in a spirit of frank intelligence. They avoided the obstacle

⁹ Calvin Thomas, *German Literature*, 261.

¹⁰ Kuno Francke, 303.

¹¹ Friedrich Paulsen's *Kant*, 39.

of the censorship by having their paper printed in Brescia on Venetian soil. In 1761 Beccaria published a treatise on *Crimes and Punishments*. He criticised the secret procedure of the courts and the cruelty of the penal law. At this time in England one hundred and sixty offenses were punishable by death. In France ordinary persons convicted of a capital offense were broken on the wheel, suffering horrible and prolonged agonies. Beccaria also protested against the use of torture to extract a confession from the suspected or evidence from the convicted criminal which might lead to the arrest of accomplices.

The men of the eighteenth century were justified in regarding the age as full of promise. They were, however, destined to be cruelly disillusioned about the all-sufficiency of reason. The history of Europe, and especially of France, from 1763 to 1789, was to reveal the formidable obstacles which the reform spirit would be obliged to remove before its ideals could become practical realities.

CHAPTER IV

THE WORK OF THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS

CHAP. IV
1763-89

Enlight-
ened
Rulers

THE Seven Years' War had involved every important country of western Europe. In 1763 the first task was to restore what had been destroyed by the ravages of the struggle. The principal rulers were not content with this, but were anxious to carry out significant reforms. The most conspicuous of them, Frederick II of Prussia, Joseph II of Austria, and Charles III of Spain, have been called "Enlightened" or "Benevolent Despots." They were benevolent because anxious to promote the welfare of their peoples, and despots because they desired to destroy the institutions which hindered the efficiency of the royal administration and prevented them from making their will the rule of government. Their successes and failures have a still deeper interest on account of their relation to the great movement of revolutionary reform soon to begin in France. Their careers may offer a criticism or a justification, or at least an explanation, of the impatient zeal with which the French leaders applied the policy of "thorough" to the institutions of the most ancient monarchy of Europe.

The problems of each state were the consequence of the same general condition, and the work of their rulers displayed, therefore, many similarities. All desired to improve the position of the peasants, and all sought to foster and regulate manufacturing. They were united in attacking local and corporate powers. A few entered into conflict with the Church over what they regarded as her impossible pretensions.

Frederick
the Great

The most successful of the enlightened despots was Frederick II. He was but slightly influenced by idealistic schemes. The Silesian wars were not a school for visionaries. The hard necessities of a military State, realized by a mind exceptionally keen and penetrating, were his unvarying guide. He had a stern conception of duty and regarded himself as the first servant of the State. His industry was tireless. But he constructed a governmental machine which his less capable successors could not manage, and which, twenty years after his death, brought ruin upon the kingdom. It is significant of his attitude that the

receipts of State were apportioned among three funds, one of which, called the *Dispositionskasse*, was made up of the surplus from the other two as well as of the proceeds of special taxes. This fund was literally at his disposition, and none of the ministers could meddle in its management, which was turned over to a cabinet councilor. Thus Frederick alone understood the exact condition of the Prussian treasury. His despotism was also patriarchal and intimate, and he intervened personally in matters of detailed administration, counting it not beneath his attention to prevent a nobleman from marrying the daughter of a simple magistrate or to hinder a middle-class burgher from buying the estate of a bankrupt nobleman.

It is not surprising that Frederick, an admirer of Voltaire, should take a liberal attitude upon religious questions. He went beyond mere toleration and granted complete religious liberty. He even wished the Jesuits to continue as teachers in his Silesian schools after their Order had been abolished by the Pope. In criminal procedure he put an end to the use of torture to extract evidence. He caused the procedure in civil cases to be simplified and his officers succeeded in clearing up dockets which had been encumbered for years with unfinished cases. During his reign rapid progress was also made towards the codification of the laws, and the work was completed a few years after his death.

Frederick's enlightened despotism nowhere assumed a more patriarchal character than in his efforts to heal the wounds of war. He was not obliged to accumulate a treasure before beginning, for when peace was made he had twenty million thalers in his war fund and ample stores of grain which he had accumulated for a new campaign. These resources he immediately used to aid the communities which had suffered most, particularly in Silesia, the New Mark, and Pomerania. With his great capacity for work and his insistence upon detail he studied the needs of each community. In one case houses must be built, in another seed must be furnished, in still another horses were required. So efficiently were his plans carried out that in a few years the memory of the wars was gone and a new and better prosperity prevailed. As many as thirteen thousand houses were erected with state help. The experience which Frederick's officials acquired was again utilized when West Prussia was annexed, in order to raise that unprogressive province to the level of its neighbors.

One method by which Frederick sought to strengthen his provinces was the encouragement of immigration. In this he

CHAP. IV

1763-89

Healing
the
Wounds
of War

CHAP. IV

1763-89

was following the precedents set by his father, Frederick William I, and his great grandfather, the Great Elector, who had welcomed the persecuted Protestants of France and of Salzburg to Brandenburg. Frederick hoped that the mercenaries who entered his army would settle in his dominions. To obtain other colonists his agents were especially active at Hamburg on the coast and at Frankfort in southern Germany. If any community suffered from the ordinary ills—crop failure, floods, fire, or the oppression of tyrannical and stupid rulers—Frederick's agents hastened thither, offering a refuge within his domains, with the promise of land, freedom from service in the army or from serfdom, and money for traveling expenses and for home-building at the journey's end. He preferred Germans, and sought those who had a reputation for skill in industry or agriculture. For example, he wished to attract East Frieslanders for cattle-raising and Swabians for ordinary farming. The land he had to offer belonged to the vast royal domains, or to the districts which he had caused to be reclaimed in the marshy regions along the Oder, the Warthe, and the Vistula. By this reclamation he had added more than 1500 square miles to the arable land of the country. Many times he was grossly deceived in his colonists, who took the state aid, but soon wearied of the hard work necessary and fled from the province. Nevertheless, the results of his colonizing enterprises were decisive. It is estimated that 900 villages were thus founded and that 300,000 persons were added to the population.

Attempts
to Abolish
Serfdom

A more certain method of increasing the population of the country would have been a thoroughgoing reform in the situation of the peasants. The attempts which Frederick made in this direction were infrequent and without much positive result. He had greater freedom of action upon the royal domains than upon the domains of the nobles. Like his father he wished to strengthen the right of the peasants to the farms which they occupied, so that neither they nor their children should be in danger of being evicted. He also tried to prevent the work required of the peasants by the holder of the estate or manor from exceeding three days a week, which he did not regard as unreasonable. After 1763 he did not permit the leases of domain lands in East Prussia to include the right to exact domestic service at the manor-house from the younger members of the peasant families. As this was commonly regarded as the special badge of serfdom, its disappearance seemed to mark the end of serfdom on the royal domains in East Prussia.

Frederick's efforts in behalf of the peasants on the estates of

the lords were less successful. He had to contend not only with their insistence upon respect for the rights of property, but with the unwillingness of his officials to act against the interests of their own class. The attempt to abolish serfdom in Pomerania revealed the course similar measures were likely to take. In 1763 while Frederick was in this province he verbally ordered that all serfdom, whether on the royal domain, the domains of the cities, or those of the nobles, should be done away with, "and without the slightest reasoning." But the nobles in one part of the province denied that serfdom existed there, and assumed that the King could not have intended to abolish any services which, in their opinion, were necessary to the prosperity of the region, while those in another part declared in effect that they did not insist on the name and desired only that the services should continue. As the King had not explained what should take the place of serfdom, and as his officials sympathized with the Pomeranian nobles, his famous order remained without effect. He insisted, however, that nothing should be done which would diminish the number of recruits for the army, and that, accordingly, the lords should not evict peasant families and seize their farms.¹

Frederick's lack of success in relieving the burdens of the peasants was due in a measure to his desire not to weaken the position of the nobles, from whom he drew the officers of his army. If a noble family became impoverished and was on the point of selling its land, he intervened to keep the property from falling into the hands of the burgher class. In some cases he lent money at a very low rate of interest. After the close of the Seven Years' War, when the nobles were in debt, and were obliged to borrow from usurers at the rate of ten per cent., Frederick's minister devised, especially for Silesia, a species of land bank, formed by associations of nobles, who on the security of their combined property were able to borrow at four per cent., and to make loans to individual nobles at four and three-quarters.

Joseph II, another benevolent despot, pushed the policy of reform still further, but so many of his projects failed that his career has been treated mainly as an illustration of ill-considered zeal. Joseph was the son of Maria Theresa and co-regent with her of the Hapsburg dominions from 1765 until 1780, when he became sole ruler. It was significant of his attitude that he

Joseph II

¹ About half of the soldiers were peasants, and were furnished by the cantonal system, which assigned to each regiment for recruiting purposes a district containing five or six thousand families.

CHAP. IV
1763-89

began his rule by destroying certain royal game-preserves, from which the peasants had suffered, and by using his private wealth to effect a conversion of the public debt at a lower rate of interest. No prince was ever more sincerely devoted to the public welfare, and his unceasing labors, unrelieved by the joys of success, hastened his death. He did not perceive, as did his mother, the immense difficulties of his task. Where she was saved by vacillation, he seemed to run towards defeat. Frederick II said of him with cruel irony, "He always took the second step before taking the first." The problems presented by the grouping under one rule of many peoples, of lordships, principalities, and kingdoms with diverse privileges and institutions, were insoluble except under the teachings of another century of painful and tragic experience. To all this were added the chaos and injustice of class privilege in its myriad forms. Under the circumstances even his failures may have been an important humane manifestation. Some of his successes opened the way for the reforms of the nineteenth century in Austria.

Relief
of the
Peasants

Most of Joseph's projects were a continuation, in more developed and radical form, of policies adopted by his mother either before 1765 or during the co-regency. This is true of the attempt to improve the condition of the peasants of Bohemia and Moravia, who, unlike most of the peasants in the German duchies, were still serfs. Two months after Joseph became sole ruler he issued a decree abolishing serfdom in his Slavic lands. This freed the peasants from restrictions on marriage, permitted them to leave the estates on which they served, and gave them liberty to choose an occupation. If they were not to be turned into a landless proletariat, it was obviously necessary to improve their situation as peasant farmers, and therefore the decree was followed by others giving them better tenant rights. Toward the end of his reign Joseph fixed the amount of the peasant's gross income which should go to the lord at a maximum of seventeen per cent. Had he gone one step further and permitted the peasants to pay off this charge, he would have accomplished a veritable revolution, but he repeatedly said he did not wish to free the peasants from their position as dependents, or subjects, of the lords, although he carefully limited the judicial powers which were still left to the lords as local magistrates. The position of the peasants in his German provinces was improved by general provisions similar to those adopted for the peasants of the Slavic provinces. His early death in 1790 did not permit all of these reforms to be-

come established; but they marked a definite advance and beyond them the Hapsburgs did not go for over fifty years. His attempt to abolish serfdom in Hungary failed, as did his other Hungarian reforms.

Another reform which touched the peasants closely was the reorganization of the land tax. Here Joseph's aim was less the increase of the revenue than an equalization of the burden, taking away the exemptions which the nobles and the clergy still enjoyed. He determined to have all the land carefully appraised and treated alike when this great task had been accomplished. To him its importance was due to the opinion, which he had gained from the Physiocrats, that the only definite increase in the wealth of a country was the net gain from the cultivation of the soil, and that upon this increment the burden of taxation should be laid. The reform was naturally unpopular with the privileged classes. They regarded the advantages they had previously enjoyed as belonging to their heritage and not to be taken away without violating their rights of property. The Hungarian nobles, of Magyar race, were outraged that they must share the burdens of taxation with the "miserable contributory commonalty," who were principally Slavs. The new appraisement was completed in 1789. It was the theory of the law that for the duchies and for Bohemia and Moravia, seventy per cent. of the peasant's gross income should be untouched, and that the State should ask for only a little over twelve per cent., leaving to the lord a little more than seventeen per cent. The appraisement had been so hurried that many of the peasants were taxed too high and complaints of the law were heard on every side. Before it had actually become effective Joseph died, and Leopold, his brother, abandoned the whole plan.

Joseph's assertion of the rights of the State in all questions involving the relations of Church and State was so uncompromising as to give this attitude the name Josephism. In it he was supported by his councilors more heartily than in his other tasks, and much that was accomplished was due rather to their initiative than to his. The most notable acts were the grant of toleration to the Protestants and to the Jews and the reduction of the number of monasteries, with the application of their income to the needs of education and religion. The edict of toleration permitted any group of one hundred families to have a chapel and a school of their own. Protestants were admitted freely to civil and military offices, and their rights were defined in the case of mixed marriages. Although this act fell short of

CHAP. IV
1763-89

full religious freedom, it placed Austria in advance of most of the other German states as well as of England and France. The attack upon the monasteries had a more practical motive. Too much landed property was immobilized in the "dead hand" and too many persons were withdrawn from the productive life of the community. In 1781 there were over 60,000 monks and nuns. Joseph began by dissolving those orders which were not devoted to education or to the care of the poor and the sick. By 1786 over 700 monasteries had been closed and their property turned over to the "religion" fund, primarily to bear the expense of an increase in the number of parish priests and to provide for the better religious instruction of the people. As has generally been the case in such vast transfers of property, there were waste and complaint of fraud, but the agricultural life of the Hapsburg provinces was stimulated by bringing a large amount of new land into the market. The aim of Joseph's other religious reforms was to make his Church independent of foreign ecclesiastical jurisdictions, diminishing even the prerogatives of the papacy in Austrian affairs. He encountered no popular opposition until he interfered with the religious practices of the people and attempted to regulate even the methods of burial.

His most signal failure was in an attempt to introduce into Hungary the administrative system of a bureaucratic state. He had already divided his other dominions into circles, with officials in whose hands all business was placed. By this change the local estates, which had given Maria Theresa much trouble, lost their importance. He now divided Hungary into ten circles. It seemed unlikely that the diet would be assembled again, and that the county assemblies of nobles would retain their ancient powers. The judicial system was reorganized and the courts were made independent of the nobles. A census was taken, apparently with the aim of introducing the method of conscription into the system of obtaining recruits for the army. By the projected reform of the land tax the immunities of the nobles would be lessened, and at the same time it was announced that their serfs were freed. When Joseph ordered German to be used as the official language instead of Latin, the Hungarians suspected him of an intention to Germanize them. The country was being hurried too fast along the path of reform and fell into a state of turmoil. At this juncture Joseph became involved in a war with the Turks and desperately needed the assistance of the Hungarians. The price he was obliged to pay was the abandonment of nearly every reform which he had attempted in Hungary.

**Failure to
 Centralize
 Hapsburg
 Dominions**

Joseph's attempts to introduce his reforms into the Austrian Netherlands were even less successful. The local constitutions of the duchies, counties, and lordships, which made up the Netherlands, had remained almost unchanged since the sixteenth century. The inhabitants were jealous of their privileges. They also resented Joseph's interference with their religious institutions. When he tried to apply his plans of a centralized administration, stubborn resistance grew into open rebellion. By a mixture of concession and severity he succeeded in restoring order in the spring of 1788. But the trouble was not at an end, and a year later, when France was in revolution, the Netherlands again rose in revolt and proclaimed their independence of Austria. This revolt had not been subdued when Joseph died in 1790.

Not all that Joseph accomplished disappeared with him. His reforming spirit had wrought permanent changes in the laws and in the procedure of the courts. In criminal procedure, for example, he made a definite break with the past. For the first time the protection of innocence became one of its objects and cruel penalties were abandoned.

Charles III of Spain was more fortunate than the Emperor Joseph. Tradition has given him credit for his excellent aims, and has not inquired too closely whether they were carried out. He knew his subjects well enough to see what was possible. Only once did he make a serious blunder, and that was when he ordered the men of Madrid to give up their slouch hats and long cloaks. Furious riots forced him to rescind the order. He abolished certain antiquated forms of taxation, but made no serious effort to remedy the evils which existed in the system of holding land. In Andalusia the estates were of immense size, and mainly devoted to cattle and sheep raising. The few peasants in the province led a miserable existence because of the *Mesta*, a privileged association of civil and ecclesiastical proprietors, who had the right to drive their flocks everywhere regardless of fences. The condition of the peasants on the plateaus of Castille, where the feudal system still flourished, was equally bad. In the north the peasants were better off, for it was the practice to give long leases and the large estates were subdivided. Charles attempted to improve the methods of cultivation by encouraging the work of economic or agricultural associations and establishing model farms. Something was also done towards road-building, of which Spain was sadly in need; but most of the roads never came into existence except on the engineers' plans. After the manner of Frederick the Great, an attempt was made to plant

CHAP. IV

1763-89

model settlements, chiefly of Flemings or Germans, upon great tracts of deserted land in the Sierra Morena. In them primary instruction was to be obligatory and no convents were to be permitted. Although the enterprise was not altogether a failure, the change of climate and habits was too sudden for many of the colonists, who sickened and died. Charles made a strenuous effort to put an end to public begging, sending sturdy beggars into the army and caring for the young and feeble in infirmaries. He also sought to assist the poor by the establishment of state pawnshops.

The attitude of King Charles upon questions of Church and State resembled that of other enlightened despots. His treatment of the Jesuits was an extraordinary instance. Regarding them as the principal agents of papal interference he secretly prepared their ruin. Early in April, 1767, they were all arrested. They were allowed only time enough to take their hats, cloaks, and breviaries, and then were expelled from the kingdom.

In the Spanish colonial system the only changes Charles made were of minor importance. He was too much under the influence of tradition to abandon the old system of government which lodged responsibility with the Council of the Indies. But he opened the principal ports of Spain to the commerce of her colonies, a reform which greatly increased the volume of trade between Spain and America.

In Italy the states in which reforms were most energetically undertaken were Lombardy, then a part of the Austrian dominions, and the grand duchy of Tuscany. Leopold, the second son of Maria Theresa, became ruler of Tuscany in 1765. He was more cautious than his brother Joseph and sought to strengthen local institutions. This resulted in a revival of public spirit. He removed the restrictions on internal trade, and even permitted the exportation of grain when the crop was abundant. He freed industry by destroying the guilds. In Tuscany, as in other Italian states, there was a multitude of ecclesiastics who held a large part of the land. Leopold's ministers made a successful attempt to remedy the situation. The Inquisition was also abolished. In criminal procedure torture was no longer used and even the death penalty was given up.


Charles Emmanuel III of Sardinia accomplished a still more remarkable work in the duchy of Savoy, that part of his dominions which lay on the French side of the Alps. He showed the way in which the remains of feudal land tenure could be destroyed without commotion or injustice. He had one advantage over his brother princes: there were no assemblies of clergy or

Italy


Feudalism
Abolished
in Savoy

PARTITIONS OF POLAND

Scale of Miles



- Partition of 1772
- Partition of 1793
- Partition of 1795
- Boundary of Poland after first Partition



nobility in Savoy to place obstacles in his path. Serfdom existed in a form which impoverished the inhabitants and forced many of them to emigrate. If a serf died childless, his property went to his lord. The only means of avoiding such a loss was to treat the property of the family as an undivided estate, for in this case the survivors continued to hold it. But the serf who was not a member of such an association could not rid himself of the inability to bequeath his property, even though he had entered trade or one of the professions and had prospered. It was this feature of serfdom which the King first attacked in 1762. After a few years he and his advisers decided to destroy the system of which it was a part. The great decree abolishing the feudal system was issued December 19, 1771, and a delegation or commission was appointed to arrange the compensation which should be given to the lords in place of the services hitherto rendered by the peasants. Each community was to declare whether it wished to purchase enfranchisement and to show that it possessed the means to furnish the indemnities due the lords. The services were then appraised and the money was raised either by requiring each peasant to pay a sum equal to the value of the services from which he was released or by dividing the whole amount to be paid among the peasants in proportion to their land tax. The task was long and arduous, and it was not completed twenty years later when the French Revolutionary armies invaded Savoy. Nevertheless, by that time the agreements between the lords and the peasants had called for the payment of nearly eight million livres, a sum worth over thirty million francs at the present time.

A monarch with a reputation as a reformer greater than her career deserved was Catherine II, the German princess who, after the murder of her husband, Peter III, in 1762, ruled over Russia for thirty-four years. Catherine was for several years a correspondent of Voltaire. She attracted Diderot to her court, and skilfully flattered other French literary men who had a powerful influence upon the public opinion of the time. She was therefore accepted as "enlightened" without a rigorous scrutiny of her deeds. The great curse of Russia was the system of serfdom, which degraded the peasants to a position little above that of cattle. This evil Catherine did not venture to attack, and she even increased it by presenting hundreds of "souls" to her favorites. She, however, introduced improvements into the administrative subdivisions of Russia and also secularized the property of the monasteries, using what remained after the monks were pensioned to provide for public instruction and nec-

The
Empress
Catherine
II

CHAP. IV

1763-89

Imperial-
ism in
Great
Britain

essary charities. She granted toleration to the strange sects of heretics which troubled the peace of the empire, and even permitted the Jesuits to reside within her dominions after the Pope had abolished the order. But most of the reforms demanded by the Representative Legislative Commission which she convened at the beginning of her reign were not undertaken. At one time discontent flamed up in the terrible revolt led by Pougatchef, but this was ended after a long struggle.

George III was not a "benevolent despot," but the history of England after 1763 illustrates the general trend of the time towards reform and more efficient organization of government. There was enough that called for reform in the political institutions of the home country, but the more pressing tasks were imposed by the situation in India and America. The stockholders and officers, high and low, of the East India Company were utilizing the victories of Clive to enrich themselves from the treasures of the native princes, and, when these were exhausted, by plunder of the hapless inhabitants. This led parliament to begin the substitution of direct action by the home government for control through a chartered company in managing the affairs of the ceded districts and dependent states. In other words, a beginning was made of the British empire in India.

The colonies in America taken from the French in 1763 were also organized. The government at first intended to give them institutions similar to those of the neighboring English-speaking colonies, but it soon became evident that this would subject the Catholic majority to the rule of a few hundred Protestant Englishmen, many of whom were adventurers. Parliament met the situation by passing the Quebec Act of 1774, which provided for an appointed council, and left the French their civil laws, slightly modified, while introducing the more lenient English criminal law. All the territory north of the Ohio and west of the Alleghanies was included within the new colony.

In dealing with the older colonies the British government blundered disastrously. This was not from the lack of a measure of reason and justice in its demands, but from a lack of sympathetic statesmanship in handling a delicate situation. It attempted to enforce trade laws which had been adopted in the interest of English manufacturers, merchants, and shipowners, and which had been evaded notoriously for years. What aroused bitter resistance was the attempt to create an imperial revenue by taxing the colonists directly. Part of the money was to be used to support troops which should guard the colonies against the danger of sudden French attack, but a part would be used

to pay the salaries of colonial judges and governors, in order that they might be more independent of the colonial legislatures. The presence of regular troops would also strengthen the colonial executives. The attempt of the English ministers to carry out such a policy led within ten years to the revolt of the colonies. A few more years and the most promising part of the British colonial empire was lost forever.

CHAP. IV

1763-89

Nothing in the principles of the Benevolent Despots deterred them from attempts to round out their territories at the expense of their neighbors. Nor was the national spirit sufficiently developed in the countries of western Europe for the policy of territorial aggrandizement to be looked upon with abhorrence. Frederick had not suffered in the eyes of his philosophical admirers because of his success in taking Silesia from Maria Theresa. The most conspicuous illustration of the spoliation of the weak by the strong was the First Partition of Poland. It was conspicuous because Poland was one of the largest countries in Europe. In the characteristics of a State, however, Poland was as lacking as the Holy Roman Empire, although in another way. It was not divided into principalities, but its central power was completely disorganized by the "liberties" of the nobles. The monarchy was elective, and the candidate as a condition of his election was obliged to sign away his prerogatives. The King had almost no army and no financial resources. The diet was held frequently, but each delegate had the right to oppose his *liberum veto* to any decree, with the result that during the reign of the last King of the Saxon dynasty, Augustus III, no one of the fifteen diets was able to reach a single important conclusion. Another source of trouble was the attitude of the dominant Catholic Church toward the dissidents: first, the Orthodox, who were of the same faith as the Russians, and were in fact Russian, belonging to lands taken from Russia by Poland; and, second, the Lutherans, living on the borders of Frederick's provinces, a part of the German movement of colonization to which Prussia had owed its origin. As the Polish territory barred the road from the kingdom of Prussia to Brandenburg, and as Poland had nearly three times the population of Frederick's dominions, it is apparent that he had a deep interest in keeping Poland weak. The acquisition of West Prussia was one of his cherished hopes.

First
Partition
of Poland

At the time when the Polish throne became vacant in 1763 both Frederick II and Catherine II were ready to utilize the dissident question as an opportunity for intervention, and both were agreed that the next King of Poland must be one of the

CHAP. IV

1763-89

native magnates. They signed a treaty in April of the following year, and Frederick secretly accepted Catherine's proposal that the new King should be Stanislas Poniatowski, a nephew of the head of the Czartoryski family, which was nourishing the futile hope of reforming the Polish constitution with Catherine's help. Before the election a Russian army entered Poland, and the diet docilely chose Prince Poniatowski. Two years later in another diet the Czartoryskis nearly succeeded in modifying the conditions under which the *liberum veto* should be used. This diet was in the form of a "Confederation," which permitted decisions to be reached by simple majority vote. But through the machinations and menaces of the Russian ambassador, determined to prevent the reorganization of the Polish monarchy, the question of the dissidents was forced to the front. He accomplished his purpose, but overshot the mark, for the Catholics, with their fanatical loyalty to the Church thoroughly aroused, not only restored the *liberum veto*, but caused the rejection of the demands of both Russia and Prussia in behalf of the dissidents. The Russians compelled a later diet, from which a majority of the members had fled, to rescind the laws against the dissidents and to place the Polish constitution under the guarantee of Russia. The defeated party immediately formed the Confederation of Bar. Russian troops, which entered the country to crush the confederates, in the course of the struggle violated Turkish territory and brought on a formidable war with the Sultan. In this Catherine's armies were finally successful, but peace was difficult to arrange, for Austria would not permit the frontiers of Russia to be pushed to the Danube. A general European war seemed imminent, a prospect which alarmed Frederick the Great, from whose memory the terrible impressions of the Seven Years' War had not disappeared. He saw in Polish annexations the means of reconciling all interests and bringing the Turkish war to a close. Joseph II was eager for the partition, but Catherine would have preferred to retain her hegemony over a united Poland. Her resistance was finally overcome and the scheme of partition carried through. By it Frederick received West Prussia,² while Austria, with less excuse, took a larger territory in what was called Galicia, and Russia annexed the lands east of the Duna and Dnieper, which had formerly been hers. Poland lost nearly a third of her territory and five million inhabitants.

Two years later Catherine signed the peace of Kainarji with

² Strictly speaking, West Prussia, Ermeland, Kulmerland, and the Netze District.

the Turks, by which they acknowledged the independence of the Khanate of the Crimea. The significance of this appeared when in 1785 she annexed the Crimea to Russia, giving to Russia as valuable a coast on the Black Sea as Peter the Great had acquired on the Baltic earlier in the century.

The land hunger of the Emperor Joseph was not satisfied with the territorial gains of Austria in the first partition of Poland. Twice he attempted to obtain Bavaria. The first time the opportunity was offered by a dispute about the succession. Joseph seemed on the point of reaching the goal when Frederick II blocked his way. The matter was not settled until Frederick invaded Bohemia. Joseph, advised by Catherine II, gave way and accepted a corner of land between the Salzbach, the Inn, and the Danube, with 60,000 inhabitants. In his second attempt Joseph arranged an exchange, offering a large part of the Netherlands for Bavaria. By another exchange he hoped to add the archbishopric of Salzburg. Again the plan was defeated by the opposition of the King of Prussia.

The French monarchy was not unaffected by the ideals which had moved a Frederick, a Joseph, and a Charles III. Louis XVI did not have the clearness of mind or the continuity of purpose which characterized these kings, but his intentions were as benevolent as theirs. Moreover, France did not await his advent before definite reforms were undertaken. The officers of Louis XV, if not the King himself, attempted the rôle of the benevolent despot.

CHAP. IV

1763-89

Other Attempts to Seize Territory

CHAPTER V

THE FRENCH MONARCHY AS A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM

CHAP. V

1754-88

No
"King"
in France

BENEVOLENT despotism was followed by revolution only in France. The reasons were many, but the chief reason was that despotism in France was incompetent. The royal advisers began early enough to combat the ills of the old régime. Their views of the situation were clarified by the criticisms which filled the books of the time, from the publication of Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws* to Turgot's *Distribution of Riches* and Raynal's *History of the Indies*. Their failure to carry through adequate plans of reform was not due to lack of ideas. They failed because Louis XV had not the character and Louis XVI had not the ability to give them firm support. Nothing interested Louis XV long. If there were evils which were difficult to remove, he was wont to say, "Well, enough of that. Things will last as long as we do." His death in 1774 did not improve the outlook as much as the excellent intentions of his grandson, Louis XVI, led some persons to hope. The new King was only nineteen, and had neither the knowledge nor the aptitude for government which would fit him to do more than heed good counsels. His over-conscientiousness made him unduly hesitant. Sustained thought was impossible to him. His ideas seemed to have so little cohesion that his brother compared them to oiled billiard balls. Therefore "the principal cause of the ruin of royalty in France was the lack of a King."¹

Several reforms which were attempted in the reign of Louis XV have already been mentioned. The most important was the effort to make the levy of the income tax, or vingtièmes, more just. Among other noteworthy reforms were the decrees freeing the grain trade. In 1754 restrictions preventing the carriage of grain from province to province were removed. Ten years later edicts were issued in favor of freedom of export, subject to a slight duty. The preambles of these decrees prove that they were written by disciples of the economists. Public opinion remained uncertain, if not hostile. When one or two crop failures

First
Reforms

¹ A remark of M. Lavissee in one of the concluding chapters of his monumental *Histoire de France*, IX (I), 402.

occurred, and the price of bread rose steadily, popular suspicion was increased, and the parlements demanded the reëstablishment of the old regulations, which, they alleged, would check the manœuvres of the speculators. The government persisted in its policy. In 1769 the crop was better and prices fell, but the following year a scarcity occurred, and this time the attack of the parlements upon the new system was successful. The former restrictions reappeared.

Meanwhile the administrative service in charge of stocking the government granaries, which was suspected of buying and selling for gain, was transformed by a contract with a merchant named Malisset. According to the contract Malisset should keep the stock of grain fresh by selling the old and buying new. He was also allowed to grind a part of the grain and sell the flour to the Paris bakers, free from many of the restrictions which hampered the trade of other dealers. As he dealt in the name of the King and seemed to be backed by the credit of the government, he was assuredly a formidable competitor. Le Prévost de Beaumont by chance came into possession of a part of the agreement with the government, and he drew up a memoir accusing the Malisset company of being in a compact to create a famine; that is, an artificial scarcity, in order to be able to sell grain at high prices. Le Prévost was arrested before he could present his memoir and was kept in prison for twenty years because he would not promise to refrain from circulating such unfounded charges. This was the origin of the famous legend known as the *Pacte de famine*.

CHAP. V

1754-88

*The Pacte
de Famine*

The economists had evidently lost the first battle for the freedom of the grain trade. They were more successful in their campaign against the restrictions of the colonial trade due to the privileged position of the Company of the Indies, the French rival of the great British and Dutch trading companies. The attack was led by Gournay who presented a memorial to the controller-general of the finances. One of the objections to the company was the limitation of its shipping to the single port of Lorient. The two wars with England in the middle of the century had ruined the company's trade and consequently its finances. But it was reorganized in 1765 and rapidly increased the volume of its commerce, although its receipts did not equal its expenditures. Finally in 1769 the government decided to suppress the company and to throw open the trade. The result justified the arguments of the economists, because the commerce of the Indies soon reached proportions never known before.

East India
Company

The government of Louis XV tried to put an end to the fac-

CHAP. V

1754-88

King and
Parle-
ments

tious opposition of the parlements by thoroughly reorganizing the courts. The occasion was a conflict over the registration of the royal edicts on taxation after the close of the Seven Years' War. The parlements professed to believe that they were the successors of the medieval *curia regis* and that their consent was necessary when the King decided to tax his subjects. Popular opinion looked upon them as a safeguard against ministerial despotism, since the States General had not been summoned for a hundred and fifty years. The judges disputed even the prerogative of the King, empowering him to order in a *lit de justice* the registration of his decrees. In December, 1770, when Louis XV solemnly condemned their doctrines and affirmed the plentitude of the royal authority, the parlement of Paris suspended its sittings. The King, advised by his chancellor Maupeou, did not compromise the affair. By a series of measures running through the following months, the jurisdiction of the parlement of Paris was diminished by the creation of six other superior councils, or courts, in Arras, Blois, Chalons, Clermont-Ferrand, Lyons, and Poitiers, bringing tribunals of final resort closer to the subjects. The judges in these courts, and the newly appointed judges in the parlement of Paris, were not to purchase their positions. This was a step toward the destruction of an hereditary, privileged magistracy. At the same time the suppression of the fees known as "spices" affirmed the principle of free administration of justice and removed one of the worst abuses of the old system. Similar reforms were made in the provincial parlements. The government promised to simplify judicial procedure and to prepare a single code of law to take the place of the many different local codes and customs. The opposition of the judges and lawyers did not move the King, and the Maupeou parlements, as the new courts were called, outlasted his reign.

The first two years of Louis XVI's reign may be described as the ministry of Turgot. Although Count de Maurepas was the principal minister, Turgot as controller-general of the finances faced the hardest task and therefore held the most responsible position. He was well trained for his work. During his administrative career as intendant at Limoges he had shown the qualities of an energetic and patient reformer, able to apply remedies suited to the ills of that backward region. But he lacked the temperament to conciliate his opponents and the sagacity to discover the moment at which compromise is necessary to secure the fruits of victory. Two things rendered the success of his plans doubtful; first, the character of Maurepas, who was more

Ministry
of Turgot

anxious to retain his influence than to support vigorously his reforming colleague; and, second, the reestablishment of the old parlements. The King undid the work of his grandfather with the mistaken idea that his act would usher in a period of reconciliation and good feeling. In reality he was restoring the chief obstacle to effective reform and thereby rendering revolution inevitable.

At the opening of his ministry Turgot urged upon the King a policy of retrenchment, summing it up in the words, "No bankruptcies, no new taxes, and no loans." His predecessor in the ministry of the finances had injured the credit of the government by expedients of partial repudiation. To borrow, therefore, was expensive. To place new taxes before the system of taxation was reorganized would be unjust to the already overburdened peasants. In consequence, economy was the sole resource. This policy was not only wise, but also its immediate results were encouraging. Within a year the deficit of forty-eight million livres was reduced to eighteen, while at the same time twenty-three million livres of floating indebtedness were paid.

Turgot corrected many abuses in the management of the finances, but his fame as a reformer rests upon three achievements,—the freeing of the grain trade, the abolition of the *corvée*, and the destruction of the guilds. His ordinance upon the grain trade was issued almost immediately after he took office. In the preamble he showed that a scarcity of grain could be only temporary, for high prices would incite the farmers to plant more. The watchfulness of farmers and merchants eager for profit was, he argued, a greater safeguard than any care which might be exercised by officials. Once more, as ten years earlier, nature seemed to oppose this particular reform, for a partial crop failure ensued. Men interested in the old system stirred up the populace to clamor for government regulation of the trade. In April and May, 1775, there was a series of riots known as the "flour war." The rioters appeared in Versailles and Paris. Under cover of solicitude for the welfare of the people the parlement of Paris tried to persuade the King to abandon Turgot's policy, but the members were summoned to Versailles and reprimanded. The lieutenant-general of the police at Paris, who made only half-hearted attempts to suppress disorder, was dismissed, and troops were sent through the disturbed districts to restore quiet. Turgot proved that he was not merely a reformer but a ruler.

The transformation of the *corvée* involved the principle of a

CHAP. V

1754-88

Attack on
Privileges

just distribution of the burdens of taxation. When a similar reform had been proposed before, the expense was to be charged as an addition to the *taille*, but according to Turgot's plan it was to be added to the twentieths, which were paid by the nobles as well as by the peasants. This was an assault upon the citadel of privilege, and it provoked a lively discussion in the King's council. The keeper of the seals declared that it was dangerous to attack the privileges of the nobility; upon which Turgot said, with more vehemence than exactness, that such inequalities were not defended even among the nobles themselves. He also pointed out that many nobles were merely rich men who had purchased titles, and added, bitterly, that while there would be some justification in respecting the exemptions of the ancient defenders of France, there was no reason why similar privileges should be conceded to rich financiers who had been pillaging the State. The ordinance in regard to the *corvée* was not presented to the parlements for registration by itself, but combined with measures revolutionizing the conditions of industry in France.

Turgot held the view taught by the economists that the monopolies enjoyed by the guilds were a dangerous restriction of the liberty of industry and a serious hindrance to the development of trade. The consequences of the monopoly were higher prices for the purchaser and a narrower opportunity for the artisan. His plan was to preserve the guild organization only in a few cases,—notably those of the apothecaries and the printers—in order to secure government control of those trades. He ordered the property of the guilds to be sold, the debts paid, and the balance distributed among the members. Henceforward it should only be necessary for a workman to record his name, profession, and domicile at the proper office and conform to the police regulations of his industry.

The ordinances on the *corvée* and on the guilds, with four others of less importance, were laid before the parlement of Paris for registration in March, 1776. Upon the question of the *corvée*, the judges took the attitude adopted by the keeper of the seals, regarding the change as a violation of the rights of property. They also considered masterships as rights over production which it would be unjust to take away without indemnification. They were ready to concede certain changes, reducing the number of guilds and lowering the entrance fees, but Turgot would not listen to any compromise, and persuaded the King to command the registration in a solemn *lit de justice*.

This was Turgot's last success. He had excited the enmity of many persons who could weary the King with their complaints.

The Queen disliked the air of economy for which he was responsible. She also attributed to him the recall of one of her favorites from the embassy at London. Maurepas became alarmed lest Turgot's energy might compromise him, and did what he could to prejudice the mind of the King. The crisis came in April. Turgot warned Louis XVI against weakness, plainly intimating his fear that this was a defect in the King's character, and saying grimly, "Never forget, Sire, that it was weakness which brought the head of Charles I to the block." Within two weeks the great minister was dismissed. He withdrew to private life, expressing to Louis XVI the hope that he had interpreted the situation amiss and that the dangers he had pointed out were chimerical.

Among the aims which Turgot had no opportunity to carry out was the organization of elective assemblies — municipal, district, provincial, and national. The local assemblies would assist the government in planning and carrying on public works and in deciding questions with regard to which the advice of local bodies would be valuable. Turgot's national assembly was not to encroach upon the powers of the Crown, which he, like all Physiocrats, felt should be unrestricted in order to be beneficent. Nor were these assemblies to be democratic, for the right of voting was restricted to holders of landed property.

At the beginning of his ministry Turgot had declared that unless the finances were put in order the first outbreak of war would throw the government into bankruptcy. Before he was dismissed, his colleagues had begun to send secret assistance to the English colonies in America which had risen in revolt against acts of the British government. The principal motive of the French was the desire to be avenged for the humiliations of the Seven Years' War, to cripple an ancient rival, and destroy the new British colonial empire. More generous sympathies moved Lafayette and a group of young officers to cross the Atlantic and offer their services to the Continental Congress. In February, 1778, France signed a treaty of alliance with the colonists and entered upon a war more glorious for her than any struggle since the early years of Louis XIV.

With the close of the Seven Years' War the ministry of the marine had set about the reconstruction of the French navy and was so successful that in 1779 it was almost equal in size to the British navy. Indeed, several times during the war the French appeared to have won the sea power. The first effect of the French alliance upon the campaign in America was the retreat of the British from Philadelphia to the more secure posi-

CHAP. V

1754-88

tion of New York. After this, interest was transferred to the struggle in the West Indies and in continental waters. In the summer of 1779, when Spain had joined in the conflict, a descent upon the coast of England was attempted, but it failed for lack of resolute and skilful leadership. The next year England's position became still more precarious on account of the Armed Neutrality, formed by the Baltic powers and the Dutch as a protest against an unjust extension by the English of the term "contraband" and the right of search. This brought about war between England and the United Provinces. The timely presence of the French fleet in Chesapeake Bay in 1781 rendered the investment of Yorktown by Washington and Rochambeau effective, and by forcing the surrender of Cornwallis secured the independence of the colonists. England continued the struggle long enough to gain an honorable peace, which the victory of Rodney over De Grasse in the West Indies in April, 1782, made possible. The English had also successfully defended Gibraltar against the combined attack of the allies. From the war the French gained little except an increase of prestige. The cost added fifteen hundred million livres to their public debt.

Turgot's fall was followed by a reaction against the policy of reform. The *corvée* was restored and many of the old abuses crept back into the management of the finances. The guilds were reëstablished, although some changes were made which decreased the traditional abuses. Trades so closely connected that it was difficult to mark off their fields were now united, and the fees for mastership were reduced. The new guilds, six of merchants and forty-four of arts and trades, were introduced into Paris immediately. The attempt at restoration was extended more gradually to other towns. Several provincial parlements took the attitude that as they had never registered Turgot's edicts the older guilds still existed within their jurisdiction.

After several months the management of the finances was entrusted to Necker, a wealthy banker, who had won a reputation as a publicist. He was a native of Geneva and a Protestant and could not be made a minister of state, but he received the powers of controller-general with the title of director-general. His greatest task was to provide the money for the war with the English, which was no slight matter in a state suffering from annual deficits. Convinced that it would be wrong to increase the burdens of the taxpayers, he resorted to a series of loans. His reputation as a banker served him in this, but in order to insure the success of the loans he made them profitable to the investor and expensive for the treasury. It is believed that of the

Necker

five hundred and thirty million livres which he borrowed during his term of office nearly half was used to meet ordinary deficits. His most dangerous blunder was his failure to provide for the service of the loans by increased taxation, and the payment of interest out of the proceeds of later loans. This policy enhanced the current opinion of his financial skill, for it seemed a prodigious feat to carry a state through three years of war without adding to the burden of taxation. The greater his glory the more certain the blame for any successor who, especially in time of peace, should resort to increase of taxation. Public opinion would ascribe such action to bad management and wastefulness and would make a merit of resistance.

Necker made his fault more serious in 1781 by publishing a *Compte Rendu au Roi*, or account of the finances, in which he pretended to draw aside the veil which had concealed the finances as a secret of State. He did this because he believed that publicity was one of the foundations of British credit. His act amounted to an acknowledgment that the finances were an affair of the nation. Had he ventured to tell the somber truth in his account, his popularity would not have gained by the revelation, because the expenditures of the year 1781 exceeded the receipts by eighty-nine million livres without counting one hundred and twenty-nine million in "anticipations," which were claims upon the year's revenue. Instead of explaining the existing situation Necker set forth the budget of a "normal" year, omitting all war expenditures as well as certain other charges which he regarded as "extraordinary." On the same principle he omitted extraordinary receipts. The result was a favorable balance of ten million livres. He left the impression on the minds of his readers that this was the actual situation, and glorified France as financially stronger than England because during the struggle France had introduced no new taxes, while England had increased her burden by many million pounds sterling. Only a few of the initiated understood that the picture was fanciful. Necker now felt that his position was so assured that he could request the King to admit him to the rank of a minister of state. His popularity, however, had aroused the jealousy of the other ministers, and Louis, on the urgent demand of Maurepas, refused the request. The consequence was that Necker resigned.

During this period, which is called his first ministry, Necker inaugurated several important reforms, abolished useless offices, checked the lavish grant of pensions, and made a better bargain with the farmers-general. He called into existence provincial assemblies in Berry and Haute-Guyenne, to accomplish tasks sim-

CHAP. V

1754-88

ilar to those performed by the assembly of Languedoc. These assemblies were filled with royal nominees, instead of being chosen, as Turgot wished, by the landed proprietors. The distinction between the three estates was recognized, although the third estate was given as many deputies as the clergy and the nobility together. The two assemblies justified their existence and eagerly and effectively worked for the betterment of their provinces.

Necker's retirement left the government in a serious predicament. The war was still to go on for two years. The financiers who had assisted him were likely to look upon the projects of his successors coldly. By the *Compte Rendu* the public had been told that the government was in possession of a surplus. Necker's immediate successor had accepted his appointment on the supposition that a balance existed, and he was chagrined to learn from the records of his office that it was simply a brilliant financial dream. When he laid the matter before the King, the good-natured Louis was indignant and conceived a settled distrust for the popular idol. As the government could not borrow to advantage it was obliged to levy new taxes, including a third twentieth. In November, 1783, the position of the controller-general was given to Calonne, an experienced administrator, a man of extraordinary versatility, but not a real statesman nor moved by well-considered aims. During his ministry, which lasted a little more than three years, the situation became acute.

Calonne was acquainted with the grave condition of the treasury, but acted upon his conviction that the resources of the country were unbounded. He won the favor of the Court by gifts and pensions. He gave the Count of Provence, the King's brother, twenty-five million livres, and the Count of Artois, his younger brother, fifty-six million livres, to pay princely debts. Calonne also paid for the château of Rambouillet, which the King had recently bought for sixteen millions, and persuaded the King to yield to the Queen's desire for the estate of St. Cloud, which was to cost six more. He afterwards defended this spendthrift policy by declaring that all "would have been lost if he had taken the attitude of penury at a time when it was necessary to hide the reality of it." By no means all the money was wasted. Some was used for desirable public improvements. Much was needed to meet war expenses, which did not end as soon as the last shot was fired. Calonne was not without able advisers—the economist Dupont de Nemours, Talleyrand, then known as the Abbé de Périgord, and the banker Clavière, who was to become minister of finances during the Revolution. For a time

The
Crisis Ap-
proaches

Ministry
of Calonne

his policy seemed successful. Confidence was restored. Loans were subscribed eagerly. The rate of discount fell and the country appeared to be prosperous. By and by criticisms and protests began to be heard. The judges who were called upon to register the successive edicts authorizing loans seized the occasion to present remonstrances. In 1785 Necker published his *Administration of the Finances*, which lauded his own achievements and decried those of his successors. Forty-four thousand copies were sold in one year.

CHAP. V
1754-88

At this time the Court suffered serious discredit from the Diamond Necklace Affair, of which the Cardinal de Rohan was the guilty dupe and the Queen Marie Antoinette the innocent victim. Rohan, Grand Almoner of France and bishop of Strasbourg, was the most notorious of the loose livers who discredited the episcopate. He was also a patron of the "Count" of Cagliostro, an unusually picturesque charlatan. In the affair Rohan was persuaded by a group of sordid intriguers that the Queen desired to receive him to favor and to avail herself of his assistance in obtaining a necklace worth sixteen hundred thousand livres. Rohan obtained the necklace and handed it to one of the conspirators who impersonated the Queen's *valet de chambre*. Rohan also gave to the jewelers who sold the necklace a contract for payment bearing the Queen's endorsement, which had been forged by the same person. In August, 1785, the plot was discovered, and Rohan was sent to the Bastille. The King unwisely permitted him to be tried by the parlement of Paris, in which he had many partizans, and which was eager to assert itself against the Crown. The result was an acquittal, applauded by the populace, although minor personages were condemned.

Diamond
Necklace
Affair

In 1786 Calonne realized that the policy of loans could not be pursued indefinitely. He had borrowed eight hundred million livres, while the annual deficits had risen to more than one hundred million. He now proposed a radical remedy. He would resume the projects of Turgot, and push them at once beyond the point which Turgot had attempted to reach. The King, at first distrustful, promised him support. Calonne's financial plans were original, his other reforms—abolition of the *corvée*, removal of the restrictions on the grain trade, organization of local assemblies—were taken practically unchanged from Turgot's program. The new land tax, on the principle of Turgot's transformation of the *corvée*, was to replace the *vingtièmes*, and no exemptions were to be granted on the score of rank or official position. The difficulty was that the country was in need of immediate resources and the details of the reform

Calonne's
Plan of
Reform

CHAP. V

1754-88

could not be worked out quickly enough to bring relief. As Calonne felt certain that the parlements would resist stubbornly, when the edicts embodying the proposed changes should be presented for registration, he was anxious to secure the support of public opinion, and persuaded the King that this could be gained by laying the projects before an assembly of royal nominees or notables.

The Assembly of the Notables met in February, 1787. Calonne did not show much discretion in selecting the one hundred and forty-seven members. Among them were several distinguished prelates who were strongly opposed to him. There were also thirty-three judges and officers of the parlements, who would be able to prolong their opposition when the decrees were submitted for registration. Calonne made the mistake of holding out hopes of relief from taxation before the assembly met, although he knew that he would be obliged to reveal the existence of a huge deficit. He was under the delusion that if he denounced abuses with sufficient vigor, he could persuade or compel the very men who profited by them to aid him in introducing radical reforms. Accordingly he attacked every characteristic feature of the existing financial system with all the fury of a pamphleteer. His words first provoked astonishment and then led to combined resistance. The notables began to discover objections to each of his more significant proposals. His provincial assemblies, chosen by the landed proprietors, indiscriminately from the three estates, seemed to be a step toward breaking down that hierarchy of orders which was a fundamental law of the monarchy. In dealing with the taxation of ecclesiastical lands and the debts of the clergy, he proposed to authorize the sale of their ground rents and feudal dues. The nobles feared that this might lead to the redemption of all feudal dues and the destruction of the basis of their social superiority. As the opposition gained strength Calonne was driven to admit that the deficit amounted to one hundred and thirteen million livres, a sum larger than the estimated product of his new land tax. The notables demanded a statement of receipts and expenditures. In the midst of the controversy the King accepted Calonne's resignation.

It would have been wise if Louis XVI had recalled Necker, who had the confidence of the financiers and who might have guided the State through the crisis. After a few weeks Louis entrusted the direction of the government to Loménie de Brienne, Archbishop of Toulouse and a distinguished member of the Assembly of the Notables. Brienne had opposed Calonne, but he

now adopted Calonne's plan, adding to it a stamp tax. He had no greater success with the Notables than had Calonne, and finally dissolved the assembly. He then made a vain attempt to conciliate the judges in order that the decrees might be registered. The first decrees — on the grain trade, the *corvée*, and the provincial assemblies — were registered without difficulty. To procure the registration of the decrees on the stamp tax and the land tax the government was obliged to hold a *lit de justice* on August 6. Even this did not close the controversy, for *parlement* met the following day and declared the act of registration void, and again, some days later, declared that the States General alone could consent to new taxation. For this revolutionary conduct the judges were exiled to Troyes. The provincial *parlements* took the same attitude of resistance and a spirit of revolt spread through the country. But by autumn both the government and the *parlement* of Paris were ready for a compromise. The government abandoned its reforms of taxation and the *parlement* agreed to register a decree prolonging the collection of the two *vingtîèmes* and abolishing exemptions.

The quarrel broke out again more fiercely two months later when the government proposed a series of loans extending over five years and amounting to four hundred and twenty million *livres*. To render this project palatable the King promised to summon the States General before the five years were ended. Although the quarrel dragged on through the winter one signal reform was accomplished — the restoration of civil rights to the Protestants. As spring approached, the struggle became more bitter, until in May the King attempted to reach the root of the difficulty by reorganizing the courts in a manner similar to that which his grandfather had found successful. He tried to commend the change by promising the codification and improvement of the laws, the abolition of torture, and the reduction of the costs of justice. But this time public opinion was hopelessly confused and the resistance of the *parlements* was looked upon as a desperate defense of liberty against absolutist practices in government.

It proved to be more difficult for the government to overcome opposition in the provinces than in Paris. Some of the provincial *parlements* would not register even the decrees which the *parlement* of Paris had accepted. The decrees of May, 1788, reorganizing the courts awakened more violent resistance, which centered in Brittany, Béarn, and Dauphiné. In Grenoble the attempt of the government to coerce the judges led to a formidable riot, which could only be quieted by the judges them-

CHAP. V

1754-88

Failure of
Calonne's
SchemesBank-
ruptcy

CHAP. V

1754-88

selves. This was followed by a successful movement for the restoration of the ancient estates of Dauphiné, reorganized to suit the public opinion of 1788. Meanwhile the financial situation had become desperate. Already in March an account of receipts and expenditures had been published, which placed the deficit at one hundred and sixty million livres. It was impossible to borrow, because the capitalists feared the loss of their money unless parlement sanctioned the issue of loans. The only means of averting ruin seemed to be a meeting of the States General. The government yielded to the pressure of public opinion and announced that the promised session should be opened on May 1, 1789. As there was almost no money in the treasury, payments were on August 16 deferred for six weeks. The notes of the Bank of Discount,² intimately associated with the government, were given legal tender value in Paris. Brienne could not survive the failure of his projects and this confession of inability to pay the debts of the government. He resigned August 25.

The financial disorders not only compromised the plans of reform, but also deprived France of the position abroad won by the successes of the American war. This became apparent in 1787, when conflicts in the Dutch Netherlands between the Orange party and the republicans invited foreign intervention. The stadtholder, William V, was a cousin of the English King, and his wife, Wilhelmina, was the sister of the new Prussian monarch, Frederick William II. France had posed as the patron of the republicans of the province of Holland, the leaders in the opposition to William. The arrest of Wilhelmina by their party in June, 1787, provoked a demand for reparation from Frederick William, and when the answer of the Dutch was evasive, a Prussian army under the Duke of Brunswick marched in from the Prussian province of Cleves. The French, paralyzed by quarrels of the ministry and the courts, and by approaching bankruptcy, did not stir. The result was that the hereditary stadtholdership was made an essential feature of the constitution of the United Provinces. This was followed a year later by the formation of a Triple Alliance, in which the Dutch exchanged the support of France for dependence upon England and Prussia.

² *Caisse d'Escompte*, founded with the aid of Turgot in 1776. During Calonne's administration its capital was increased to one hundred millions, of which seventy were lent to the government. It was the first bank national in character since Law's time, and may be regarded as the predecessor of the Bank of France. In 1787 its note circulation amounted to eighty-eight million livres.

France
Loses
Influence
Abroad

The turn of affairs in the East inflicted another humiliation upon France, which was the traditional defender of Turkish interests. The Emperor Joseph, weary of the French alliance, had made a treaty with Catherine II, looking to the partition of Turkey, and when, in 1787, the Turks attacked her for seizing the Crimea, he joined in the war. The Swedes thought the occasion good for the recovery of provinces which the Russians had taken from them earlier in the century, and they invaded Russian Finland with a large army. The Count de Montmorin, French minister of foreign affairs, sought to learn the aims of Joseph and Catherine, but failed, and Louis XVI was obliged to content himself with feeble efforts at mediation. In international politics France was soon to be reckoned as a negligible quantity.

CHAP. V

1754-88

CHAPTER VI

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

CHAP. VI

1733-1800

Import-
ance of
Economic
Advance

IN 1788 France was on the verge of revolution, if not of financial ruin. For a time the statesmen of rival nations congratulated themselves upon the diminished influence of this formidable power, but when the catastrophe came it proved to be so great that neighboring countries could not long escape its influence. Meanwhile, an industrial revolution had begun in Great Britain, which, ushering in an age of machinery, was destined to affect profoundly not only the struggle in France, but also the wider conflict into which that was merged. The nation which first equipped itself with the new instruments of manufacture would inevitably outrun its rivals in industrial development and the accumulation of wealth. In case of war, its larger financial resources would vastly increase its military and naval power. This became especially clear in the first decade of the nineteenth century when the French Revolution armed itself for the conquest of Europe and under the leadership of Napoleon undertook to humble Great Britain.

Although the forces set in motion by these two revolutions seemed involved in a fatal conflict for mastery, their essential rôle was one of coöperation. The industrial revolution eventually furnished an economic foundation upon which the political and social principles of the French Revolution might erect the institutions of a democratic society. The development of manufacturing by machinery built up great cities, whose leaders gained an influence stronger than that of the old semi-feudal landlords or that of the more recent mercantile aristocracy. For a time society seemed simply to have exchanged masters, but in the end the new aristocracy and the old alike became responsive to the hopes and demands of the common people, who, crowded together in the cities, were conscious of their strength as well as of their rights.

It was the inventions in two great industries, and in the application of power to render them effective, that gave to Great Britain at the close of the eighteenth century her extraordinary advantage over her neighbors and rivals. These industries were

Relation
of Inven-
tions

the manufacture of cloth, especially of cotton cloth, and the manufacture of iron. As soon as the new machinery was approaching completion, a steam engine capable of moving it was nearly perfected. James Watt, the inventor of the steam engine, took out his first patent the year Richard Arkwright patented his spinning frame. This meant that the factories could be equipped with machinery in places where it was impossible to obtain water power. A few years earlier a blast furnace had been built which increased the production of cast iron several hundred per cent., and a few years later a method was discovered for transforming cast iron into malleable iron. The most significant inventions, therefore—the machinery, the mode of producing the material for its construction, and the motive power to propel it—were complementary. This accounts for the swift triumph of the industrial revolution in Great Britain. It profoundly modified the situation in the last twenty years of the century. The great wars began before other nations had an opportunity to appreciate the advantages of the change. From 1792 to 1815 the war-troubled continent was not a field for economic experiments, and when the wars were ended, Great Britain was a generation ahead of her rivals.

Even before the middle of the eighteenth century there were isolated instances of the introduction of machinery. As early as 1598 William Lee had invented a stocking-frame, the success of which aroused such jealousy on the part of the knitters that Lee was obliged to take refuge in Rouen under the protection of the enlightened Henry IV. After Lee's death his associates returned to England and settled in the neighborhood of Nottingham, which soon became the center of a flourishing stocking industry. The use of machinery in a trade so special could, however, exercise little influence upon industry in general.

In certain parts of Italy spinning machines had long been used in producing silk thread, but the secret was carefully guarded. An Englishman in the first part of the eighteenth century succeeded in obtaining plans of the machines and built a silk mill. His enterprise was for a time profitable, but the supply of silk was uncertain, and his success was hardly more significant than the introduction of the stocking-frame.

It seems to have been a mere chance that the most important invention in the manufacture of iron did not belong to the seventeenth rather than to the eighteenth century. The use of charcoal in iron furnaces was already menacing the forests of England with destruction. Moreover, the English furnaces could not supply the demand for pig iron and the manufacturers

CHAP. VI
1733-1800

of things into which iron entered as a part were obliged to import large quantities from Sweden and Russia. The only way to assure the future of the industry was to find a method by which "pit" coal could be used in smelting ore. In its natural state it could not be burned with the iron, for it made the cast iron brittle. The discoverer of the process by which coal could be turned into coke and used in this form was a son of Lord Dudley, who possessed furnaces on his estates. But before the process was perfected Charles I and parliament were involved in war, and Dudley fought on the side of the King. Although he survived the struggle, he never again secured the support necessary to make his invention a practical success. Dudley and other ingenious men were precursors rather than creators. The time was not ripe.

**Expansion
 of Trade**

The changes in the economic situation by the middle of the eighteenth century gave an extraordinary stimulus to the inventive energies of men acquainted with the needs of industry. The older methods were no longer adequate to the demands made upon them. Foreign trade was expanding with tremendous rapidity. The changes affected Great Britain and France especially, for they had flourishing colonies in America and valuable trading stations in India. Between 1715 and 1789 French foreign trade increased fivefold. At the close of the period more than half of this trade was with the colonies, especially the sugar-raising colonies of the West Indies. The progress of British trade was as rapid and more free from disastrous interruptions. Commerce with the North American colonies alone had reached before the Seven Years' War an annual average of two million pounds sterling, nearly three times what it had been forty years earlier. The wars in the middle of the century did not check or disorganize British trade as they did the trade of France, because Great Britain maintained her supremacy upon the sea and was better able to protect her shipping. Another fact favored the development of English industry. The guild system had broken down more completely in England, and the government did not place obstacles in the way of invention by insisting upon minute regulation of the processes of manufacture. In England also capital, so necessary for industrial experiments on a large scale, had reached a higher stage of development, partly as a consequence of the success of the Bank of England founded at the close of the preceding century.

The progress of industry in Germany was retarded by her petty state system, with its multitude of tariffs, transit dues, and tolls. The cities of the far interior, like Nuremberg and Augs-

burg, so flourishing in the sixteenth century, had long been losing ground. The population of Nuremberg was only half what it had been two centuries earlier. Augsburg's cloth industry, which employed six thousand weavers in the sixteenth century, employed only five hundred in the latter part of the eighteenth. Cities situated on the coast, like Hamburg, which shared in the newer commercial activities, grew rapidly, but their prosperity had little apparent influence on the cities of upper Germany.

CHAP. VI

1733-1800

The changes then taking place in England are illustrated by the growth of Liverpool. In the early part of the seventeenth century Liverpool was hardly more than a fishing village, and even a century later its population numbered only five thousand. The development of the colonial trade, including the slave trade, which followed the close of the War of the Spanish Succession, was profitable to Liverpool. The population of the city increased fivefold by 1750. But the relations between it and the inland towns were as yet undeveloped. England, unlike France, had no canals. The roads also were still in deplorable condition. These obstacles were almost as great as the tolls and dues which hampered internal trade in continental countries.

Not only did economic necessity act as a spur, but also any advance in one part of an industry stimulated men to improve the processes in other parts. This is illustrated in the case of weaving. The weavers had long been hampered by the difficulty of throwing the shuttle from side to side, if the cloth was broad. In 1733 John Kay devised a flying shuttle, which enabled him to weave even broadcloth without the assistance of a helper. As his invention also increased the speed with which ordinary weaving was done, it destroyed the balance in the industry. The women of England were unequal to the task of supplying the thread which the weavers wanted. The need of machines for spinning was felt more keenly than before.

The Flying Shuttle

In the textile industries the manufacture of cotton profited most by the invention of machinery. This industry had been of slow growth in England. It had been introduced in the sixteenth century by Flemish weavers who fled from their country during the religious wars. In the early part of the eighteenth century it was still of far less importance than the woolen industry. The spinners were unable to produce a thread as strong and fine as that spun by the Hindus, and they commonly mixed linen with the cotton in order to increase the strength of the cloth. They owed their market partly to the fact that parliament, influenced by the woolen merchants, had prohibited the importation of India prints. As soon as spinning and weaving

CHAP. VI

1733-1800

machinery were invented the cotton industry advanced by leaps until it became one of the most distinctive industries of Great Britain, and of greater importance than the woolen trade. Its peculiar home was Lancashire, where the climate was moist and equable, and where the port of Liverpool was close at hand.

The Spinning Jenny

A machine for spinning cotton thread was invented the same year as the flying shuttle, but the inventor did not have the capital to introduce his invention. A few years later it was purchased and a mill was built provided with the machines, but it was badly managed and the enterprise failed. The first successful machine was made by James Hargreaves, who was a carpenter as well as a weaver. The story is told that he entered the room where his wife was spinning so suddenly that she upset her spinning-wheel. He noticed that the wheel kept on turning as it lay on the floor, and this suggested to him the idea of making a wheel which would turn several spindles and spin several threads at once. He constructed a machine which spun eight threads, and named it a "spinning jenny" in honor of his wife. In 1767 he began to make machines to sell. As they were light they could be set up in cottages and did not interfere with the domestic system of manufacture. The thread which they produced was fine, although it lacked somewhat in strength.

Arkwright

Richard Arkwright's machine, which was patented in 1769, the year before Hargreaves obtained his patent, was constructed on a different principle. Its essential feature, like that of the unsuccessful spinning machine invented a generation earlier, was a system of rollers, each revolving faster than the one before, and by this means drawing out the strands of cotton. The thread was strong, but not fine. Arkwright's machines differed from those of Hargreaves also in the fact that they were too heavy for a spinner's cottage. Special buildings were required. In 1771 with the aid of certain capitalists Arkwright built a mill on the Derwent near Derby. As water power was used his machine was called the water-frame. Its introduction meant the partial abandonment of the domestic system, and the transfer of the spinner from the home to the factory, one of the most far-reaching consequences of the industrial revolution, and not peculiar to any single trade.

While Arkwright was busy constructing and equipping mills, Samuel Crompton invented a machine which eventually superseded both the spinning jenny and the water-frame. This was the mule-spinner, which combined the essential features of each. The first machines were made of wood, but in 1790 metal rollers were substituted and the mule was rapidly introduced. The

thread was both fine and strong; indeed, it was better than the thread hitherto produced by the Hindu spinners. With this thread by 1783 muslins were made which could enter into competition with India goods. Two years later the production amounted to fifty thousand pieces. The way was thus marked out for the supremacy of British cottons.

CHAP. VI

1733-1800

The invention of spinning machinery destroyed the balance in the textile industry. The spinners were now ahead of the weavers, as after the invention of the flying shuttle the weavers had been ahead of the spinners. Two consequences followed. A period of ten or twenty years ensued during which the great demand for weavers raised their wages, making them the aristocrats among artisans. A second consequence was the danger that the surplus thread would be exported and that continental weavers would obtain part of the advantages of the invention. There was even talk of prohibiting the export of cotton thread. The problem of restoring the balance between spinning and weaving was a common topic of conversation. The solution was found, curiously enough, by Edmund Cartwright, a clergyman who was wholly without mechanical knowledge, and who had never even seen a weaver at work. Cartwright had been distinguished hitherto only by his brilliant studies at Oxford and by certain poems in the style of Pope which he had published. In a chance conversation with two men from Manchester he argued that it was possible to construct a loom, while his more practical companions took the other side. Cartwright obtained the help of a carpenter and blacksmith and constructed a loom for which he obtained a patent in 1785. This machine was, however, so clumsy that it required two strong men to run it. Cartwright saw its defects and remedied them. Within two years he made looms which could weave ordinary cottons, calicoes, or fine muslins. He fitted out a mill at Doncaster in Yorkshire, but it was badly managed and the enterprise failed. In 1791, with the aid of two Manchester spinners, he constructed a more elaborate mill, capable of holding four hundred looms. The jealousy of the weavers was now aroused and the mill was burned. Cartwright's resources were exhausted, and the introduction of his invention was delayed, so that it was ten years before his machines began to be widely used.

A Power
Loom

Meanwhile the processes of making cast iron and malleable or bar iron had been revolutionized. The first furnace which used coal successfully in smelting iron ore was constructed by Abraham Darby in 1735. His invention attracted little attention for many years. The lack of a forced draft prevented him from

CHAP. VI

1733-1800

Iron
Foundries

producing more than five or six hundred tons of cast iron a year. Twenty-five years later Dr. Roebuck founded his famous iron works on the Carron River, near the Firth of Forth. Assisted by the engineer Smeaton he constructed a powerful blast by means of cylinders, which enabled him to triple the amount of cast iron produced by the furnace. He also partially solved the problem of transforming cast iron into malleable iron with the use of coal. The difficulty had been that this method did not free the iron from its impurities as did the use of charcoal. As long as coal could be used only for smelting the ore, only half the obstacles to the development of the iron industry had been removed. England had a vital interest in the success of these experiments, because she wished to become independent of foreign producers. In 1783 the method known as "puddling," that is, purifying the cast iron in a "reverberatory" furnace, was discovered by Henry Cort. The masters of the great forges were at first incredulous, but they were soon convinced that the bar iron produced by the new process was equal or superior to the best Swedish iron. Before the close of the century the annual production of the furnaces around Coalbrookdale, where Abraham Darby won his first successes, amounted to thirteen or fourteen thousand tons. The Carron iron works were equally successful. They became famous throughout Europe and a cannon, the carronade, was named for them.

The most famous ironmaster of the time was John Wilkinson, who saw more clearly than his fellows the possibilities of the industry. He announced his intention to build a boat of iron. Men thought his head had been turned by the rapid industrial changes of the past few years, but in 1787 the boat was successfully launched on the Severn. The next year he sold forty-eight miles of iron piping to the city of Paris for its waterworks. Already with the aid of Darby he had constructed an iron bridge across the Severn with a span of one hundred feet. It was about the year 1788 that iron began to be substituted generally for wood in spinning machinery.

New
Successes

The development of the iron industry made possible a new method of printing calicoes. Up to 1785 the work had been done with engraved blocks ten inches long and five inches wide. "The printing of a piece of calico twenty-eight yards long and in a single color involved 448 separate applications of the block."¹ With the introduction of metal cylinders several colors could be laid on at once. This decreased the labor by ninety-nine per cent.

¹ W. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, III, 640.

The improvements in textile machinery were not limited to the manufacture of cotton cloth, but were adapted to the spinning and weaving of woollens. The advance in this trade was not, however, so significant. At the same time the discoveries of Berthelot, the French chemist, made known in England by Watt, led to the abandonment of the old, wearisome methods of bleaching and dyeing.

Among other inventions almost equally important was the perfecting by Huntsman of the crucible process in the manufacture of steel. This confirmed the supremacy of Sheffield in the cutlery trade.

Most of the inventions which had been revolutionizing English industry had been the work of practical men, face to face with obstacles which had to be overcome if their business was to be made successful. The improvements in the iron industry would have been more rapid had men possessed the knowledge of chemistry which was soon to be gained. As it was they were obliged to proceed empirically. The history of the steam engine was different. James Watt, who contributed most to its development, was a man acquainted with the recent discoveries in science. His mechanical genius had manifested itself early and he had chosen as a profession the construction of laboratory instruments. He became deeply interested in the progress of chemistry and worked with Dr. Roebuck, founder of the Carron iron works. He made experiments upon the pressure of steam and undertook to improve a pump invented by Newcomen, which used steam to raise the piston in its cylinder, relying on atmospheric pressure to force the piston down again. When Dr. Roebuck needed a better pump to get the water out of his coal mines, Watt set seriously to work upon the correction of the defects in Newcomen's machine. Although he did not succeed in time to save Roebuck from being ruined by his mining venture, he took out a first patent in 1769 and finally constructed an engine which used steam exclusively and could furnish motive power for factories as well as pumps. His principal difficulties were due to lack of skill on the part of the workmen who made his cylinders. This was before the day of machine tools. Watt had entered into partnership with Roebuck, and with Matthew Boulton, an enterprising Birmingham manufacturer, when Roebuck failed. Boulton invested not only all he had but all he could borrow. Watt was many times discouraged and on the point of abandoning the struggle, but Boulton never faltered. By 1787 success was assured. Already one of Watt's steam pumps had been placed at Chaillot on the Seine in the suburbs of Paris. The

CHAP. VI
1733-1800

James
Watt

CHAP. VI
1733-1800

steam engine was also being used to run other machinery besides pumps. It was introduced into spinning factories, flour mills, and machine shops.

These industrial changes were accompanied by an improvement in the routes between different parts of Great Britain. An era of road and canal building began, and such work speedily assumed the proportions of a mania. The first canal ran from the collieries at Worsley seven miles to Manchester. In one place its construction necessitated a tunnel through rock, and in another an aqueduct over a river. Soon the cities of the east and the west coast, as well as London and the Midlands, were connected by canals. The improvement in the roads was brought about by the extension of the turnpike system. New methods of road construction were planned by such engineers as Metcalfe, Telford, and Macadam.

The Rivals
of England

The progress of this industrial revolution in England had not escaped the attention of her rivals in manufacturing. French travelers realized that France could not hope to compete with England unless French manufacturers adopted the new English machines and processes. One of them admired the success with which the English had constructed iron machinery. Writing in the year 1786, a year critical for the trade relations of the two countries, he said that the iron was of such quality that it resembled polished steel and he deplored the lack of that art in France. He added, "It is the only means of multiplying our manufactures on a large scale and of competing with the English on even terms, for it is impossible to pretend to such competition if we struggle on with our old machinery, especially with machinery built of wood."²

The progress of invention in England, especially in manufacturing cotton, gave British products a double advantage. It reduced the cost to the manufacturer, enabling him to compete successfully in every market, and so improved the quality of his goods that in several cases he monopolized the trade. A certain grade of cotton thread fell in nine years from thirty-eight shillings a pound to fifteen. Moreover, continental spinners could not produce thread as fine and strong as that spun by Crompton's machines. If continental weavers were to compete with British weavers, they had to buy British thread. That Great Britain profited by her advantages is indicated by the rapid rise in the consumption of raw cotton. At the beginning of the century her importations were a little more than a million pounds. In 1771

² P. Mantoux, *La Révolution industrielle au dixhuitième siècle*, 315.

they amounted to 4,760,000. By 1800 they had risen to 56,000,000. **CHAP. VI**

A few enterprising French manufacturers desired to utilize the new British machinery. Martin, a native of Amiens, in 1784, presented an Arkwright machine to the Academy of Sciences. An attempt was made to start a factory for the construction of such machines. About the same time spinning machinery was introduced in several mills in Languedoc. Enough was attempted to alarm the workmen in one or two cities. In 1789 the artisans of Caen demanded that the use of the spinning machines be forbidden on the ground that it would deprive spinners of employment. France as a whole adhered for another generation to the old methods.

1733-1800

In Germany also the new machinery was introduced slowly. It was 1798 before a mill equipped with spinning machines and run by water power was completed. Even the young republic across the seas was more enterprising, for in 1789 Samuel Slater, one of Arkwright's workmen, succeeded in fitting a mill at Pawtucket, in Rhode Island, with spinning machinery. Hargreave's jenny had been used in Philadelphia still earlier. Such facts illustrate the spread of the new ideas, although as they were simply occasional, they show also the enormous advance the British were making over their rivals.

It was at this juncture, when British industry was being revolutionized, and French industry clung tenaciously to earlier methods, that England and France entered into a commercial treaty which was conceived in the spirit of Turgot and Adam Smith. The eighteenth article of the Treaty of Versailles in 1783 had pledged the two countries to rearrange their commercial relations within two years. Before the treaty was signed, in February, 1783, Vergennes, the French minister of foreign affairs, had written to his agent in London, "One does not get rich from very poor nations"; in other words, that the richer England and France were the greater opportunity for each to profit by the trade of the other. The policy of exclusiveness was, therefore, in his opinion, a blunder. The French were apparently more eager for a treaty than the English, for they were filled with suspicions towards their neighbor, who had humbled them in the war of the American Revolution. William Pitt was then prime minister of England and, while he was in favor of freer trade, was exasperatingly slow in meeting the proposals of Vergennes. In 1785, as a reminder, the French issued a temporary order restraining the importation of English products, especially cottons, which were just then the rage in France. Finally, in the spring of 1786, William Eden was sent to Paris

A Commer-
cial Treaty

CHAP. VI

1733-1800

to negotiate for the English. Pitt was a hard bargainer, and several times Eden felt that he demanded so much that the negotiations would fall through and commercial war would be the result. Pitt was anxious to open the French market to the products of the new English machinery as well as to English hardware and cutlery. He proposed that the French should reduce their duties to five and seven per cent., but he was unwilling to admit French silks on any terms. A bargain was at length struck, which gave French wines the terms granted to Portuguese wines by the famous Methuen Treaty, and which in turn admitted English cutlery and hardware at ten per cent. and cottons at twelve per cent. The same duties were also applied to French goods, but there was little likelihood that the English would import either iron and steel or cottons from France at that time. The treaty was on the whole more favorable to England than to France. It became effective in May, 1787. In the wine districts it was popular, but in the manufacturing towns it was universally denounced. The effects of the treaty were heightened by the taste for English goods already widespread in France. An industrial crisis, due in part to the financial embarrassments of the government, and to the crop failure of 1788, also aggravated the situation. When artisans were thrown out of employment and looms were idle, French public opinion held the treaty responsible. The unfortunate consequences appeared several years later when the two countries were involved in war and it became the policy of France to exclude English products altogether from France and from all other countries which the French could control.

The industrial revolution in England had consequences even more significant than its influence upon the trade relations between Great Britain and the Continent. Its most important consequence was the creation of the factory system, with all the changes which this drew in its train. Cottage industry or the domestic system was doomed, although it was continued in some trades for many years. The workmen who could not find employment eventually under the new system were reduced to misery. The transition period between the old and the new was, therefore, peculiarly trying. It occurred at a time when a revolution in English land management was bringing to an end the rights in the common fields which the villagers had possessed since the Middle Ages. The weaver who cultivated a little plot of land and turned his cow or geese out upon the village commons found himself attacked in two directions. He was faced with a ruinous competition from the factory loom and at the

same time lost that part of his livelihood which came from agriculture. **CHAP. VI**

1733-1800

One of the clearest indications of the change which was taking place is found in the movement of population. The towns in the new cotton, iron, and coal districts grew with great rapidity, while many of the older agricultural regions lost population. Between 1760 and 1800 the population of Manchester was quadrupled. Bolton, a mere village, grew to be a thriving town of 17,000. Birmingham and Sheffield grew more slowly, only doubling their population in forty years. But the change is all the more striking because many observers earlier in the century were convinced that England was actually losing in population. The growth of the great cities was bound to have an effect upon the political development of the English people, leading toward democracy. That this did not occur as soon as might have been expected was due mainly to the French Revolution which ran a course so violent that the majority of Englishmen became immoderately conservative. **Changes in Population**

CHAPTER VII

THE FALL OF THE OLD RÉGIME IN FRANCE

CHAP.
VII

1788-89

IF royal authority almost ceased to exist in France after a few months of revolution, this was not because of the violence with which it was attacked or of any fixed intention on the part of the people to destroy it, but because abdication in the presence of difficulties had become habitual. The government of Louis XVI suffered from something worse than mere incapacity to suppress disorder. It did not persist in any of its policies long enough to overcome even those obstacles of the every-day sort which had no elements of mystery or surprise. It remained decked in the trappings of tyranny, without being able either to put them off or to play the part. The King, when the crisis became bewildering, sought to escape his perplexities by spending his days in hunting. Nor was it probable that the situation would be corrected by the appointment of Necker. He was a man of petty expedients, rather than a statesman capable of devising a program of reform which would command the support of the nation.

Necker's first task was to save the government from the discredit of a partial bankruptcy and to secure money for current expenses. His appointment restored public confidence. State securities advanced thirty points and stock of the Bank of Discount increased in value almost as much. A royal decree soon withdrew the treasury notes that Brienne had provided for, but the notes of the Bank of Discount remained legal tender. Necker could not resort to public loans to obtain money, on account of the panic from which the country was slow to recover, and he turned to the Bank of Discount for aid, as his predecessors had done for the past five years. From this and similar sources he obtained seventy-five million livres, satisfying the most urgent needs of the treasury until the spring of 1789. He advanced two millions of his own fortune.

Questions equally serious were raised by the industrial crisis and a partial failure of the wheat crop. For thirty years the price of bread had risen steadily and in several localities it had tripled and even quadrupled. At Paris, early in 1789, a four-

pound loaf cost fourteen sous and a half, which, taking into account the relative value of money, was a famine price. In many towns mobs tried to compel traders to sell grain at a price below the market rate. To relieve the situation Necker returned to the methods of trade regulation already several times abandoned. In the preamble to one of his decrees he intimated that the measure was designed to thwart the schemes of monopolists. He thus countenanced the popular suspicion that speculation was at the bottom of the trouble. Parlements and administrative or municipal officers, fearful lest their communities should suffer, issued decrees forbidding the transport of the grain beyond their jurisdiction. As a result, in large cities like Paris, the supply of bread and flour became very uncertain.

The policy of the government in regard to the organization and work of the coming States General was the matter of most immediate importance. By a decree, issued on July 5, 1788, officials and other "instructed" persons were requested to search for documents and to present memoirs to aid in determining the method of convocation. The practical effect of this decree was to do away with the censorship of political writings. The presses turned out scores of pamphlets, and reputations were in the making. Men ambitious to be accounted statesmen labored to signalize themselves in these discussions. The theories they advocated belonged to a common body of doctrine, which affirmed the supremacy of the third estate and condemned class privilege, measuring the importance of communities by the size of the population rather than by the number of special privileges contained in their charters. For the principle of historical rights was substituted the theory that the general will determines the character of the law. One of the pamphleteers, Rabaut Saint-Étienne, a famous Huguenot preacher, pointed out that even if the clergy and the nobles were subtracted the nation would remain, because twenty-four million people would be left. But, he asked, what would be the case if the twenty-four million were subtracted? His conclusion was that the third estate should have at least as many representatives as the two privileged orders, and that the States General should meet as a single body, its members voting as individuals. Target, a Paris lawyer, argued that the clergy and the nobles were mistaken in thinking that they constituted two orders; they formed, said he, only one, the privileged order, and there was only one other, the non-privileged. The best known pamphlet was written by the Abbé Sieyès and was a development of the ideas suggested by three questions: "What is the third estate? Everything. What has

CHAP.
VII
1788-89

The
Pamphlet-
eers

CHAP.
VII
1788-89

Plan of
Represent-
tation

it been in the political order? Nothing. What does it aspire to be? Something." The agitation was not carried on solely by pamphlets. The same questions were discussed in the salons and wherever thoughtful men assembled.

The government under the influence of Necker attempted to steer a middle course. Late in December, in a long and labored report, he announced that the third estate should have as many deputies as the other orders put together. He suggested that in questions of common interest the States General should meet and vote as a single body, but he made this method dependent upon the wishes of the orders. His decision seemed liberal because the parlement of Paris had declared itself in favor of the mode of organization used in 1614. At the same time Necker brought forward in the name of the King a definite program of reform. In this he proposed that no taxes should be levied without the consent of the States General, that the expenses of the Court should be provided for separately by a civil list, and that the ministers should limit themselves to the sums assigned to their departments in the annual budget which was a part of his plan. He promised, also, that the practice of arbitrary arrest by *lettres de cachet*¹ should be regulated by law and that the liberty of the press should receive legal sanction. His words implied a confidence that the clergy and the nobles would voluntarily abandon their exemptions from taxation. But in regard to the feudal system, he said, "It will never occur to members of the third estate to seek to diminish the seigniorial honors and prerogatives which distinguish the first two orders, whether in their property or their persons; for no Frenchman is ignorant of the fact that these prerogatives are a property as respectable as any other, that several are essential to the monarchy, and that His Majesty would never permit the slightest infringement of them." In the royal letter of convocation, the work of the States General was stated in comprehensive, not to say vague, terms. The deputies were to propose measures concerning "the needs of the State, the reform of abuses, the organization of all parts of the administration, the prosperity of the kingdom, and the welfare of all." Groups of voters and of electors were permitted, as of old, to present their grievances and petitions in *cahiers*. The King expressed the hope that through this extraordinary con-

¹ A *lettre de cachet* was an administrative order assigning a place of imprisonment to the person arrested. As he could not resort to habeas corpus proceedings, his imprisonment was at the pleasure of the government.

sultation he would become acquainted with the needs and the wishes of even the remotest inhabitants of his kingdom.

The mode of choosing deputies to the States General presented almost as many anomalies as the institutions of the old régime. The electoral district was the bailiwick or *sénéchaussée*. In nearly all cases the elections of the three orders were separate. The nobles voted directly for the deputies of their order. This was true also of the bishops and of the parish priests. The monks, however, were given only one vote for each monastery. The arrangement which gave a parish priest as large a share as a bishop in the choice of clerical deputies was an immense gain to the cause of the third estate. The first consequence was that parish priests formed over two-thirds of the deputation. The elections of the third estate were indirect; that is, the voters of a bailiwick chose the members of an electoral assembly, which selected the deputation to the States General. The ordinary townsman had less voting power than the villager, for all cities except the largest had a local electoral assembly, making the choice of the deputies to the States General doubly indirect. This accounts for the number of country lawyers who sat in the States General, and gave point to Edmund Burke's reproach that "its general composition was of obscure provincial advocates . . . the fomenters and conductors of the petty war of village vexation." The suffrage was practically universal, being granted to all those whose names appeared on the tax rolls.

Paris, Metz, Strasbourg, and two other large cities had special electoral assemblies with the right to send deputies directly to the States General. In Paris the suffrage was restricted to those who paid six livres in taxes, or who possessed a university degree, or held letters of mastership in the crafts, or enjoyed an official title. Many Parisians did not appreciate their new privilege. Only a fourth or a fifth of those entitled to vote took part in the election. Some like Bailly, future mayor of the city, enjoyed the sensation of "breathing a new atmosphere: it was a phenomenon to be something in the political order." Another Parisian noticed the absence of workingmen, and said, "Who can tell if the despotism of the bourgeoisie will not succeed the so-called aristocracy of the nobles."

The assemblies of voters, as well as the electoral assemblies, drew up cahiers. In some cases they adopted models prepared by ambitious politicians, in others they debated fiercely what articles should be included, and in still others they recorded simply the views of individual members, occasionally in the naïve

CHAP.
VII

1788-89

The
ElectionsThe
Cahiers

CHAP.
VII

1788-89

language of the peasants. The cahiers of all three estates agreed in demanding a constitution embodying the liberties which Necker had promised. The nobles and clergy declared themselves ready to give up their exemptions from taxation, but they desired to preserve their other privileges. Many of the cahiers of the third estate contained complaints of oppressive feudal burdens, although they did not unite in demanding the abolition of the feudal system. It was liberty rather than equality that seemed to be the universal cry.

Versailles was chosen as the place where the States General should meet. Prudent persons had suggested Soissons, or some other provincial town beyond the reach of a Paris mob, but the government did not wish to be put to the trouble and expense of moving the administrative bureaus. Necker urged the claims of Paris, because he thought that the public credit and the integrity of the public debt would be safer in a city where many of the creditors of the State lived.

The opening session of the States General took place on May 5. The great hall was crowded with deputies and spectators. Gouverneur Morris, who was to succeed Jefferson as American minister to France, was obliged to go at eight o'clock and sit "in a cramped position until after twelve" in order to witness the ceremonies. It was easy to distinguish the different orders, for the costumes had been arranged by the government. Black had been imposed upon the deputies of the third estate, in striking contrast to the splendors of the dress worn by the nobles. The black costume of the priests also contrasted with the red or violet robes of the higher clergy. At one o'clock the King entered, followed by the Queen. The principal speech was made by Necker. He said nothing about the December program of reform, but spoke at great length about the finances. As Mirabeau declared in his newspaper, it was not a speech but a volume. At four o'clock the ceremonies were over. As the King rose, cries of "Vive le Roi" filled the house. Even the Queen was applauded, which had not happened for months. She made a courtesy, and the applause redoubled.

The aim of Necker's speech was to allay the anxieties due to the deficit of one hundred and sixty millions acknowledged by the government of Brienne. By subtracting anticipations and extraordinary expenses he reduced the total to fifty-six millions, and explained that by a few simple reforms and easy economies the remainder could be wiped out. He then exclaimed, "What a country, gentlemen, in which without taxes and with resources hitherto ignored we can remove a deficit which has been the talk

Meeting of
the States
General

of Europe!" Upon the tasks of the States General he spoke only in vague terms, declaring that they "should note and follow the traces of national welfare in all its ramifications." This futile attitude was apparently not Necker's fault, for the King was unwilling to renew the promises already made in his name.

The States General represented the best intelligence of France. Few assemblies have held a greater number of distinguished men. Morris, who watched its proceedings closely, acknowledged that it had many good heads, although he added that they would have been better for a little experience. He meant, probably, experience in deliberative assemblies, for many deputies had had experience as administrators and councilors of government. Dupont de Nemours had served in Turgot's administration and had assisted Calonne. Talleyrand was another of Calonne's advisers. About half of the deputies of the third estate were lawyers, some of them leaders in the profession, like Thouret of Rouen, Merlin of Douai, Treilhard and Tronchet of Paris. More than half the nobles were officers in the army, including no fewer than eleven lieutenant-generals. Two brigadier-generals, Montesquiou and Custine, were destined to take a prominent part in the campaign of 1792. Several officers had served in the American Revolutionary War, including Lafayette, Charles and Alexander Lameth, and the Viscount de Mirabeau, brother of the more famous Count. Political pamphleteers were there — Mirabeau, Sieyès, Target, and Rabaut Saint-Étienne. Mounier, a leader of the revolutionary agitation in Dauphiné, was a deputy. Among the clergy were men distinguished in the administration of their dioceses.

No sooner was the opening session of the States General over than the deputies of the three orders were involved in a deadlock which lasted seven weeks. The members of the third estate were determined that all should meet as a single assembly, while the nobles insisted upon their ancient right to act as a separate order. The clergy adopted a waiting policy. The bishops would have been glad to imitate the nobles, but they could not depend on the support of the parish priests who formed the majority of the ecclesiastical deputation. The controversy centered about the method of examining the credentials of the deputies. The nobles finished this business in a separate chamber and the clergy took similar action provisionally. The third estate refused to organize at all, regarded their body as an assembly of citizens, chose their oldest deputy dean, and invited the deputies of the clergy and nobles to unite with them and proceed to organization. Two commissions of conciliation, one

CHAP.
VII

1788-89

appointed by the King, failed to bring about a settlement and public excitement reached the danger point. On June 10, the third estate assumed the right to proceed with the organization of all the deputies as a single body whether the clergy and the nobles presented themselves or not. During the examination of credentials, which occupied several days, a few parish priests belonging to the clerical deputation appeared, submitted their credentials, and were accepted as members. When the work of organization was completed the new body, on June 17, took the title "The National Assembly."

The ministry now decided to intervene. Necker wished by a mixture of concession and restriction to set limits to the course of a revolution which each day grew more menacing to the established order. He urged the King to declare that the present estates should meet as a single body to deliberate upon affairs of general interest, but without the right to settle questions concerning feudal property or the prerogatives of the Church. He hoped to make such restrictions acceptable by offering a liberal program of reform, including the immediate abrogation of the pecuniary privileges of the clergy and nobles and the admission of all citizens to civil and military employments. The ministers agreed only that a declaration should be made by the King at a session of the States General to be held on June 22. The controversy in the council between Necker and his opponents was so prolonged that the royal session was deferred one day. Meanwhile, on June 20, when the members of the third estate attempted to enter their hall, they found it closed, ostensibly that preparations might be made for the coming joint session. They went to a covered tennis court near by, and there, amidst the wildest enthusiasm, bound themselves by an oath never to separate until they had given a constitution to France. A day or two later the majority of the clergy joined them. By this time the opposition to Necker in the council had been reinforced by the influence of the Queen and the King's brothers, and Louis rejected Necker's plan and adopted one which was certain to be obnoxious to the third estate.

At the royal sitting on June 23, the King declared that the organization by orders was an essential feature of the monarchy. He requested the nobles and the clergy to meet with the third estate in a common assembly during the continuance of the existing States General, but excluded from discussion feudal rights, the constitutional privileges of the clergy and nobility, and the manner of organizing future meetings of the States General. He promised to sanction the abandonment by the clergy and the

nobility of their pecuniary privileges. But he did not say that the meetings of the States General should be periodical. Indeed, a majority of the ministry wished the summoning and the dissolving of that body to continue to be a royal prerogative. The King's program of reform was extensive and specific, but was, after all, only a list of intentions, and Frenchmen had listened to the publication of similar lists many times during the past fifteen years. In both his opening and his concluding words the King spoke as if the three estates, even in the present States General, were to organize themselves separately. When the sitting was over and the King had gone out, the deputies of the third estate with many of the clergy and some of the nobles remained in their places. As the King had specifically ordered them to "separate immediately," the grand master of ceremonies asked them if they had not heard the King's commands. The Count de Mirabeau exclaimed that they would go only when driven out at the point of the bayonet, and the Abbé Sieyès declared in his sententious manner that they were still what they had been the day before.

The majority of the deputies of the third estate regarded the King's declaration as a belated act of tyranny, although they held his advisers rather than him responsible. Nevertheless, it was not perfectly clear at the time that the assembly was wise in adopting so uncompromising an attitude. Arthur Young, the English traveler, who was at Versailles, believed that the "Commons put immense and certain benefits to the chance of fortune, which may make posterity curse, instead of bless, their memories as true patriots." He thought that the King could have been induced, in view of the need of money, to make further concessions, but, he added, the "people seem with a sort of frenzy to reject all idea of compromise." A few days later the situation was changed, for the new assembly continued to gain recruits from the clergy, and forty-seven of the nobles came over in a body. Louis now yielded and requested the other clergy and nobles to follow their example. The deadlock was broken on June 27, and the States General gave place to the National Assembly.

The Parisians watched the drama at Versailles with mixed feelings. The more zealous advocates of change were filled with rage. Crowds gathered daily within the gardens of the Palais Royal,² eagerly listening to the latest pamphlets or applauding the fiery outbursts of the statesmen of the cafés. Occasionally

Paris

² Belonging to the Duke of Orleans. The gardens were surrounded by cafés and shops.

CHAP.
VII

1788-89

they varied this diversion by assaults upon police agents or upon nobles suspected of opposing the popular cause. The number of penniless strangers in the city rapidly increased because of distress in the provinces. The good bourgeois of the town were alarmed and began to clamor for the organization of a citizen militia. The government was also alarmed, fearing a sudden invasion of Versailles, which was distant only a short march from Paris. After June 23 the King's advisers urged that more regiments be ordered to the neighborhood of Paris. The Court party secretly hoped that the presence of an army would enable the government to reaffirm the declarations of June 23, perhaps to arrest the leading members of the National Assembly, and restore governmental authority, which was slipping from the feeble grasp of the King. In consequence of the orders issued between June 23 and July 1, an army of 20,000 was collected near Paris and between Paris and Versailles. The last detachments were expected about the middle of July. This army was made up chiefly of the foreign regiments in the royal service, which were less affected by the excitement of the political struggle than the French regiments. The detailed orders show that the troops were to protect the Bourse, the Bank of Discount, the Royal Treasury, the Bastille, and the Invalides against mob violence. But the air was filled with the wildest rumors as to the schemes of the princes and the reactionary nobles. All the greater was the desire of the citizens of Paris for a militia, a desire expressed repeatedly by the Paris Electors, who had continued their organization after the elections were over and who were holding sessions in a hall at the Hotel de Ville. The National Assembly also saw a menace in the presence of troops and asked for their removal.

The court party took with ill grace their defeat of June 27 and only waited until a sufficient army was at hand to get rid of Necker and assume control themselves. The King had little reason to be grateful to Necker for the conduct of the government thus far, and it was not difficult to procure an order for his dismissal on July 11, coupled with the requirement that he leave the country at once. The ministers who supported Necker's policy were dismissed at the same time, and a new ministry was formed which was expected to give a firmer tone to the management of affairs.

When the news of Necker's dismissal reached Paris, early on Sunday afternoon, July 12, the city was thrown into an uproar. Men cried out that the National Assembly was to be dissolved and that Paris was on the point of being assaulted by the regi-

ments which were encamped on every side. The excitement was greatest in the Palais Royal. Camille Desmoulins, a young journalist, mounted a table and summoned the crowd to arms, declaring in breathless accents that a "Saint Bartholomew of the patriots" was planned for that very night. Soon a collision took place between the excited crowds and the soldiers in the western quarters of the city. Many of the French Guard, a regiment entrusted with the preservation of order both in the capital and in Versailles, and always ready for a quarrel with the foreign regiments, joined the mob and attacked a detachment of troops on the *Place Louis Quinze*.³ As the commander of the royal troops was left without positive orders, he withdrew late in the evening. That night terror reigned in Paris. The citizens not only feared an attack from the army, but expected that the vagabonds who had plundered the gun shops would begin a carnival of pillage and murder. The mobs were, however, restrained by the guards, who realized that if the resistance to the royal troops should degenerate into an aimless riot, a reaction must follow and they would be mercilessly punished. They were the only force which could check the worst deeds of violence, for the police had disappeared with mysterious swiftness as soon as it was evident that the royal administration was unable to cope with the insurrection.

Before the night was over many of the Electors of Paris had assembled at the Hotel de Ville. Early the next day they organized a permanent⁴ or executive committee, and made Flesselles, the provost of the merchants, its chairman. They directed the citizens of the sixty districts to reassemble as at the time of the elections, and to organize a citizen militia, to which each district was to furnish two hundred men. Meanwhile the Hotel de Ville was filled with citizens and vagabonds clamoring for arms. Nevertheless, the Electors and the permanent committee began to bring order out of chaos. By afternoon the streets assumed a more normal appearance. Armed citizens acted as patrols, and quietly disarmed men who could not show that they were members of any district. The city, however, still feared an assault by the royal troops.

Early on the morning of July 14 a great crowd, partly composed of the new citizen soldiers, assembled before the esplanade of the Invalides, demanding the arms which they knew were stored there. The governor tried to gain time. The Electors

³ Square of Louis XV, afterwards *Place de la Révolution*, now *Place de la Concorde*.

⁴ Meaning a committee which sat continuously, without adjournment.

CHAP.
VII

1788-89

Fall of the
Bastille

sent the law officer of the commune to harangue the mob and save the building from sack. It was in vain; suddenly the crowd climbed over the low rampart or broke through the gate, and carried away the 30,000 muskets stored in the building. A similar crowd gathered about the entrance of the Bastille at the other end of the town. The Electors again attempted to intervene, gaining assurances from the commander, Delaunay, that he would not fire unless he was attacked. Through a misunderstanding the people were fired upon from the walls and a general struggle began. Men at the Hotel de Ville represented to the military committee of the Electors that citizens were being shot down at the Bastille and procured an order that cannon be used against the fortress. Some guards who were in the square in front of the Hotel de Ville joined the cannoneers and a more regular attack was begun. Delaunay was ill prepared to resist and offered to surrender, threatening, if his terms were not accepted, to blow up the fortress and wreck the eastern section of the city. The leaders of the guards accepted the surrender, but were unable to protect all their prisoners. While Delaunay and one or two others were being conducted to the Hotel de Ville they were dragged away and murdered. Meanwhile the disorder in the Hotel de Ville increased. A new mob from the Palais Royal accused Flesselles of being a traitor and insisted that he be tried at the Palais Royal. To save his colleagues Flesselles consented to go, but was murdered on the way and his body cut to pieces by the populace. This was not the last instance of lynch law. A few days later Foulon, a royal councillor, who had been named to the ministry of July 11, and his son-in-law, Berthier, intendant of Paris, whose duty it had been to furnish the royal troops with supplies, were torn to pieces by mobs on the ground that they had been traitors to the nation.

The fall of the Bastille warned the King that he was in the presence of revolution. He yielded to the demands of the National Assembly, promised to withdraw the troops, and recalled Necker. When a deputation from the Assembly carried the news to Paris, the exultant citizens chose Lafayette, one of its members, to be commander of the new militia, and Bailly, another, to be provost or mayor. A day or two afterwards the King consented to recognize the triumph of the citizens by proceeding to the Hotel de Ville and confirming the revolution which had taken place in the government of the city.

The Electors of Paris at once assumed the task of reorganizing the city, but after some controversy with the district assemblies of citizens concluded that their special task was completed

and made arrangements for the choice of deputies, whose duty it should be to frame a constitution and assist the mayor in the management of affairs. A military committee assisted Lafayette in planning the permanent organization of the militia, now called the National Guard. The work of the military committee was promptly completed. Its most difficult problem was the management of the French Guard, which the King refused to receive again into favor. This regiment of 3,600 men was the only trained force upon which Paris could depend either for defense against the machinations of the Court or for security from mob violence at the hands of the vagabonds and deserters from the royal army who infested the city. If, however, the regiment should preserve its organization, it might become the master rather than the agent of the municipality. The military committee resolved to divide it into sixty companies, one for each district, and assign to these companies the burdensome work of police duty, which the ordinary citizen soldier had no time to perform. The scheme was not certain to succeed, for the guards were proud of their organization. Moreover, they advanced the extraordinary theory that by their insurrection they had captured their regimental chest, hospital, and barracks, and that if they consented to the plan of incorporation they must be paid for these. The municipal officers, Mayor Bailly confessed, were not in a position to argue the validity of the claim, and paid them the immense sum of a million livres. The colors of the new National Guard were blue, white, and red, the tricolor, made up of blue and red, the colors of Paris, and white, the color of royal France.

The chief business of the communal assembly was to discuss the principles upon which their municipal constitution should be founded. The members at first accepted the theory of complete municipal autonomy, each community being master of its internal affairs and bound to other parts of the country only by the federal tie. But as the mayor, the deputies, and the district assemblies could not work in harmony, little progress was made. Many months elapsed before the city received a permanent organization and then it was at the hands of the National Assembly.

The triumph of Paris over the old government won the homage of other French cities and the applause of liberal men everywhere. The monarchy seemed synonymous with despotism and its humiliation was a guarantee that men henceforward were not to breathe the air of a Bastille the moment they championed ideas of liberty. Samuel Romilly, an English lawyer, expressed the

CHAP.
VII

1788-89

A New
Govern-
ment in
Paris

CHAP.
VII

1788-89

Revolution
in the
Provinces

common feeling in a letter to a Parisian, "I need not tell you how much I have rejoiced at the Revolution which has taken place. I think of nothing else, and please myself with endeavoring to guess at some of the important consequences which must follow throughout all Europe."

The Revolution was not confined to Paris. In some places the news of the dismissal of Necker and of the uprising of Paris prompted a similar insurrection. In other places the occasion was a bread riot or the necessity of taking vigorous measures to guard against a scarcity of food. The troubles at Strasbourg illustrate another phase. There a feeling of jealousy existed between the populace, which was French, and the municipality, still mainly under the control of the old German families, for until 1681 Strasbourg (then Strassburg) had been a Free City of Germany. The explosion occurred late in July. A band of vagabonds, joined by the town idlers, stormed the Hotel de Ville, destroyed its furniture and scattered its archives over the streets. The citizens armed themselves and with the aid of soldiers drove the vagabonds across the Rhine. But that did not end the trouble; for the troops, rewarded for their assistance, expended their money in reveling, threw open the prisons, and held high carnival in the streets, until sheer exhaustion made them docile. In August the old municipality retired and a new one was elected. In a few cities the municipality did not at once give way, but was reinforced or watched by a standing committee. Occasionally a municipality used the opportunity to strengthen its powers at the expense of a local parlement or a bishop. In all cases a national guard was organized.

The movement in the towns spread to the countryside. A strange panic ran through many regions, stirred up by such cries as, "The brigands are coming!" Similar rumors had been carried to the Electors at Paris during the crisis. The terror was so acute and so mysterious in its origin that it has been called the "Great Fear." Peasants hastened to the market-place or hid in the woods, arming themselves as best they could, and awaited the coming of the "brigands." When the brigands did not come, a leader often appeared who transformed their terror into angry suspicions of the nobles or into a desire to destroy the records of feudal dues or even the châteaux. The "war on the châteaux" was especially violent in the eastern part of France. When the peasant bands did not break up voluntarily, the militia of the towns dispersed them and restored peace.

The National Assembly did not intend that the King should find in these disorders an excuse for bringing together troops

which might enable the government to renew the attempt to restore monarchical authority. A new oath was imposed on the soldiers in which fidelity to the "Nation" received the chief emphasis. The officers were obliged also to swear, in the presence of the municipal officers and of regiments, "never to employ those under their orders against the citizens, except at the requisition of the civil and municipal authorities." The precaution was added that this requisition must be read to the assembled troops. Thus, as has been aptly said, the King's sword was broken.

The news of the revolution in the provinces, and of the terrible excesses which occasionally accompanied it, interrupted the National Assembly in its task of preparing a program of social and political reorganization. Early in July a committee on the constitution had proposed a plan of work and Lafayette had submitted a declaration of rights. The dismissal of Necker suddenly broke off this discussion of principles. After a new municipal government had been improvised at Paris, the Assembly took up the question whether the declaration of rights should precede or accompany the completed constitution. By August 4 the news from the provinces was so alarming that vigorous measures of repression were at first deemed necessary. Several noblemen insisted that the best way to pacify the country, and especially the peasants, was to remove the injustices of the existing régime, suggesting that certain feudal dues be abolished, that others be extinguished by purchase, and that the burdens of taxation be equalized. It was also proposed that all citizens, without distinction, be made eligible to office. A spirit of sacrifice moved the Assembly, and nobles, clergy, the representatives of towns and provinces, all who by charter or custom had a situation more privileged than that of their neighbors, rushed to the speaker's tribune to surrender what they now considered unjust advantages. Dumont, a friend of Mirabeau, recalled, years later, seeing members weep with joy "at finding themselves carried on the wings of enthusiasm far beyond their wildest dreams." A few were startled at the untimely haste with which projects requiring a year's careful study were hurried through in a night. One deputy sent to the president a piece of paper on which were written the words, "Nobody any longer has any self-control; break up the sitting." The Abbé Sieyès, who was not present at this session, declared in the Assembly, at a time when some of its decisions were being put into form, "You wish to be free, but do not know how to be just!"

In their final form the decrees of August 4 outlined a program of reorganization based upon the principle of equality.

CHAP.
VII

1788-89

The King
and the
ArmyAugust
Fourth

CHAP.
VII

1788-89

Revolutionary
Program

The law of land tenure was to be so changed as to destroy every vestige of the feudal system. Serfdom and all dues which represented it were abolished without indemnity. All feudal or perpetual land dues, if not tainted by a servile origin, should be extinguished by purchase. Rights of the chase and similar noble privileges were annulled. The Assembly promised a new system of justice, replacing the existing courts, from the parlement of Paris to the humblest manorial court. The venality of office was to cease and the administration of justice was to be gratuitous. The program also included eligibility of all citizens to offices in the Church, the administration, or the army. Every one would be taxed according to his property or his income, without regard to privilege or rank. The landholders were promised relief from the tithe, a change which amounted to a princely gift at the expense of the nation. Other church dues were to be abolished, on the understanding that a decent support should be provided for religious services and for the clergy. The Assembly went so far as to forbid further payment of the annates to the papacy, thus violating an agreement between France and Rome nearly three centuries old.

These decrees bear the character of a great program of reform, but they were understood by multitudes of the peasantry and the townspeople as acts of legislation. So many Parisians sought to enjoy their new right to the pleasures of the chase in the woods and private parks beyond the city walls that Lafayette was obliged to station detachments of the National Guard at the gates in order to prevent other guardsmen from yielding to the common impulse. Even ardent revolutionists like Brissot felt that sudden "restitutions intoxicate the people, who put no limits to what they assume has been granted to them." The ministry were at first inclined to take a critical attitude towards this program, but on September 21 the King agreed to have it published as a plan of work.⁵

After this program was completed, the Assembly resumed the discussion of its "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen." In preparing it the deputies followed the precedent set by the Americans in their State constitutions. Some thought it would be better to postpone the declaration until the constitution should be finished. All hoped to proclaim in such clear terms the rights commonly violated in Europe that the statement would serve as a program of liberty for all nations. The articles upon which the Assembly finally agreed set forth a theory

⁵ The decrees were not regularly promulgated until November 3.

Declara-
tion of
Rights

of society based upon the equality of man and upon the sovereignty of the people. According to it law is an expression of popular will, and in formulating it the citizens may take part directly or through their representatives. Public officers have only the authority delegated by law. The second part of the Declaration guarantees to the individual the historic liberties and the safeguards of personal security which had long been a part of the English and American legal tradition. Believers in religious toleration were alarmed, because the Declaration said that "the manifestation of religious opinions must not disturb the public order established by law." An article was added, asserting that the principle of separation of the powers should be embodied in every constitution worthy of the name. This principle, narrowly interpreted, was to have an unfortunate influence upon the work of the Assembly. The ministry took the same attitude towards the Declaration of Rights as towards the decrees of August 4.

The delay of the King in accepting and promulgating the decrees abolishing privilege alarmed the ardent revolutionists of Paris. A debate in the National Assembly upon the organization of future legislatures and upon the power of veto also excited them. These questions were closely related. The deputies were agreed that hasty legislation should be avoided, but many of them felt that it was unwise to adopt a system of "checks and balances," meaning by that the opposition which an upper chamber of a legislature might make to proposals of a lower chamber, as well as the danger that a particular piece of legislation might be postponed indefinitely by the exercise of the royal veto. When the system embodied in the new American federal constitution was advocated, the reply was made that there was no comparison between a presidential veto and a royal veto, because the latter would be supported by the prestige of an ancient monarchy. It was a system of two chambers, rather than the royal veto, which was sacrificed. Several of the advocates of the bicameral system were known to be secret admirers of the English House of Lords. To establish such a chamber in France would seem, however, to restore the régime of privilege which had just been condemned. The provincial nobility feared that the peers would be chosen from among the court nobles. The plan of dividing the legislature into two chambers was, therefore, rejected. The power of veto granted to the King was not absolute, although no measure to which the King opposed a formal objection could be reenacted by the existing as-

CHAP.

VII

1788-89

Beginnings
of a Con-
stitution

CHAP.
VII

1788-89

Agitation
in Paris

sembly or by its successor. If a third assembly passed it, the King could not use his veto.

The agitators at the Palais Royal and some of the more violent district leaders urged the patriots to march to Versailles and arrest the unfaithful deputies who were ready to grant the King a veto upon the will of twenty-five million people. The firmness of the National Guard under Lafayette checked an incipient riot late in August. The situation in the city was distressing. The lack of food was chronic. Laborers were often obliged to go to the bakeries at dawn and stand in line in order to obtain bread before the hour for beginning work. The city was crowded with unemployed men as well as with vagabonds. Many petty shopkeepers and artisans suffered because hundreds of wealthy people had been frightened away by the disorders. Moreover, the National Guard could not be confidently relied upon. Several of the companies, which had belonged to the regiment of the French Guard, were anxious to resume the duties and honors which had been theirs before July 12. They were especially jealous of the royal bodyguard.

In September an attempt of the ministry to protect Versailles against an irruption of the Parisian mob led to the very disaster they feared. The regiment of Flanders was ordered to Versailles, ostensibly at the request of the local national guard. The radical leaders in Paris pretended to see in this move a repetition of the attempt in June to overawe the Assembly and accomplish its transfer to Soissons or Compiègne, if not a plot to enable the courtiers to conduct the King to Metz and begin a civil war. The suspicions were turned to rage when the officers of the bodyguard gave a banquet to the regiment of Flanders, at which a few soldiers, heated with wine, insulted the National Assembly and the tricolor. The King and Queen appeared during the dinner and were received with extravagant protestations of loyalty. The excitement in Paris was fomented, many believe, by intriguers in the pay of the Duke of Orleans, the cousin of the King, who was suspected of a design to supplant him. The troubles culminated on October 5 in a furious riot.

Early in the morning on that day the Hotel de Ville was invaded by a mob of market women, by men disguised as women, and by other men whom the Parisians of the time called "brigands." The insurrection seemed directed against the municipality. Threats were made to burn the building. Soon the cry was raised, "To Versailles," and the mob streamed out the western gate of the city along the road to the royal town. Many companies of the National Guard now insisted on marching to

October
Days

PARIS

THE OUTBR

Scale of Feet



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Versailles to avenge the honor of the tricolor. For hours Lafayette struggled to restore obedience, but in vain. Finally he sent word to the municipal assembly that he could not hold the troops any longer, and received from it an order to lead the guard to Versailles, in spite of the fact that Versailles was not within the jurisdiction of the Paris municipality. Meanwhile the mob had reached Versailles and had broken into the hall of the National Assembly, clamoring for bread. Mounier obtained the King's sanction to the Declaration of Rights, and to certain constitutional decrees, and announced this triumph to the crowd with the futile hope that it would quiet their passions, but they cried out that they wanted bread, not decrees. The Paris army arrived late at night. Lafayette protested his devotion to the King, but was coldly received. Some one called out, "There's Cromwell!" He retorted, "Cromwell would not have entered alone." About five o'clock the next morning, after stationing guards at the entrances to the palace grounds, Lafayette tried to snatch a few moments of sleep. Unfortunately one entrance had been left unguarded and through it the "brigands" penetrated into the inner courtyards and corridors of the château. Before the National Guard came to the rescue two of the body-guard were killed and their heads cut off, to be borne on pikes as hideous trophies by the victorious mob. For a moment even the Queen's life was in danger. As the day wore on Lafayette informed the King that it was the wish of the National Guard and of the Parisians that he, with the Queen and the dauphin, should make Paris their residence. The King consented, and the royal family, the soldiers, and the triumphant rioters took up the march for Paris. At nine in the evening the royal family entered the Tuileries, a palace which had not been occupied by a French monarch since the Regency.

The court party now regarded Louis XVI as a prisoner, but the Parisians loudly proclaimed that at last he was freed from the intrigues of the aristocrats. The King, they said, would requite the love of the people by devotion to their cause and would become, as a decree of the National Assembly had declared him to be, the "Restorer of French Liberty." A few days later the Assembly transferred its sittings to Paris. Some of the deputies refused their consent to the change, and alleging one excuse or another, returned to their homes. Mounier, until this time one of the most influential men in the Assembly, retired to Dauphiné and attempted to arouse the provincial estates to resist the radical measures adopted under the domination of Paris, but he failed dismally and soon left the country. It was too late

CHAP.
VII

1788-89

Louis XVI
at Paris

CHAP.

VII

1788-89

for half measures. The Revolution had passed beyond the control of the conservatives. Royal authority was gone. The question was, What would the radical leaders accomplish, now that power and opportunity were theirs?

CHAPTER VIII

REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION

FIVE months had passed since the opening of the States General, and yet little progress had been made toward a settlement of the questions which the King had brought to the attention of the deputies or toward a solution of the more difficult problems of legislation which they had added after the States General became the National Assembly. Momentous changes had taken place, but thus far their outcome was hardly more than the destruction of obstacles to reform. Only a beginning had been made of the detailed work of constitutional reconstruction. Other reforms had scarcely been outlined. Two years were to slip away before the work of the Assembly was completed. Its labors were often hindered by the necessity of attending to questions of administration which under other circumstances would have been left to the royal ministers.

Opinions upon the success of the Assembly have differed widely. Edmund Burke's judgment of it was a mixture of indignation and contempt. The Swiss journalist Mallet du Pan was equally vehement in denunciation. But Samuel Romilly and Arthur Young took saner views of the matter. When the career of the Assembly was only half over Romilly wrote, "Notwithstanding the injustice which the Assembly itself has been guilty of in several instances, it must be admitted that no assembly of men that ever met since creation has done half so much toward promoting the welfare of the human species as the National Assembly." The stupendous sweep of the changes which were proposed and the opportunity they seemed to offer of a renewal of the terms upon which oppressed mankind should conduct the struggle of existence, filled some men with hope and enthusiasm. Wordsworth, then a young man, was living in France, and over a decade later his impressions were still so vivid that he wrote,

Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven! Oh! times
In which the meager, stale, forbidding ways
Of custom, law, and statute, took at once
The attraction of a country in romance!

CHAP.
VIII

1789-91

The Revolution and
Foreign
Opinion

CHAP.
VIII

1789-91

The
National
Assembly

The special conditions under which the Assembly did its legislative work affected its success. It was in no serious danger of mob violence, although individual members might be insulted on the streets. The disorderly element in Paris was put in wholesome fear by the adoption of a severe riot act, after the murder of an innocent baker, October 21. The unfavorable conditions under which the Assembly worked were of its own making or due mainly to the inexperience of its members. The hall of sessions was too large and its shape was unsuited to the needs of a deliberative body. Discussion was difficult where a speaker must force his voice in order to be heard. At first scarcely any one except Mirabeau ventured to speak without a carefully prepared manuscript. In many instances questions were not discussed, but orators, one after another, entered the speaker's tribune and read carefully prepared addresses, often repeating arguments which had been made by members of their own group. During such discussions, as the newspapers of the day remarked, the Assembly resembled a learned academy rather than a legislative body. Towards the close of its career impromptu speaking and real debate gained a larger place in its sessions. Rules of procedure had been drawn up in July. They forbade interruptions from the visitors' galleries, but it was impossible to suppress this kind of disorder. Arthur Young, who visited the Assembly in January, 1790, wrote in his journal: "The audience in these galleries are very noisy: they clap, when anything pleases them, and they have been known to hiss; an indecorum which is utterly destructive of debate." The manner in which the proceedings were conducted depended mainly upon the president, who held office for only two weeks. When Mirabeau became president in January, 1791, he showed a mastery of the difficult art of managing business which marked him as the ablest man in the Assembly.

Mirabeau was also the greatest orator among the deputies. His strong face, made still more striking by the ravages of smallpox, his burly frame, and his powerful voice added extraordinary force to the expression of his thoughts, which, if not always sound, were full of vigor and originality. Although like the other deputies he carried a manuscript into the tribune, he occasionally made impromptu speeches which reached a high level of parliamentary eloquence. His written speeches were usually the work of one of a little group of confidential friends whose thinking he inspired. Another able speaker was Barnave, who came from Dauphiné and was at first a follower of Mounier, but afterwards attached himself to Adrien Duport, the leader of the more pro-

gressive deputies. One of the most conspicuous orators on the conservative side was the Abbé Maury, who in the earlier part of the reign had been a popular preacher at Paris and who came to the Assembly with a reputation for liberalism. He disappointed his admirers by persistently advocating a system of things which too clearly resembled the old régime. About eighty of the deputies took frequent part in the debates, while fifteen were "in the breach all the time."

The Assembly would have been more effective as a legislative body had it been divided into well-organized parties or groups. The only real party in France was the Jacobin Club, or Friends of the Constitution, which met in one of the ancient halls of the Jacobin convent. It was originally composed of deputies alone, but afterwards many prominent Parisian revolutionists were admitted. Similar societies were organized in other cities and carried on a correspondence with the Jacobins at Paris. By the fall of 1791 these affiliated societies numbered four hundred and six. Much of the influence of the Jacobin Club was due to the fact that the deputies who belonged to it frequently agreed at the club what should be their action when a project was brought forward in the Assembly. They also wrote to the clubs in the provinces urging them to join in the agitation, with the result that the Assembly was deluged with letters and memorials in favor of the idea.

In the hall where the Assembly met the deputies were grouped according to their political opinions. Those on the extreme right of the president were called the "Aristocrats," while next to them sat the "Monarchists" or "Impartials." The deputies on the left were called the "Patriots" or the "Corner of the Palais Royal." During the discussion of constitutional questions in the summer the group which Mounier led was carefully organized and had a directing committee. The group led by Duport and two young noblemen, Alexander and Charles de Lameth, was more permanent. Among the deputies at the extreme left sat Maximilien Robespierre, an attorney from Arras, who boasted that he was of no party, but voted according to principle.

The deputies were assigned without regard to their opinions to one of thirty bureaux to which projects were referred for examination. There were also many special committees, the personnel of which represented the opinions prevailing in the Assembly. These committees worked out the details of the principal projects of legislation. The most important was the committee on the constitution. Sometimes committees assumed administrative duties which properly belonged to the ministry,

CHAP.
VIII
1789-91

The
Jacobin
Club

Parties

CHAP.
VIII

1789-91

News-
papers

or refused to work in harmony with the minister whose departmental policy their measures affected. The committee on finance, for example, would not coöperate with Necker or support his plans.

The public opinion of the day was formed by the newspapers as well as by great speeches made in the Assembly. Several of them were edited or directed by members of the Assembly, as Mirabeau directed the *Courrier de Provence* and Barère the *Point du Jour*. The most popular paper was the *Révolutions de Paris*; the most notorious, *L'Ami du Peuple*, edited by Dr. Marat. Nearly all were periodical pamphlets rather than newspapers. In November the publication of the *Moniteur* was begun, and this aimed to give a full and faithful report of the proceedings in the Assembly. Such a journal was especially important because the Assembly did not keep a complete record of debates, although it frequently ordered particular speeches to be printed and annexed to the record of the day's proceedings.

New local
Govern-
ment

Next to the condition of the finances, the problem of most immediate concern to the Assembly was the creation of a system of local government to take the place of the provisional régime which had been established during the summer of revolution. The new municipalities were performing their unexpected tasks with self-sacrificing good will. Their officials were sometimes unable to keep a footing as the earth quaked with successive shocks of political and social upheaval. They were profoundly loyal to France and felt the unifying impulse coming from devotion to a common ideal, but their inexperience, fears, and jealousies seriously hampered the restoration of order, prevented the resumption of trade, and rendered impossible in many places the collection of taxes, menacing the whole country with the evil consequences of anarchy. The Commune of Paris, chief of these self-constituted governments, was involved in quarrels with its constituent districts, which were infected with the prevalent spirit of local independence.

The Assembly could not recur to the system, or rather the lack of system, of the old régime. The chaos of municipal rights and privileges had been condemned in the tenth article of the August decrees. Moreover, the preservation of a large measure of the local autonomy which had become a fact in July seemed prudent to men still terrified by the shadow of the ancient monarchy. The projects which the Assembly adopted must be judged from the point of view of their real merit and lasting influence rather than from that of their incidental defects. For the first time a great nation was endowed with a uniform rule of

municipal organization. Closely connected with this was the establishment of a similarly uniform administration over the larger areas of local government.

CHAP.
VIII

1789-91

The main features of the new law were ready before the close of 1789 and the new system was put into effect early in 1790. Instead of several differing systems of subdividing the country for administrative purposes, a single system was adopted, creating eighty-three departments of nearly uniform extent. Their boundary lines corresponded as nearly as possible to ancient local boundaries, large provinces like Normandy and Brittany being divided into several departments, while smaller provinces formed a single department, or, in one or two cases were united with other territory to form one. In this way little violence was done to the continuity of local development. The provincial names were not preserved, but the departments were named from the principal rivers, mountains, or other geographical features which distinguished them. Paris was in the department of the *Seine*. Surrounding it was the department of the *Seine et Oise*. The next department to the east was the *Seine et Marne*. Rouen was in the *Seine Inférieure*, Bordeaux in the *Gironde*, Toulouse in the *Haute Garonne*, Marseilles in the *Bouches du Rhone*, Dijon in the *Côte d'Or*, and Strasbourg in the *Bas Rhin*.

Depart-
ments

Each department was subdivided into districts. Both department and district had administrators and councils, charged with the management of local interests or with the enforcement of national laws within their particular jurisdiction and acting as the local agents of the central government in administrative matters. The central government had no local representative, like the intendant under the old régime, entirely dependent upon it and subject to its orders.

The life of the new local administration centered in the municipality rather than in the department. In size the municipalities, or communes, varied from the little parish of less than 500 inhabitants to the great cities of Lyons, Marseilles, and Paris. To these municipalities was given a uniform system according to which the number of officials was proportioned to the size of the community; the smallest having three, the largest twenty-one. Paris was given a special law on much the same lines several months later. The functions of the municipal government were twofold. It was the local administration and at the same time, like the districts and departments, the agent of the central government in carrying out general laws as well as in assessing and collecting taxes. So far as the latter function was concerned, it was in theory strictly subordinated to the district

The Mu-
nicipalities

CHAP.
VIII

1789-91

and departmental administrations. In practice, partly because of the turbulence of the times, it was able to nullify laws and leave taxes uncollected. Whenever this happened the cause was usually not the spirit of rebellion, but, rather, timidity or inexperience in enforcing unpopular laws.

To employ over forty thousand local governments as agents for the enforcement of law or the collection of the national taxes, and at the same time to concede to the central government no effective means of coercion, was to decree anarchy. The problem was earnestly debated in February, 1790, when the news of the second war on the châteaux reached the Assembly. Conservative royalists like Malouet argued that power should be given the King to move troops to the seats of disorder, since his ministers could be made responsible. Many deputies thought this would lead to a restoration of despotism, and the Assembly contented itself with making the proclamation of martial law mandatory in case of riots, and holding the municipal officers civilly and even criminally responsible if they were negligent. A year later the King was given the right in serious cases to suspend the members of departmental or district administrations, and the directors of the departments were given the same right over municipal officers, on the understanding that the National Assembly or its successors could restore the suspended official. This did not offer a remedy applicable in cases of ordinary negligence, nor was it in any sense preventive. As a result much of the work of the Assembly was discredited because it was not carried into effect. Not the least unfortunate result was the attempt three years later to recover by violent means a necessary central administrative control.

Powers
Retained
by the
King

If the decrees on local government declared in effect that the King should not rule, the constitution of the central government did not leave him much more than the opportunity to obstruct. It is true that he retained an extensive appointing power. The substitution of elections for venality as a method of entrance upon office was not necessarily a disadvantage to him. Had he been able to assume a strong leadership, the change must have increased his power. He could not appoint to all the positions in the army, but the patronage which was assigned to him was free from the obstacles of private privilege which under the old régime prevented the royal right of appointment from being a means of increasing the efficiency of the body of officers. He controlled foreign affairs even if he could not declare war or make treaties without the consent of the legislature. The fundamental weakness of his position lay in the fact that the

Assembly refused to permit his ministers to be chosen from among its own members. This did not mean simply that deputies could not act as ministers while retaining their seats in the legislature. The constitution provided that an interval of two years must elapse from the time when a man ceased to be a deputy before he became eligible for the ministry.

This restriction was dictated partly by theoretical considerations drawn from the doctrine of the separation of the powers and partly by dread of a revival of despotism. The distrust or jealousy which the schemes of Mirabeau excited in the minds of influential members of the Assembly was the immediate cause of its adoption. In October, 1789, Mirabeau attempted to carry through negotiations looking to the selection of the ministry from the Assembly, in order that the two bodies might work in harmony. On his lists were Lafayette, Talleyrand, and Sieyès. He was himself to become a minister without portfolio, taking the leadership in the Assembly. These schemes were noised abroad and aroused fears that the Assembly was to be muzzled and the work of reform hindered. On November 7 after a sharp debate it was voted that no member of the Assembly could accept office. The consequence was more far reaching than was intended, for it implied that the King's ministers were suspected of being in collusion with him, planning a restoration of despotism. It left them disarmed and unprotected to bear the brunt of popular attack in case the ills of the country became still more irritating.

Mirabeau did not abandon hope of being able eventually to carry through his plan. He saw that the only hope of saving the country from anarchy was in a group of ministers strong enough to lead the Assembly and at the same time to impose their advice upon the King. He felt an irresistible impulse to assume a great rôle in his country's affairs, although he realized that the scandals of his earlier career and the debts which still harassed him were an almost insuperable obstacle. In May, 1790, he accepted the dubious position of secret adviser to the King. The arrangement bore the aspect of a corrupt bargain, in spite of the fact that Mirabeau did not sacrifice his political independence. The King supposed he was purchasing a dangerous demagogue, and was ready not only to give Mirabeau 6,000 livres a month, but also to give him a million livres at the close of the session of the Assembly, if his conduct should prove satisfactory. Meanwhile he paid Mirabeau's debts. The notes which Mirabeau prepared for the King and sent through the Count de la Marck show that he gave excellent advice. His judgments, with

CHAP.
VIII
1789-91

The
Ministers

Mirabeau
and the
Court

CHAP.
VIII

1789-91

few exceptions, were wiser than those of his contemporaries. His counsels were, however, lost on Louis XVI, who, as the Count de Montmorin, his minister of foreign affairs, said, listened to business as if one were talking about the concerns of the Emperor of China. Before Mirabeau died in the spring of 1791 he elaborated a Machiavellian scheme for strengthening the monarchy by discrediting the Assembly. Part of the plan was to encourage extravagant measures proposed in the Assembly and part was to organize a campaign of hostile criticism. This also remained without effect. One suggestion only, and that the most mischievous, was adopted by the Court. When Robespierre proposed that no member of the National Assembly should be permitted to serve in the succeeding legislature, the deputies who belonged to the Court faction were instructed to vote for it.

Royal Veto

The Assembly, faithful to the idea of the separation of the powers, conceded to the King no initiative in legislation. His share was the negative one of being permitted to check any particular form of legislation by a veto, which had the dangerous consequence of leaving the question open and of making him an obstacle to its settlement. It is not surprising that the new constitution has been termed an "engine of war" directed against the monarchy. The King was not so dull as to fail to see that his position was made inferior to that of the King of Poland. His only resource was to accept frankly the consequences of the Revolution and to march at the head of reform, instead of hesitating or resisting until he was dragged behind.

The
Suffrage

If power passed from the monarchy, into whose hands did it fall? Until later events modified the constitution, political power belonged to the middle class or bourgeoisie. This appears not merely from the personnel of the new government, but also from the restrictions which the constitution threw about the suffrage. The privilege of voting was granted to those possessing a property large enough to pay a tax equivalent in value to three times the local rate of an ordinary laborer's daily wage. An important minority in the Assembly, opposing even so small a restriction, obtained the concession that the qualifying tax should be paid by every man whose wages exceeded the sum fixed by the municipality as the local rate, whether he had taxable property or not. The citizens who had the privilege of voting were called "active," while the others were called "passive." The Assembly estimated the number of active citizens at 4,298,360, leaving about three million passive citizens. This was not universal suffrage, but it cannot be said that the right of voting was restricted to the middle class.

Whatever political control the middle class possessed was derived from the conditions of eligibility to membership in electoral assemblies as well as in local governmental bodies. In these cases the tax qualification was ten times as high as that of the simple voter. A higher property qualification was demanded of candidates to the national legislature, the payment in direct taxes of a silver mark, worth about fifty livres. The opposition to this provision was strong, and in its final revision of the constitution the Assembly withdrew the restriction, while at the same time it raised the qualification of electors. Henceforward only owners or tenants of property of an annual value of from one hundred to four hundred days of labor, according to the locality, were eligible to electoral assemblies. But this decree was adopted so late that it had no practical results, because all the elections, even those to the Legislative Assembly, were completed, and because universal suffrage was decreed before another year was over.

CHAP.
VIII
1789-91

In the program of August 4 the Assembly had promised a new judicial system. The privilege of administering justice, whether inherited from seigniorial ancestors or purchased from the King, was to be abolished. In the Declaration of Rights the Assembly had also solemnly undertaken to guard citizens against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, to concede the presumption of innocence to the unconvicted, and to inflict only reasonable penalties upon the guilty.

Judicial
Reform

Early in the fall of 1789 the Assembly began to redeem these pledges by changing the procedure in the case of persons charged with crime. The occasion for this step is interesting. It appears that the Paris National Guards were reluctant to make arrests because they knew that offenders would be tried according to the secret methods of the old régime and punished with unnecessary severity.¹ Lafayette urged the municipal assembly of Paris to petition the National Assembly for a modification of the procedure. The result was a provisional measure which insured the presence of two chosen citizens at the drawing of any indictment, with the right to express their opinion upon the evidence or the procedure, performing in a tentative way the functions of grand jurors. As soon as the indictment was completed, the accused person was to have access to the papers, was allowed counsel, and could summon witnesses in his own defense. The final law of criminal procedure was not passed until immediately before the close of the National Assembly. By this law

¹ See S. Lacroix, *Actes de la Commune de Paris*, I., 515-517.

the rôle of the two "notable" citizens was assigned to a "jury of accusation" composed of eight men acting with the assistance of a director. The remainder of the provisional scheme was retained in a more developed form.

Meanwhile the organization of the courts had been changed. The parlement of Paris and the provincial parlements were doomed by the Revolution. In November, 1789, they were ordered not to resume their ordinary sessions, and their work was left in the hands of the "chambers of vacations." In August, 1790, the new organic law was ready. One of its aims was to reduce the number of suits by offering a voluntary jurisdiction by arbitrators. It also brought judicial assistance within reach of all by providing a justice of the peace in each canton and one more in each of the larger municipalities. The district courts could hear appeals from one another, saving the litigant the long journey to Paris or to some important provincial city necessary under the old régime. The Assembly did not provide for the use of a jury for civil cases. In each district there was a criminal court, while the municipalities and the justices of the peace had jurisdiction in case of minor offenses. The judges were elected,—the justices of the peace by the primary assemblies, the district judges by the electors who chose the administrative officers and the deputies to the National Assembly. There was no greater danger that judges would be unduly influenced by political considerations than that the judges of the old régime would be influenced by class prejudices. The excellent choices made at the first elections in many departments showed that the electors took their responsibility seriously. The judges were to hold their position for six years, which would carry the time of the new election well beyond the period of violent revolution. The Assembly desired to provide a civil code which should unify the laws of France. This hope was not realized, but the penal code was changed. Its system of punishments was a great advance upon the previous system. The death penalty was to be inflicted by decapitation, a mode hitherto reserved for noble offenders, and a special machine was soon devised for this purpose.² Its name, the guillotine, has imposed upon its inventor, Dr. Guillotin, an unhappy fame. One of the defects in the system of procedure established by the Assembly was the refusal to give the judges any discretionary power in fixing penalties. This prevented the tribunals from taking account of mitigating circumstances or new evidence.

² Established as the mode of execution by the Legislative Assembly, March 20, 1792.

The army was reorganized in such a way that it ceased to be royal and became national. This was symbolized by the adoption of a new flag—the tricolor—upon which should be inscribed the words “Discipline and Obedience to Law.” Appointment to the lower grades was based partly upon experience and partly upon the result of examinations. Seniority determined the selection of two-thirds of the lieutenant-colonels and colonels. The King could appoint only one-third. He could appoint half the brigadier and lieutenant-generals and the six marshals. From the point of view of efficiency the change was excellent, reducing to a minimum the opportunities of sinister influence; but the prerogative of the King was touched in a sensitive spot. The peace establishment of the army was reduced to 113,630, not including the artillery and engineers. National guards, rather than troops of the line, were ordinarily relied upon for service in case of local disorders.

In dealing with the colonies, as with the communities in France, the Assembly was compelled to take account of accomplished facts. At the outset it made a significant concession by admitting as members deputies from Santo Domingo. The other colonies gradually gained a similar privilege until the colonial deputies numbered seventeen. The presence of these deputies was an admission that the old colonial system was at an end, and that the colonies were no longer to suffer from ministerial despotism or from the equally dangerous despotism of a national parliament in which they could raise no voice of protest. Events also forced the Assembly to take a definite attitude on the question of the limits of colonial autonomy. The news of the Revolution had encouraged each class of the colonial population to expect the realization of its peculiar hopes. The planters desired freer access to the markets of the world, the poor whites hoped for the advantages that their richer neighbors alone enjoyed, the free blacks for civil equality; even the slaves cherished hopes of liberty. The ministry permitted local assemblies to be formed. The clash of interests brought on a petty civil war, especially in Santo Domingo. The trouble was increased by the presence of regiments infected with the spirit of mutiny, so widespread in the army at home.

The situation in Santo Domingo, the richest of the sugar colonies, was serious. A colonial assembly was chosen, and did in miniature what the National Assembly undertook for all France. It assumed large powers, dismissed royal officers and royal troops, attempted to reorganize the administrative system and the courts, and even opened the ports to products specifically

excluded by a royal ordinance. In Santo Domingo also the question of the status of the free blacks reached an acute stage. As property-holders their interests were identical with those of the whites, provided the whites did not exclude them from a share in the civil conquests of the Revolution.

The National Assembly finally gave to the colonies an organization similar to the local administrative system of France except that it delegated executive powers to a governor. The constitution of the colony, once approved by the national legislature, could not be changed without the demand or consent of the local assemblies. To this local legislature was abandoned the responsibility for the making of laws on all matters except trade and defense. If the governor did not withhold his consent in order that the authorities at Paris should first be consulted, laws could be put into force provisionally before they received the final sanction of the National Assembly and of the Crown.

On the question of the free blacks the Assembly, on May 15, 1791, decided that those whose parents had also been free should be admitted to political privileges.³ In the last days of the Assembly, however, the friends of the planters succeeded in having the whole matter referred to the colonial assemblies. The result of this was that the free blacks and mulattoes were roused against the whites during the terrible slave insurrection which soon broke out and either remained indifferent or led bands of slaves. Except for the treatment of this question, the National Assembly adopted a colonial policy in remarkable contrast to that held, up to this time, by any other State.

In the work of the National Assembly the distinction between measures constitutional in character and others which were ordinary pieces of legislation was not rigorously maintained. Late in its career, with the first chiefly in mind, the Assembly took the name "Constituent," by which it is generally known. But some of its legislative projects were to have more far-reaching consequences than any of its constitutional devices. One of these was the legislation upon the feudal relations of the peasants.

The peasant landholders, who saw in the decrees of August 4 the prospect of immediate relief from feudal burdens, had reason for complaint as month after month passed and no law stated what dues were abolished without indemnity and what must be extinguished by purchase. The lawyers of the feudal

³ Slavery in the colonies was not abolished by the Constituent Assembly, although it reaffirmed, September 28, 1791, the ancient principle which declared every person free as soon as he entered France. Slavery was abolished by the Convention. See p. 207.

committee, appointed to report upon the matter, were not able to make recommendations until February, 1790. Their investigations convinced them that the distinction which the Assembly had attempted to establish in August was impracticable. How could it be determined, except in comparatively few cases, what dues originated in or represented serfdom? Moreover, dues had been bought and sold for centuries like other property, and why should the present owners be made to suffer for the usurpations of their remote predecessors? A modern French jurist has asked a further question, touching servile tenements, which were widely spread in Franche Comté and Burgundy, and which carried with them a status of serfdom from which the tenant might be relieved by ceding the property. "How was any one to understand," he writes, "why a family which had received a free tenement charged with perpetual rent should still be obliged to pay that rent, while a neighboring family which had received a servile tenement was relieved of all charges without having to pay any indemnity?" The lawyers of the committee were, from their training and course of thought, disinclined to tear down the structure of feudal property, which it had been their professional business to strengthen and defend. They assumed that the Assembly had not intended to abolish without indemnity dues attached to servile holdings, if similar dues rested on free holdings, and held that all such charges must be treated as the consequence of an original grant of land or money or other things of value unless there was in each case evidence to the contrary.

The law for the abolition of the feudal régime was adopted on March 15, 1790. Its fundamental principle was expressed later in the statement that "man has never been able to become proprietor of man." Rights or privileges which gave one set of men imprescriptible claims upon either the services or the tribute of other men implied social superiority and were regarded as a species of proprietorship. As such they must be ended, and their possessors compensated if the rights were analogous to rent for the use of land or interest for the use of something else of value. Rights over milling or baking, ferries, bridges, and markets, were abolished without compensation. Release from the duty of providing for these common needs was treated as equivalent in value to the rights. Local industry was made free and the management of roads, bridges, and markets was transferred to the community. In case of feudal dues the lord lost the right to continue to collect, if the peasant offered to pay once for all the money value. The right ceased to be imprescriptible and could no longer confer social superiority.

CHAP.
VIII
1789-91

Law of
March 15,
1790

CHAP.
VIII

1789-91

The loss to the lord was social, not financial. Henceforward he was merely the leading citizen of the community.

The nobles would have borne the loss with greater resignation, had not the Assembly passed a decree three months later which forbade them to use their titles, armorial bearings, and liveries. Each noble must use his true family name. According to the rule the Marquis de Lafayette should be styled M. Motier, and the Comte de Mirabeau, M. Riquetti. A majority of the Assembly was not in favor of the measure, but many, including prominent noblemen, feared they would be misunderstood if they voted against it.

Complaints
of the
Peasants

The peasant was disappointed by the terms of the March law because they embodied the legal presumption that the ordinary dues, *cens*, *champart* or *terrage*, *lods et ventes*, originated in a valuable grant rather than in violence or usurpation. He must accordingly pay the estimated value of an annual charge in order to be rid of it. The courts were open to him to prove that the presumption did not apply in his case, but it was practically impossible to establish the truth of his denial, for the law said that proof of the validity of the charge should be made according to the procedure hitherto in effect. Sometimes this made possession for forty years satisfactory proof. Even if the usurpation were more recent, the peasant would have a difficult task to substantiate his denial. The papers in the case belonged traditionally to the lord. Moreover, although the lord could be compelled by judicial process to produce them, they would not facilitate the proof of such a fact as usurpation. The Assembly might have placed the burden of proof upon the possessor, requiring him either to produce the titles, or to establish by evidence a possession sufficiently ancient to show that his right was equitable. The special case of the destruction of titles by the recent mobs, or renunciation because of fear, was provided for in the law itself.⁴

The peasant was also disappointed because the method of extinction by purchase, fixed by the law of May 4, 1790, seemed unnecessarily burdensome. The peasants were obliged to pay for the annual charges at the rate of twenty or twenty-five years' purchase, according as the dues were in money or in kind. This assumed that the lords were receiving only four or five per cent. on their right in the peasant's land. Another difficulty was that the dues contingent upon a transfer of the property must be

⁴For a severe judgment on this feudal legislation, see Introduction to *Les Comités des Droits féodaux et de Législation*, by Ph. Sagnac and P. Caron.

bought at the same time, although a peasant might have no intention of selling his land and his liability to pay the former lord's claims was remote. The complaint against the lumping of the annual and contingent charges was in a measure justified, because where the State was a creditor the annual charges could be paid without at the same time paying the contingent charges.

The dissatisfaction of the peasants did not limit itself to protests and petitions. Before the new laws were passed the distrust of the peasants flamed up into a new "war on the châteaux," especially in the provinces immediately south of the Loire. The national guards, controlled by the larger towns, were able to disperse the peasants and restore order temporarily. It seemed, however, as if anarchy would become chronic. The officers of the rural municipalities naturally sympathized with the peasants, for they were themselves peasants. Occasionally they took the lead in repudiating the ancient obligations. Two municipalities ventured to summon the former lords to produce titles for all the dues they claimed. The Assembly annulled these acts by special decree. When harvest time came, it was very difficult to collect the *champart*. In 1791 the Assembly issued special instructions, recalling the peasants to a sense of what had been done for them and remonstrating with them for lawlessness and lack of respect for property. Such an appeal was rather a confession of failure than a step towards success. The peasants awaited more favorable legislation from a succeeding assembly.

A year after the Assembly began its efforts to free agricultural labor it freed trade and industry by abolishing the guilds or corporations which had survived Turgot's attack or had been re-established after his overthrow. This important reform met no resistance either in the Assembly or outside. The cahiers of several towns where the guilds were powerful urged their retention, and, in a few cases, requested a reestablishment of the system which existed prior to Turgot's ordinance. For the costly and cumbersome restrictions of the system the Assembly substituted simply the payment of a moderate tax called the *patente*. With the guilds disappeared also the minute regulation of the processes of manufacture.

In their zeal to make effective the grant of liberty of work the deputies refused to permit citizens engaged in any industry or trade to unite in an organization to promote their interests. This law, which followed the other at an interval of three months, was suggested by the attempts of workmen in Paris and the larger cities to fix a minimum wage and to prevent others from working at lower wages. The Assembly threatened those who should

CHAP.
VIII

1789-91

War on the
Châteaux

The Guilds
Abolished

CHAP.
VIII

1789-91

engage in a strike with fines and a temporary loss of active citizenship. Acts of violence were to be punished according to the laws against sedition. This legislation aroused no protest even on the part of radicals like Robespierre, who apparently did not anticipate an antagonism between middle class producers and workingmen.

Customs
Barriers

The abolition of the seigniorial monopolies, rights over roads, bridges, ferries, and markets, removed many of the obstacles to industry and traffic in the interior. The same result, in larger measure, followed the transfer of tariff barriers to the frontier. France was no longer divided into provinces of the "five great farms," "provinces reputed foreign," and "provinces effectively foreign." The deputies of privileged districts protested against a change never ventured by even the most despotic kings, but provincial as well as class privileges had been condemned on August the 4th. Foreign commerce was also emancipated.

Taxes

The collection of taxes, already made with difficulty when the States General opened, was seriously disorganized by the revolutionary disturbances of July, 1789. In several cities the offices for the collection of the octrois were destroyed, and the municipal authorities could not or would not restore them promptly. Occasionally it was the offices of the excise that were the objects of the wrath of mobs. At some of the public storehouses mobs compelled a reduction in the price of salt. The Assembly did not improve the situation when on June 17, 1789, it branded the existing taxes as illegal, although it approved their collection as long as it should remain in session or until it should replace them by others. The temptation to oppose inertia, if nothing more, to their collection must have been strong.

The loss of revenue from such causes was increased by the abolition of certain taxes by the Assembly. Its first attempt to redeem the pledges of August was to levy on the privileged classes for the six months of the fiscal year closing in September the direct taxes from which they had been exempt. The proceeds were to help lighten the burden of taxation for the year 1790. The next step was to equalize the burden of the salt tax by decreeing that from October 1 the price should nowhere be above six sous a pound. In many regions the people would listen to no compromise on this subject. The news of the action of the Assembly provoked an uprising in Anjou which was imitated elsewhere. The efforts to collect the tax continued until March, 1790, when its abolition was ordered, on the understanding that the loss should be made up by additions to the direct taxes for the year, an understanding not immediately carried into effect.

In this way sixty millions of revenue were sacrificed. About a year later the octrois were abolished, a step justified on the theory that the towns under the old régime had for the most part been exempt from the *taille*, and now that all alike were to pay the direct taxes these special indirect taxes should cease. The excise on wines and liquors also disappeared, together with the state monopoly of tobacco, each step costing serious loss of revenue.

In the abolition of nearly all the indirect taxes the Assembly was influenced by the theory of the Physiocrats that the net revenue from the land was the only proper subject of taxation. Compensation for the losses which these changes entailed it hoped to find in a greater readiness to pay the direct taxes. In this the Assembly was disappointed, especially after the organization of new local governments. The loss from May 1, 1789, to January 1, 1791, on the basis of the estimated revenue, was about thirty per cent. For the first three months of 1791 the loss was about one-half. The estimated deficit for 1789 was 160 millions; for 1790 Necker estimated it at 294 millions.

Not until the last days of 1790 and the early part of 1791 did the Assembly fulfil its promise of a new system of taxation. This system consisted of a land tax, a personal property tax, a tax upon industrial and mercantile establishments, that is, the *patente*, and a tariff on imports and exports. In levying the land tax the Assembly was embarrassed by the lack of a satisfactory appraisalment. The rules established for reaching a provisional valuation were impractical, because they presupposed a knowledge of the income from each piece of land during a period of fifteen years. Fortunately they permitted in case of necessity an estimate based upon the local market value. The tax on personal property was levied upon an income estimated by external signs of wealth, of which the principal was the rental value of house or apartment. Rentals valued below 100 livres were reckoned as half the income, from 100 to 500 as one-third, and so on.

New Sys-
tem of
Taxation

The estimated product of the two taxes was to be divided among the departments and subdivided among the districts, municipalities, and individual taxpayers. The preparation of tax lists was entrusted to the local authorities, a feature of the law responsible for the bad start of the new system. The Assembly was five months late with its plan of distribution among the departments, and the local officials, either bewildered by the complexity of the system, or not zealous in taxing themselves and their neighbors, showed no energy in making the levy. By September, 1791, the Assembly found that half of the depart-

CHAP.
VIII

1789-91

ments had not been heard from, nor could the minister of the interior obtain answers to appeals for action. This evil was chronic during the Revolution and introduced into the payment of taxes a kind of inequality as arbitrary and unfair as any that flourished under the old régime. The farmers in many districts became a privileged class, paying neither taxes nor feudal dues, and receiving high prices for their produce.

Tariff of
1791

The tariff of 1791 was in part a means of raising revenue and in part a system of moderate protective duties. The committee which reported the original project was squarely protectionist in sentiment, but the Assembly was unwilling to go so far, and the committee was obliged to modify its project. The tariff included export as well as import duties, and combined with it was a short list of prohibited articles, ranging from ships to tobacco and linen thread. Among other things the exportation of coal and of wood for building was prohibited. The new revenue service was closely patterned upon the excellent system created by the Farmers General. It produced about the same amount of revenue as the preceding tariff.

Much of the work of reorganization undertaken by the Constituent Assembly was permanent, although modified in particular features by subsequent legislatures. The attempt to reorganize the Church cannot be reckoned among the Assembly's acts of constructive statesmanship. More than any other act it led to division and strife, and later to the reign of violence. This legislation, together with the financial projects associated with it, requires separate and more detailed treatment.

CHAPTER IX

THE FINANCES AND THE CHURCH

A FINANCIAL problem of no ordinary magnitude perplexed the leaders of the reform party in the Constituent Assembly. The revenue of the government had long been insufficient to cover its expenditures, and yet the Assembly proposed to increase the expenditures enormously by carrying through a costly program of reform. Venality of office was rooted in every corner of the old régime, and when the old gave place to the new, judges, lawyers, notaries, officers of the King's military and civil establishment, municipal officers, and masters of trade corporations, all must be compensated or reimbursed. The total amount needed to cover these requirements was over two thousand million livres. In addition several hundred millions more must be found in order to extinguish the heritage of "anticipations" of revenue and unpaid government notes. To raise such an amount would require experienced management in a modern State equipped with a sound financial system. Whether an old system, falling to pieces under the shock of revolution, or a new one which had not the support of a strong central government, would be equal to the task was more than doubtful.

Necker had defects as a financier, but his knowledge and experience might have saved the Assembly from some of its worst blunders. The principal lesson it seemed to have learned from him was the art of minimizing difficulties and hiding deficits. Several of the leaders, like Mirabeau and Talleyrand, were his political enemies, and let slip no opportunity to weaken his hold on the country. By the close of 1789 he had lost control of the finances and the Assembly gave little heed either to his advice or to his warnings. In September, 1790, he resigned and returned to Switzerland, although, as a pledge of good faith, he left behind, in advances to the government, two million livres of his private fortune.

It was not lack of ability among its members that was mainly responsible for the mistakes of the Assembly. One of their number touched the difficulty when he said to them in 1791, "Do you think our finances would not have been administered

CHAP. IX

1789-90

The
Burden
of Debt

Financial
Leadership

CHAP. IX

1789-90

better, more prudently, more economically, since the opening of the States General, if we had then possessed the experience which we have acquired?" Some of the men who pointed out the true principles of finance were suspected of disloyalty to the Revolution, because such arguments came most often from the self-constituted defenders of the Crown and the Church. At the last the Assembly branded as unpatriotic the attempt to force from it a full statement of its financial record. But its instincts may have been wiser than the warnings of the financiers. Many necessary reforms since Turgot's day had been checked by the argument from caution used consciously or unconsciously in the interest of privilege. The Assembly seemed confronted by the dilemma of shortening its program or refusing to be delicate in the choice of financial expedients. It has often been accused by its critics of having "muddled through."

Loans

The Assembly soon discovered how difficult it was to ward off bankruptcy, to say nothing of paying the cost of a comprehensive scheme of reorganization. No resources could be found by borrowing. Twice in August, 1789, and for relatively small sums, Necker attempted to negotiate loans. Both failed signally. Temporary assistance was obtained from the Bank of Discount, which was ordered to furnish money for the immediate requirements of the treasury. Necker tried to persuade the Assembly to transform this into a national bank, and permit it to issue notes to the amount of 240,000,000 livres while lending the government 170,000,000, but the Assembly adopted only the part of the scheme which provided for the loan. Necker also tried the device of a "patriotic contribution" of a quarter of each citizen's income, payable in three years. The statements of income were to be voluntary. To this project the Assembly assented, throwing, however, the entire responsibility upon the minister, as his enemy, Mirabeau, suggested. The failure of the plan was disguised because of the long period of time which must elapse before its results could be known. Declarations of income were to be made to the municipal officers before January, 1790. So few had been made by December that the Assembly postponed the date two months. Many were afraid to declare their income, for fear it would reveal to watchful creditors their deplorable financial condition. Moreover, the decree gave no instructions as to a method of estimating income. Declarations were made so slowly that in March, 1790, the Assembly required municipal officers to set down the amount in cases where no declarations were handed in. But municipalities which did not succeed in collecting the direct taxes were equally remiss

with this contribution. By the end of 1790 not a third of the municipal rolls had been made out. During the first year 30,000,000, instead of 150,000,000, were collected. If in the earlier stages of the Revolution such resources proved insufficient or useless, what must have been the situation when the size of the floating debt was increased by the hundred millions through the reimbursements that were voted!

CHAP. IX
1789-90

The equanimity of the deputies in the face of these difficulties is accounted for partly by their decision in November, 1789, to use the accumulated wealth of the Church as an extraordinary resource sufficient to reassure all creditors of the State, old or new. The financial policy of the Revolution centers in the utilization of this resource. The failure to manage it wisely led through acts of successive legislatures to the stupendous bankruptcy of 1797.

The attack on the property of the Church was not wholly a financial measure, but was suggested partly by the desire to weaken a great corporation, the rival of the State, and to reduce the clergy to the position of individuals authorized and paid by the government to perform certain religious duties. Many deputies also believed that the sale of the ecclesiastical lands would strengthen the cause of the Revolution, for every purchaser would naturally become an ardent advocate of its success. Such a measure was necessary, moreover, if the reorganization of the land system promised in the pledge to abolish feudalism was not to remain incomplete. Reformers were unwilling to have a fifth or even a tenth of the landed property of France immobile in the "dead hand" of the Church. This land, like the rest, must be brought into the market.

Property
of the
Church

The secularization of church property was a significant incident in the process, extending over the centuries since the Protestant Revolution, by which civil society recovered its ancient supremacy and the sphere of the Church, so large in the Middle Ages, was narrowed to include only strictly ecclesiastical concerns. Northern Germany and England in the sixteenth century had witnessed the confiscation of much church property. The process, stopped with the check of the Protestant movement, was now resumed by France. It was to have far-reaching consequences.

In the fall of 1789 the financial aspect of the affair was uppermost. The attack began during the enthusiastic assault on privileges on the night of August 4. At this time it took the form of an abolition of tithes, but in the course of the debate the declaration was made that church property belonged to the na-

CHAP. IX

1789-90

Decree of
November
2, 1789

tion. The first attack was led by Talleyrand in October and gained weight from the fact that he was a noble and a distinguished officer of the Church.

The debate opened on October 10 and the decisive vote was taken on November 2. Most of the time between was occupied by other matters. Talleyrand's argument was based on the theory that the property of the Church had been given for the performance of certain duties, and that if the State guaranteed the performance of these duties and provided for the support of the clergy the property was at its disposal. Mirabeau urged the Assembly to declare without ambiguity that the property of the Church was the property of the nation on the understanding that the expenses of religion should be paid and that a minimum salary of 1,200 livres should be provided for the parish priests. To the supporters of the motion the defenders of the Church replied that the property could not be considered as a single whole, given to the Church or to public worship, because it had been given or bequeathed to individual parishes, to hospitals, and to dioceses. They reminded the Assembly that the deeds of gift had been recognized for centuries in the courts and rested upon the same legal foundation as other property rights. The attacking party retorted that the necessities of the State were the supreme law. This party finally changed the motion in such a way as to avoid the question of right, declaring that the property of the Church was at the disposal of the nation on condition that the expenses of worship, the support of the clergy, and the care of the poor were adequately provided for. The opposition of the parish priests had already been disarmed by the second part of the motion, which promised them a minimum salary of 1,200 livres and lodging. In this form the decree was adopted on November 2. The defenders of the Church did not regard their cause as lost even then, for it was a long step between such a declaration and the enactment of specific measures to make effective use of this property. Indeed, it was six months before the full, practical consequences were drawn from the declaration of November 2.

First Plan
of Sale

The property of the Church was estimated at between two and three thousand million livres. Its exact amount could not be ascertained until the local authorities should make a detailed appraisal. The Assembly in dealing with the question was guided more by pressing needs than by any well considered policy. It seemed desirable to sell enough church property to refund the sums advanced by the Bank of Discount and to pay anticipations of revenue and arrears of interest on the public

debt. Accordingly on December 19 a decree ordered the sale of royal domains and church lands to the amount of 400,000,000 livres, and established an extraordinary fund "into which the proceeds should be paid." Against these proceeds *assignats* would be issued, a part going to the bank in return for loans, including 80,000,000 which it was to lend the government within the next six months. The only consequence of the decree was the issue by the bank of notes, eventually about 112,000,000, which were claims upon the extraordinary fund, and which were sold at a discount of five or six per cent.

No immediate steps were taken to designate the property which, according to the decree of December 19, should be sold. In February the suppression of the monastic orders opened the way. This decree did not compel all monks and nuns to abandon the monastic life; the nuns being permitted to remain where they were, while the monks were brought together in certain monasteries. Many houses, especially in the large cities, were thus freed for sale.

The Assembly now abandoned the compromise measure of November 2 and declared the property of the Church the property of the nation. Believing that purchasers would be found more readily if the title was once transferred, the plan was adopted of selling to the municipalities, which, in turn, could sell to individual purchasers. The municipalities would also stand between the purchaser and the danger that the State might some day, moved by reactionary influences, reverse its policy. Under this plan Paris offered to buy half of the first property designated for sale.

A law determining the rules for appraising the different kinds of property was required, but the need of money was so immediate that the mode of issuing the *assignats* was first considered. For months the country had been suffering from a dearth of money. Business was carried on by the use of all sorts of substitutes for coin. Notes were issued by responsible firms, even by individuals. In Paris there were nearly a hundred kinds of unauthorized notes. A similar situation existed in the departments. Necker did not think that the issue of more paper, even with the church lands as security, was the true remedy. In a report made in March he declared that the condition of the money market, rather than the needs of the treasury, should determine the amount of state notes to be put into circulation. He warned the Assembly that the addition of two or three hundred millions to the amount of notes of the Bank of Discount already in circulation would present a frightful total. The

CHAP. IX

1789-90

advocates of the measure argued that the assignats would not be paper money, because they were secured on first-class real estate and were to bear interest at three per cent. They professed to believe that the people would prefer assignats to coin, and that this would bring the hoarded coin upon the market again. The whole transaction was regarded as a sort of treaty between the State, its creditors, and all private debtors and creditors, according to which the new landed property was used to secure each one and to relieve the situation until a new system of taxation should render possible a return to ordinary methods.

The issue was voted on April 17, and provided for assignats in denominations ranging from 200 to 1,000 livres. As soon as the receipts from the sale of the public lands reached a million livres, a million livres in assignats were to be withdrawn from circulation and burned. With the payments of the patriotic contribution in 1791 and 1792 proportional amounts of assignats were also to be destroyed. Each purchaser of land was assured that the assignats for which his land served as security would be called in. The municipalities, which were to take charge of the sale, were not to use the proceeds for ordinary expenses, but to turn the money over at once to the extraordinary fund. As no assignat below the value of 200 livres was issued, the circulation of ordinary coins, it was thought, would not be affected. These would be as necessary as before, for the decree provided that the debtor must offer exact change in meeting his obligations. The issue of the assignats would imply the withdrawal of the notes of the Bank of Discount, and until the assignats were ready the bank-notes were to have printed on their backs "promise to furnish assignats."

If the Assembly had voted no other issue of assignats, such a method of obtaining from the public a loan with the church property as security could not be criticized as more expensive than an ordinary loan. The assignats were simple mortgage notes and it was so stated on their face. The difficulty with the scheme was that for the time it seemed to remove all necessity of financial prudence and to enable the Assembly to vote vast sums of money without considering too narrowly how they should be found. But the Assembly discovered even before the assignats were printed that they would not be on a par with gold and silver. In May the assignats which were to be delivered in June were at a discount on the market of from five to ten per cent.

But the gravest danger in the plan was that the causes which led to the issue of April suggested another issue in September.

New Issues

Before an assignat was issued the Assembly had used up 143,000,000 by requiring the Bank of Discount to lend the treasury, in lieu of the assignats, twenty millions in April, twenty-eight in May, fifty in June, and forty-five in July. Coin in which to transact retail business was at a premium. Persons who had sums to pay which could not be met exactly by assignats were obliged to purchase the balance, and as early as May, 1790, were paying six per cent. premium. The need of instruments of exchange, felt everywhere in France, was not the only motive impelling the Assembly to draw again upon its great resource. A report of the finance committee in August showed that the demand debt, not to mention the funded debt, amounted to 1,340,000,000 livres and that the annual interest account was 257,000,000. The total estimated annual expenses of 650,000,000 could not be borne without new and heavy taxes, the thought of which the Assembly would not tolerate, for one of the reasons for its existence was the need of relieving the taxpayer. The battle of April was fought again in August and September, with the result that another issue, of 800,000,000 livres, was ordered. The interest feature of the first issue was abolished. To meet the demand for assignats of smaller denominations assignats of fifty livres were soon included and in the following spring assignats of five livres were substituted for those of the largest denominations. So great was the demand for money of any sort that the fifty livre assignats were at first disposed of at a premium. When the smaller ones were issued precautions were taken in order that they might not fall into the hands of speculators. The Constituent Assembly did not stop with its limit of 1,200,000,000, but issued 600,000,000 more in June, 1791. Regularly as each month passed the Assembly turned to the extraordinary fund for from fifteen to forty million livres to cover the growing monthly deficits. In this way and in the payment of reimbursements the Assembly drew from this fund before its labors were over 1,453,000,000 livres. The movement of the national finances down the steep incline of an irredeemable currency was already so rapid as to make it improbable that any successive legislature could check the speed.

The mode of selling the new public lands was determined in a series of decrees which followed the issue of the assignats. The property was divided into classes, of which the first was the arable land and its appurtenances. This should be appraised as equal in value to twenty-two years' revenue. Other classes of property, including dues of various kinds, were estimated at twenty years' purchase, forests at fifteen. The State guaranteed

CHAP. IX

1789-90

the property as free from feudal dues. If such dues were part of its revenue, the annual and the occasional dues might be extinguished separately, which made a land settlement easier than in the case of seigniorial lands. The purchase price was payable in instalments, twelve per cent. being due at once and the rest within twelve years. The property was to be sold to the highest bidder but not below the appraisal value.

Shortly afterwards the Assembly decided to provide for the sale of all the public lands, except the woods and the forests and those reserved to the King. This time the sale was direct, proposals being made to the committee on "alienation," or the directory of the department or district where the land was located. The sales were most active in 1791. The property generally brought much more than its appraised value. The explanation is that the appraisement was low, partly in order to insure the success of the sales and partly because the revenue upon which it was based was small under the lax management of the clergy. At first the Assembly professed the policy of subdividing estates to increase the number of small proprietors, but soon the needs of the treasury proved stronger than social theories. The lands naturally went to those who had money to pay for them. The relative number of small proprietors was not increased, although in distinctly rural districts the peasants acquired more than the bourgeois. Six-sevenths of the land in the district of Versailles was bought by citizens of either Versailles or Paris. In several districts of the department of the Gironde the proportion was similar. It has also been found that many of the clergy bought lands which had belonged to their parish churches. The question of the distribution of the church lands by these sales is complicated by the fact that lands were frequently bought to be sold again. It is believed that these second sales slightly increased the number of peasant proprietors.¹

No steps taken by the Assembly in dealing with the Church had thus far aroused formidable opposition, although their total effect was revolutionary. The clergy, once a State within the State, managing a vast property, negotiating loans, offering "free gifts" to the King, had exchanged this position for that of simple ecclesiastics, receiving a salary or a pension from the government. The Assembly had gone still further and by decrees forbidding the payment of papal dues, like the annates, had interfered with the relations of the French Church to the Pope. At the instance of Montmorin, the French minister of

¹ See especially, Marcel Marion, *La Vente des Biens nationaux pendant la Révolution*.

foreign affairs, the Pope had agreed to waive his right for the time being, hoping that the storm would soon blow over. The suppression of the monastic orders carried the Assembly still further into the field of religious reform. The question was whether it would pause or its zeal would lead it upon even more dangerous ground. Now that the course of the Revolution had elevated it to supreme power it was tempted to settle long disputed questions of Church and State and of the relations of the French Church to the papacy. It yielded to the temptation, and the laws which it undertook to enforce were the occasion, if not the cause, of bitter civil strife.

It is not surprising that the Pope was opposed to a revolution which treated his rights with scant respect. In March, 1790, the French ambassador had with difficulty restrained him from publishing an encyclical condemning both the principles and the acts of the Assembly. This condemnation he embodied in an allocution delivered in secret consistory, on March 29. Already the ecclesiastical committee of the Assembly had begun work on their project of reform. The committee included a strong majority of Gallicans, although none of its members were Voltairian or really hostile to the rights of the Church, as they understood them. Their project was laid before the Assembly late in May and was discussed during the next six weeks. The opposition of the bishops and of the majority of the other clergy in the Assembly did not at first appear to be irreducible. Their criticisms and objections were at once presented by Boisgelin, archbishop of Aix, a prelate of conciliatory disposition. While he explained the objections to the plan of the committee from the point of view of ecclesiastical law, he appeared to insist principally upon the necessity of seeking the coöperation of the Church, through the action of a national council or of the Pope, in introducing changes in a canonical manner. The difficulty with the leaders of the Assembly was that they expected the Church to accept every feature of their program. Churchmen alone were to illustrate the spirit of conciliation. If the bishops refused to use all the devices known to ecclesiastical diplomacy in carrying the plan out canonically, the bishops or the Pope must assume responsibility for a strife which was inevitable.

The title of the proposed law was "Civil Constitution of the Clergy." The qualifying word "civil" was a disclaimer on the part of the Assembly of any intention of interfering with religious concerns. The Assembly, however, undertook to accomplish by the action of civil authority changes hitherto regarded as lying principally within the competence of ecclesiastical authority. The

CHAP. IX

1789-90

course of the debate showed that the members of the Assembly were even less inclined to compromise than the committee. Men like Robespierre did not think the committee sufficiently "philosophical" in its attitude.

Two fundamental purposes appeared to be embodied in the new constitution: first, to render the Church simply one department of the State, its clergy differing from other officials simply in function; and, second, to destroy the effective jurisdiction of the Pope. Although learned canonists were on the committee, they took the unhistorical attitude that it was possible to return to conditions which, they believed, were those of the primitive Church. They were, moreover, inconsistent; for in some respects they were not content with primitive conditions and wished to modify these to ensure the supremacy of the State. Frequently, too, they referred to the Pope as the Bishop of Rome, and one of their members spoke as if his functions were limited to the diocese of Rome. They ignored the fact that after proclaiming religious freedom in their Declaration of Rights they should not attempt to regulate the internal organization of any church. This inconsistency did not stir the churchmen especially, as they did not believe in the Declaration of Rights, but they insisted that in these matters the Church of France or the sovereign pontiff must be consulted. Some of these questions were involved in the Concordat, a solemn treaty between the Pope and France, which had not been abrogated.

Changes
Made

The constitution reduced the number of bishoprics and archbishoprics to eighty-three, abolishing fifty-two. Their limits were to be identical with the boundaries of the departments. Instead of archbishoprics, ten bishops were to have metropolitan jurisdiction. Aside from the parish clergy and the vicars, who assisted the bishops in the management of their dioceses and in the instruction of young priests in the diocesan seminaries, there were to be no ecclesiastics. Many kinds of clergy of ancient origin disappeared both in name and function. The authority of the bishop also was reduced. He could perform no act of jurisdiction without the consent of his council of vicars. He was no longer nominated by the King and granted canonical institution by the Pope. He was to be elected in the departmental electoral assembly, the body which elected the deputies to the legislature, and from which no one was excluded on account of his religious opinions or the absence of them. Thus Protestants, Jews, and Voltairians could take part in the choice of bishops. For confirmation he was to look to the metropolitan or, in default of him, to the oldest bishop within the juris-

diction of the metropolitan.² Like the bishop, the parish priest was elected. Each, before being inducted into office, must take an oath of fidelity, among other things, to the constitution, which seemed to include this Civil Constitution of the Clergy. The Pope's jurisdiction was cut off by the provision which forbade French bishops to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign bishop. The newly elected bishops were expressly forbidden to look to him for canonical institution, but they should write him a letter as chief of the Church and in token of their communion with him. The Civil Constitution made liberal provision for the support of the clergy; of those whose positions were destroyed by the law, as well as of those retained in active service. The rules in regard to residence were strict, insuring that the faithful henceforward should not be watched over by absentees. But in the eyes of loyal churchmen such features did not redeem the law from the vice of its origin. The project of the committee was adopted on July 12 and sent to the King for his signature. After waiting ten days the King announced to the Assembly that he would accept the measure, but would delay the formal act of sanction in order "to take measures necessary to assure its execution." On the following day, July 23, there arrived from the Pope confidential letters to the King and two of his ministers, warning them that if the King approved the Civil Constitution of the Clergy he would lead his people into error and schism. In reply, advised by his ecclesiastical councilors, the King urged the Pope to delegate to the bishops the authority to put the changes into effect, at least temporarily. This expedient appears to have had the approval of many of the bishops in the Assembly, who realized that it was impossible to force their fellow deputies to abate their demands and hoped to save the situation by yielding. The appeal did not bring a prompt response and on August 24 the King gave his sanction to the law.

Attitude of
Louis XVI

Pope Pius VI was in an embarrassing position. The papal possessions on the Rhone had been affected by the progress of revolution in the surrounding country. In June the Avignonese had driven out the papal legate and had voted in favor of annexation to France. The inhabitants of the Comtat Venaissin desired to live under the authority of the Pope, but they also desired to enjoy the reforms offered to the French people by the Revolution. When the question of annexation was brought before the National Assembly, it refused its consent, on the ground that the rights of the Pope as well as the wishes of the people should

Policy of
the Pope

² The election was to take place on a Sunday after mass, at which all electors were required to be present. Title II, art. 6.

CHAP. IX

1789-90

be respected. The committee to which the matter was referred declared that otherwise annexation would be an act of conquest and as such already forbidden by a constitutional decree. If, now, the Pope should condemn the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, his attitude was likely to exasperate the Assembly, lessen the force of its scruples, and lead to his own spoliation. It is not surprising that he sought to gain time.

The legislation of the Constituent Assembly upon the Church may be criticized from the point of view of what it was right for a government to undertake after it had solemnly proclaimed the principle of religious liberty, but it should be judged, rather, from the point of view of practical statesmanship. Within a year it had become such a potent cause of strife that leading politicians thought seriously of modifying it or changing its character altogether.

CHAPTER X

THE MENACE OF CIVIL WAR

TWO days after the enactment of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy added a potent element of religious discord to the other causes of division among Frenchmen, a great festival of federation was held in Paris. The occasion was the first anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. Twenty-five thousand delegates from all parts of France represented the national guards and the soldiers and sailors of the line and the marine. Imposing ceremonies in the presence of a vast crowd of spectators took place on the Champ de Mars. An enclosure was built resembling a Roman circus, with places for the National Assembly and the King. An altar was erected and upon it mass was celebrated by Talleyrand, the bishop who had proposed the appropriation of a part of the church lands. King, Assembly, and troops took once more the oath of fidelity to the new order. Even the torrents of rain which fell at intervals could not chill the ardor of the delegates, who found in the success of the festival evidence that the constitution was at length assured. The shouts for the King were long and full of warmth. A year later he referred to these moments as the sweetest of his residence in Paris.

The idea of federation appeared spontaneously during the municipal revolution of the preceding summer. At first there were federations of the national guards of neighboring cities. The movement spread until the soldiers of whole regions were brought together. It affirmed the unity of French sentiment at a time when the old régime was disintegrating and the country seemed to be in danger of becoming a jarring multitude of half-independent communities.

Not all Parisians shared the enthusiasm of the crowds on the Champ de Mars. Many of the nobles left Paris shortly before to avoid the festal scenes. Many other nobles, not merely residents of Paris but those of other parts of France, were already beyond the frontier. Some of them had emigrated in the summer of 1789, because, like the Count of Artois and the Prince of Condé, they belonged to the defeated court party and feared

CHAP. X
1790-91

Federation
of July 14,
1790

The
Emigration

CHAP. X

1790-91

to meet the fate of Foulon and Berthier. Others had fled from their châteaux under the menace of peasant mobs. These at first took refuge in the towns, but as disorder increased many left the country, expecting to return after a few months. The insurrection of October 5 and 6 frightened away others, including several members of the National Assembly. The decree suppressing hereditary nobility, with its titles and armorial bearings, embroiled the nobles with the Revolution more than any other act of the Assembly. Many of them believed that the laws abolishing feudalism had dealt unjustly with their property, and they now thought their honor was touched. Some bore names associated with the glories of France, but these they were forbidden to use. Necker urged the King to veto the decree. But he signed it, taking the advice of the reactionary courtiers, who told him that to accept a measure like this, of which all Europe knew he disapproved, would show conclusively that he was a prisoner. The provincial nobles, always jealous of the court nobility, had for the most part resisted the appeals to emigrate, but their attitude now changed.

The Army

The regular soldiers as well as the national guards were represented at the festival of federation. The influence of the Revolution upon the army was, however, not altogether wholesome. The soldiers undoubtedly became capable of a more genuine patriotism since they were treated as citizens and were told that promotion depended upon their capacity and their services rather than upon court favor or wealth. But often they did not seem able to distinguish between the spirit of liberty and the spirit of disobedience. The news of the rich reward received by the French Guard at Paris after the insurrection of July 14, 1789, impelled other regiments to demand a distribution of the contents of the regimental chests. They even tried to sell their equipment or their horses. Mutinies occurred in which the lives of the officers were endangered. The most formidable outbreak took place at Nancy in Lorraine in August, 1790. It involved three regiments, one of which was a Swiss regiment in the service of France. The task of putting down the mutineers was assigned to the Marquis de Bouillé, who was in command of the army of the East. He led a force of about four thousand men to Nancy. For a time it seemed as if the soldiers would return to obedience without a struggle, but firing began, perhaps by misunderstanding or accident, and a fierce battle followed in which the mutineers were defeated. The ringleaders were punished with death or the galleys. The conservatives applauded this vigorous assertion of authority, while the radicals sought

to represent the punishment as an act of despotism and to treat the victims as martyrs of liberty.

CHAP. X

1790-91

There were other equally serious causes of anxiety. The controversies over the seizure of church property, the suppression of the monastic system, and the refusal of the Assembly to declare the Roman Catholic religion the religion of France had by the summer of 1790 roused religious passion to the danger point. The first consequence was an outburst of religious hatred in the South, where many bitter memories separated Huguenot and Catholic. In the cities of Montauban and Nîmes the prosperous middle class was mainly Protestant, while the mass of the population and the gentry of the surrounding country were Catholic. The Protestants naturally rallied to the cause of a revolution which gave them religious equality. They formed the majority of the national guards. Later private companies made up of Catholics were organized. At Montauban a serious riot broke out on May 10 when the municipality proceeded to take an inventory of the convent of the Cordeliers. A detachment of national guards was attacked by a fanatical mob, several were killed, and the rest thrown into prison. They were released only on the approach of an army of fifteen thousand national guards from Bordeaux. The National Assembly held the municipality responsible for the affair, and its officials were cashiered. The troubles at Nîmes a month later were of similar origin. On the first day the Catholics appeared to have the upper hand, but on the following morning hundreds of Protestants from the Cévennes marched into Nîmes, and before the struggle ended three hundred Catholics perished.

Troubles
in the
South

The Catholics worsted at Nîmes sought to utilize the scheme of federation and assembled on the plain of Jalès between thirty and forty thousand national guards drawn from four southern departments. The more restless spirits wished to attack Nîmes, but wiser counsels prevailed and a petition was drawn up asking the National Assembly to permit the Catholic party at Nîmes to arm and asking it also to order the release of the Catholics imprisoned after the riot. The Assembly treated the deliberations as illegal and ordered the prosecution of the leaders, but nothing was done. The ardent revolutionists saw in the meeting evidence of a conspiracy to restore the old régime, while the emigrant nobles hoped that the temporary organization effected might be used as the nucleus of a royalist revolt.

The controversy over the Civil Constitution of the Clergy reached a crisis in the fall when attempts were made to enforce its provisions. The Pope continued to pursue a temporizing

CHAP. X

1790-91

Resistance
of the
Clergy

policy. The most influential clerical deputies in the Assembly, under the leadership of Boisgelin, held that until the Pope authorized the introduction of changes the French clergy must take the attitude of passive resistance. This policy Boisgelin announced in an "Exposition of Principles" to which ninety-seven clerical members adhered. The struggle entered upon a new phase when the Bishop of Quimper died and the Abbé Expilly, a member of the ecclesiastical committee, was elected bishop according to the mode prescribed by law. Anticipating the refusal of the metropolitan of Rennes and the oldest bishop of the province to consecrate him, the Assembly in November added to the procedure known as an "appeal against abuse of power," giving the district court the right in such cases to designate any French bishop to perform the act of consecration. The same law empowered local authorities to meet the policy of passive resistance on the part of their bishop by proceeding to reorganize the parishes without his coöperation. Before the month of November was over the Assembly resolved to discover by means of a test who were willing to obey the law and who were defiant. In the Civil Constitution a form of oath was provided which ecclesiastics were to take before assuming the duties of the office to which they had been chosen. It was now proposed that all bishops and beneficed clergy be required to take the oath at once. Those who refused should be regarded as having resigned their positions. After a short debate the project was voted on November 27.

An Oath
Prescribed

The decision of the Assembly to exact an oath¹ of the clergy threw the King into an agony of distress. His conscience was troubled because he had sanctioned the Civil Constitution. Already he had begun to plan an escape from Paris to a frontier fortress, where, surrounded by faithful regiments commanded by the Marquis de Bouillé, he would be able to restore his shattered power. The completion of the plans waited upon the attitude of the neighboring sovereigns, especially of the Emperor Leopold, the Queen's brother. On November 26 the King gave the Baron de Breteuil, the principal member of the short-lived ministry of July, 1789, and one of the first emigrants, full powers to open negotiations with friendly courts. But there was no hope of immediate aid from either Leopold or other monarchs. The King's only resource was papal action rendering possible

¹ They were "to swear to watch with care over the faithful of the diocese or parish entrusted to them, to be faithful to the nation, the law and the King, and to maintain with all their power the constitution decreed by the National Assembly and accepted by the King." Art. 1.

the enforcement of the Civil Constitution by delegated ecclesiastical authority. Advised once more by Boisgelin, the King sent a supreme appeal to Rome early in December. Time for reply had not elapsed before the Assembly pressed the King to sanction the oath. The movements of the populace seemed to announce a new October 5. Louis, "with death in his soul" as if he were committing a mortal sin, gave the decree his sanction on December 26. He exclaimed, "I should prefer to be King of Metz rather than remain King of France in such a posture, but this will soon be ended." He had assumed a double part that was to hasten civil war, bring about the ruin of the monarchy, and lead to his own death.

According to the decree of November 27 the oath was to be taken by the clergy publicly on Sunday after mass; by the bishops in the cathedral churches, by the priests in the parish churches. The Assembly unwisely inserted a provision that its ecclesiastical members should take the oath within its walls, thus furnishing them a conspicuous platform upon which to display their determination to resist. The first to take the oath in the Assembly was the Abbé Grégoire, who had been one of the priests to join the third estate at Versailles in June, 1789. He afterwards explained that his oath was one of submission to law and that it did not imply approval of solutions given in the law to problems of ecclesiastical organization or discipline. His example was followed by only a third of the clerical delegation in the Assembly. Nearly two hundred either refused to take the oath or surrounded their act with qualifications not permitted by the law. Of the entire episcopate only four took the oath. One of these was Talleyrand and another was the former minister Brienne — neither of them conspicuous for piety. One of the two titular bishops to take the oath was Gobel, bishop of Lydda *in partibus*,² who three years later was to become notorious in the tragi-comedy of the Worship of Reason. Many of the bishops who refused to take the oath were moved, their critics believed, by prejudices of caste quite as much as by considerations of religion. Of the other clergy — vicars-general, superiors and directors of seminaries, parish priests and vicars, professors in colleges — about half declined to take the oath. Many who consented retracted a few weeks later when a papal brief, issued in April, threatened with suspension any who did not retract within forty days.

The refusal of nearly all the bishops and half of the clergy

² *In partibus infidelium*, that is, in Moslem lands.

CHAP. X

1790-91

Religious
Schism

to take the oath brought the ecclesiastical reforms of the National Assembly into a precarious situation. According to the law non-jurors could perform no functions as official pastors. The consequence was that a multitude of communities were left without religious services, although the Assembly in the instructions which it issued permitted non-jurors to continue their duties until they were replaced. The machinery of election was at once set in motion to fill the vacancies. In order to increase the number of candidates for vacant sees, a special decree, bearing upon the elections of 1791, reduced the qualification of experience from fifteen years to five years, opening the road of promotion to young and ambitious men. With few exceptions the new bishops were chosen on the ground of their "patriotism" rather than for their piety. One of the best choices was Henri Grégoire, made bishop of the department of the Loire-et-Cher and destined to win distinction later in the Revolution for his defense of the Catholic faith. To consecrate the first bishops-elect, appeal was made to Talleyrand. Once consecrated, they officiated at the consecration of others. Gobel, the new bishop of Paris, consecrated thirty-six between February 27 and April 26.

The difficulty was not over when the new episcopate was installed and the parish priests entered upon their functions. Instead of one Church France now had two. One set of clergy was called "non-juror" or "refractory," the other "constitutional" or "intruder." In many communities the parish priest who refused to take the oath remained, holding religious services in a house or a barn, hearing confessions, granting absolution, and celebrating mass. By the "patriots" he was regarded as a law-breaker and he looked upon them as subverters of true religion, as schismatics and heretics. The religious liberty guaranteed in the Declaration of Rights appeared to be almost as impossible as under the old régime. The difficulties increased rather than diminished, and in several departments the officials were busied hurrying troops here and there to protect "intruders" from the wrath of the peasants.

It was inevitable that the trouble should become acute in Paris. Many Catholics resorted to private chapels or to chapels of convents in order to receive the ministrations of a clergy whom they considered faithful to the principles of the Church. Mobs of "patriots" collected near by, seeking to interrupt the services and to terrify the worshipers. The directory of the department, anxious to preserve religious liberty and to put an end to disorderly scenes, authorized the rental of unoccupied churches or other buildings for the purpose of holding religious services,

Attempts
to Preserve
Religious
Liberty

stipulating that the sermons should contain no criticisms of the laws or the established authorities. Accordingly, the former priest of St. Sulpice rented the Church of the Théatins from the municipality and services were announced for April 17, Palm Sunday. Before the hour of worship a mob collected and refused to permit any one to enter the church. An insulting sign was placed over the door. The municipal authorities succeeded after a time in restoring order. The National Assembly now took up the matter, approved the decision of the Paris directory, and extended the privilege to all other communities. By the same decree, on May 7, non-jurors were also given the right to say mass in the official churches. This compromise testified to the desire of the Assembly to be just, but the affair was already beyond its control, and the compromise turned out to be a temporary palliative soon forgotten in the bitterness of the conflict. Ardent revolutionists could not understand how there could be two forms of worship in the same religion.

The King, whom the agitators called the "first functionary," set an example of defiance to the law by continuing the services of the non-juring clergy in the royal chapel at the Tuileries. Upon the approach of Easter he was tormented by the fear that in giving his sanction to decrees which had provoked a schism he was guilty of wrong and should not commune. But he wished to avoid having the ministrations of the constitutional clergy thrust upon him and prepared to spend the Easter season at St. Cloud, where he had resided for several weeks in the preceding summer. Rumor declared that this was a scheme to escape, and that from St. Cloud the King would go to Compiègne, and from Compiègne to Metz or some other fortress town. The day after the affair of the Théatins when the King and Queen entered their carriage to go to St. Cloud, they were stopped by national guards in the courtyard of the palace. Bailly and Lafayette appealed in vain to the soldiers to respect the rights of the King. After a scene lasting nearly two hours the royal family left the carriage and reëntered the palace. Louis, urged by his ministers, consented to dismiss his almoner, who was a non-juror, and to hear mass on Easter Sunday at the Church of St. Germain-l'Auxerrois, the parish church of the Louvre, whose priest had taken the oath.

The King and Queen were now more than ever determined to escape from their prison. The details of the plan were already fixed. Montmédy, near the frontier of Luxemburg, was chosen as the place of refuge. Bouillé was to concentrate close at hand the regiments, chiefly composed of foreigners, upon

Louis XVI
and the
Law

The King
Plans to
Escape

CHAP. X

1790-91

which he could rely. He was to find his excuse in a movement of Austrian troops on the frontier of the Austrian Netherlands. At the last moment, when the King and the Queen were ready, he was to announce the despatch from Paris of a consignment of treasure and was to send cavalry detachments along the road toward Paris to convoy it safely. The arrangements for the escape from the city were entrusted to a confidant of the Queen, the Count de Fersen, a Swedish nobleman who resided at the Court.³

Meanwhile to quiet the suspicions of the public, the King consented to send a circular to the French embassies abroad, signed by Montmorin, but probably composed by the leaders of the constitutional party in the Assembly, in which the statement that the King was not free was denounced as an "atrocious calumny." The sovereign nation was declared to have "no organs except the public functionaries, of which the King is the first." It was hardly necessary for Louis to send word through Breteuil to foreign courts that this language was dictated by the perilous situation.

The preparations for flight were finally completed, and on the night of June 20 the royal family left the palace in disguise and were driven by Fersen to a village beyond the walls, where they were transferred to a large traveling carriage. The measures taken to insure the success of the flight were destined to make it fail. At first everything went well. The carriage was driven rapidly until the King thought his escape was assured. He was already beyond the place where the first detachments of cavalry were to meet him. But the appearance of soldiers aroused the suspicions and fears of the countryside, and the officers were obliged to lead their men away from the highroad. The villages through which the coach passed seemed in an ominous state of expectation. The King was recognized once or twice. When the coach reached Varennes, almost within the lines of Bouillé's army, it was delayed by the inability of the couriers to find post-horses. The authorities, warned at that moment that the coach contained the royal family, arrested the party. The King acknowledged his identity and was detained to await orders from Paris. His brother, the Count of Provence, was more fortunate. Disguised as a private gentleman he traveled without interruption to the northern frontier. Had the King succeeded in carrying out his plan, the consequence would have been civil war.

³ Fersen had served as an adjutant with Rochambeau in the American Revolutionary War.

When the King fled from the Tuileries, he left a declaration condemning the principal features of the constitution which he had repeatedly sworn to defend. He said he did not regret the sacrifices which he had made, but deplored the ruin of the monarchy and the spread of anarchy. Everywhere the agents of the royal administration were, he declared, without authority. Power had passed to the clubs, especially to the Jacobins, whose orders public officials were compelled to heed. He complained that no initiative in legislation was left to him, that decrees termed "constitutional" became effective without his sanction, and that in the administration of justice he did not retain the pardoning power. He complained also that, although few appointments in the army were reserved to him, his nominations had been opposed. The influence of the clubs he felt to be fatal to military discipline. Turning to foreign affairs, he asserted that successful negotiations with other states were impossible, since the right of declaring war was no longer his and the course of negotiations was subjected to the chances of debate before a large assembly.

The Assembly, as soon as it was informed of the King's flight, adopting the theory of an abduction, ordered measures taken to stop the royal family and to bring about the arrest of those who had contrived the abduction. It also voted that decrees should be sealed and promulgated without awaiting the sanction of Louis XVI, and drew up a new military oath from which the King's name was omitted. Finally it published a proclamation, going over in an angry tone the points of the King's declaration, asserting that, if he did not some day declare that he had been misled by the influence of factious men, he should be denounced to the whole world as a perjurer.

The news of the King's arrest was known in Paris by nine o'clock on the evening of June 22. Until that time the principal sentiment was the fear lest the liberties which had been achieved should be endangered by his escape. This was not unmixed with feelings of contempt for the King and a desire to destroy the symbols of royalty. The royal family was brought back to Paris on June 25 through streets guarded by soldiers and thronged by spectators. The soldiers did not salute the King, the spectators did not raise their hats, but there were no insults, only an ominous silence.

Louis XVI was now actually a prisoner, and the government, though carried on in his name, was directed by the Assembly. Its leaders were confronted by the problem of the political consequences of the startling veto he had essayed to pronounce upon

CHAP. X

1790-91

The
Assembly
and the
King

A Republi-
can Move-
ment

CHAP. X

1790-91

the constitution which was nearing completion. In Paris there was a small but growing sentiment in favor of treating the King's flight as an abdication, and of organizing a republic. The most noisy advocates of this solution were found in the club of the Cordeliers, whose leading member was Danton, a prominent lawyer. The sentiment of France, expressed in addresses sent to the Assembly, was still strongly monarchical. In the Assembly those leaders who had done most to destroy the King's power were, nevertheless, theoretical monarchists. The flight had proved to them, better than any other evidence, that they had gone too far and had rendered his position unendurable. They were not inclined to advance toward a republic, but rather to recoil and to undo measures which seemed too radical. They reopened the question of a single or a bicameral legislature, but concluded not to reverse the decision of September, 1789. They sought, however, to render the legislature more representative of the conservative interests of the country by increasing the property qualifications of the members of the secondary electoral assemblies. The King they resolved to restore, and on July 15 they voted that when the constitution was completed he should be given an opportunity to declare, in entire freedom, whether he would accept it. At the same time they embodied in it a provision which would lead to his deposition if he again attempted to put himself at the head of an army, to be used "against the nation," as he aimed to use that commanded by Bouillé.

The decision to restore the King led to a conflict with the Paris radicals. They drew up a petition demanding that the National Assembly consider his act an abdication and call a new "Constituent" Assembly to try him and to reorganize the executive power. This petition they took to the Champ de Mars for signature. The Assembly, alarmed by attempts of similar petitioners to force their way into its hall, thought that the agitation foreshadowed an outbreak, and called upon the municipal officers to preserve the peace and guard the freedom of its councils. On July 17, toward the close of the day, when rumors of all sorts were flying about, the municipal council declared the city under martial law and, informed that the crowds at the Champ de Mars were riotous, proceeded thither accompanied by national guards. The troops on their appearance were greeted with missiles, and fired into the crowd before Bailly or Lafayette could restrain them. A stampede took place and many persons were trampled upon. When the field was cleared, about twelve lay dead and as many wounded.

The radicals called this affair the Massacre of the Champ de

Affair
of
the Champ
de Mars

Mars, while the conservatives regarded it as a salutary act of firmness. As the Jacobin Club was associated with one of the petitions, all the deputies who belonged to it except Robespierre, Pétion, Grégoire and a few others, attempted to reorganize the club at the convent of the Feuillants. The seceders took the same name, so that for months there were two clubs called "Friends of the Constitution," one sitting at the Jacobins and the other at the Feuillants. The clubs outside of Paris retained their affiliation with that at the Jacobins. Many of the seceders returned when the club adopted an attitude less extreme on the constitutional question.

The general denial of religious liberty to those who refused to conform to the established Church was a new cause of emigration. By this time it had become the fashion to emigrate. One nobleman wrote to his son, who sympathized with the Revolution, "At your age it is necessary to do what the other young people are doing." The Count of Artois sent appeals to the noblemen in the army to join the forces which were assembling on the frontier. Many went, moved by the strange notion that honor called. The exodus became so alarming that the more earnest revolutionaries concluded that either the whole army should be disbanded or the officers should be dismissed. The Assembly refused to go so far, but a few days before the King's flight it drew up a new form of oath. By it officers and soldiers bound themselves to take no part in any conspiracy against the constitution, and any man guilty of unfaithfulness to his pledge should be "regarded as infamous, unworthy of bearing arms or being counted in the number of French citizens." Those who intended to emigrate reassured themselves by means of the subtlety that this oath was binding only as long as they remained "functionaries." To avoid infamy, it was only necessary to resign first. More than 2,000 officers did resign between September, 1791, and December, many without previously sending in a resignation. Of 9,000 officers in the line about 6,000 resigned before this movement ended.

The King's flight led to the enactment of a decree forbidding all persons except merchants to leave the kingdom. In July those who emigrated were subjected to a tax three times their regular assessment for the current year unless they returned within a month. Severe measures were justified not only because the movement threatened the efficiency of the army, but also because the Prince of Condé had already collected a small army on the Rhine. During the preceding winter the Count of Artois had formed the project of using a new assemblage of

CHAP. X

1790-91

Catholic troops at the Camp of Jalès as a center for a royalist insurrection in the South. He was forced to abandon the project because the royal family thought that such a movement would compromise the success of their attempt to escape from Paris. Nevertheless, the manœuvres at Jalès seriously alarmed public opinion.

When the work of revising the constitution was completed, the Assembly announced that the King might proceed to a town of his choice and there decide whether he would accept or reject it. To him this freedom seemed only apparent. He cherished the scheme of bringing about a congress which should represent the European powers and whose decisions should be enforced by their combined armies. This would, he thought, enable him to pose as a mediator between the indignant monarchs and his misguided subjects. He therefore regarded an acceptance of the constitution as a means of gaining time, and on September 14 he promised to defend it loyally against attack from domestic conspirators or foreign foes. Marie Antoinette, in a letter to a friend, sadly remarked, "It would have been more noble to refuse."

The folly of the King's brothers robbed the act of what little appearance of sincerity it possessed. In a letter which they addressed to him, and which was published in Paris, they declared that any acceptance on his part would be the consequence of constraint, for his heart would reject an act which his duty as king forbade. Their words gained meaning from the fact that the Count of Provence held court at Coblenz as "regent" of France, alleging that the King was a prisoner, and from the additional fact that the Prince of Condé maintained military headquarters at Worms, surrounded by an army of several thousand emigrants. The self-styled regent attempted to enter into diplomatic relations with the foreign powers and the Empress Catherine of Russia sent him an ambassador.

The last session of the Constituent Assembly was held on September 30, and on the following day its place was taken by a new assembly, called the Legislative Assembly, that is, the legislature provided for in the constitution. The two differed in their functions, for the period of constitution making was ended and the time for normal legislation had come. Although no member of the Constituent Assembly could be chosen to the Legislative Assembly, the new body was loyal to the monarchy. The primary elections had occurred before the flight to Varennes, and in consequence the electors who formed the electoral colleges or secondary assemblies were not seriously influenced by

King and
Constitu-
tion

The Legis-
lative As-
sembly

the radical movement of July, 1791. Even in Paris only three or four deputies out of twenty-four were radicals. After the Assembly was organized the Constitutional Royalists were the most influential group, numbering about 250, or one-third of the whole. The center which called itself Independent was somewhat larger and voted either with the right or left. The radicals were in a decided minority, numbering only 130. Among them were several deputies from the department of the Gironde — Vergniaud, Guadet, and Gensonné — a group which formed the nucleus of the later Girondin party. Brissot, one of the Paris deputies, was soon on intimate terms with them. This radical minority, through its energy, its zeal for the Revolution, and its uncompromising defense of the French view of every international question, often wrested the leadership from the right. The efforts of the radicals to interpret the constitution in a republican sense made its features less acceptable to the King and rendered the success of the experiment still less probable.

CHAPTER XI

THE REVOLUTION AND EUROPE

CHAP. XI
1789-92

THE Revolution began as the deliverance of a great nation from the trammels of arbitrary government and antiquated privilege. So most liberal minds understood it, in other countries as well as in France. Two years passed and its course appeared to lie directly towards civil war. The principal reason for the sinister change was the failure of the leaders to listen to counsels of moderation and to estimate accurately the strength of the conservative or reactionary forces which successive reforms, and especially the attempt to reorganize the Church, were rousing to resistance.

France and
her Neigh-
bors

The relations of Revolutionary France and her neighbors underwent a similar change. Many discerning minds in England, Germany, and Italy at first thought it meant the end of despotism and feudal oppression everywhere. The Declaration of Rights was a new gospel of individual worth, bringing hope to men of all countries. Such a creed could recognize no national boundaries. And yet Frenchmen remained Frenchmen, with traditional ambitions which influenced their aims and lurked beneath the most fraternal outbursts of cosmopolitan feeling. Moreover, a rigid adherence to what they were pleased to term principles would make trouble with their neighbors as it had at home. The statesmen of neighboring lands cared little for such principles, but were likely to keep their attention fixed upon their own interests and to object stubbornly if the French National Assembly insisted upon placing its interpretation upon their rights. Their antagonism was quickened by the danger that the revolutionary spirit would cross the borders of France and subvert their government or undermine their social system. For this reason the months which saw the approach of civil war in France saw also preparations for a foreign war.

English public opinion, at first generally favorable, became more discriminating after the uprising in October, 1789. Men took sides and grouped themselves into defenders or opponents of the Revolution. New societies were formed or old societies revived, and these entered into correspondence with the French societies, particularly with the Jacobin Club. A sermon preached

by Dr. Richard Price before one of them was taken by Burke as his text for a searching examination of the principles and acts of the Revolution. Burke had become an open and scornful critic before the first year of revolution had passed, but his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* did not appear until November, 1790. In spite of its defects, the book possesses historic importance, both because of its immediate effect upon public opinion in England and on the Continent and because it illustrates a method of thought upon political institutions which was destined to displace the method of Locke and the French philosophers and to serve as a type for the best political thinking of the nineteenth century. Burke insisted that reform must find limits in a reasonable respect for historical rights. He believed that the conflict of established interests would lead to sound political life more surely than any ingenious mechanism for expressing the "general will." His criticisms of the acts of the French and of their assembly were unjust because they were based upon a prejudiced and defective knowledge of social conditions in France both before the Revolution and during its first year. Burke's book brought many replies, the most notable of which were Sir James Mackintosh's *Vindiciae Gallicae* and Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man*. A more effective reply appeared in Arthur Young's *Travels in France* and particularly in the section describing the burdensome feudal privileges which had rested on the peasantry.

The controversy over the Revolution was carried into parliament, especially in the debates on the constitution of Quebec in 1791, and led to a split in the Whig party and the alienation of Burke and Fox. The Revolution was beginning to alarm the classes which inherited a privileged position. They gained such a horror of reform that every scheme seemed equally reprehensible. The consequence was that the social and political development of England was retarded during a generation. There never was a real danger that admiration of French principles or of the achievements of the Revolution would lead to upheaval in England. The governing classes were not yet divided in attitude towards the principles of English social order or political organization. Moreover, Englishmen had long enjoyed many of the liberties Frenchmen were struggling for. In Ireland the situation was different. One of the societies organized was the United Irishmen, and a group of revolutionists was formed which was later to cause England anxiety.

The full consequences of the Revolution for Germany were momentous, but several years elapsed before they were even

CHAP. XI

1789-92

English
Criticism

Germany

CHAP. XI

1789-92

partially apparent. Liberal-minded Germans were enthusiastic over the first conquests of the Revolution. They hailed the fall of the Bastille as a great symbolic event. Schlözer, of Göttingen, whose journal was a weight in political discussion and was always upon the table of the Emperor Joseph, declared that the angels in heaven must have sung a *Te Deum* at the news. The poet Klopstock was fervid in his admiration. The philosopher Kant, who had been deeply influenced by Rousseau's writings, saw in the Revolution evidence of a truer appreciation of the essential worth of man. After the October insurrection, the Germans, like the English, began to be discriminating in their praises. They felt that the French were carrying too much passion into their work and that injustice would be the result. Gentz, who was to become one of Germany's foremost political thinkers, and who at first regarded Burke's criticisms as unjust, in 1792 translated the *Reflections*, adding valuable observations, which were the first example in Germany of political discussion in accord with the methods of the newer historical science.

In Germany political conditions offered insuperable obstacles to the revolutionary propaganda. Its weakness as a loose confederation of States practically independent was a source of strength in this respect, for there were many centers of local activity, each with its special traditions and attachments. The great States, Austria and Prussia, were not decadent, like the old Bourbon monarchy. Frederick the Great had been dead only three years. The Prussian landed aristocracy still possessed feudal rights over the peasants, but they lived on their estates, and were a present force for good or for ill. Nevertheless, in some of the petty States along the Rhine oppression was so odious and the contagion of revolution so near that discontent produced local insurrections. Indeed, the news of the Revolution swept like a strong breeze across Germany, changing the moral atmosphere.

The rulers of Europe watched the progress of the Revolution with feelings suggested by its bearing upon their cherished schemes. The financial crisis, out of which France had been attempting since 1787 to escape, had already exercised a paralyzing influence upon her foreign policy, but no one looked for so utter an overthrow of royal power as came suddenly in June and July, 1789. The impressions which it made were everywhere distinct and fresh. For Austria it meant the collapse of an alliance which had been full of deceptions. If the campaign against the Turks had continued to be as disastrous as

it was in 1788, the loss of the moral support of France would have been serious. But the Emperor Joseph and his minister Kaunitz affected an attitude of indifference or disdain. Their disappointment must have been real, judging from the relief and joy with which the news from Paris was received in Berlin. The Prussians had not forgotten the perils from which the genius of the great Frederick delivered them in 1757, and it seemed possible that if the struggle in the East developed into a general European war France might again throw the weight of her army into the scale. With the fall of the Bastille this danger was averted. Late in July the Prussian minister Hertzberg wrote his master that the French monarchy was ruined, and that the opportunity had come to establish the influence of Prussia upon firm foundations, since Austria could no longer reckon upon French support. The Prussian ambassador in Paris was instructed to enter into relations with the radicals and increase the embarrassments of the French government.

The English government was suspected of pursuing a policy similar to that of Frederick William II. Shrewd observers felt that William Pitt, the prime minister, could not be indifferent to the fact that the revolutionary movement was ruining the power of France more certainly than a long succession of defeats, and without drawing a single pound sterling from the British treasury for military expenditures. Since riots disastrous to French influence abroad were now cheap in Paris, few believed that so excellent a financier would resist the temptation to invest. In his first utterance in parliament on the Revolution, early in 1790, Pitt expressed the hope that France would emerge from her state of struggle and trial freer and therefore stronger, capable of taking a still more brilliant part in the affairs of Europe. His attitude was correct, but a quarrel with Spain soon made evident the disappearance of France as an international factor.

The Spaniards, attempting to render effective their occupation of the northwestern coast of America, seized two English vessels in Nootka Sound, on the western coast of Vancouver Island, a place to which English traders had occasionally resorted since Captain Cook visited it in 1778. As soon as Pitt was informed of this act, he demanded reparation from the Spanish government. By virtue of the offensive and defensive alliance known as the Family Compact, between Spain and France, Spain had a right to call upon France for support in case the quarrel resulted in war. When the formidable prepa-

Nootka
Sound
Affair

CHAP. XI

1789-92

rations which England was making to enforce her demands were known, Montmorin, French minister of foreign affairs, thought that the time had come to silence the strife of factions by an appeal to patriotic union against the ancient enemy. He sent word to the National Assembly that in view of the armaments in England the King had ordered the arming of fourteen ships that he might fulfil his obligations to his ally. This precipitated a debate upon the right of peace and war, during which the radical orators ascribed war in general to cabinet intrigue and dynastic ambition. At the close the Assembly decreed that any declaration of war or treaty of peace must be made by the national legislature, although to the King was still left the right to propose the declaration. The Assembly also seized the occasion to assure the world of the peaceful character of the Revolution, formally renouncing wars of conquest or attacks upon the liberties of other peoples. This was a noble attitude, if it was a fixed principle of policy, but it might degenerate into mere delusive pose. Neither the debate nor its conclusion offered much prospect of support to Spain. When in June, 1790, Spain made a formal demand for help, Montmorin waited two months before he ventured to bring the matter again before the Assembly. Under Mirabeau's influence the Assembly replied by ordering negotiations opened with Spain to give the alliance a purely defensive character. At the same time the Assembly voted the arming of forty-five ships. The Spaniards despaired of obtaining any real assistance and concluded to come to terms with the English, a conclusion hastened by the reception of an ultimatum from Pitt. A treaty was signed in October without even consulting France. The little that Montmorin learned of the negotiations came through London. Nothing could have marked more significantly the destruction of the Family Compact and the ruin of French influence in foreign affairs.

Border
Problems

The conduct of the Assembly towards the rights of foreign States could be squared with its attitude of renunciation only by an ingenious method of definition and distinction. Its decrees of August 4 attempted to destroy the rights which German princes possessed in Alsace and which were secured to them not only by the treaties of Münster and Ryswick, but also in several instances by separate agreements with the French Crown. The abolition of the tithe, the confiscation of church property, and the destruction of foreign ecclesiastical jurisdiction within France, severing relations with German dioceses and provinces which had existed a thousand years, was a still

more serious blow to several great princes of the Church in Germany. Among those who suffered by one feature or another of this legislation were the Duke of Württemberg, the Margrave of Baden, the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Archbishop-Electors of Mainz, Treves, and Cologne, and the Bishops of Speyer and Basel. To them it seemed as if the spirit of Louis XIV had taken possession of the National Assembly and as if its acts were the sequel of the decisions of the Chambers of Reunion which had lighted the flames of war a century before. It was difficult for them to see how a nation which had solemnly renounced wars of conquest could settle by simple decree questions of right which Louis XIV had been unable to determine by half a dozen campaigns.

Even if an attempt had been made to settle the question of Alsace upon grounds of historical right, the French and the Germans would not have found agreement easy. When the French had obtained Alsace in 1648, they had received simply what the House of Hapsburg possessed. The treaty expressly stipulated that the princes, lay or ecclesiastical, who held fiefs directly, or "immediately," of the empire should not lose the rights and prerogatives attached to such a legal status. The same stipulation protected the autonomy of the imperial cities. These reserved rights were successfully ignored by Louis XIV, so far as they interfered with the exercise of sovereignty. The inability of the empire to protect its less powerful vassals led them to make separate arrangements with France, acknowledging French sovereignty over their Alsatian territories, and receiving in return a royal guarantee of their remaining rights. But when the Revolution began to exercise sovereignty, before which no barriers of local privilege were strong enough to stand, it was unlikely that princely rights in Alsace would be treated in a manner acceptable to the German legists.

In no region did the burdens of the old régime rest with more crushing weight than in Alsace, where serfdom still lingered, and the people were taxed not only by the King of France but also by their German lords. The decrees of the National Assembly greatly reduced the burden and for the first time made the Alsatians feel like Frenchmen. In an obscure way the lawyers of the National Assembly perceived this, and declared that the union of Alsace to France rested on the will of the people and not on the treaties of Westphalia. They were ready to treat the rights of the German princes as relics of ancient and iniquitous usurpations. These princes had, they said, no just ground of complaint, and if France should offer an indemnity,

CHAP. XI

1789-92

the offer would be prompted solely by a desire to live on good terms with her neighbors. This attitude was embodied in a report which the Assembly adopted in October, 1790.

To the German princes it was not wholly a question of right, or of income, but partly also of existence. What must be the effect upon the peasants of the States immediately across the Rhine or below Alsace, if they saw the Alsatian peasants suddenly relieved of the burdens which had been oppressing them all for centuries, especially as relief came in the name of principles utterly destructive of the civil, ecclesiastical, and social order of Germany? The princes of the Church felt the danger more keenly than other princes, and not without good reason. When the French sent a diplomat to take up the question of compensation, he suggested to the Margrave of Baden the plan of finding territorial indemnities in the domains of the Church on the right bank of the Rhine and offered him those that belonged to the bishopric of Strasbourg. It was natural that the ecclesiastical princes, especially the archbishops of Mainz, Treves, and Cologne should clamor for extreme measures against the French. They urged upon the imperial diet the theory that France by ignoring the reservations made in the treaties had forfeited all right to Alsace, and demanded that the empire resume full jurisdiction. They were anxious, too, that a military cordon should be drawn along the French frontier to prevent the spread of the revolutionary plague. The lay princes were inclined to less aggressive views. The more impecunious would have taken money for their claims, had this not been forbidden by the diet. Others, under the leadership of Prussia, suggested that if the matter were properly brought before the French government it would recall the obnoxious decrees. Finally the long process of reaching a formal decision from the imperial authorities was begun after the Emperor Leopold, who succeeded his brother Joseph in February, 1790, had been unable to obtain a satisfactory answer from the French government. The decision came in 1791, and its affirmation of the German claims was one element of a diplomatic situation of which war was the consequence.

The spirit in which a prince-bishop of the empire was likely to meet the demands of moderate revolution was illustrated in the case of Liège. The news from across the border in the summer of 1789 created such an atmosphere of political enthusiasm that a controversy about the prerogatives of the bishop led to risings in one or two towns, and finally in Liège itself. There was a general cry for the restoration of the liberties

taken away a century before. The bishop appeared ready to yield every demand. New magistrates were chosen and the estates were summoned. But no sooner was this done than the bishop fled to Treves. He had already appealed to the imperial court at Wetzlar for protection. With unseemly haste, this court, by which the most important affairs were delayed for years and sometimes for generations, annulled the proceedings at Liège as an infringement of the peace of the empire, and ordered an "execution" by the troops of the circle of Westphalia. Prussia, because the duchy of Cleves, a possession of Frederick William of Prussia, belonged to this circle, took the leading part in the execution, but the King was anxious to negotiate a compromise between the absent bishop and his subjects and promised them redress of grievances and an amnesty. Neither the bishop nor the imperial court, however, would listen to suggestions of compromise and the King withdrew his troops. The duty of levying execution was then assigned to the circles of Franconia, Swabia, and the Rhine, but their troops were defeated and it was not until 1791 that Austria, acting for the circle of Burgundy, restored the bishop. He avenged himself upon his subjects with such unreasoning cruelty that a year or two later they welcomed the French invaders as deliverers.

The conduct of France towards the princes who held lands in Alsace and the contagion of French revolutionary principles might vex the minds of petty German princes, lay or ecclesiastical, but neither Austria nor Prussia was at first turned from the plans they were seeking to carry out when the Revolution began. Austria wished to bring the Turkish war to a successful conclusion, while Prussia hoped with the support of the maritime powers to intervene between the contending States in such a way as to win substantial benefits without the costs of war. Frederick William's minister, Hertzberg, believed that Turkey would welcome Prussian intervention, and, glad to be saved from ruin, would concede to Austria the frontiers of the Peace of Passarowitz, which included northern Servia, with Belgrade, and a part of Wallachia. In order that the balance of power might be preserved Prussia could then demand compensation through a system of exchanges, according to which Austria should return Galicia to Poland and Poland should grant to Prussia the cities of Danzig and Thorn with the palatinate of Posen and Kalisch, territory which Prussia needed to round out what she had gained by the first Partition. Other advisers of the King urged a grand alliance against Russia and

CHAP. XI

1789-92

The
Austrian
Nether-
lands

Austria, made up of Sweden, Poland, Turkey, and Prussia, supported by the maritime States. Sweden was already at war with Russia, and Prussian influence in a measure had supplanted the influence of Russia in Poland. Meanwhile Prussia was able to embarrass Austria by encouraging sedition in Hungary and open revolution in the Austrian Netherlands.

The revolution in the Netherlands had apparently been suppressed in 1788. The following year it gained new life from a quarrel over subsidies. The Emperor Joseph considered the time opportune for changes in the constitution of the provinces. This violation of ancient liberties aroused a spirit of resistance, and a small army of exiles, which entered the country in October, found so much popular support that by December the Austrian troops were obliged to retire to Luxemburg. Early the following year the States General declared the Netherlands independent and attempted to organize a federal republic. Frederick William despatched one of his ablest diplomatic agents to Brussels to assist the new congress. At his suggestion also a Hessian general undertook to reorganize the provincial forces. Frederick William carried matters further than Hertzberg's scheme required, seeing a good opportunity of crippling Austria, while Hertzberg wished to use Austria's embarrassments to bring her to the acceptance of his favorite scheme.

This revolution in the Netherlands had nothing in it which offended Frederick William's devotion to the ancient order. It had only the name revolution in common with the events which were destroying the foundations of that order in France. At first, indeed, the French were deceived by the coincidence in name. The ardent revolutionist Desmoulins named his journal *Les Révolutions de France et de Brabant*, and Lafayette was suspected of desiring to transform both the Austrian Netherlands and the United Provinces into liberal republics under the patronage of France. But as soon as the Austrians were driven out of the Netherlands the revolutionists fell to fighting among themselves and it was at once apparent that the stronger party was made up of stanch defenders of the Church and of local privileges. This party could no more restrain the fanatical masses of its followers than the Parisian leaders could control the populace of the faubourgs. In March, 1790, there was a rising in Brussels, and the Belgian democrats had to fly for their lives in the veritable reign of terror which followed. Such a republic the French National Assembly refused to recognize, although equally disinclined to respect the claims of the Austrians to sympathetic support.

The political situation in Europe was profoundly modified by the death of Joseph II and the accession of his brother Leopold, who was celebrated for his mild and enlightened administration as Grand Duke of Tuscany. Leopold did not approve of his brother's summary methods of revolution from above. He succeeded in quieting the Hungarians and in persuading them to recognize him as King, although he did not give up all the reforms which Joseph had introduced. With the Belgians his negotiations were not successful. His greatest danger lay on the side of Prussia, which seemed determined to insist upon her fantastic scheme of exchanges, even at the peril of war. Leopold undermined the Prussian position, however, by convincing the English that he was ready to abandon Joseph's plan for the partition of Turkey and by urging upon their attention the danger that he might give the Netherlands to France in return for aid against the Prussians. In the spring Prussia mobilized an army in Silesia and sent him an ultimatum, but he contented himself with suggesting modifications in the scheme of exchanges. Finally, in July, a conference was held at the Prussian headquarters at Reichenbach. There the disagreeable news was brought to Frederick William that neither Turks nor Poles would listen to Hertzberg's propositions, and that England demanded that peace be made upon the basis of the situation at the opening of hostilities. All that was left to the Prussians was the dubious satisfaction of dictating to Leopold terms of agreement which he had arranged beforehand.

One of the consequences of the conference at Reichenbach was that Gustavus III concluded to abandon his useless struggle with the Russians. Another was that Leopold was free to restore by force his authority in the Netherlands. He made liberal promises to the Belgians and gave them until November 21 to submit. Representatives of England, Prussia, and the United Provinces, meeting at The Hague, made a futile attempt to mediate. Leopold's troops crossed the border and easily overthrew the new republic. These troops also restored the bishop of Liège. The negotiations for peace with the Turks dragged on into the year 1791. Finally, in August, Austria made peace with Turkey by the Treaty of Sistova and a few days later Russia signed preliminaries which the following January became the Peace of Jassy. The ambitious schemes of Catherine and Joseph for the partition of Turkey had dwindled to mere rectifications of frontier. Prussia's intervention, which was to illustrate a new application of the great Frederick's policy in 1772, had led to humiliating rebuffs and a signal loss

CHAP. XI

1789-92

The
Emperor
Leopold

CHAP. XI

1789-92

Revolution
in Poland

of prestige. Meanwhile the Revolution in France forced itself upon the attention of the jealous rivals and Poland offered to Russia a better field of gain than the provinces of the Turkish empire.

The Poles had shown an unexpected amount of political sense in bringing together a reform diet while Russia was involved in war with the Turks. This "Four Years' Diet" met in October, 1788. The anti-Russian party, supported by the assurances of Prussian support, was successful in the elections. One of the first acts of the diet was a demand that Russian troops be withdrawn from the territories of the republic. This exhibition of energy, however, had no sequel, and the two years, the diet's term of service, expired before anything had been accomplished except the signature of a defensive treaty with Prussia. New elections were held in 1790, with the understanding that the existing members of the diet should also sit in the new body. By the spring of 1791 the reform party, realizing that haste was necessary because the war clouds in the East were lifting and Russia's hands would soon be free, secretly agreed upon a draft of a constitution, which was proclaimed by the King on May 3 and accepted by the diet. Only twelve members refused their approval.

The new constitution made the monarchy hereditary and endowed it with effective powers of government. In place of a diet, paralyzed by the operation of the liberum veto, was a legislature, with two chambers. In the lower chamber representation was granted to the towns, depriving the nobles of the political monopoly which they had hitherto enjoyed. Personal liberty was also safeguarded. Although the Catholic religion remained the religion of the State, other creeds were tolerated. Serfdom was condemned in principle, but the constitution went no further than to sanction in advance any settlements which might be made by proprietors with individuals or with communities. As the opposition at first made no effort to organize resistance, it looked as if Poland had been regenerated and was about to enter upon a new career of greatness.

The permanence of this revolution depended upon the attitude of the neighboring States, for if they should agree upon a policy of hostility and spoliation enough malcontents could be found in Poland to create a situation inviting foreign intervention. Prussian enthusiasm had been cooled by the refusal of the Poles to consider Hertzberg's project of exchange. The treaty of March, 1790, did not pledge Prussia to sustain the new constitution, although it did pledge her to defend the in-

Attitude
of the
Powers

tegrity of Poland's territory. When Hertzberg learned of the Polish revolution, he pointed out to the King the danger it contained for Prussia. The succession to the throne was offered by the constitution to the elector of Saxony and his heirs. If Saxony and Poland were united in a well-organized government Prussia's position would be imperilled. The total population of the new kingdom would be double the population of Prussia. Such a Poland would be the natural enemy of Prussia's progress, even if it did not deprive Prussia of the advantages won by Frederick the Great. But Frederick William still feared the possibility of war with Russia, and, if this took place, the friendship of Poland was necessary. Moreover, negotiations were already begun looking to an understanding between Prussia and Austria, and Frederick William learned that the Emperor Leopold was anxious to embody in any agreement a guarantee of the new order of things in Poland. Leopold's secret hopes were that Poland would become strong enough to curb the ambitions of both Russia and Prussia. Frederick William did not hesitate, therefore, to send word to Warsaw and to Dresden that he approved what had been done, and he indicated his readiness to join Austria in sanctioning the new constitution. Unfortunately for Poland the matter did not end there. Russia had to be reckoned with. Catherine II had twice guaranteed the old constitution of Poland, which was favorable to her schemes, and she regarded the *coup d'état* of May 3 as fatal to her influence. This strengthened her inclination to sign a peace with the Turks, in order to prevent the consolidation of the new Polish régime.

Before the drama of Varennes none of the greater powers concerned itself with the troubles of France. The repeated demands of the emigrant princes only irritated Leopold. He would give Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette no assurances of military support until they left Paris and drew about them a considerable party. The news of the flight and of the forced return of the King to Paris changed the situation. To the Emperor such violence seemed inexcusable and odious. He at once despatched to the principal powers a note suggesting common action in order to restore the King to liberty and to restrain the excesses of a revolution which compromised the honor of monarchs and imperilled the existence of all governments. It was fatal to the success of this overture that England refused to take part in any intervention. The only consequence was that Prussia and Austria drew nearer together. Leopold seemed on the point of winning Prussia over to his Polish policy, and the Prussian

CHAP. XI

1789-92

agent signed a preliminary treaty guaranteeing to Poland her territory and constitution. When the negotiations touched French affairs, the Prussians raised the question of indemnities, in view of the possibility that military intervention should lead to Austrian acquisitions on the French frontier. They would not have been averse to the promise of Austrian Silesia. England's attitude, however, made intervention only a remote possibility. Frederick William and Leopold met at the château of Pillnitz in Saxony to discuss the situation. When the emigrant princes appeared demanding intervention, with the recognition of the Count of Provence as regent of France, Leopold and Frederick William refused to entertain such a scheme. The most they would do was to give the princes a "declaration" which was in the nature of a polite refusal. This is the famous "Declaration of Pillnitz," of August 27, 1791, which pronounced the restoration of the monarchy in France a matter of common interest and expressed the hope that other States would not refuse to employ their forces for this purpose. The declaration explained that "Then and in this case Austria and Prussia would be ready to act with sufficient troops." On the evening of the issue of the declaration Leopold wrote to Kaunitz that he had not bound himself to any definite action. "Alors et dans ce cas is with me," he said, "the law and the prophets—if England fails us, the case I have put is non-existent." He seems to have thought that the menace contained in the "declaration" might have a wholesome influence on public opinion in Paris and frighten the radicals into the adoption of a more moderate policy. Unfortunately for King Louis, his brothers published this declaration first a week after the King had accepted the constitution and at the end of their open letter to him repudiating his acceptance as insincere and contrary to his sacred duty. They added, falsely, that not only Prussia and Austria, but England and the other powers, were making active preparations for intervention. Not all Parisians were deceived as to the character of the declaration, for many regarded it as a rebuff to the princes.

Two weeks after the Declaration of Pillnitz the National Assembly complicated the situation by annexing Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, the papal territories in the South. Since the preceding summer the question had been raised repeatedly, because the papal authorities were unable to restore order. The desire of the inhabitants of Avignon for annexation was undoubted, the wishes of the Comtat were not so clear. As long as Mirabeau was alive the Assembly adhered to its first position

Declara-
tion of
Pillnitz

Annexa-
tion of
Avignon

that annexation would be contrary to the pledge inserted in the constitution. The break with the Pope in the spring of 1791 over the enforcement of the laws reorganizing the French Church removed one reason for caution. Old claims to the territory were drawn from the archives. The method of aggrandizement through popular movements in neighboring States appeared to have nothing in common with the brutal seizures operated by Louis XIV. The Assembly finally decided upon annexation, basing the act upon the ancient rights of France as well as upon the wishes of the inhabitants. The consent of the Pope was not sought, but the Assembly offered to negotiate with him for the payment of any indemnities which might be due. The proceeding was well characterized in a letter which Mirabeau's friend, the Count de la Marck, wrote to the Austrian ambassador: "It is evident that after such conduct France will be in a state of war with all governments; she will threaten them with domestic insurrection, and insurrection will lead to conquest."

Neither the Declaration of Pillnitz nor the annexation of Avignon was enough to bring on war between France and her neighbors. Moreover, as soon as Leopold heard that Louis XVI had accepted the constitution, he withdrew the declaration and received the minister of France. Frederick William took the same attitude. But serious questions still remained, furnishing grounds of complaint to both sides. On the one hand the affair of the dispossessed German princes was at a critical stage. The imperial diet in August reached a "conclusion" maintaining the rights of the princes, and this action merely awaited the ratification of the Emperor. Austria and Prussia were more inclined to defend these claims, now that the rights of the Pope in Avignon had been flagrantly violated. If the rights of princes were to be settled in Paris without consulting them, whose turn would come next? On the other hand, it seemed intolerable to patriotic Frenchmen that the border German States should serve as a base of operations for emigrant conspirators. The Count of Provence continued to hold court at Coblenz as regent of France, and the Prince of Condé made Worms his military headquarters. Only the most conciliatory diplomacy on both sides could find a peaceful solution for these problems, but no attempt was made to conduct negotiations in this spirit.

In France four policies were pursued at the same time: one by the King through Breteuil, his representative abroad; another by Narbonne, the minister of war; a third by the *Fevillant* or constitutionalist group in the ministry; and a fourth by the

CHAP. XI

1789-92

Foreign
Policy of
France

Legislative Assembly. The King, deeming intervention by the powers his only hope, sent pressing appeals to them. Narbonne, supported by Lafayette's influence, thought that a short campaign against the princes who were harboring the emigrants would popularize the monarchy. If Austria gave them military support, the result would probably be the same, for Prussia could be detached and England would preserve her neutrality. Delessart, Montmorin's successor in the ministry of foreign affairs, had no firm policy, but was inclined to listen to the constitutionalists, who assured him that a sufficient display of force on the part of Leopold would thoroughly intimidate the French radicals and lead of necessity to a compromise and a restoration of royal authority. The Assembly, believing that open war was preferable to the continuance of an equivocal situation, speedily assumed direction of affairs and conducted negotiations by means of decrees which menaced the King and the ministry as much as they alarmed the German princes and exasperated the Emperor.

The
Emigrant
Question

The question of the armed emigrants could be approached in two ways. The Assembly could by decree threaten their lives and sequester their property, or it could order the invasion of the States which harbored them. The first method was tried in a decree of November 9, which declared that those who after the first of the following January remained on the frontier in arms should be charged with revolt and upon their appearance in France should be tried, and, if found guilty, should be put to death. The princes also were to be indicted for treason, if they did not return before January. This method was rendered futile by the refusal of the King to sanction the decree, although two months later he did approve of a measure sequestering the property of the emigrants.

The Assembly, on November 29, tried the second method. A deputation was sent to the King requesting him to use in dealing with foreign powers "language suitable to a King of the French. . . . To the German princes he should declare that if they continued to favor preparations made against France, the French would bear amongst them not fire and sword but liberty." On November 29 also a young deputy named Isnard expressed the same thought in more striking language. "Say to Europe," he cried out, "that if cabinets engage kings in a war against peoples we will engage peoples in a war against tyrants." The King decided to yield to the Assembly's demands, believing that the consequence would be a European intervention or a war. If war resulted, he thought the resistance

of France would be broken down in a single campaign and that his people would turn to him as mediator, to save them from the vengeance of the Powers. Accordingly on December 14 he announced to the Assembly the despatch of an ultimatum to the Elector of Treves, declaring that if he did not disperse the emigrants within a month he would be treated as an enemy.

On the same day the King informed his confidential agent abroad that he hoped the Powers would intervene, disperse the emigrants, and defend the Elector. This they in effect did. When the Elector appealed to them, Austria and Prussia promised aid, but insisted upon the dispersion of the emigrants. The Elector complied and the hapless exiles were obliged to seek a refuge elsewhere, traveling, many of them on foot, through the mud and snow of a German winter. The Landgrave of Hesse, the Duke of Württemberg, and even the King of Prussia refused them asylum. On December 21 the French government was informed that these measures had been taken, and the incident was closed.

Unfortunately for France the war had got into politics. The Girondin leaders, especially Brissot, Vergniaud, and Isnard, believed that war would unite all patriotic Frenchmen in support of the Revolution. The King and his ministers would be obliged to support the national cause or be convicted of treason. Louis had irritated the radicals by his veto of a decree aimed at the non-jurors who were accused of fomenting civil war. Early in its career the Assembly had been informed by a special commission of the hostility of many parishes toward the new clergy. In some cases the non-jurors still retained their pulpits, or, if they had been expelled by force, they held services in the woods or the fields. The acts of the new clergy were often denounced as invalid, a serious accusation because the registry of births and marriages remained in the hands of the clergy. Sentiment in the Assembly first took the sensible direction of undoing in part the work of the Constituent Assembly by depriving the oath of its semi-religious connection, by renaming the Civil Constitution of the clergy a "law" concerning the civil relations of worship, and by taking from the clergy their character as officials. Public opinion seemed to be moving toward a separation of Church and State, in order that in a free State the Church might also be free and might not continue to be a source of civil troubles. This moderate attitude was changed when news reached Paris from western France that the non-juring priests were organizing the peasants for resistance. In one or two places a repetition of the riots of Nîmes and Montauban was

CHAP. XI

1789-92

French
Demands

feared. The Assembly now decided to impose on the non-jurors a civic oath, depriving those who refused of their pensions and placing them under surveillance as suspicious persons. The King vetoed this decree the same month in which he vetoed the decree against the emigrants. He seemed to the radicals, therefore, the ally of traitors at home as well as of conspirators abroad.

If the Assembly wanted war, excuses could easily be found. To the Emperor's announcement that he would support the "conclusion" of the German diet, it replied by a decree declaring "infamous" and a traitor any one who should take part in a congress looking toward the restoration of the rights suppressed by the Constituent Assembly. The Austro-Prussian treaty of July 25, 1791, based on the idea of intervention, which Leopold had not renounced altogether when he withdrew the Declaration of Pillnitz, was also treated as a pretext for war. The Girondins urged that France imitate the example of Frederick II in 1756 and not wait to be attacked. Their views triumphed and on January 25 the Assembly "invited" the King to declare to the Emperor Leopold that his acts were an infringement of the treaty of 1756 and to give him until March 1 to renounce all hostile combinations and to explain satisfactorily his conduct hitherto.

The course of the negotiations had already convinced both Leopold and Frederick William that war was unavoidable and they resumed the task of arranging a definite treaty of alliance. This was signed on February 7, although the details were left for subsequent settlement. Leopold's reply to the summons of January 25 was full of strictures upon the French political situation, and in it Kaunitz made the Emperor appeal to "healthy" public opinion to restrain the factious. When this was read in the Assembly, on March 1, it aroused general indignation. A few days later the overthrow of the ministry followed. Narbonne sought the support of Lafayette in imposing his policy upon the King and was summarily dismissed. The war party, led by Brissot, then turned upon Delessart, who was working in sympathy with the *Feuillant* policy, accused him of treason in permitting Austrian insolence to go unrebuked, and immediately ordered his arrest. In the debate Vergniaud, the greatest of the Girondin orators, menaced the life of the Queen, declaring that perfidious counsels were misleading the King, that "he alone was inviolable," and that "no other head convicted of being criminal could escape the sword of the law."

The consequence of this struggle was the appointment of a

ministry composed of men committed to the Girondin policy. Foreign affairs were given to Dumouriez, a bold, clear-sighted man, but an adventurer rather than a statesman; the finances to Clavière, a Swiss banker, and the interior to Roland, who, with Madame Roland, belonged to the inner circle of the Girondin group. Dumouriez sought the support of the Jacobin Club and conducted his negotiations with the Austrian Court in the tone and with the accent of Jacobin eloquence. War became simply a question of days or, at most, of weeks.

CHAP. XI
1789-92
A Girondin
Ministry

Meanwhile, on March 1, the Emperor Leopold had died, and had been succeeded by his son Francis, who was more inclined to war than his father and who immediately drew nearer Prussia. The natural reluctance of Louis XVI to consent to war was lessened by his conviction that the resistance of the French would break down speedily and that his people would turn to him as the only means of obtaining favorable terms of peace. Accordingly on April 20 he proposed to the Assembly a declaration of war against Austria. The sentiment in favor of war was so overwhelming that only seven deputies voted against the decree. The Assembly repeated the renunciation of conquest which the Constituent Assembly had placed in the constitution, asserting that France took up the sword simply in defense of liberty and independence and that the war was not of "nation against nation, but the just defense of a free people against the unjust aggression of a king."

War with
Austria

The war was directed against Francis not as emperor, but as head of the House of Hapsburg, whose royal title was "King of Hungary and Bohemia." The ministry attempted to separate the cause of Prussia from that of Austria, but Frederick William took the attitude that a declaration of war against his ally was directed against him also. With the minor princes of Germany, France had better success, because they were exposed to the first shocks of the conflict. Bavaria adopted a policy of neutrality, and only Hesse-Cassel promised the allies assistance. Prussia and Austria threatened, if the minor States pursued a particularist policy, to limit their efforts to the defense of their own frontiers. Soon the kingdom of Sardinia, whose duchy of Savoy was on the French side of the Alps, was added to the list of the enemies of France.

This war, undertaken "with a light heart," meant the ruin of the party which advocated it and the dethronement and death of the King who sanctioned it. The Girondins, who dreamed of a glorious struggle of liberty against tyranny and of peoples against kings, discovered that in the tempestuous sea of

CHAP. XI

1789-92

popular passion heaved up by war they were not strong enough to guide the ship of State. The King, instead of being mediator between subjects humbled by defeat and an angry Europe, became an object of distrust and hatred. In the turmoil and anarchy of the struggle supreme power was seized by the radical Jacobins, who were not men of half measures and subtle combinations, and who were embarrassed by no alliances with the beneficiaries of the old régime or the ministers of the King.

CHAPTER XII

THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY

ALTHOUGH war was declared on April 20, 1792, no serious operations were undertaken by either side until July. The French army was still seriously disorganized. The feeling of distrust between soldiers and officers had been increased by the emigration of thousands of officers. In August, 1791, when the flight of the royal family occasioned rumors of war, the Constituent Assembly ordered the enlistment of 100,000 volunteers. It tried to make the service attractive by offering privileges which the regular soldiers did not enjoy, including better pay, the right to choose their officers, and the permission to return home at the close of each year's campaign. Nevertheless, volunteers came in slowly. After the war had been in progress for two months only half of the battalions were ready, and only half of these had any share in the actual fighting two months later. The spirit of disorder infected the volunteers as well as the regular soldiers. Their officers were often chosen for ability to manage political gatherings rather than for military qualities, although there were striking exceptions. Several were destined to become famous in the Napoleonic wars — among them Jourdan, Davout, Moreau, Desaix, Brune, Soult, and Lannes.

The army suffered from other difficulties. Equipment and supplies were lacking. Frequent changes in the ministry of war added to the confusion. No fewer than seven ministers occupied the office within six months. Each worked zealously to bring order out of chaos, but the task was discouraging. The difficulties were increased by the depreciation of the assignats, which were quoted at 56¹ in June. This caused suffering, especially among the officers.

Neither Frederick William nor Francis was able to take advantage of the situation. Francis would not be ready to open the campaign until his election as emperor had been secured, and both monarchs wished to settle the question of the in-

CHAP.

XII

1792-93

The French
Army

Delays of
Austria

¹ At Paris. The rate of depreciation differed in different localities. For example, assignats were, at the same time, 67.6 + in the *Côtes-du-Nord*.

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

demnities which they might claim in the event of victory, each fearing to be overreached by his rival. The alliance between the two seemed a political monstrosity, in view of the half century of bitter conflicts just ended. Arthur Young wrote that the two would agree as well as "oil and vinegar—fire and water." Frederick William's chief anxiety was on the side of Poland, for the Empress Catherine of Russia during the fall and winter had been nursing the opposition of the Polish nobles to the settlement of May 3. They were ready to organize a "confederation," counting on the support of Russian troops, which the Peace of Jassy made available. All that was needed to assure the complete success of Catherine's Polish policy was the absorption of the energies of Austria and Prussia in a struggle with France. Accordingly Catherine urged upon Frederick William and Francis the need of combating the Revolution; but they were not her dupes.

Russia
and
Poland

Russian intervention in Poland came the month that war broke out between France and Austria. The Poles were ill prepared to resist. The mass of the population was indifferent, having no share in the promised reforms and no relief from serfdom. King Stanislas was too timorous a leader to utilize the forces which the patriotic members of the diet offered. When Prussia was appealed to for support on the strength of the defensive treaty of 1790, Frederick William replied that the May constitution had invalidated the guarantee. By July the struggle was practically over and the King obliged to give his adhesion to the Confederation of Targovitz, as the association of malcontents was called. The fires of resistance were everywhere stamped out by merciless bands of soldiery. Catherine held the prey in her grasp, but she realized that she could not refuse to satisfy Prussian and perhaps Austrian greed of territorial gain. Before Frederick William moved an army towards the French frontier he had reason to believe that he would receive indemnities in Poland, but neither to him nor to Austria were Catherine's assurances clear. The Prussian and Austrian diplomats considered an exchange of the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria as offering Austria the necessary indemnification, but it proved impossible to reach a definite agreement.

Conduct of
Louis XVI

In France the unreasoning enthusiasm for war was succeeded by anger at the discovery that the country was unprepared and that the efforts of the French foreign office to detach Prussia from Austria were futile. The Girondins skilfully turned suspicion towards the King and the ministers in power before the March crisis. Delessart had already been accused of treason;

they now demanded the same accusation against Montmorin, his predecessor, still one of the secret counselors of the King. They declared that the King's friends, far from abhorring the projects of the enemy, desired an invasion and were seeking to assure its success. This assertion was only too true. Since the beginning of the war the Queen had been informing the Austrians of French military plans, of which she learned through the King. Towards the end of May a royalist journalist, Mallet du Pan, left for Germany, provided with letters and instructions from the King, with the mission of convincing the Allies that, on the one hand, they should separate their cause from that of the emigrant princes and renounce publicly any design to restore the old régime, and, on the other hand, they should frighten the radicals by threats of condign punishment, and so afford moderate men an opportunity of recovering control.

The situation was rendered still more perilous because religious strife in western France threatened to grow into a peasant insurrection encouraged by non-juring priests. The Legislative Assembly struck at the priests by a bill which empowered the local authorities to expel them from the country. Its suspensions of the King prompted it to accept the proposal of the minister of war for a camp of 20,000 federated national guards near Paris. Louis XVI was no more inclined than in the previous November to harass the dissident priests, and he was not willing to strengthen the radicals by furnishing them with an army of national guards. He was already weary of the ministers whom the March crisis had forced upon him, and when early in June Roland insisted upon the acceptance of the decrees the King dismissed him, with his colleagues Clavière and Servan. The Assembly declared that the fallen ministers carried with them the regrets of the nation. For two or three days Dumouriez remained, hoping to play a great rôle now that he was rid of his embarrassing colleagues; but, when he saw that the King was not disposed to listen to his advice and that he might be held responsible for the dismissal of the "patriot" ministers, he withdrew.

The ministerial revolution roused political passions in Paris as the dismissal of Necker had three years before. A new element was introduced by a letter from Lafayette, in command of the army of the Center, criticizing the late ministers and denouncing the intrigues of the Jacobin Club. The intervention of a popular general, which was of sinister presage for the orderly course of constitutional life, emboldened the King to veto the project of a camp of *fédérés* as well as the plan of

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

A Mob in
the Tuil-
eries

deporting priests accused of sedition. He also appointed a new ministry composed of dependents of Lafayette.

After this intervention of the army came an intervention of the street. It took the form of an armed procession of petitioners, which finally was permitted to defile before the Assembly, and which soon afterwards broke into the Tuileries and crowded for hours past the King and Queen. The mob was moved by brutal curiosity or the desire to frighten the King into recalling his ministers and accepting the vetoed decrees. The incident occurred on June 20, the third anniversary of the Tennis Court oath. The news aroused indignation in different parts of the country, which was in the main still loyal to the King and the constitution. Even the radicals in Paris and the Assembly felt that the affair was a blunder. Lafayette hurried to Paris and demanded the punishment of the conspirators responsible for the outbreak. There was a chance that he would rally the Paris National Guard and close the Jacobin Club, but the King and Queen treated him coldly and he returned to his troops without accomplishing anything.

Before Dumouriez withdrew from office he occupied the ministry of war for three days and signalized his presence by reporting the deplorable condition of the army and the defenselessness of the frontier fortresses. France now began to realize her peril. The Girondins, their friends no longer in the ministry, redoubled their attacks upon the Court. Vergniaud in a powerful speech, on July 3, declared that the Allies, the emigrant princes, and the deserting officers all acted in "the name of the King," to "restore his authority" and "the splendor of his throne," and intimated that, while in the conduct of the war the King complied formally with the terms of the constitution, he had not felt it his constitutional duty to provide for the needs of the army or to win victories.

The Assembly, realizing that invasion was imminent, solemnly announced that the country was "in danger." This proclamation carried with it special obligations for the people. Every one must wear the national cockade; all citizens who had been members of the National Guard or who were capable of bearing arms were called to active service; and all administrative bodies must exercise unrelenting vigilance. Attempts were made to strengthen the army by adding new battalions of volunteers. When it was known that several departments, in spite of the royal veto, had despatched their contingents for the proposed camp, the Assembly renewed the project in a different form, providing that after taking part in the anniversary cele-

The Crisis

bration of July 14 the guards should march to Soissons to form a camp of reserves. July 14 came and the King proceeded to the Champ de Mars and renewed his oath to the constitution. A few days later he issued a special proclamation urging all Frenchmen to unite loyally in repelling the invader. This was a ghastly mockery, for Marie Antoinette was sending letter upon letter to her friends begging the Allies to hasten their march upon Paris.

July 14 was also a day of festival for Germany. On that day the newly elected emperor, Francis, nephew of Marie Antoinette, made his formal entry into Frankfort, and was crowned amid medieval splendors. Soon afterwards Frederick William and Francis met at Mainz to confer upon the plan of the coming campaign and to discuss the question of indemnities. Already the Duke of Brunswick had been chosen commander of the invading armies. He had been brought up in the school of the great Frederick and was accounted a prince so "philosophical" that a few months earlier Narbonne had proposed to offer him the command of the French army.

The allied monarchs determined to issue a manifesto before they ordered their armies to cross the French frontier. This idea they borrowed from the draft which Mallet du Pan had brought to their headquarters, but the language of menace was dictated by the rancor of the emigrant nobles, one of whom wrote the manifesto. It was reluctantly signed by the Duke of Brunswick as commander-in-chief. In it the French were bidden not only to restore Louis XVI to complete liberty of action, but also to obey the orders of the allied monarchs, and abstain from every form of opposition to the invading army. If any national guards or administrative officers should resist, they would be punished as rebels; and if Paris offered any insult to the King or invaded the Tuileries, the city would be given up to military execution and total ruin. The King was asked to name a place near the frontier to which he might retire, and where, aided by chosen counselors, he might provide for the re-establishment of order in the kingdom. Until he had done this, the Allies protested, they could not accept any declaration of his as a free act. The manifesto also intimated that the sound part of the French nation secretly wished the success of the invaders, because this would permit them without peril to declare against the radicals who were now oppressing them. Nothing that Vergniaud or even Marat ever said hinted more plainly the disloyalty of the King and his supporters to the national cause.

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

Manifesto
of Brun-
swick

CHAP.

XII

1792-93

Plot to
Overthrow
the King

The only way out of the dilemma was through the overthrow of the King. France could not hope to defend herself successfully with such a monarch, furthering secretly the schemes of the enemy and able by the use of his constitutional prerogatives to hamper the effectiveness of the national defense. This furnished a unique political opportunity to the violent men who had risen to influence in Paris. The constitutionalists occupied a position fatally weak. They still believed in the King and felt it dishonorable to suspect him of lack of fidelity to the common cause. The Girondins suspected him, but were confused by their desire to return to control through the reappointment of their friends as ministers and the King's acceptance of them as his political guides. They were also disinclined by temperament to acts of violence. The radical Parisians and their leaders, impelled by simpler passions, moved with brutal directness toward the solution. They had been fed on suspicion for months, or had sedulously fed others upon it. They believed that Paris was in danger and that all would soon be lost unless loyal and energetic hands grasped the helm. Only in a few departments, chiefly in the southeast, was there any similar agitation. Marseilles, bolder than the rest, ventured to demand the deposition of the King.

The demand of Marseilles reached the Legislative Assembly on July 12. With it came the announcement that early in July a battalion of five hundred men, well furnished with patriotism and munitions, would set out for Paris.² The tone of the document displeased the Assembly, but delighted the Paris radicals. Matters there were fast reaching a crisis. The directory of the department, made up of constitutionalists, had suspended Mayor Pétion, a friend of the Girondin deputies, for his failure to check the insurrectionary movement on June 20. The King confirmed the suspension, but almost immediately afterwards signed a decree of the Assembly annulling it. Robespierre, Danton, and others who had promoted or countenanced the movement the year before for the deposition of Louis now resumed their agitation with better prospects of success. When the federated national guards began to arrive the Jacobins sought to indoctrinate them. Of the 4,500 men who came before the end of the month about 1,800 remained, defying repeated efforts of the government to send them on to Soissons. They formed a committee, with headquarters at the Jacobin Club, and as

² On their way toward Paris the *Marseillais* sang a patriotic song written by Rouget de Lisle for the army of the Rhine. The song was soon known as the *Marseillaise*, which it has been called ever since.

early as July 17 petitioned the Assembly for the deposition of the King. It was not until the end of the month that the Marseilles battalion arrived, preceded a few days by a battalion from Brest. The sections or wards of the city had meanwhile been authorized to hold daily meetings. Delegates from these meetings, most of which were controlled by radicals, met at the Hotel de Ville and early in August drew up an address to the Assembly, repeating the request already made by the federated guards. On August 4 the section of the *Quinze-Vingts* threatened that if the Assembly did not depose the King before midnight of August 9 the tocsin would be rung and the people would rise.

Two or three times before the fateful night attempts were made to start an insurrection. One of these was on the day when the battalion from Marseilles reached the city. The radicals counted not only upon the federates who had refused to leave Paris for Soissons, but also upon the national guards of the more revolutionary sections. Although the mayor formally complied with his duty by exhorting the people to calmness, he was in sympathy with the movement. The guards from the revolutionary sections were provided with a full supply of cartridges at the arsenal by order of the police commissioners. For the defense of the King the chief reliance was the Swiss Guard, which was reinforced from the barracks outside the city. Mandat, commander of the Paris National Guard, was a stanch royalist and he looked for support to the guards from the moderate or conservative sections. He had formed a sound plan of defense, which aimed at the dispersion of the insurrectionary forces before they could reach the Tuileries.

August 10

The signal for the insurrection was given by the *Quinze-Vingts*, the section which had fixed the date. Because the Assembly adjourned on the evening of August 9 without acting on the petition of the Paris sections, and especially because by a substantial majority it exonerated Lafayette, against whom an accusation had been brought for his conduct in June, the sectional assembly voted that each section should send three commissioners to the Hotel de Ville to take counsel about the means of "saving the country." In this action a majority of the sections appear to have concurred. Before morning commissioners of twenty-eight sections were present at the Hotel de Ville. Until about seven o'clock they contented themselves with urging upon the city council measures calculated to cripple the defense of the Tuileries. The council, few in numbers, enfeebled by indecision or intimidated by the galleries, perhaps half sympathetic, consented. The measure which proved fatal to the royal

CHAP.

XII

1792-93

Attack
on the
Tuilleries

cause was the summons sent to Mandat to present himself at the Hotel de Ville. While there the commissioners, substituting themselves for the council, ordered his arrest, whereupon, as he was leaving the building, he was shot by the mob.

The death of Mandat disorganized the defense. The King was persuaded to go down into the courtyard of the Tuilleries and speak to the soldiers, but his very countenance and bearing seemed to say: "All is lost!" Some of the cannoneers, deserting their pieces, shouted: "Down with the King! Down with the fat pig!" Others declared that they would not fire upon their fellow-citizens. Upon this the law officer of the department urged the King to take refuge with his family in the hall of the Legislative Assembly. As the party crossed the Tuilleries Gardens the dauphin tossed the dry leaves into the air, and the King remarked: "They are falling early this year." It was a curious coincidence that the presiding officer of the Assembly was the Girondin Vergniaud, who five weeks before had bitterly attacked the King in a speech. His words now sounded like a profession of loyalty: "Sire, you can count upon the firmness of the National Assembly; its members have sworn to die in defending the rights of the people and the lawful government." But these were only words.

About eight o'clock bands of insurrectionists, led by the men from Marseilles, advanced upon the palace. The national guards either fraternized with them or dispersed. The Marseillais entered the courtyard and attempted to win over the Swiss. It was a futile effort, for the Swiss believed their honor as soldiers was pledged to the defense of the palace. How the battle began is still uncertain, but the Swiss speedily cleared the courtyard and even the square beyond. The defeated Marseillais returned to the attack, supported by the revolutionary masses from the faubourgs. The cartridges of the Swiss were soon exhausted, and then an order to cease firing, written by the King at the hall of the Assembly, was given to them. The battle had been furious and nearly four hundred of the assailants had been killed. The vengeance of the mob was pitiless; before its energies had spent their force eight hundred,—Swiss, royalists, and even palace servants,—were dead. The mob also vented its rage upon the costly furnishings of the royal apartments. One of those who watched the battle was Captain Napoleone de Buonaparte.

The insurrection of August 10 not only overthrew the monarchy, it discredited the Legislative Assembly. Its leaders could only register the will of revolutionary Paris, covering the articles

of their surrender under an accumulation of seven explanatory considerations. They left for a convention, the election of which they decreed, the task of changing the constitution. Meanwhile they voted that the King should be suspended provisionally from the exercise of executive functions. At first they did not contemplate the organization of a republic, and began to prepare a project for the appointment of a governor for the dauphin. Before the day was over, however, they substituted a decree declaring that the King and his family were hostages. A day or two later they surrendered the King to the care of the revolutionary Commune, as the irregular body organized on August 10 was called. By its officers he was conducted, amid the insulting cries of the populace, to the ancient tower of the Temple, which once was part of the château of the crusading order of the Templars.

The threatening attitude of Paris forced the Assembly to change the ministry immediately. The first minister chosen was Danton, one of the organizers of the insurrection of August 10. In making this choice the leaders of the Assembly offered a pledge of reconciliation to the promoters of the insurrection. As Condorcet later explained, they saw in Danton a man strong enough to control the "despicable instruments of a glorious revolution," and yet of such ability and standing that neither the Assembly nor the other ministers would be humiliated by being forced to deal with him. The "patriot" ministers, whom the King had dismissed in June, were now reinstated by acclamation. The virtual head of the ministry was Danton, minister of justice, rather than the "virtuous" Roland, minister of the interior, the best known of the former Girondin ministry.

In preparing for the primary elections the Assembly abolished the distinction between "active" and "passive" citizens, and gave the suffrage to every man over twenty-one years of age who was not in domestic service.³ In order to make the changes in the government acceptable to the departments, couriers were despatched in every direction. Only a few departments hesitated to recognize the validity of what had been done. The most serious resistance occurred in the department of the Ardennes and in the municipality of Sedan, where Lafayette, unwilling to recognize the new government, attempted to carry his army with him in a movement to restore the King and put down the Paris revolutionists. The refusal of his soldiers to follow him, although up to this time he had possessed their complete confi-

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

The King
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³ For this restriction, see Aulard, *French Revolution*, Miall trans., II, 77-78.

CHAP.

XII

1792-93

dence, compelled him to abandon the project. He crossed the frontier with several of his staff, hoping to take refuge in America, but the Allies held him as a prisoner and treated him with great harshness as the fomentor of the ills from which France was suffering. France as a whole would not quarrel with victorious Paris in the presence of the enemy. Moreover, the French had too long been trained to obey those who bore the insignia of authority to assume other than an attitude of submission.

The results of August 10 in legislation were also profound. Projects of law which the King had not signed were legalized by a general provision. The Assembly had already, on July 27, declared the property of the emigrants confiscated and had ordered it sold. The sweeping character of the measure, making no distinction between emigrants and holding out no promise of restoration, as did the decree of sequestration the preceding February, showed the exasperation felt by the Assembly as the allied army was about to cross the frontier at the call of these emigrants. The measure was also financial in its bearings. The assignats had fallen to a discount of nearly fifty per cent., and the deputies believed that the property of the emigrants would double the security. The Assembly had authorized the issue of 900 million assignats, making a total of 2,700 million provided for since April, 1790.⁴

The Assembly struck another blow at the nobles by reversing the principle of the feudal legislation of 1790. Not only was the burden of proof transferred from the peasant, who denied that his holding was the result of a property grant, to the noble, but the noble must produce the original titles, which in most cases had disappeared. Furthermore, contracts of enfranchisement, maintained in 1790, were annulled, and the dues which represented them were abolished without indemnity. Considering that the State was already, or was soon to become, through the fact of emigration, the principal owner of this sort of property, and expected to use it, with other confiscated property, in financing the Revolution, the decree showed an ill-considered generosity. At the same time, urged by the ruder voices at the Hotel de Ville, the Assembly ordered the destruction of the mute evidences in stone and bronze of the departed régime, except in cases where a commission should decide that pieces of sculpture or statuary interested the arts.

With the non-juring priests the Assembly dealt in summary

⁴ The circulation October 1, 1792, was 1,972 million, 617 million having been annulled.

fashion on August 26, giving them fifteen days to leave the country on pain of being deported to Guiana. If they recrossed the frontier they should be condemned to ten years' imprisonment. On the last day of the session the Assembly took the significant step of entrusting the records of civil status — births, marriages, and deaths — to the municipalities, depriving the official priesthood of one of its important functions.

The Assembly had no thought that such measures would weaken the force of its appeal to liberal minds, and it embodied this assurance in the renewal of a decree conferring French citizenship upon the friends of humanity in Europe and America, notably upon Bentham, Wilberforce, Mackintosh, Paine, Washington, Hamilton, Klopstock, Pestalozzi, and Kosciusko. It also attempted to conciliate opinion by repeating the renunciation of all projects of conquest.

As the war had given the radicals an opportunity to destroy the monarchy and seize supreme power, the approach of the allied army enabled them to terrify their political opponents into submission, under the guise of organizing effectively the national defense and protecting the city of Paris against traitorous royalists. Brunswick's army did not cross the frontier until nine days after the King's overthrow. The news of August 10 made the Duke and many of his advisers, who felt no enthusiasm about the project, still more hesitant. Even if it were true that generals of French armies and commanders of French garrisons would, as the emigrant princes declared, either open the road to Paris or make a feigned resistance, it was evident that these secret sympathizers with the Allies would now be deprived of the chance to aid the project and that the army would be put into the hands of men wholly committed to the idea of stubborn defense. Furthermore, the Austrians had not brought into the field all the troops they had promised, and the army of invasion numbered 80,000 instead of 110,000, the number regarded as adequate. Still the army marched on. Longwy, the first important frontier fortress, fell, and a week later Verdun was invested. The town was badly fortified and contained many royalists who were unwilling to suffer in a cause which they considered to be that of a faction and not of France. The city surrendered on September 2, and Brunswick now thought that his army would be before Paris by the middle of October. The Parisian leaders did not realize how slow were the movements of the Prussian army, how the heavy rains would retard its advance, and how hunger and disease were enlisted against it. They knew simply that for four weeks it had been steadily

The
Prussian
Invasion

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

The Revolu-
tionary
Commune

drawing nearer, and they also knew that their own army was disorganized by the flight of Lafayette and the inability of old Marshal Luckner to resist the Prussian advance. What Dumouriez and Kellerman, who took the places of Lafayette and Luckner, could accomplish, was uncertain. In the light of this perilous situation the history of the last days of August and the early days of September must be judged.

During the weeks which followed August 10 the Revolutionary Commune exercised a virtual dictatorship. This was not due to the talents of its members, who with few exceptions belonged to the petite bourgeoisie. Huguenin, most conspicuous at the outset, possessed a record as a deserter and a swindler. He signalized his qualities by ordering the slaughter in cold blood of ninety-six Swiss soldiers brought as prisoners to the Hotel de Ville. There were one or two literary men of consequence, M. J. Chénier and Fabre d'Eglantine; but others, like Hébert or Chaumette, subscribed themselves "literary men" because reluctant to give a more exact designation. Among the commissioners were also Billaud-Varenne and Robespierre, the latter elected after the insurrection was over, both destined to notable careers within a few months, and Tallien, who was to compass Robespierre's fall. Pétion remained mayor, but without influence. The administrators of the constitutional Commune were displaced, but afterwards restored through the intervention of the Legislative Assembly.

The leaders of the Commune were determined that the "conspirators of August 10" should be punished. By this term they described those who had defended the King, and who intended, it was alleged, to gain control of Paris and hold it until the Prussians should arrive. Five of the King's ministers had been sent before the High Court at Orleans for trial. A court-martial to try officers, notably of the Swiss, had been created. These measures did not satisfy the Commune, whose representatives demanded an extraordinary tribunal, formed in Paris, with judges and jurors chosen by the sections, and with the right to pronounce without appeal upon the cases of conspirators. The Assembly, under threat of insurrection, conceded what the Commune demanded, but attempted to save its dignity by providing that the judges should be chosen by an electoral assembly instead of by direct vote.⁵

The Commune would not tolerate criticism of its acts either by the press or by committees of the Assembly. It declared

⁵ This is commonly called the Tribunal of August 17.

publicly that several of these committees contained traitors, and it suppressed reactionary journals by forbidding their transmission through the mails. When its agents attempted to arrest the editor of the leading Girondin newspaper, the Assembly, already outraged by the attitude of the Commune upon all matters of controversy, adopted a decree replacing the existing body of commissioners by a provisional council of two deputies from each section. The Commune resolved to resist and it found support in most of the sections. The Assembly, partly influenced by the danger of continuing the struggle in the presence of the invader, endeavored to submerge a body which it could not destroy, by asking each section to name six deputies — including the existing commissioners, if the section desired. This compromise was effected on September 2.

On the morning of September 2 the news came that Verdun was besieged. Fear spread over the city, for this fortress, the last which guarded the road to Paris, could not long resist. The fall of Longwy had alarmed several of the ministers, and the government might have been transferred to the region of the Loire but for the determination of Danton to defend Paris. Both Commune and Assembly united in an effort to bring together on the Champ de Mars a great army of volunteers and forward recruits to the danger line as fast as possible. But sinister spirits cried out that it was not safe to go, as long as the conspirators of August 10 were unpunished. The tribunal of August 17 was meting out justice, while the populace wanted vengeance. A decree ordering a general search of houses for arms was utilized by the Commune to effect the arrest of a multitude of its opponents. The prisons were filled. The journalist Marat, whom the insurrection had furnished the opportunity of printing his mad provocations to wholesale murder, had urged repeatedly that the prisoners be put to death. On September 2 he became a member of the municipal committee of surveillance, which had just been reconstituted of men ready for such a brutal enterprise. On this day also two or three sections voted that the prisoners should be put to death. When the tocsin sounded from the church towers, summoning courageous citizens to the Champ de Mars, a band of priests who were being conducted to the prison of the Abbaye were set upon and murdered. What began apparently as an outburst of popular fury immediately took on the appearance of an operation carefully meditated beforehand. The mob rushed off to the convent of the Carmelites not far away and murdered over one hundred non-juring priests and bishops confined there. During the night two tribunals

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

Massacres
of Sep-
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CHAP.
XII

1792-93

Conduct
of the
Commune

were improvised at the prisons of the Abbaye and La Force, by which the prisoners were interrogated, and in almost every case hurried away into neighboring streets or courtyards to be cut down by the merciless band of volunteer executioners.

When the council of the Commune heard that the "people" had broken into the prisons, it voted merely that prisoners for debt and for civil causes should be removed, showing at least a guilty indifference to the fate of the other prisoners. Billaud-Varenne proposed that commissioners be sent to the prisons with instructions to deliver to the people the prisoners accused of having a part in the conspiracy of August 10. At first the council seems to have adopted such a decree, but it soon returned to a better sense of its responsibility. The committee of surveillance, however, expressly sanctioned what was being done. Billaud-Varenne and several other councilmen, either at the Abbaye or La Force, uttered words of approval to the murderers or assisted the work of the tribunals of blood. On the second day of the massacres the committee sent a circular to the other municipalities of France commending the example of Paris and urging as the common cry, "We march upon the enemy, but leave behind no brigands to slaughter our wives and children."

The council as a body now attempted to dissociate itself from an affair which was reaching frightful dimensions. Late in the session of September 2 it despatched deputies to the prisons to restore "calmness" and to protect the prisoners.⁶ But its most important member, Robespierre, had no word of pity for the men who were perishing by the score, and endeavored to lengthen the list of victims by directing popular suspicion against the Girondins in the Assembly. The committee of surveillance launched orders of arrest against several of them, but no arrests were made. As the Legislative Assembly was too terrified or too weak to act with effect the massacres did not cease until September 6, after more than a thousand persons had been killed. The saner councilmen refused to assume responsibility before the country for the circular of the committee of surveillance, and sent another, September 7, repudiating it. Few Parisians realized what a hideous stain blurred the glory of the Revolution.

The massacres gave to some men a new motive for remaining in power, since any loss of influence would expose them to the charge of being "Septemberers" or plain murderers. Even

⁶ On the morning of September 3, however, it voted to pay the "executioners" of the preceding night. See F. Braesch, *La Commune du Dix Aout*, p. 506.

Danton, who, it is believed, disapproved the deed, and whose policy of retaining the friendly neutrality of England it seriously compromised, did not dare to condemn it openly. His conduct has been explained on the assumption that rather than permit the Commune to reap all the advantages of the fear which it inspired he was willing to be thought to have planned the whole operation.⁷

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

At the beginning of September, in the face of a common danger, the Legislative Assembly and the Commune had seemed ready to sink their differences and unite for the common defense of Paris; but the massacres made compromise impossible. As soon as they dared raise their voices the Girondins condemned the crime in unmeasured terms and demanded the punishment of the men responsible for it. The elections to the Convention rendered certain the continuance within its walls of the strife between the Commune and the Girondin leaders. The Paris electoral assembly, which began to choose deputies on September 2, placed upon its list the names of three members of the committee of surveillance, including Marat. Billaud-Varenne, who had countenanced the work of the murderers, was also chosen. It is equally significant that the names of Brissot and Condorcet, the two most notable members of the Paris delegation to the Legislative Assembly, did not appear on the list. The election was a defeat for Brissot and his Girondin friends and a triumph for Robespierre and his followers. Danton was the only man of force in the delegation who would be likely to seek the basis of a compromise, but he was to some extent the prisoner of a faction.

Elections
to the
Conven-
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Outside of Paris the elections were more favorable to Brissot, Vergniaud, and their friends. Their strength in the Convention has been placed at 165 out of the total of 783 deputies. They were commonly called *Brissotins*, *Rolandistes*, or *Buzotins*, from Buzot, another member of the party, while in history they are known as Girondins. Their opponents, a few months later by common consent called the *Montagnard*, or Mountain party, were not as numerous, and were divided loosely into groups inclined to follow the leadership of Danton or Robespierre or even Marat. The mass of the Convention took a more neutral attitude, although at first generally voting with the Girondins. No fundamental difference of policy divided the Girondins and the Mountain, and their antagonisms grew mainly out of the settled distrust the Girondins felt for all adherents of the insurrectionary

⁷ Deforgues and Duplain, two of his intimates, were members of the Committee of Surveillance.

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

commune and out of their detestation, repeatedly expressed, of those responsible for the massacres.

The Convention met on September 20. Its first important work was to recognize in law the abolition of the monarchy accomplished in fact six weeks before. Decrees should henceforward be dated from the "First Year of the Republic." Like the Constituent Assembly, although the circumstances were altogether different, the Convention formally voted that the office of deputy and of minister were incompatible. Danton anticipated this vote and resigned his position as minister of justice, feeling that as a minister he would be supported loyally neither by friends nor critics. Another vacancy was made by the resignation of Servan, the minister of war. Two weaker men were chosen to fill these places, lowering the level of competence in this body.

The Convention had not been in session two days before a violent controversy opened between the Girondins and the Paris deputies. The Girondins made the blunder of including Danton with Robespierre and Marat in the sweep of their condemnation. Danton would gladly have united with moderate men in giving France a sane administration, but the refusal of the Girondins to listen to offers of peace threw him back upon his Paris following, and eventually led to their ruin as well as his own. In the reconstitution of the Commune, ordered by the Convention, under the influence of the Girondins, who hoped to deprive the radicals of control, the radicals were successful. The choice of Chaumette, an extremist, as solicitor, and of Hébert, one of the "Septemberers," as his assistant, exasperated the distrust which the Girondins felt towards the Commune. They had already proposed a departmental guard for the Convention. In December they secured the passage of a decree summoning the primary assemblies to purge the Convention, hoping to drive out their enemies; but upon second thought they abandoned the rash scheme. Only upon one subject was a semblance of union preserved. This was the national defense.

It was on September 20 also, the opening day of the Convention, that the Prussian invaders were checked about one hundred miles away at Valmy. When Dumouriez received command of Lafayette's army he planned to prevent an invasion by creating a diversion in the Austrian Netherlands, but the insistent cry of Paris that the city be covered compelled the abandonment of this scheme. Dumouriez and Kellerman, one starting from Sedan, the other from Metz, now endeavored to unite behind the defiles of the Argonne and hold the road to Paris.

The Re-
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Conflicts
in the
Convention

Valmy

The deliberateness of Brunswick's movements rendered this possible. He had at first intended to secure the line of the Meuse and to defer a further advance until spring, but he was overruled by Frederick William, who felt that he would be unfaithful to his knightly task if he left Louis XVI so long exposed to the vengeance of his rebellious subjects. Brunswick compromised the King's purpose by putting too much caution into his operations. A panic which seized a large French division gave him a chance of disorganizing Dumouriez's army by a quick advance, but he was reluctant to risk his own army, especially because the Austrians had not sent all the troops they promised and because of the precarious situation in Poland.

On the morning of September 20 the Prussians moved against the French lines on the hill of Valmy and the plateau beyond, and a decisive struggle seemed at hand. The Prussians were confident that their better training would soon put to rout the undisciplined masses of the French. Again the prudence of Brunswick disappointed the expectations of the Prussian army. He was reluctant to push home his attack, and seemed to think that by a smart cannonade he could compel the retreat of the French. The movement was a failure. The French maintained their positions until nightfall. The Prussians were discouraged, while the French were correspondingly elated because they had inflicted a check upon the "invincible" army of the great Frederick.

Dumouriez now sought to gain time by negotiating with the Prussians until he was strong enough to attack them. The Prussian army was in a sorry plight, fast becoming a traveling hospital, as the poet Goethe, who was with the army, remarked. The loss through disease during the next eight days was 6,000. Retreat became inevitable, especially when rumors reached headquarters that an attack by the French upon the Netherlands and along the Rhine was imminent. This danger caused the Austrians early in October to withdraw one of their supporting corps. Verdun was abandoned and then Longwy. On October 23 the Prussians recrossed the French border.

The retreat of the Prussians was none too soon, for since the early days of October a great panic had swept the Rhine country from Speyer to Coblenz and even Cologne. It was caused by an amazingly successful raid of a small French army under Custine, who captured Speyer and Worms without a fight. On October 21 the important fortress of Mainz surrendered, and the French crossed the Rhine and laid Frankfort under contribution. These disasters were due to the improvidence of the

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

Allies, who upon their entry into France had drawn off for operations on their flank the small force that protected this region against a *coup de main*. Custine saw opportunity for a great venture in war and politics. He would carry the revolutionary gospel into the Rhine country at the point of the bayonet. A little coterie of German enthusiasts at Strasbourg — clergymen, university professors, and literary men — had inflamed his zeal. He could count on the neutrality of several of the lay princes. His policy was "war upon palaces, and peace to cottages." He severely repressed pillage, although he exacted more than two million livres from Speyer and Worms. As soon as the news of the capture of Worms reached Mainz the archbishop-elect, his clergy, the nobles, and many of the wealthy, fled down the Rhine or further into Germany, carrying all the property they could move. They paid for transportation more than enough to have put Mainz in a good state of defense. After he was safely in Würzburg the Elector forbade any of the ordinary inhabitants to leave Mainz. No wonder that neither citizens nor peasants had a mind to be shot down in defense of the sovereignty of such a master, and that the fortress made no show of resistance. Custine promised to respect the rights of property and not to levy war contributions. He also declared that the inhabitants might remain in their ancient slavery, if they preferred it to the freedom that went with French institutions. The government was first carried on in the name of the Elector. Custine's harsh levy of two millions upon the imperial city of Frankfort was taken by the Germans as a significant commentary upon his constant and grandiose offers of French liberty.

The news of the capture of Mainz frightened the Elector of Treves away from Coblenz. His subjects made overtures of surrender to Custine, although Custine had no serious thought of attacking Coblenz. Even the imperial judiciary at Wetzlar attempted to secure protection from the French. At this juncture the return of the Prussians put an end to the panic and immediately threw Custine on the defensive. He had missed the opportunity to hamper the retreat of the Prussians, and soon was driven out of Frankfort and was obliged to retire to Mainz. Meanwhile a group of Mainz agitators and enthusiasts, among whom Georg Förster was the most noble figure, thought the time had come to put an end to priestly rule on the left bank of the Rhine. They formed a club in Mainz and began to work for union with France. Custine, no longer recognizing the electoral sovereignty, appointed a provisional government

for Mainz, Worms, and Speyer, and the county of Falkenstein.

The Revolution had made greater progress in Savoy than along the Rhine. With the exception of the clergy and the nobles, the people were more in sympathy with France than with her enemies, although their ruler, the King of Sardinia, had signed a treaty with Austria, and thus had dragged them into war with the French. When the French army crossed their border the day after the battle of Valmy it was received with acclamations by the inhabitants. Those opposed to revolutionary ideas fled. The syndic of Chambéry declared to General Montesquiou, "We are not a people conquered, but a people that is freed." Montesquiou promised that their laws should be respected and that their destiny should rest in their own hands. A few weeks later a "National Assembly of the Allobroges" met and in three days hurried through the entire program of French revolutionary legislation, including the seizure of church property and the sequestration of the property of those who had fled at the approach of the French army. The question of union with France had already been referred to the communes. Out of 658, 583 voted for union, 72 gave their deputies power to settle the question, and the three that remained were still under control of the Sardinian army. The Savoyard assembly, accordingly, sent a deputation to Paris to lay the wishes of the "Allobroges" before the Convention.

While this delegation was on its way to Paris, Dumouriez advanced to the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands. His troops outnumbered the Austrians about three to one. The Austrians were also weakened by the hostility of the most active local political leaders. Dumouriez took advantage of this, publicly declaring that the French would not interfere with the efforts of the "Belgians" to organize a government, provided they would no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the "Hapsburg tyrants." He ordered his generals to assemble the townspeople, proclaim their sovereignty, and require them to elect a provisional administration. If any towns refused to do this, and declared for their Austrian master, they were to be treated as Brunswick had threatened to treat Paris. Incidentally, Dumouriez ordered that any armed French emigrant who should fall into the hands of his generals should be shot within twenty-four hours. Since both the democratic and the Catholic revolutionists, who hated one another cordially in 1790, were united in their desire to throw off the Austrian yoke, the policy of Dumouriez was acceptable to them. After he broke the Aus-

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

Savoy

The
Nether-
lands

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

Foreign
Policy of
the Con-
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trian resistance at Jemappes, on November 6, he rapidly overran the provinces and the bishopric of Liège.

This astonishing series of triumphs brought in its train a number of perplexing problems. In each case the French advance had been made easy by the coöperation of a part of the inhabitants. In several of the small States along the border an incidental result had been a revolution, and the party which could rely upon the support of French troops had seized power. The French had not conferred the blessings of liberty without charge. The usual military requisitions were made. Custine had accompanied his bulletins of victory with sacks of German gulden. The minister of foreign affairs had suggested that in the towns to which he should "bring liberty" he should select important books to enrich the French national library. Voices were already raised in the Convention arguing that the generals should seize the property of princes, nobles, and priests, in order that France might be recompensed more adequately. In this as well as in the question of the attitude which the government should take towards the brood of revolutionary administrations in Savoy, Germany, and the Netherlands, the French were embarrassed by their own declared principles. When the Convention had announced the advent of the republic, it pledged itself not to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors. It also declared that it would not engage in wars of conquest. But if it refused to countenance those who had assisted it in putting to flight the Prussians, Austrians, and Sardinians, it could never hope for such assistance again. Underneath the confused mass of good intentions and sentimental phrases lay also the desire for a France greater than that of which even a Louis XIV had dreamed, a France which should unite to herself all peoples dwelling within the limits of the Alps and the Rhine. When, therefore, a definite appeal came from the republicans of Mainz, expressing fear that they might finally be abandoned, the Convention, on November 19, in a whirlwind of enthusiasm declared that it would succor all peoples who should wish to recover their liberties and that orders would be given to the French generals to carry aid to any who had been vexed for this cause.

Two days after this great declaration the delegates from Savoy appeared at the bar of the Convention with their petition for annexation. Many members of the Convention wished to vote at once, but the more scrupulous felt that reflection was necessary, in order to discover how such a step comported with the principle of renunciation of conquests. The search did not

require many days. The committee reported that, although the French had renounced the "brigandage of conquests, they had not declared that they would repulse from their bosom men brought near to them by an identity of principles and of interests" and whose territory was enclosed within the "limits set by the hand of nature to the French Republic." If such peoples freely chose to be united to the French, their petitions should be granted. The report of the committee was accepted and Savoy became a part of France. Nice, which was conquered at the same time, was not annexed until January, 1793. What had happened in Savoy might happen in Germany west of the Rhine and in the Belgian lands. The danger was that, as the Convention had discovered a way to make gains of territory without making conquests, it might also discover who were and who were not to be reckoned as "people" in investigating petitions for annexation. This was likely to be the case when the visionary enthusiasts of the Girondin group were forced to yield in matters of foreign policy to the more practical radicals of the Mountain party.

Neither the declaration of November 19 nor the annexation of Savoy made clear to the generals of French invading armies the line of action which they were to follow. Events in the Belgian lands hastened a decision upon this question, though hardly on principles which the leaders of the Convention had originally contemplated. Dumouriez had driven the Austrians out of the Netherlands, but this proved the least of his difficulties. Pache, the new minister of war, who had been a member of the Commune of August 10, embodied the distrust of Dumouriez felt by the Paris radicals, and his agents in the Netherlands were more eager to thwart the victorious general and to plunder the country than to provide supplies for the army. They insisted that war requisitions should be paid in coin and that this coin should be forwarded to Paris, while the army supplies were paid for in assignats. In this way the fall of the assignats was to be stayed. But such a policy alienated the Belgians and rendered the country insecure as a base of operations for the campaign Dumouriez was conducting to drive the Austrians across the Rhine. The Belgians were glad to be rid of the Austrians, but they were opposed not only to any scheme of annexation to France or even to the introduction of French institutions. As the difficulties of the situation increased, the Convention sent several deputies, among them Danton, to investigate the situation. He and his companions not merely studied the situation, they sought to give control to the small minority of

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

The
Belgian
Question

CHAP.

XII

1792-93

Decree of
December
15, 1792France
and
England

Belgians who wished a French régime, if not annexation to France. To assist them they called in a crowd of Jacobin retainers from the nearest towns of northern France. They finally concluded that a new law was needed, authorizing French generals to abandon the attitude of benevolent spectators and to become active agents of social and political reorganization. The report of its commissioners led the Convention, December 15, to adopt a decree formulating a definite policy of revolutionary propaganda.

According to this decree existing authorities were to be superseded by provisional administrations chosen by the people, but in the number of the "people" were not included nobles or any persons who had been officials, civil or military, of the old government, or members of privileged corporations. The system of taxation, the tithe, feudal dues of all kinds, titles of nobility, all special privileges, were to disappear, and the property of both State and Church was to be put "under the safeguard and protection of the French Republic." An account was to be kept of the expenses which the French should incur for the common defense, and the amount charged to the peoples enfranchised. If the French government should discover that "the common interest required that French troops remain in the country after the provisional government has given place to an organized administration, this administration shall provide for their subsistence." In this way the burden of supporting the armies of France might be shifted to the shoulders of her neighbors. The Convention further declared that any people which should refuse this brand of liberty, and should recall its ancient masters, should be treated as enemies. They would cease to be "people" and should be reckoned as slaves.

The French policy of territorial aggrandizement added another State to the list of the enemies of the republic. As late as the beginning of November the English ministers believed that a policy of neutrality was sound. They even cherished the hope of making further reductions in taxation. But the invasion of the Netherlands changed the situation, for it menaced the security of the United Provinces, guaranteed by treaty with Great Britain. Pitt evidently did not regard the invasion alone as ground for English intervention, although Englishmen had not forgotten that the terrible War of the Spanish Succession at the beginning of the century had been provoked by an aggression hardly greater. In a war with the Austrians the French had a right to invade Austrian territory. When, however, the French asked the Dutch for permission to sail up the Scheldt, in

order to facilitate an attack upon Antwerp, when a little later the French declared the Scheldt an open river, in violation of the treaty rights of the Dutch, and when the declaration of November 19 seemed to invite the Dutch radicals to overthrow the government of the stadtholder, Pitt believed a passive attitude no longer safe. Accordingly the English government opened tentative negotiations with the Austrians and Prussians, pledged its support to the Dutch in case of attack, called out the militia, and hastened forward military and naval preparations. Reassuring explanations of the November declaration sent by the French minister were counterbalanced by news of the decree of December 15, which threatened to force French institutions upon unwilling populations.

There were other causes of friction. Moderate opinion in England had become hostile, especially after the overthrow of Louis XVI and the massacres of September. The members of the English Corresponding Societies felt it their duty to increase the vehemence of their advocacy of French principles, and sent memorials to the Convention protesting against British neutrality in the struggle between France and her enemies, and giving hope of the organization of a convention in England. These noisy pronunciamientos deluded the French into the conviction that the English people were really on their side. Meanwhile the British government began to repress agitation. In the summer a proclamation against seditious writings had been issued and Thomas Paine had been prosecuted for seditious libel on the ground of what he had written in *The Rights of Man*. In December parliament by the Alien Act placed foreigners under surveillance and authorized the government to expel them from the kingdom whenever such a step seemed advisable. It was less and less probable that the new republic would be recognized or that formal diplomatic relations, broken off after August 10, would be resumed. Meanwhile the desire of the government to reach an understanding with the Allies was cooled by the information that Prussia was to be permitted to indemnify herself for the losses of the war by annexing a portion of Poland, while Austria was to find reward in an exchange of the Netherland provinces for Bavaria. Between the morals of the Allies and the morals of the French, those of the old and those of the new régime, there did not appear to be much choice.

The decision of the Convention to exact vengeance of Louis XVI for his disloyalty to the Revolution hastened on war not only with England, but also with the United Provinces and with Spain. The King's supporters had been punished on August

CHAP.

XII

1792-93

Execution
of the
King

CHAP.

XII

1792-93

10 and September 2; why should the principal culprit escape? So felt the radicals in the Commune and their friends in the Convention. But the majority of the Convention, and especially the Girondin leaders, were reluctant to insult a fate so tragic as that of the fallen monarch. This reluctance seemed to expose the Commune and the Paris deputies to the danger of being marked for sacrifice in case of any compromise with the Allies or the old régime. Until the Convention also dipped its hands in blood these men were not secure. Their clamors were supported by the more excitable patriots of the Convention, who saw in the Revolution a struggle between despotism and liberty, between kings and peoples, and believed that in this struggle Louis had played the part of traitor. They suspected that those who argued the inviolability of the King, according to the constitution of 1791, which made deposition the extreme penalty for his offenses, were at heart royalists and enemies of the republic. The discovery late in November of compromising papers in a secret receptacle in the Tuileries revealed the war of intrigue which the King had waged upon the Revolution. This made the position of those who argued against a trial untenable, and early in December Louis was formally arraigned. He did not decline the jurisdiction of the Convention, but his answers to the questions addressed to him were disingenuous. The vote for conviction was practically unanimous. When the question of penalty was raised the radicals sought to intimidate their opponents by demanding that the votes be given individually as each person's name was called. To vote for some other penalty than death required courage in the face of hostile galleries and in a city controlled by the men of August and September, and yet 321 voted against inflicting the death penalty. At first there was only a majority of one for immediate execution. The sinister event took place on January 21. One consequence was the expulsion of the French diplomatic agent from England. France retorted by declaring war upon England and upon her Dutch ally, the United Provinces. War with Spain and with the Empire followed a month later.

Two days after the French republicans executed a king, the chivalrous defenders of monarchical right, Frederick William of Prussia and Catherine of Russia, agreed upon the destruction of a kingdom. Poland was the victim. At this second dismemberment several of its best provinces and half of its population were annexed by its neighbors. Thorn and Danzig, with Posen and other districts, later called South Prussia (containing, all told, a million inhabitants), were assigned to Prussia; while

Russia's share was Kief, Volhynia, Podolia, and Wilna (about twice as much). Russia would have desired to exclude Prussia altogether from the spoil, but Frederick William had marched an army into Poland, the war with France giving him opportunity to mobilize his entire forces. Such an argument convinced Catherine. But neither Prussia nor Russia saw any reason to admit Austria to the solemn duty of stamping out Jacobinism at Warsaw, because Austria was not in a position to support effectively her claims for indemnity, since the advance of the French occupied all her energies. The agreement of January 23 was kept secret, to enable Russia and Prussia to complete their arrangements for its enforcement.

CHAP.
XII

1792-93

CHAPTER XIII

THE REIGN OF FORCE

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

The Revolu-
tion and
the People

THE necessities of national defense, which had borne the men of August 10 into power, should have marked the bounds of their undertaking and guarded them from assuming the attitude of republican rigorists and defying all the States of western Europe. The task of carrying liberty, of the Jacobin brand, into the neighboring lands at the point of the bayonet did not appeal to the soberer portion of the French population, especially after news of defeat succeeded the earlier tidings of victory. The people were weary of being dragged from crisis to crisis. Industry was in ruins, famine menaced the cities. One of the members of the Convention wrote from the south in March, 1793: "Everywhere the people are tired of the Revolution. The rich detest it, and the poor are persuaded that we are at fault because they lack bread. Even the clubs have lost their energy. The municipalities chosen by the people themselves are weak or corrupt." "But," he added, "we must conduct the ship of state to port or perish with it, for we shall never be pardoned for wishing a liberty pure and unmixed." The republic was undoubtedly in peril, but the situation was due to the political excesses of the radical leaders as much as to the perversity of the enemies of the Revolution either in or out of the country. Patriotic France could not heartily unite for the common defense under such leadership, and yet these leaders were desperately resolved to remain in power. They identified their supremacy with the safety of the republic, they regarded their political enemies as traitors, and secured union by methods of violence and terror. They may have saved the country from being despoiled by the Allies, but they hopelessly compromised the permanence of the republic and made its name a byword in Europe for a generation. The conduct of the Allies was on no higher plane. They devised schemes of sanguinary vengeance and reckoned the list of indemnities in terms of French provinces or of Polish territory. In England the governing classes, frightened at the inroads of Jacobinism, clamored for the suspension of liberty of assemblage, of speech, and of the press. The Reign of Force was already begun.

After the war with the English and the Dutch opened, the French ministry redoubled its efforts to create a diversion which should relieve the pressure of attack upon the borders of France. Overtures were made to the King of Sardinia for a treaty in accordance with which France should assist him in conquering the Milanese, while he in return should cede Sardinia, and recognize the annexation of Savoy and Nice. The French were ready to promise him in addition the ancient republic of Genoa, although they did not yet control it. This was merely a formal difficulty, which might be overcome by persuading the Genoese to admit a French garrison as a protection against the covetousness of the King of Sardinia. The most cherished scheme was the resumption of the classical combination of Turkey, Sweden, and Poland, against Austria and Russia. Sweden had despatched an ambassador to France and the Polish patriot Kosciuszko was in Paris, but the French emissary to Constantinople could at first get no further than Bosnia. The ministry was not above making indirect overtures to Austria with the hope of detaching her from Prussia by holding out the old bait of the recovery of Silesia, being equally ready to promise Frederick William Austrian Silesia in return for an alliance.

French diplomacy reached across the Atlantic and attempted to find an ally in the young republic of the United States, many of whose citizens were watching the progress of the Revolution with deep sympathy. The relations of the United States with both England and Spain were so strained that the French had a reasonable hope of success. English garrisons had not been removed from the frontier posts and it looked as if the English, urged by the Canadians, were attempting to retain a hold upon the unsettled lands of the northwest, or, at least, to create an Indian territory which would serve as a barrier to the expansion of the United States. The Indians were furnished with supplies which enabled them to keep up their attacks on the border settlements. Feeling in the United States was made still more bitter when these Indians defeated General St. Clair. Another grievance was the reluctance of the British to negotiate a treaty of commerce. They sent no minister until 1791, and when he arrived his principal function seemed to be delaying the settlement of all questions at issue. With Spain the difficulty concerned the southern boundary of the United States and the rights of trade by the lower Mississippi. A movement to organize a separate commonwealth west of the Alleghanies seemed imminent unless the settlers in that region were supported in their controversy with the Spaniards.

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

Search for
AlliesFrance
and the
United
States

CHAP.

XIII

1793-94

When war broke out between England and France, American sympathies were mainly with the French; but many warm admirers of the Revolution had found their ardor chilled by the news of the massacres of September and the execution of Louis XVI. The United States was bound by the treaties of 1778 to guarantee the territories of France in the West Indies and to permit French prizes to be brought into American ports. It was a question whether under those treaties the United States could remain neutral. Washington's cabinet was not agreed on this question, but he decided to publish a declaration on April 23 that the United States was at peace with both England and France and that American citizens should abstain from acts hostile to either nation. Early in April a new French minister, Genet, a political friend of the Girondins, arrived at Charleston, and, without waiting to be received by the government, proceeded with the greatest energy to carry out what he deemed to be the spirit of his instructions. He despatched privateers to prey on British commerce along the coast and appointed consuls with admiralty functions to condemn prizes. He also attempted to organize expeditions against the Spaniards and contemplated an attack on Canada. When he reached Philadelphia and discovered that Washington was likely to interfere with these schemes, he thought a direct appeal to the people advisable, declaring in a letter to the ministry that "America is lost to France if the purging fire of our revolution does not reach its midst."

Meanwhile the policy of the French towards territories lying within their "natural boundaries" became more clearly defined. Their leaders declared that the Alps, the Rhine, and the Ocean, were also the "Ancient" or Gallic boundaries, and that to recover these lands was not conquest, but merely "reunion." Steps were taken to hasten the holding of primary assemblies in regions occupied by the French army, placing them under the control of commissioners who were to secure "liberty of voting." These commissioners were instructed by the ministry that the annexation of the Belgian lands would add forty million livres to the annual revenues of France and a thousand millions in the form of security to the assignats. They did not permit the question to be submitted to a general assembly of Belgian delegates, as was done in Savoy, but dealt with municipal assemblies, using soldiers to keep the opponents of annexation from disturbing the harmony of the meetings. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that many communes petitioned the Convention for annexation and that the Convention yielded to their desire. But

most of these annexations occurred in March, when the hold of the French upon the Netherlands was already shaken.

On the Rhine, sentiment was more favorable, and the French commissioners sought to bring together a Rhenish convention. They found it hard, nevertheless, to discover a sufficient number of men willing to take the oath to liberty and equality, which was the indispensable qualification for voting. Those who refused the oath were expelled. Finally 345 voters were assembled in Mainz, 479 in Speyer, and 250 in Worms. The convention met at Mainz on March 17 with 100 delegates, representing the district from Landau to Bingen, and declared for union with France on the ground that it could not defend itself against the Allies and that the new-found liberties would perish save under French protection. Förster and two other deputies were sent to Paris with the petition for annexation. Many German communes had already been annexed separately. The Convention accepted the petition on March 30. A few days later the Prussians and Austrians laid siege to Mainz.

As soon as war was declared upon Great Britain and the United Provinces, Dumouriez was ordered to invade Dutch territory. He met no serious obstacles until he reached the Rhine, but he realized that unless success was immediate the enterprise would end in disaster, because the Belgian lands were seething with discontent and would rise if the French forces were once defeated. He was unable to cross the Rhine immediately, and before he could obtain boats he was recalled by the threatening progress of the Austrians on his flank. The Austrians and Prussians had agreed that their first task should be to drive the French from the left bank of the Meuse, leaving the complete reconquest of the Netherlands until Mainz should be captured and the Rhine route reopened. Success against Dumouriez led to a change of plan.

Dumouriez had long meditated the design of using the prestige of his victories and the fidelity of his troops to overthrow the politicians in power at Paris and restore the monarchy, with the King's son, Louis XVII, on the throne, and with himself as a sort of "mayor of the palace" or lieutenant-general. To render the scheme feasible a final victory in the Netherlands was indispensable. Before an occasion for battle offered he ventured to oppose the policy of the government, closing revolutionary clubs in Belgian cities, dismissing the commissioners, and assuring the inhabitants of the restoration of their plundered treasures and of protection against French agents. In a letter

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

Downfall
of
Dumouriez

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

The
Vendéan
Insurrec-
tion

to the Convention he attributed the discontent in the Netherlands to its policy and to the conduct of the commissioners. The ministers did not lay this letter before the Convention until an attempt had been made through Danton to persuade Dumouriez to withdraw it. Before Danton reached the headquarters of the army the expected battle took place, but it ended in a decisive defeat for the French. The disaster occurred at Neerwinden on March 18. In spite of this Dumouriez persisted in his design and tried to bargain with the Austrians for an armistice long enough to enable him to set up a new government in Paris. He was ready to place frontier fortresses in their hands as a pledge of good faith. When finally the minister of war¹ and commissioners from the Convention were sent to arrest him, he surrendered them to the Austrians as hostages for the safety of the royal family. But his design failed because the army refused to follow him in such a treasonable enterprise. On April 5 he rode across the frontier with most of his general officers. Unlike Lafayette he had bargained with the national enemy, and in the eyes of France he was a traitor and not merely a victim.

To the peril which menaced the country from the loss of the Belgian lands and the treason of Dumouriez was added the peril of civil war, half religious and half political, in the old provinces of Poitou and Anjou. It was named the Vendéan insurrection from the department where it originated. The treatment of the dissident priests drove the western peasants into a rebellious mood, and the spirit of dumb resistance was transformed into open insurrection when the news came of a law, adopted February 24, providing for the levy of 300,000 soldiers. Every man from eighteen to forty was liable to service, and might be required to enlist if there were not enough volunteers among his neighbors to make up the local quota. The first insurrectionary bands assembled about the middle of March under leaders of their own choosing — a gamekeeper, a carter, and a wigmaker. Priests took control and the bands were called the "Christian" or "Roman² Catholic" army. The royalists saw that they could use the peasants to fight for the restoration of the monarchy, and nobles like Lescure and La Rochejaquelein assumed the leadership. The army was now called Catholic and Royal.

The first news of retreat in the Netherlands nearly brought about in Paris another August 10, directed this time against the Convention. The people were suffering for lack of bread. They had learned well the lesson of suspicion and cried out for

¹ Beurnonville, successor of Pache.

² In distinction from the "constitutional" Catholics.

the punishment of traitors. For several hours on March 9 the ministers were besieged at the ministry of foreign affairs and few deputies dared attend the evening session of the Convention. To "save the people from being terrible," as in the days of September, Danton argued that the government should become terrible by organizing a new extraordinary criminal court, giving it power to try without appeal all offenses against the Revolution and the Republic. This was agreed upon on March 10.

An attempt was now made to give more unity to governmental action by authorizing the selection of ministers from the membership of the Convention. The council of ministers had steadily lost in influence and effectiveness, and all recognized that the Convention was the real center of power. At the beginning of the year a Committee of General Defense had been appointed; but this committee, the sessions of which were public, did not succeed. The project of choosing ministers from the Convention was wrecked by personal fears and jealousies, like a similar project in 1789. This time it was Danton who was suspected of arranging for his own passage to control. A middle course was taken by organizing, on April 6, an executive committee, or Committee of Public Safety, composed of nine members, holding secret sessions, and empowered to issue orders to the ministers or other executive agents, subject to a report to the Convention. Its term of service was a month and its right of arrest affected only its agents. Danton was the most influential member, but the majority of his colleagues represented the moderate party in the Convention.

In order to compel local administrative officers to work in harmony with the government, the practice of despatching members of the Convention on important occasions to different parts of the country was developed into a system of permanent control. Such deputies, called "Representatives on Mission," were to proceed by twos through the departments assigned to them, hasten the levy of volunteers, suspend and even arrest suspected officials, order necessary measures, and keep the Committee of Public Safety and the Convention accurately informed of the local situation. The plan, if successfully worked out, would check the evil of administrative anarchy, from which the country had suffered since 1790, but it gave weak men an opportunity to play the tyrant. It was virtually a resumption of the ancient practice of sending out Intendants. The plan was applied to military affairs as well as to civil administration, three deputies, clothed with full powers, being sent to each army.

Before the reorganization of the government was effected, the

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

Organiz-
ing a
Strong
Govern-
ment

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

Emigrants

legislation of the Convention against reactionaries and royalists had become more severe, not to say vindictive. Emigrants, defined as persons who could not prove an uninterrupted residence in France since May 9, 1792, were banished and declared civilly dead. If found within the limits of French jurisdiction they were to be executed summarily. Even girls between fourteen and twenty-one, if they returned after being deported, were to be executed. The aim of this law was principally fiscal, and it contained provision for the confiscation of the eventual, as well as the existing, property of emigrants. Although emigrants were civilly dead, the Republic could claim all that otherwise might fall to them for the next fifty years. Nor could its hold upon this property be shaken off by gifts, sales, or other methods of evasion, against which the law guarded specifically.

The Revolutionary
Tribunal

The new criminal or "Revolutionary" Tribunal seemed at first unlikely to gain a better reputation for being "terrible" than that of its unhappy predecessor, the Tribunal of August 17, 1792. The Convention had reserved the presentation of cases to a commission, and had filled the commission with deputies from the Girondin group. When the organization of the tribunal was completed, its officers, jealous for its reputation, complained that no cases were ready for them. Marat, appearing once more in an appropriate rôle, demanded the suppression of the commission, and this the Convention agreed to; but still the obstacle remained in another form, for decrees of accusation must now be presented by the Convention. After a few days, however, the right to take up cases was given to the prosecutor, Fouquier-Tinville, a broken-down attorney who had served as director of the jury of the preceding tribunal. He could do this of his own motion or upon denunciation of any public body or private citizen. Only members of the Convention, ministers, and generals of the army could not be arraigned without a special decree. In the first month of its career the tribunal condemned only nine persons, but it gave the measure of its judicial competence by sending to the guillotine an ex-soldier and a maid-servant for uttering, when drunk, anti-revolutionary cries. Their offense was called conspiring for the restoration of the monarchy. The other judgments were simple acts of vengeance, without value as a warning to the real enemies of the Republic, but the fault lay with the law rather than with the tribunal.

Meanwhile a new political crisis menaced the country. Economic distress was acute. Chaumette, the city solicitor, threatened the Convention with insurrection if it did not check the rise in the price of bread by fixing a maximum price for grains.

The Convention yielded, although its maximum law of May 3 remained practically a dead letter. But while the question of food, and the danger of foreign invasion, made possible by the treason of Dumouriez, roused the passions of the people, the factional struggle in the Convention and the determination of the Paris radicals to control the government precipitated the conflict.

The Girondins distrusted Danton and the Committee of Public Safety. A few days before the committee was organized one of their leaders had accused him of complicity in the treason of Dumouriez. This did not keep him, after the first angry protests had been uttered, from seeking to end the strife of factions and direct the energies of all towards a reorganization of the national defense; but the Girondins spurned his overtures. They also made the blunder of persuading the Convention to accuse Marat formally before the Revolutionary Tribunal of provocation to sedition—so blind were they to the impossibility of securing a verdict of condemnation from such a court. The retort of the radicals was prompt. With the mayor at their head delegates from the Commune demanded the expulsion of twenty-two Girondins. A new committee of insurrection had already been organized by the sections. On May 18 rumors of a projected attack on the Convention led the more violent Girondins to propose that the substitute deputies meet at Bourges and that the Commune be dissolved. The Convention decided instead to appoint a commission with the duty of investigating all conspiracies, especially those directed against the national representation. The Girondins succeeded in naming the personnel of this commission. Besides proposing measures of precaution against a possible uprising in Paris, the commission ventured to arrest Hébert, editor of the *Père Duchesne*, and the president of a section. The Committee of Public Safety adopted a neutral attitude, endeavoring to direct the attention of all factions to the necessary work of the hour, although it naturally desired the dissolution of a rival body like the Girondin commission.

The struggle culminated on May 31, when commissioners from the sections superseded the existing council of the Commune (although immediately afterwards associating the councilors with themselves) and despatched a demand to the Convention for the withdrawal of the obnoxious commission and the arrest of twenty-two Girondins. After a bitter controversy the Convention annulled the commission. For a few hours Paris seemed satisfied. Not so Marat and Robespierre, and their friends at the Hotel de Ville. They were resolved to drive from the Con-

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

A New
Crisis

May 31,
June 2,
1793

vention these enemies who were forever appealing from Paris to the provinces. A new insurrection was organized. A great army marched upon the Convention, June 2. Surrounded, coerced by cannon, betrayed by its radical leaders, the Convention, or rather the minority present, ordered the arrest of twenty-nine deputies, together with the ministers of finance and of foreign affairs. The Committee of Public Safety a few days later made a futile effort to persuade the Convention to reassert its authority and to deprive the Commune of control of the armed forces of the city. The intervention of Robespierre defeated the attempt. The Convention was for months to govern by grace of the Commune, and had to share the enthusiasms and satisfy the passions of the faction that ruled Paris.

The increasing exasperation of the departments against the Paris radicals resulted in civil war even before the victory of the Commune over the Convention. The moderates in Lyons rose on May 29, overthrew their radical municipality, and imprisoned several of its members. The news of the struggle in Paris caused not only Lyons but other cities — Bordeaux, Marseilles, Nimes, and Toulon — to refuse to recognize the Convention as the government of France. Many departmental administrations took a similar attitude of resistance. This movement was stigmatized as "Federalism," as if it were inspired by the idea of substituting for the "Republic, one and indivisible," a federation of departments. The strength of the radicals was in the municipalities and in local branches of the Jacobin Club, whose energetic action checked the departmental movement and prevented the larger cities from joining hands in a conflict against Paris. They had the great moral advantage of being able to appeal to the patriotic sentiment of France for union against the invader, who was again menacing the frontiers, and who would certainly use civil strife as a means of despoiling France like another Poland. Moreover, the Convention, though humbled and decimated, was the government. The "federalists" at Bordeaux attempted to call another convention at Bourges. To allay the fear that the continued rule of the Convention might mean the domination of Paris, the Committee of Public Safety hurried to completion the draft of a constitution. It was adopted by the Convention on June 24, was submitted to popular vote in primary assemblies throughout the country, and on August 10 its acceptance was announced. No steps were taken, however, to put it into effect.

During the month of June the Committee of Public Safety sought by negotiation to disorganize or reduce the resistance of

the departments. In the north resistance collapsed after the defeat at Vernon of a small force of Normans which had begun a march upon Paris. Bordeaux, unable to gain the support of Languedoc, was soon isolated and compelled to surrender. Marseilles and Lyons made an effort to unite their forces, but this was thwarted. With these failures the insurrection assumed a royalist character in Marseilles, Lyons, and Toulon. Marseilles was captured on August 25, as the royalists were planning to admit the English. Three days later English and Spanish war-ships occupied Toulon. Lyons prepared to endure a siege.

Before the crisis of civil war was passed, the country was threatened with an invasion as serious as that of 1792. The Committee of Public Safety, under the influence of Danton, had made efforts to open the way for a return of peace, or, at least, to diminish the number of the enemies of the Republic. Taking advantage of a frontier incident, Danton, within a week of the creation of the committee, persuaded the Convention to reverse the policy of revolutionary propaganda and to declare that while the Republic would tolerate no intervention in its affairs it would not meddle in the affairs of any other government. The policy of the committee looked towards a use of the territory actually occupied as a means of facilitating desirable rectifications of frontier. It did not propose to insist on the "natural" frontiers, particularly in the case of the Netherlands, although it had no intention to give up Nice and Savoy. But its plans were rendered futile by the fatal defect of the instability of its power. In Prussia there were a few advocates of peace with France, but quarrels with Austria over Poland were the only ground for hope that Prussia might be detached from the coalition. Even Sweden did not venture to confirm a treaty already drawn by her minister at Paris, and took an attitude of strict neutrality. All chance of a general pacification disappeared on July 10, when a new committee was elected of which Danton was not a member, and to which, later in the month, Robespierre, who had no sympathy with Danton's plans, was elected.

If Prussia and Austria had coöperated heartily, the Allies might have reached Paris before the summer was over. The French troops were in dire distress. Clothing, food, and munitions were lacking. The staffs were disorganized by the arrest of officers whose chief fault was that they belonged to the old nobility or were unable to satisfy the deputies sent by the Convention to watch them and control their policy. After a long siege Mainz was compelled to surrender on July 23. Five days later Valenciennes, a northern fortress town, fell. Condé, an-

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

Danton's
PlansFrance
Invaded

other important fortress, had already fallen. The French advance in the Alps was checked, and the southern frontier at both ends of the Pyrenees was broken. The surrender of Mainz gave the Austrians a chance to conquer Alsace and Lorraine, but Brunswick would not lend the needed assistance. Prussia was reluctant to aid Austria in procuring indemnities before Austria consented to the indemnification of Prussia in Poland, promised by the treaty of January 23. The consequence was that only England was heartily engaged in the struggle against France, but England did not put many troops in the field and worked mainly by subsidizing the continental powers. The peril to France was great, although not as great as it appeared. In the presence of the twofold danger of foreign invasion and civil war the Convention resolved to call upon every able-bodied man for military service. This was termed the *levée en masse* and it was decreed on August 16.³ Men from eighteen to twenty-five formed the "first requisition" and were to be enrolled immediately. Later requisitions might be made upon older men, including those of forty. Such was the origin of the conscription, which, when fully organized five years later, gave France immense advantage over other powers in the possession of a regular channel for the supply of vast numbers of recruits.

Economic
Distress

Increasing industrial distress and financial disorder aggravated all the evils from which France was suffering. By May the income from taxation was 500 million livres in arrears. The receipts from the three direct taxes in 1792 had been only five millions, and the receipts for 1793 were to be still smaller. The sole resource was confiscated property, which might be turned into quick assets in the form of assignats. The amount of assignats in circulation in February was nearly 2,400 millions, and it was soon increased by 2,000 millions more. The financiers of the Convention consoled themselves with the reflection that their resources still reached the enormous total of 7,000 millions, but their decrees proved that confidence in the assignats was shaken.

The As-
signats

During the spring and summer of 1793 the Convention resorted to extreme measures to stay the depreciation of the assignats. Heavy penalties, finally the penalty of death, were provided against those who sold coin at a premium or distinguished in commercial transactions between coin and assignats. The attempt was made through a forced loan of a milliard to withdraw a third of the total issue from circulation. According to

³ The mode was regulated by the decree of August 23.

the first plan this loan was to be exacted from the rich, that is from persons with an income of at least 6,000 livres. The excuse for such discrimination was that the machinations of the rich caused the Republic heavy expenditures. Furthermore, a loan, interesting them in its prosperity, would transform them from enemies into supporters. By the end of summer it was found necessary to charge all incomes with the contribution, increasing the relative share until the excess on incomes above 9,000 livres was claimed by the State. The loan did not bear interest, but evidences of payment might be used in the purchase of the lands of the emigrants — friends, it was presumed, of the unhappy lenders. This device for reducing the amount of the assignats was ineffective on many accounts, and especially because the assignats paid in were reissued and because new issues were voted. Another scheme provided for the demonetization of all assignats of a nominal value above one hundred livres, if issued before August 10, 1792, and so bearing the royal effigy. The loss, it was supposed, would fall mainly upon the rich, for the poor would not be likely to have large bills among their savings. Of these assignats 558,000,000 were still in circulation. They could be used for arrears of taxation and for the purchase of public lands until the following January. Even after they were demonetized they were at a premium in some quarters. Indeed it was the preference for them, indicating a lack of confidence in the Republic, which had incited the Convention to demonetize them.

If the government was unable to stop increasing the amount of assignats in circulation, their value must inevitably depreciate. By the beginning of July they had fallen to 36. Prices, accordingly, rose at an alarming rate. The grain markets were not well stocked, although there had been no crop failures. The farmers waited for still higher prices, or feared that their wagons would be plundered, if they tried to market their grain. The prices of other necessities also rose, and the distress of the people was fast becoming unbearable. Persons with moderate incomes found them inadequate, and holders of government securities, even when the interest was paid, were reduced to penury.

The general distress prompted the Convention to seek a remedy by fixing a maximum for prices. France, the deputies argued, was like a beleaguered town, where the ordinary rules about the rights of property were no longer applicable. A grand accounting of stock of all kinds should be made, and its owners, whether wholesalers or retailers, must agree to place it on sale in small lots, on pain of being punished as monopolists, that is,

CHAP.

XIII

1793-94

criminals worthy of death. Not until the failure of the first maximum law for grains was this legislation developed by defining what were the necessities of life, by providing for taking an account of stock under municipal supervision, and by forcing the sale of any item of this stock which the customer might desire, whether the current price was satisfactory to the merchant or not. The final step was to fix the same maximum price for grains and flour all over the country, providing a rate per league for transportation. The price of other necessities was the price of the year 1790 plus one-third. Wages were fixed at the rate of 1790 plus one-half. Millers and bakers were not permitted to withdraw from trade without giving three months' notice. In order to render possible the application of these decrees the Convention ordered the preparation of schedules of prices for all localities, permitting the retailer to add five per cent. to the maximum rate. The collection of this material proved a formidable task and the report was not ready until February, 1794.

The maximum legislation was respected where the local authorities were thoroughly in earnest about its enforcement. In Paris the loss fell chiefly upon wholesalers, who could be supervised easily, and who were forced to sell also at retail. Butchers and bakers were watched by their neighbors, and did not dare to close their shops even when business was carried on at a loss. The authorities at Paris did not enforce the law of wages and so the employer suffered a double damage. The first effect of the law fixing the rate on necessities was a rush of purchasers to the shops, eager to take advantage of the lower prices, and fearful lest the stock when once exhausted would not be replenished. While the shopkeeper utilized this resource of forgetting to refurnish his shelves with commodities, the manufacturer possessed the simple remedy of debasing the quality of his goods.

What effect these laws had upon the value of the assignats is difficult to determine. Other causes were also at work. The Convention triumphed over its enemies at Lyons and Toulon. Its armies were again victorious on the frontiers. The government was given a more efficient organization. Moreover, "terror was made the order of the day," and the first impressions were strong, if not salutary. By the end of the year the assignats had risen to 51, but after this time the fall was resumed and was never checked again.

The legislative work of the Convention was not limited to measures dictated by circumstance. During these troubled weeks it undertook to destroy what remained of feudal property.

By a decree of July 17 any lease described in feudal terms or embodying feudal elements was annulled and the property passed to the holder. The task of determining whether the feudal taint was present was thrown upon the courts, with a vast amount of litigation as the consequence. Since the value of feudal dues had been counted among the assets of the republic and had been estimated at fifty millions, the rich and the noble were not the only sufferers from such legislation. The Convention also attempted to distribute existing fortunes by depriving fathers of the right to determine the amount which should go to each heir. Property was to be divided equally among the children, if there were any; if not, among the other heirs. In their desire to find applications for the sacred principle of equality the deputies gave natural children rights equal to those of children born in wedlock. Early in 1794 a wiser application of the principle was made in the decree abolishing slavery. Far-reaching though these measures were, they were overshadowed by the sanguinary laws dictated to the Convention by fear and passion during the critical months of 1793 and 1794.

The military situation in September, 1793, was better than it had been in August, but the accumulation of impressions led in September to the adoption of measures which characterized what is known as the "Reign of Terror." These included a definition of treason within whose dreadful sweep any enemy or even critic of the party in power could be brought, a reorganized and enlarged Revolutionary Tribunal, with more summary methods of trial, a Revolutionary Army to terrorize Paris and the neighboring departments, and, finally, a Committee of Public Safety transformed into an irresponsible board of despots. The impulse to such action came primarily from the Commune and the Jacobin Club. Paris was under the control of its most violent men, of whom Hébert was a conspicuous figure. Marat had been assassinated in July by Charlotte Corday, a young Norman girl, who believed she was slaying the leader of the radicals and avenging the fallen Girondins. Her act seemed to justify in advance the cruelties perpetrated in the name of the law. The radicals were made secure against a revolt of the sections by a provision that the poorer citizens should be paid forty sous a day for attendance at the sectional meetings. The demands of the Paris agitators had great weight with the Convention, but the measures which it adopted, on recommendation of the Committee of Public Safety, generally fell short of what was asked. When, for example, the Jacobins and the Commune asked for a Revolutionary Army, divided into sections, each accompanied

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

The Revolutionary
Tribunal

by a tribunal and a guillotine, with a procedure unembarrassed by the ordinary rules of justice, the Convention voted simply the organization of a Revolutionary Army.

Among the measures of Terror devised in September, 1793, was the reorganization of the extraordinary criminal court, now formally named the Revolutionary Tribunal. The number of judges was increased to 16, of jurors to 60, and the court was divided into four sections, to secure the swift punishment of any who ventured to resist the government party. Service on the jury became, in general, a permanent, highly paid function. Among the new jurymen were Duplay, Robespierre's landlord, and other members of his faction. It is alleged that Fouquier-Tinville in important cases chose jurors who were "solid," that is, could be relied upon to bring in a verdict of guilty. The court degenerated into a mechanism for registering proscriptions. These were rendered easy by the Law of Suspects adopted on September 17, which treated as suspicious persons, liable to immediate arrest, all former nobles, or relatives of emigrants, who had not constantly manifested their attachment to the Revolution, and, in general, all "partisans of tyranny, federalism, and enemies of liberty." The condemnations of the tribunal, which were only 5 in August and 14 in September, ran up to 50 in October, and 69 in December. Among the victims were the Queen, the astronomer Bailly, who had been the first mayor of Paris, Barnave, who next to Mirabeau was the greatest orator of the Constituent, even the Duke of Orleans, although he had voted the death of the King, and twenty-one of the Girondins with Mme. Roland. The case against the Girondins was on the point of breaking down for lack of evidence, when, on the demand of the Jacobin Club, the Convention decided that the hearing might be closed as soon as the consciences of the jurors were sufficiently enlightened. It is hardly necessary to add that this happy consummation was reached before the Girondins had begun their defense. The ceaseless war of the Republic upon conspirators was the special business of the Committee of General Security, originally appointed in October, 1792. Its personnel was long an object of contention between the Girondins and the Jacobins, but was finally controlled by the Committee of Public Safety. It grew into a ministry of police, with a jurisdiction covering France and a salary account of nearly 400 million livres.⁴

The Republic reserved its most savage punishments for the

⁴ Local committees of surveillance assisted the Committee of General Security.

Vendéans and for the towns which had risen against the Convention. Lyons surrendered early in October. The Convention declared that it should be destroyed, and that only buildings dedicated to industry and education and houses occupied by the poor or by patriots should be left standing. Its name should be *Ville Affranchie* or Freetown. This monstrous decree, an echo of Roman vengeance, was impossible of execution. Couthon, a friend of Robespierre, first undertook the task, but was too moderate in his action, and was recalled. In his place Collot d'Herbois, a sanguinary sentimentalist, and Fouché, an ex-Oratorian schoolmaster, were despatched to do the work. They were supported by the Paris Revolutionary Army, which reached Lyons late in November. Upon the city itself their destructive wrath went no further than the partial ruin of a score or two of houses in the fashionable quarter. The walls were also pulled down. Upon the prisoners was visited the penalty of armed rebellion, and it was done with a refinement of cruelty. At one time sixty were struck down with cannon, those who were only wounded being finished with the saber. At another time 200 were killed by musketry fire. For five months a "Commission of Justice" sent men to the guillotine, until nearly 2,000 had perished. Toulon met a similar fate in December. Before the year closed the Vendéan revolt was also crushed. Scattered bands disturbed the west, but the insurrection was no longer a serious danger. This success was disgraced by the conduct of a half-mad fanatic, the deputy Carrier, whom the Committee of Public Safety sent to Nantes. Finding excuse in the fact that the Vendéans had rarely given quarter, he caused nearly 2,000 prisoners to be shot on the plain beyond the walls. He discovered a more expeditious method of killing prisoners through the sinking, perhaps accidental, of a barge loaded with ninety dissident priests. Of this he ordered repetitions until about 2,000 more had been drowned. When the Committee of Public Safety learned what he was doing, he was recalled, but no attempt was made to punish him. The only rebellious district to escape was Corsica, which in 1794 offered the crown to George III. Paoli had led the insurrection, but the English did not permit him to remain as viceroy.

The dangers of the country led to the concentration of extraordinary powers in the hands of the reorganized Committee of Public Safety, powers which several of its members — Carnot, Lindet, and Saint-André — used to further the national defense, and which fanatics like Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois, and sometimes even Robespierre, utilized to satisfy vindictive political hatreds or to crush factions which dared to oppose their

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

Committee
of Public
Safety

policy. In August the Committee was granted a credit of fifty millions for secret expenses, and used the money in part to secure its own control. Two months later the plan of putting the new constitution into effect was formally abandoned and the government declared "revolutionary" until the war ended. The supervision of all constituted authorities was entrusted to the Committee. It was to nominate generals and to authorize measures adopted by the ministry. In December its powers were more clearly defined in a law which brought to an end the anarchy of conflicting authorities, whether legal or self-constituted. Through national agents, who replaced district and municipal solicitors, the Committee could see that the laws were enforced. For one thing, this checked the independent activity of the Commune of Paris. Departmental administrations were reduced to the supervision of public works and the distribution of tax levies. Their councils and solicitor-generals were suppressed. The personnel of many local bodies was also changed by "deputies on mission" acting for the Committee. In the spring of 1794 it gained the additional right of filling provisionally vacancies created by removals which it had ordered. When, on April 1, the executive council was replaced by twelve commissions, subordinated to the Committee, the Committee finally appeared in its true rôle as a governing board rather than a committee of the Convention.

A New
Calendar

The triumph of the radical Jacobins during the Reign of Terror was fatal to the state Church which the Constituent Assembly had created. Its clergy, whether chosen in 1791, or priests of the older Church, could not be expected to coöperate heartily with the faction in control of the government. Some were Jacobins, but others lagged behind in the paths of "moderation." The Jacobin leaders, accordingly, began to transfer to the constitutional clergy, in whom they saw the fomenters of civil tumults, the hatred which they felt for the proscribed dissidents. Men who cherished the opinions of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists confused their contempt of Catholicism with love of country. The Convention gave countenance to this feeling by adopting a new calendar and by substituting for the Christian era a new republican era.⁵

According to the new calendar the first year opened on September 22, 1792, the day when the Republic was proclaimed. The months were named from the processes of nature; the cold au-

⁵ Another motive was to provide a rational mode of measuring time. On August 1, 1793, the Convention had adopted the metric system of weights and measures.

tumnal mists, for example, giving the name *Brumaire*, the winter rains *Pluviôse*, the growth of the seeds *Germinal*, the waving fields *Prairial*, and the summer heats *Thermidor*. Even the structure and sound of each name, as Fabre d'Eglantine said in his report, was intended to indicate the character of the month.⁶ For the week was substituted the decade, and the festal day was the tenth or *Décadi*. By such changes the legislators hoped to break the associations of the old calendar with its saints' days and recurring festivals.

In the same anti-Christian spirit they welcomed deputations which offered at the bar of the Convention the spoils of parish churches. In response to one of these deputations, on November 6, it empowered the local authorities to suppress official parishes by merging them in neighboring parishes. The radicals of the Commune concluded that they were in the presence of a great popular movement which would lift to supreme influence those who managed to appear as its leaders. They forced Gobel, metropolitan bishop of Paris, and his vicars, to proceed to the Convention and renounce their offices. Three days later, on November 10, they organized a festival of liberty in the cathedral of Nôtre Dame, transformed for the occasion into a "Temple of Reason." In the municipal council they ventured still further, voting to close all churches in Paris and to place the priests under surveillance. The Convention was at first intimidated by the Parisian phase of the movement, and many of the ecclesiastics among its members renounced their functions or abjured their faith. A few, led by Bishop Grégoire, stood firm. The most influential men in the Convention and in the Committee of Public Safety realized that such a movement would compromise the cause of the Republic abroad, foment civil strife at home, and jeopardize the national defense. Robespierre became the spokesman of this feeling and denounced the leaders of the movement as ill-disguised emissaries of the invader. The Convention solemnly reaffirmed the liberty of worship, but threw so many qualifications about the act that in most cases the decree remained a

CHAP.
XIII
1793-94

The Wor-
ship of
Reason

⁶ "Nous avons cherché même à mettre à profit l'harmonie imitative de la langue dans la composition et la prosodie de ces mots et dans le mécanisme de leurs désinences; de telle manière que les noms des mois qui composent l'automne ont un son grave et une mesure moyenne, ceux de l'hiver un son lourd et une mesure longue, ceux du printemps un son gai et une mesure brève, et ceux de l'été un son sonore et une mesure large." Again he remarks: "C'est ainsi que des le premier de Germinal il se peindra sans effort à l'imagination, par la terminaison du mot, que le printemps commence. . . ." Procès-verbaux du Comité d'Instruction Publique, II. 700, 701.

CHAP.

XIII

1793-94

The Fac-
tions in
Conflict

dead letter. Notre Dame was still called the Temple of Reason, and the movement spread from Paris to other large towns, sometimes supported by the "deputies on mission," occasionally restrained by them. In its correspondence the Committee sought to check outbreaks of anti-religious violence, but was reluctant to have the principle of religious liberty interpreted literally. In some places the churches never were closed, in others they were now reopened. In many country districts the people looked upon the constitutional priests with suspicion and regarded their overthrow with indifference. Before the anti-Christian movement ran its course it led to violent factional struggles within the Jacobin party and was responsible for a long list of proscriptions.

The faction which had organized the festival of liberty and the Worship of Reason was called Hébertist because its leading member was Hébert, assistant city solicitor and editor of the *Père Duchesne*. In his attack upon this faction Robespierre had the support of Danton and of their common friend, the journalist Camille Desmoulins. Desmoulins began in December the publication of a new journal, the *Vieux Cordelier*, its name recalling the time when the Cordelier Club was not in the hands of the Hébertists, but was managed by Danton and his friends. This journal in witty paragraphs, with biting sarcasms, attacked the Hébertists and ridiculed their methods of promoting the new religion, intimating that the consequence would be a fresh outbreak of the Vendéan insurrection. But Desmoulins was ready to go farther than Robespierre, and in his third number, under guise of defending the acts of vengeance by which the Republic had frightened its enemies into submission, he showed that some of these deeds resembled the most odious excesses of the Roman tyrants as described by Tacitus. About the same time Philippeaux, a deputy on mission in the Vendéan region, revealed the gross mismanagement of the government and held the Committee of Public Safety responsible. Desmoulins also referred to committeemen so proud that one hardly ventured to address them. His attack on the system of Terror brought a deputation of weeping women to the Convention, begging for the release of innocent relatives. At this juncture Collot d'Herbois returned from the butcheries at Lyons, and both he and his friends realized that a reaction against the policy of Terror would ruin them politically, even if it did not menace their lives. Philippeaux and Desmoulins were attacked in the Jacobin Club, and before the incident closed Desmoulins was repudiated by Robespierre. The journalistic struggle between the *Père Duchesne* and the *Vieux Cor-*

delier increased in violence. The Committee of Public Safety, restive under criticism, and fearing loss of prestige, resolved to reassert itself. In the midst of the controversy it caused the arrest of Fabre d'Eglantine, a Dantonist, accusing him of embezzlement; and, when Danton asked that Fabre be heard by the Convention in his own defense, Billaud-Varenne threatened Danton himself.

The dénouement seemed long in coming. Although the quarrel was at its height by the middle of January, it was two months before the Committee concluded to crush both Hébertists and Dantonists. The Hébertists precipitated the crisis by attempting to take advantage of the distress in Paris and the chronic lack of food in order to stir up a popular insurrection against the Convention and the Committee. This time the people were not deluded and attributed their ills to the Hébertists themselves, and to the Revolutionary Army which frightened the farmers into concealing grain. The Hébertists were arrested, tried summarily, and executed. After destroying those who sought to exaggerate the policy of repression, the Committee turned on the Dantonists, or "Indulgents," arrested and tried them on the absurd charge of conspiring to restore the monarchy, and, as in the case of the Girondins, cut short the trial before the defense was heard. So perished Danton, the organizer of August 10, the principal minister of the first period of the Republic, the creator of the Revolutionary Tribunal, the head of the First Committee of Public Safety; judicially murdered to satisfy rancorous jealousies and to save the rulers of France from being questioned too narrowly. The Republic seemed to have become a monster eager to tear and devour her own children. The immediate consequences of the destruction of the Hébertists were greater than those which followed the death of Danton and his friends, for it brought to an end the independence of the Commune, already seriously undermined by the decree granting powers of control to the Committee of Public Safety.⁷ The mayor retired and the Committee replaced him, as well as the national agent, and his assistant, with its own appointees. Paris was now simply a part of the governmental machine.

The death of Danton left Robespierre the greatest figure among the rulers of the Republic. In the Convention he seemed supreme. The new commissions, which replaced the ministry, were filled with his partisans, who also controlled the Commune. Only in the two governing committees did he face even a latent

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

Hébert-
ists and
Danton-
ists De-
stroyed

⁷ The Revolutionary Army of Paris was also suppressed.

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

Robes-
pierre

opposition. He was not yet regarded as responsible for the Terror, and was sometimes appealed to for the restoration of religious liberty. He had actually saved seventy-five members of the Girondin group from proscription after the death of their leaders. His chief desire seemed to be the introduction of the reign of "virtue," but his conception of virtue (true public spirit or good citizenship) was drawn from the pages of Rousseau, and he could not understand, any better than a grand inquisitor, how a just man could depart in thought or deed from the law of rectitude which he expounded with arid eloquence in reports and addresses.

Two acts characterized the period of Robespierre's supremacy. The first gave to the religious ideas of Rousseau the sanction of a decree of the Convention. By it France solemnly recognized "the Existence of the Supreme Being and the Immortality of the Soul," appointed a festival for the symbolic introduction of this religion of the Savoyard Vicar, and provided for annual festivals celebrating the principal virtues and relationships of life. The first festival occurred on June 8, and Robespierre, then president of the Convention, acting as a sort of supreme pontiff, advanced and applied the torch to an effigy of atheism. This festival was followed two days later by a second characteristic event, the reorganization of revolutionary justice, rendering procedure against the enemies of the Republic more swift and sure. Robespierre was personally responsible for the terms of the law which deprived the accused of counsel and suppressed the hearing of witnesses in case there was material or "moral" evidence enough to convince the jurors. Every imaginable attitude of opposition was a crime. When it was remembered what Robespierre meant by republican principles, it was ominous that the law pronounced a criminal whoever sought to distort their energy and purity. The Tribunal itself was reorganized. Only jurors known to be sure were retained; the weak were eliminated. Fouquier-Tinville redoubled his sinister activity. Already in the month before the law was passed the tale of death had risen to 354, but in the next seven weeks 1,376 were executed, more than had perished during the previous fifteen months of the Tribunal's existence. Why Robespierre gave such frightful speed to the enginery of death is a mystery, unless his original intention was by such means to destroy the remnant of opposition, and, with no rivals to obscure his devotion to the Republic, introduce the reign of order and clemency, fitting accompaniments of the triumph of virtue. But already the opposition, prompted partly by fear, partly by disgust at Robes-

pierre's religious ideas, had begun to organize its forces. It was aided by victories on the frontier which rendered the daily butcheries on the Paris squares a horrible anachronism.

The military disasters of 1793 had ended with the surrender of Mainz, Condé, and Valenciennes. New leaders were fighting their way to the front. The general direction of the army was entrusted to Carnot, a member of the Committee of Public Safety. Jourdan, who the year before was only commander of a battalion of volunteers, won a victory at Wattignies, October 16, and relieved Maubeuge, an important barrier fortress. By the end of the year all the frontiers of France except Roussillon were cleared. The government completed the reorganization of the army by the consolidation of the volunteers and the line, combining two battalions of volunteers and one of the line in a demi-brigade of about 3,000 men. The system of the *levée en masse* brought the numbers in the army up to 850,000 by the spring of 1794. Robert Lindet, also a member of the Committee, reorganized the service of provisions and military supplies. The generals were beginning to develop the art of manœuvring in the field so that they could take advantage of the superior power of individual initiative possessed by French citizen-soldiers. Clouds of skirmishers were used to open the battle and columns were employed to break the enemy's line. Artillery was massed that cannonades might have a more decisive effect. The great event of the campaign of 1794 was the victory of Fleurus, on June 25, when Jourdan defeated the Austrians so completely that they again evacuated the Netherlands. The Prussians were also forced to retreat towards the Rhine. This delivered France from the nightmare of invasion and took from the Terrorists all excuse for the policy of sanguinary repression.

The growth of opposition in the Committee of Public Safety so offended Robespierre that towards the end of June he practically ceased to attend its sessions. The center of opposition was, however, in the Committee of General Security. After long reflection, on July 26 (8 Thermidor), Robespierre made a long speech in the Convention, defending himself against the charge that he had attempted to dominate his colleagues, or in any way to separate his cause from that of the Convention, and threatening vaguely those who had exaggerated the Terror. He declared that several men should be expelled from the Committee of Public Safety and that the Committee of General Security should also be purged. His failure to mention names was fatal, for every one who had been associated with the Dantonists or the Hébertists, and those who had otherwise antagonized him,

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

Successes
of French
Armies

Opposi-
tion to
Robes-
pierre

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

The Ninth
of Ther-
midor

feared that they would be destroyed in a new "amalgam,"⁸ and this fear consolidated the opposition. A struggle followed over the question of ordering the speech printed and distributed to the communes, the usual compliment in such cases. The Convention finally agreed that it should be printed, but refused to send it to the communes.

That night the conspirators sought to unite moderate men and extremists in an effort to overthrow Robespierre. The moderates were told that their turn would soon come, if the tyrant were not overthrown, while to the extremists Robespierre was denounced as an enemy of revolutionary severity. The next day (9 Thermidor) in the Convention Robespierre's friend Saint-Just began to read a prepared speech by which he aimed to restore harmony, suggesting precautions against the ambitions of any single member of the Committee, but he was violently interrupted by Tallien, who demanded that "the curtain be torn apart." Billaud-Varenne denounced Robespierre, asserting that the decree of June 10, which reorganized the Revolutionary Tribunal, was intended to support Robespierre's schemes. When Robespierre rushed to the speaker's tribune, Collot d'Herbois, who was presiding, refused to recognize him. The session soon resolved itself into the despairing struggle of Robespierre to obtain a hearing in spite of the clamors of his enemies. His efforts were vain, and after hours of turmoil the Convention voted to place him under arrest as a "dominator." With him were arrested Saint-Just and Couthon of the Committee, Robespierre's brother Augustin, his friend Le Bas, and Henriot, commander of the Paris National Guard.

When the Commune heard of this action, it declared itself in insurrection, and summoned the sections to its assistance. Robespierre and his friends were delivered from prison and conducted to the Hotel de Ville. He still hesitated to countenance any acts of rebellion against the Convention. Meanwhile it decreed that the prisoners and their partisans were outlaws, and rallied the majority of the sections to its cause. About midnight a heavy rain dispersed the crowds on the square in front of the Hotel de Ville. Shortly afterwards the troops of the Convention pressed into the building and found Robespierre stretched out on the floor, his jaw fractured by a bullet. Whether he was wounded by one of the first men to penetrate the room or had attempted to commit suicide is not known. At the close of the day he was executed on the *Place de la Révolu-*

⁸ This was the nickname for a combination in a single proscription of persons accused of various offenses against the Republic.

tion amidst shouts of execration from the people who had lavished adulation upon him in his days of power. With him perished, then or soon afterwards, 103 of his partisans in the Commune and the Jacobin Club. Now that the idol was overthrown, it became the fashion or the excuse of every man who had cowered under the Terror or who had voted its decrees of proscription to load Robespierre's name with infamy and to hold him responsible for all the crimes of the Revolution.

France believed that by a régime of merciless severity she had preserved her unity and repelled the invader from her borders. During the same months Poland attempted to rise against her spoilers, failed, and was blotted from the map. After the Diet of Grodno had agreed to the cessions demanded by Russia and Prussia, groups of Polish patriots began to organize in order to undo this shameful work. Their principal leader was Thaddeus Kosciuszko, a nobleman who had served in the American army during the Revolutionary War. The Russian policy compelling the dismissal of a large part of the Polish army assisted the plans of the Poles, for from these soldiers were gathered recruits for an uprising. The conspirators worked so secretly that the Russian commander, who still occupied Warsaw, could not seize any of the threads of the conspiracy. The struggle opened at Cracow on March 23, 1794. A month later Warsaw was in the hands of Kosciuszko. King Stanislas swore to live and die with his subjects. The fatal obstacle to a successful struggle was the existence of serfdom, which divided the interests of the nobility and the peasants. Kosciuszko did not venture to abolish serfdom: he tried to lessen its unjust burdens, but this alienated many of the nobles. In the larger towns the mercantile class deplored a conflict which they felt must fail, and which was certain to bring ruin upon them. Under the circumstances it was impossible to organize a successful resistance; Kosciuszko's small army was defeated in October, and Warsaw was stormed a month later. Russia had won the victories, but Prussia and Austria sent armies into the field, with the consequence that the spoil had to be divided. Months passed, however, before the three could agree upon a plan of division. France, blood-stained but triumphant, bleeding and ruined Poland, were the two tragic figures of this terrible period.

CHAP.
XIII

1793-94

Third
Partition
of Poland

CHAPTER XIV

THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE REPUBLIC

CHAP.
XIV

1794-96

End of
the Reign
of Terror

THE men who had brought about the overthrow of Robespierre did not intend to abandon a scheme of government which had raised their party to power. Their motive had been to save themselves. None were more surprised than they that their triumph ended the Reign of Terror. There was something irrational about such a result. Robespierre had been no more responsible than half a dozen others for the sinister violence of Jacobin rule. It is true that the reorganization of the Revolutionary Tribunal in June, 1794, was mainly his work, but several of the leaders in the conspiracy against him were fanatics more sanguinary than he — for example, Collot d'Herbois, who had ordered the *fusillades* at Lyons, Tallien, who had sent many "federalists" at Bordeaux to the guillotine, and Fréron, who had directed the *fusillades* at Toulon.

Nevertheless, after the death of Danton, Robespierre was the only great Revolutionary name left. His immense influence was partly due to this fact. With the semblance of power came increasing responsibility for the régime under which France began to writhe as if tormented by a horrible nightmare. When he fell the shock was so great that France was aroused. Sanity, a sense of justice, and courage were restored. A continuance of the Reign of Terror became impossible.

The men who had taken the principal parts on the Ninth of Thermidor — Tallien, Barras, and Fréron — discovered the next day that they were popular heroes. As soon as they perceived the strength of the reaction against the Robespierrist government they were glad to play this part, for it might save them from proscription. Tallien was the most popular of the three. He it was who had interrupted Saint Just on the fateful morning. Pasquier relates that Tallien appeared at the theater after rumors had been circulated of an attempt to assassinate him. "It was known that he was to be there. Never was a theater so full. The stairways were as crowded as the hall itself. He appeared at last: what a reception! What applause! The spectators, men, women, and children stand on the seats, they cannot gaze at him enough. He was young, rather handsome; he had

a serene air. Mme. Tallien was beside him and shared in his triumph." Fréron was a journalist, and his newspaper, *L'Orateur du Peuple*, took the lead in the reaction against the impenitent Jacobins who attempted to save the Terrorist régime from destruction. Stimulated by his words young men of fashion, the *jeunesse dorée*, armed themselves with cudgels and attacked the Jacobins on the street or invaded their meetings. The party which united in pulling down piece by piece the great machine of Jacobin domination was called Thermidorian from the date of its origin.

The first part of the revolutionary government to be affected by the change was the Committee of Public Safety. Even after Robespierre's death the Convention was afraid to leave governmental powers concentrated, lest a self-appointed successor might seize them. On the eleventh of Thermidor the deputies voted that all committees should be renewed by quarters each month, and that in the case of the two principal committees an interval of a month must come between the close of service upon them and a réélection. This did not reassure the timid and a few weeks later they distributed the work of administration between sixteen committees, assigning to the Committee of Public Safety only war and diplomacy. Such subdivision of responsibility was dangerous, but it had the effect of giving the executive commissioners more of the character of ministers, since they remained in office while the personnel of the committees was constantly changing. The Convention also assumed greater importance as the center of government as well as of legislation. In the spring of 1795, however, the Committee of Public Safety was made the executive agency through which all committees acted.

The Revolutionary Tribunal was promptly reorganized. The law of June 10 (22 Prairial) was repealed and adequate means of defense were granted to the accused. Barère, a member of the Committee of Public Safety, had the assurance to propose the reappointment of Fouquier-Tinville as public prosecutor. Fouquier was, instead, arrested and after a trial which was not finished until May, 1795, was condemned to death. With him perished fifteen of the former judges and jurors of the Tribunal. The infamous Carrier had preceded him to the scaffold. After these efforts to reestablish the balance of justice the Tribunal ceased to act and was soon abolished.

The Jacobin Club, which had become an instrument of the Robespierrist rule, was first changed and then destroyed. Robespierre's partisans were driven out of the club immediately after his overthrow. In October the Convention forbade correspond-

CHAP.
XIV

1794-96

Reorgan-
ization
of the
Govern-
ment

CHAP.
XIV

1794-96

The
Jacobin
Club

ence between the mother society and the societies in the departments. This act exasperated the Jacobins, one of whose leaders was Billaud-Varenne, no longer a member of the Committee of Public Safety. Three weeks later in a speech at the club he threatened the Thermidorian party, crying out: "The lion is not dead when he sleeps and at his awakening he will exterminate his enemies." The *jeunesse dorée* took up the challenge, besieged the club and maltreated the members. The government then ordered the club closed.

The Paris Commune also ceased to exist. Most of its officials had perished with Robespierre. The Convention appointed two commissions, one of police and one of taxation, to administer the city. The assemblies of the sections or wards were permitted for a time to meet, but when in the following year they served again as recruiting centers for revolutionary mobs they were closed. The local revolutionary committees, which had been directed by the Committee of General Security and had spread a gigantic police net over the country, were reduced in number, and afterwards quietly allowed to go out of existence.

The operation of the rule upon the renewal of committees speedily changed the personnel of the two governing committees. Each month the members who were to retire were indicated by lot. Barère was one of those in the Committee of Public Safety who withdrew for this reason, while Collot d'Herbois and Billaud-Varenne were forced by public opinion to resign. Carnot who had rendered important services in organizing the defense of the country was chosen by lot for retirement, but the Convention thought he could not be spared and elected him to one of the positions made vacant by resignation. As new members were selected to fill these vacancies, the committee resembled the Dantonist committee of 1793 in attitude and policy.

Committee
of Public
Safety

The political complexion of the Convention was also changed. The men who had overthrown Robespierre had been obliged to beg the members of the center or the Plain for support. Till this time the moderate men in the Convention had voted silently for measures demanded by the dominant faction. Many of them were like the Abbé Sieyès, who when asked what he did during the Reign of Terror replied, "I lived." But in the struggle of Thermidor the moderates held the balance of power. After that it was impossible to treat them as so many votes to be captured by intimidation. Three weeks later Durand-Maillane, one of their leaders, demanded the adoption of a decree which should permit them to address the Convention without being molested. The Jacobins were slow to perceive the change that was taking

The Con-
vention

place. It became still more evident in December with the re-admission of the seventy-five Girondins who had been imprisoned during the Reign of Terror. In March, 1795, the Girondins who had escaped from Paris after the insurrection of June 2, 1793, and had eluded capture, were admitted. Among them were Louvet, who was famous for his speech against Robespierre in the fall of 1792; Isnard, who in May, 1793, had prophesied the utter destruction of Paris if the Girondins were attacked; and Lanjuinais, who had demanded on June 2, 1793, that the Commune be dissolved. The Girondins promised to forget their injuries, but this was beyond the power of human nature.

The Convention did not leave untouched the economic system which the Jacobins had constructed by decrees upon the assignats, upon monopolists, and upon maximum prices. The value of the assignats had fallen steadily since the beginning of 1794 in spite of the law and of the guillotine with which it was enforced. By September they were worth only 27, and by December, 20. It was in December that the opponents of the law finally succeeded in obtaining its repeal, arguing that if it remained on the statute books, famine would be inevitable. Nevertheless, repeal was only a partial remedy, for the government kept on printing assignats at the rate of sixty or seventy millions a day. By the time the sessions of the Convention came to an end twenty-nine *billions* had been issued! The government was obliged to establish a manufactory of paper, in order that the supply might be sufficient. So hard worked were the employees engaged in making assignats that they threatened to strike. Under the circumstances it is not astonishing that prices continued to rise. In September, 1795, the price of flour was one hundred times what it had been in 1790. Sugar which had been eighteen sous a pound in 1790 was sixty-two livres or francs.¹ A pound of butter was thirty francs, a pair of shoes two hundred, and a hat three hundred. The mass of the population in Paris lived upon distributions of bread, meat, and coal, made either gratuitously or at reduced prices. Many persons, especially women, were obliged to stand in line all day in order to obtain even a scanty ration for their families.

One consequence of the depreciation of the assignats was the waste of the national resources in public lands. Only a part of the purchase price had to be paid immediately. The remainder

¹ The Convention, on April 7, 1795, in a law providing for the introduction of the metric system, voted in principle two years before, declared the franc to be henceforward the monetary unit, replacing the livre, which was of substantially the same value.

CHAP.
XIV
1794-96

Waste of
Public
Lands

Industry

could be paid in annual instalments. The longer the payments were delayed the less the purchaser had to pay. He had commonly made only four or five payments before 1795, when the assignats were rapidly becoming worthless. The Convention in alarm, on June 21, 1795, decreed that if the balance was not paid within forty days the assignats would be received only at a scale of depreciation fixed by law. This caused a rush to make payments, and the greater part of the purchase price was; therefore, paid at a time when the assignats were worth about one-thirtieth of their nominal value. In consequence the government lost the bulk of the value of the property which it took from the Church and the emigrants, and the purchasers were enriched at the expense of less fortunate Frenchmen. In many cases the purchasers were peasants or townsmen, but in others they were speculators. At no time was the transfer of property from one set of men to another more rapid or less justifiable, and never were the contrasts between insolent wealth and abject poverty greater.

The industrial outlook was gloomy. Trade had fallen off since 1792 not only because of civil war, in which great producing communities, like Lyons, had suffered, but also because of the loss of colonies and of over-sea markets. The coast trade was interrupted by the close blockade which the English maintained, rendering communication between various departments difficult, for the roads were in a state of neglect. The decrease in manufactures is illustrated in the case of woollens in which the production fell from 2,606,977 pieces in 1788 to 802,408 in 1795. In consequence of the maximum laws and of the general disorganization the methods of manufacture had been cheapened and inferior material had been used. French goods lost a reputation difficult to regain. The recovery of trade was hindered by the attempt to exclude all English products, in order to strike at an enemy who could not be attacked directly.

The farmers were better off than the townsmen, for the Revolution had swept away feudal and church dues and had not organized effectively the collection of taxes. The farmer who rented his land was most fortunate as long as he could pay fixed rent charges in depreciating paper. An instance is recorded of one whose rent was 600 livres, and who paid it with one sack of wheat, demanding 600 livres in change, wheat being then worth 1,200 livres a sack. But the farmers, like the rest, suffered from the insecurity of the roads and sometimes did not venture to market their crops. They also felt the drain of the "blood tax," which took away so many young men to fight the battles of the Republic.

Although the Jacobins had made their supremacy odious, they had not discredited the Republic utterly, and in 1795 there was little prospect of a return of the Bourbons. It is true that bands of men styling themselves "Companies of the Sun," "Companies of Jesus," and "Companies of Jehu" infested one or two departments of the south and east, broke into the prisons of Marseilles, Tarascon, Aix, and Lyons, and massacred Jacobins who were awaiting trial. There were royalists in these bands, no doubt, but the savage vengeance taken was not royalist but simply human. During the early part of 1795 it seemed as if peace had settled over the western departments where Vendéans and Chouans² in scattered groups had been successfully defying efforts to crush the rebellion. This result was reached by the wise promise of an amnesty and by generous terms of peace negotiated with the leaders. But a new turn in affairs soon threatened the agreement. In June the dauphin, called by the royalists Louis XVII, died in prison, after long months of cruel neglect. The Count of Provence now proclaimed himself Louis XVIII, "by the Grace of God King of France and Navarre." His declaration that the old order in State and Church must be restored made still more unlikely the reorganization of a strong royalist party. Isolated risings took place among the Vendéans and Chouans, and the English attempted a landing of emigrants on the peninsula of Quiberon, but the little army was beaten by General Hoche, and seven hundred emigrants were shot by order of the Convention. Hoche again pacified the Vendéans, even permitting church bells to be rung in order that the grievance on the score of religion might be removed.

As the spring of 1795 approached, the feeling in the Convention against committee-men of the Terror became more intense, although most of the deputies had been either actors or supernumeraries in that tragedy. All through the fall and winter the preliminary hearings in the case of Fouquier-Tinville were being held. The evidence constantly brought out his relations with the Committee of Public Safety and the Committee of General Security. Why punish a poor tool like Fouquier, and the judges and jurors who worked with him, and leave the men who controlled them uncondemned? In the centers of fashion, the salons of Mme. Tallien, Mme. de Staël (Necker's daughter), and of Mme. Récamier, the Terrorists were constantly decried. The Jacobin atrocities were even turned into a ghastly joke by organizing *bals des victimes*, to which no one was admitted who had

CHAP.
XIV

1794-96

The Royalists

Reaction
Against
the Terrorists

² A nickname for the Breton rebels.

CHAP.
XIV

1794-96

not lost a relative on the scaffold. In these dancing parties "one of the favorite figures was an imitation of a *guillotinée*." In the theaters anti-Jacobin pieces were popular. A new hymn, the *Réveil du Peuple*, the rival of the *Marseillaise*, was sung everywhere. This hymn consoled the shades of the Terror's innocent victims with the grim assurance that

Le jour tardif de la vengeance
Fait enfin pâlir vos bourreaux.

Early in March a committee, appointed the preceding December, reported in favor of placing Collot d'Herbois, Billaud-Varenne, Barère, and Vadier on trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal. The Convention accepted the report and ordered them arrested.

This act roused the Jacobins in the Convention and in Paris to fury. They tried to persuade the people that only the Constitution of 1793 could bring relief from their sufferings. On April 1 a mob crying "Bread and the Constitution of 1793!" broke into the hall of the Convention. The Jacobin or Montagnard deputies took sides with the mob, but the National Guard arrived and drove the invaders out. One consequence was that the Convention ordered the four accused deputies deported at once. A still more serious outbreak took place two months later. On this occasion several Montagnard deputies assisted the mob in its attempt to force the Convention to take action favorable to its demands. As soon as the insurrection was suppressed, the Convention ordered that eleven deputies implicated in the affair be tried before a commission. Two of them escaped, one committed suicide, and six of the others were condemned to death. When the sentence was announced the six attempted to kill themselves with a knife passed from hand to hand. Three were successful, but the other three only wounded themselves and they were guillotined. These men were called the "Last of the Montagnards." Feeling against the Montagnard group became so bitter that even Carnot was in danger of arrest. He was saved by the exclamation of a deputy, "Carnot organized victory!"

It was high time for the Convention to provide France with a constitutional government. At first the deputies hardly dared to discuss any project except some modification of the Constitution of 1793, which had been revered but not introduced. They were emboldened, however, by the insurrections of April and May, 1795. These events prompted them to reduce the political importance of the Paris populace by abandoning universal suffrage. A new project was, accordingly, brought forward, which

fixed the qualifications for suffrage at substantially what they had been in 1791. This gave property owners control in the electoral assemblies, and enabled them to designate the national legislators as well as the principal administrative and judicial officers. The project embodied a system of local government different from that adopted in 1789. Instead of preserving all the communes from the great cities down to the small villages, it created cantonal municipalities of almost uniform size. This seemed to assure a more vigorous municipal life and greater efficiency of administration. According to the proposed constitution resident commissioners were to be appointed by the central government to keep the municipal and departmental administration to the strict enforcement of the laws. The acts of the local administrative bodies could be annulled by the ministry "if contrary to law or the orders of the higher authorities."

CHAP.
XIV
1794-96

By the new constitution the national executive was a directory or board of five members, a Committee of Public Safety reduced in number. The directors could not initiate legislation, nor could they veto bills. Even the treasury was withdrawn from their control and was placed in charge of a special committee. The separation of powers was carried so far as to invite disputes and make *coups d'états* probable.

The legislature was divided into two bodies, a council of 500, which was to initiate bills, and a council of Elders, which was to accept or reject what was submitted to it. The Convention was so haunted by specters of returning royalism, it had so long confused its own supremacy with the safety of the Republic, the habit of power was so ingrained, that it required the electoral assemblies to select two-thirds of the councilors from its membership, and provided that, if the assemblies did not comply, the members who were returned should choose a sufficient number of their former colleagues to bring the total to the required two-thirds. This requirement was embodied in supplementary decrees, which, like the constitution, were submitted to popular vote. In the plebiscite, or "referendum," universal suffrage was permitted. The vast majority of the voters, however, stayed at home. Only 49,978 took the trouble to vote against the constitution, while 1,057,390 voted for it. In the case of the supplementary decrees the opposition was more pronounced, for a third of those who voted — 314,282 — refused to accept them. In Paris they were rejected by a vote of 21,734 to 1,156.

Elections

Paris did not limit its opposition to a hostile vote. On October 5 (13 Vendémiaire) an army of National Guards, chiefly from the conservative sections, marched against the Tuileries,

CHAP.
XIV

1794-96

13th
Vendé-
miaire

where the Convention held its sessions. The Convention, forewarned, was prepared for a struggle. Although it had only a fourth as many soldiers as the hostile sections, its army was better managed. The commander, Barras, had called to his assistance General Napoleon Bonaparte, an artillery officer who had distinguished himself at the siege of Toulon. During the night guns had been brought by Major Murat from an artillery park near the city, and when the conflict began it was quickly decided by cannon.

This ill-starred attempt had two important consequences. It was the beginning of the prodigious fortunes of General Bonaparte, who as a reward was soon made commander of the army of the interior with headquarters at Paris, and who a few months later was entrusted with the more important command of the army of Italy. The immediate consequence of the 13th Vendémiaire was the strengthening of the radicals in the Convention. They used the opportunity to strike another blow at the conservative forces of the country by a decree excluding all returned emigrants and their relatives from any office, legislative, administrative, or judicial. As the lists of emigrants included 120,000 names, a large body of men was shut out from all share in the public life of France.

Another consequence was that the scheme of forcing the election of two-thirds of the members of the Convention upon the voters was not only carried through, but the board of directors was filled with ex-members of the Convention who were also regicides. The electoral assemblies chose only 379 members of the Convention, and these men chose, from supplementary lists, made by the electoral assemblies, enough men to make up the necessary two-thirds. The ex-members of the Convention were stronger in the Council of 500 than in the Council of Elders. The constitution provided that the directors were to be chosen by the Elders from a list of fifty selected by the 500. The Conventionals took advantage of this to present to the Elders a slate composed of five prominent names and forty-five "obscurities." In this way they forced the choice of their candidates. The directors were Barras, a *ci-devant* viscount and ex-Terrorist, and four other regicides of less sinister reputation — Reubell, Sieyès, Letourneur, and La Revellière. Sieyès would not serve, because he felt that such a government would soon become discredited, and Carnot was chosen in his place. Among the members of the councils whose election was not forced were many former members of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies. They were for the most part attached to the Republic but opposed to

The
Directory

the faction which had controlled it since 1793. With them were naturally associated those ex-members of the Convention who had led the reaction against the Montagnards. Several of these had been the free choice of the electors. Indeed, Lanjuinais had been elected in seventy-three departments and Boissy d'Anglas in seventy-two.

No government ever faced gloomier prospects, at least so far as the internal condition of the country was concerned. The minister of finances significantly remarked that the manufacture of assignats could not keep pace with the expenditures. When the directors took possession of the Luxembourg palace, which was to be their official residence, the table upon which they drew up their first record had only three sound legs, and the chairs in which they sat were borrowed from the janitor. Had they not received help from the requisitions laid by successful generals upon conquered territory the administrative machine must have come to a standstill. A forced loan exacted of the "rich" was a dismal failure. The issue of assignats went on until February, 1796, and when this stopped the government made another experiment in paper money, the *mandats territoriaux*, which collapsed in a few weeks.

Nor was the day of political plots and Jacobin specters past. The first year of the Directory witnessed the efforts of "Gracchus" Babeuf to overthrow not only the government but also bourgeois society. Babeuf had begun his career as a petty official. During the Revolution he had made several ventures as a journalist, the last as editor of the *Tribun du Peuple*, a name adapted from that of Marat's famous sheet. Babeuf had also gathered about him a number of sympathetic spirits who called themselves the "Society of the Equals" and who worked out an elaborate scheme of social reorganization upon the basis of common property. According to their ideas the object of society is to defend the equal right of every individual to the enjoyment of all goods. No one is to have a superfluity. All are to work, and are to be divided into classes to which shall be assigned particular kinds of work. Each class is to choose magistrates to see that there is an equal distribution of tasks. Products are to be kept in storehouses and each one is to be supplied as his needs require. All are to eat at a common table. The movement gained a certain moral enthusiasm from the disgust felt by many at the effrontery of the men whom the Revolution had enriched. The inability of the Directory and the councils to relieve the distressing condition of the country gave force to the criticisms which the "Equals" hurled at the existing

CHAP.
XIV

1794-96

The New
Govern-
ment

Babeuf

CHAP.

XIV

1794-96

order. In Sylvain Maréchal the movement found its poet, who apostrophized the councils as mere machines for making decrees, with futile plans of finance, and prophesied that

L'Egalité saura sans vous
Ramener l'abondance.

The followers of Babeuf found allies among the radicals whom the Thermidorian policy had deprived of power and influence. This group included Robert Lindet, an ex-member of the Committee of Public Safety, and several less known ex-members of the Convention. They were ready to join in the overthrow of the government and a return to the policies of 1793, although they did not subscribe to Babeuf's extreme doctrines. Their headquarters were at the Club of the Panthéon, a revived Jacobin Club, which at one time numbered several thousand members. For military assistance they counted upon the Legion of Police, which had been formed by the Convention before the 13th Vendémiaire out of the remnants of the Revolutionary Army of Paris, a choice collection of Jacobin cutthroats. Babeuf and his friends proposed to take possession of the government by means of an insurrection, in which the members of the Directory and the councils should be summarily executed. A new national assembly was then to be formed, chosen by the people "in insurrection, upon nomination by the insurrectionary committee."

The director Barras encouraged the conspirators somewhat, because it was his custom to have a foot in every camp. Carnot, however, who regretted his connection with the Reign of Terror, was determined to put down the "anarchists." Through his influence an order was given to General Bonaparte to close the Club of the Panthéon and a few weeks later the Legion of Police was disbanded. The details of the conspiracy were revealed to Carnot by one of the men who had been admitted to its inner council, and the conspirators were arrested on May 10, 1796, on the eve of the insurrection. Before their trial was begun their partisans attempted to win over a body of troops which was stationed in the suburbs of Paris, and which included a part of the disbanded Legion of Police. The attempt failed and thirty-two of those implicated in it were executed. Babeuf's trial was not concluded until May, 1797, when he and one of his fellow-conspirators were condemned to death. A more appropriate fate would have been confinement in a mad-house, for the society of which he dreamed was dreariness itself and the methods by which he proposed to introduce it were

worthy of Marat or the other authors of the September Massacres.

One of the most difficult situations which confronted the Convention and the Directory was presented by the religious question. The constitutional Church had never recovered from the incidents of November, 1793. In the spring of 1794 few of the priests who remained in the Church received their salaries, and even the pensions promised to those who abdicated their functions ceased to be paid. After the fall of Robespierre the government resumed the payment of pensions, but in September, when the priests demanded their salaries, the Convention voted that the Republic should not pay the expenses of any worship. This decree in effect repudiated the obligation which the Constituent Assembly had solemnly and repeatedly assumed when it took possession of the property of the Church. It was also the beginning of a régime of separation of Church and State, although unaccompanied by any measure which guaranteed either to the constitutional or to the dissident (non-juror) priests real religious freedom. Attacks were made in the departments upon religious worship and the Convention still meditated schemes for the organization of festivals which should make the people forget the splendor of ancient ceremonial. Bishop Grégoire seized the occasion of one of the debates upon the subject to declare that the Republic must be Christian if it would endure. In the following January he reopened the churches in his diocese. His example was imitated elsewhere, until the movement became irresistible. The Convention yielded so far as to proclaim religious liberty once more, although it forbade the establishment of any permanent funds by the communes for the support of religion and threw all sorts of restrictions about acts of worship. The concession, however, was received with enthusiasm all over the country. On the next day mass was said in all the chapels of Paris. It was the same in the departments. As soon as the decree reached Chalons-sur-Marne, for example, "the excitement of trying to procure suitable places for the exercise of worship was universal. Although extremely numerous they could not contain the crowd, especially on Sundays and feast-days; the congregation sat on the staircases, in the court-yards, or even in the streets."³ The advocates of the ancient Church, as well as those anxious for religious peace, now persuaded the Convention to permit the use of church buildings which had not been sold, if in each case the officiating clergy

³ From a contemporary letter cited by Aulard, Tr. III, 261.

CHAP.
XIV

1794-96

would make a declaration of submission to the laws of the Republic. In Paris the result was the restoration of Nôtre Dame and twelve other churches. The changed situation was beneficial to the non-jurors as well as to the constitutional clergy. They were still technically regarded as emigrants, but they returned to France in crowds and began to celebrate the offices of religion openly. Many of the common people resorted to them rather than to the constitutional clergy, who were affected by the charge of schism brought against them by the people. But on the day before its sessions ended the Convention renewed the laws against the non-jurors, and the directors of the new government sought to enforce their provisions. Nevertheless, the return of the French to the religion of their forefathers was unchecked.

Education

One of the last decrees of the Convention provided for the organization of a public school system. The task of carrying the law into effect was left to the directorial administration. The leaders of the Revolution had early appreciated the necessity of establishing schools for the people. In no other way was it possible to assure the realization of that ideal of equality set forth in the Declaration of Rights. There was a more practical reason. By confiscating the property of the Church and destroying corporate privileges of various kinds the Constituent Assembly had disorganized the existing system of education, which was closely dependent upon the Church. Nevertheless this assembly did nothing beyond inserting in the new constitution the principle of free primary instruction. Talleyrand was requested to prepare a report on the subject, but it was not ready until the close of the session. His report contained, however, several of the elements which became distinctive of the French school system. It was the report of Condorcet, the friend of Turgot, a member of the Committee of Public Instruction of the Legislative Assembly, that formed the actual basis of subsequent plans.

In this report, presented on April 20, 1792, Condorcet recommended the establishment of one primary school for every four hundred inhabitants. His plan included under other names the present French superior primary schools, the *lycées*, the local universities, and the Institute, or, as Condorcet described it, a National Society of Arts and Sciences. He wished to secure the independence of the teachers and members of the National Society, and, accordingly, made it a self-perpetuating body, with the right to name the members of the university faculties. Primary school teachers were to be nominated by the faculty

of the local university and chosen by the "fathers of families." Instruction was open to everybody and free at all stages. Condorcet was also a member of the Committee of Public Instruction of the Convention, but in 1793 he was drawn into the quarrel between the Girondins and the Jacobins and perished. The Convention in only one respect went beyond him; it decided that primary instruction should be compulsory as well as free, although it finally abandoned this principle.

The law concerning primary schools, which received its permanent form on October 25, 1795, provided rather vaguely for one or more schools in each canton, a measure far less liberal than that suggested by Condorcet. Attendance was neither compulsory nor gratuitous, although the local authorities were permitted to admit a certain number of "indigent" pupils. The schools for boys and for girls were to be separate. On the same day central schools, that is *lycées*, were established in each department. Only a few of these were successful, which is not surprising, since trained or competent teachers were almost wholly lacking. Private schools, a continuation of the old colleges, were more flourishing. The Convention was not unmindful of the need of normal schools, and one of its greatest creations was the *Ecole Normale* of Paris, which was opened on January 20, 1795.

The Institute dates from the same legislation which established the primary and secondary schools. It was intended to replace the Academies which had been destroyed in 1793. Its three classes: physical and mathematical sciences; moral and political sciences; and literature and the fine arts, contained twenty-four sections. The number of members resident at Paris was 144, including many distinguished men, for example, Laplace, Berthollet, and Chaptal. Lavoisier, a still greater scientist, had not survived the Reign of Terror, for he had been sent to the scaffold together with every other former farmer-general whom the Terrorists could seize. The Convention also reorganized the Library of the King as the National Library, and enriched it with many of the treasures taken from the libraries of the suppressed monasteries.

The task of rebuilding a better France amidst the ruins with which short-sighted leadership, political passion, civil war, and foreign invasion had covered the land was thus begun. Its successful accomplishment was hindered by the adventurous foreign policy which French statesmen and soldiers now adopted.

CHAP.

XIV

1794-96

Law of
1795The In-
stitute

CHAPTER XV

IMPERIALISM AND BANKRUPTCY

CHAP.
XV

1795-97

IN 1792 the French had learned to regard the Alps and the Rhine as the limits set by nature to the Republic. The theory seemed plausible as long as Dumouriez occupied the Netherlands and Custine held Mainz. But by the summer of 1793 the situation was very different. The Allies were everywhere successful and the problem was to save France from dismemberment. Nevertheless the doctrine of the natural boundaries was not abandoned by French statesmen. When the armies once more advanced beyond the ancient borders, public opinion, although eager for peace, expected that its terms would extend France to the Rhine as well as to the Alps. And it was not unlikely that a new series of victories would tempt French statesmen to adopt policies still more venturesome.

The second conquest of the Austrian Netherlands had begun with the battle of Fleurus on June 25, 1794. The advance of the French to the Rhine was rendered easy by the dissensions of the Allies, and especially by the fears of the Prussians that they might be deprived of their share in the final partition of Poland. By the end of October the only positions held by the Allies were Luxembourg, Mainz, and the *tête du pont* of Mannheim. The people of the Netherlands and of the districts on the left bank of the Rhine had no cause to rejoice at the return of the Republican armies. The Allies had plundered them, but their deliverers were greater masters of the art of pillage, all the while professing the policy of peace to cottages and war to châteaux. The government agents extorted sixty million livres from the Belgians and twenty-five million from the region between the Meuse and the Rhine. The plan was to levy on the rich, upon those who fled at the approach of the French, and upon church treasuries, but such burdens have a way of distributing themselves, and the agents were not always nice in their discrimination. Besides money, pictures were taken, and galleries were robbed to enrich the museums of Paris. The despair of these peoples boded ill for the French in case they were again forced to retreat.

But the French did not retreat. When winter came, they

invaded the United Netherlands (or United Provinces), which an unusually cold season made easy of approach. They were urged forward by the Dutch "patriots," the victims of Prussian intervention in 1787, more than two thousand of whom had been forced to take refuge in France. Those who had remained in the country eagerly awaited the coming of the French. A committee was formed in Amsterdam to prepare for the organization of a provisional government. Both this committee and the States General, the government which it sought to overthrow, assembled at The Hague and sent agents to Paris to negotiate with the Committee of Public Safety. The Prince of Orange, the stadtholder, concluded that resistance was useless, and believing that the French would not agree to a treaty as long as he was in Holland, withdrew with his family to England. The old States General dissolved itself, making way for a body named chiefly by the committee of patriots at Amsterdam. This party was now anxious to come to terms with the French, who had been received as friends by the radicals everywhere. The surrender of Zeeland had been accepted under guarantee of independence and protection of property. What alarmed the patriots was not the conduct of the French soldiers, which was admirable, but the attitude of the Convention, which meant to draw heavy indemnities from the Dutch and to annex the lands south of the mouth of the Rhine. From February until May the negotiations dragged on. The Dutch reminded the French of their often proclaimed principles, while the French retorted that their interests were their real principles. Finally two members of the Committee of Public Safety, Reubell and Sieyès, were sent to The Hague, and under threats of using force compelled the Dutch to yield. By a treaty signed on May 16 Dutch Flanders, Venloo, and Maestricht were ceded to France, and Flushing, an important commercial port, was to receive a French garrison. The Dutch also promised to pay an indemnity of one hundred million florins, and maintain a French army of 25,000 men during the war with England. An interesting commentary on the latter provision is the fact that in the following September the Dutch were actually paying 36,000 French soldiers, although only 7,000 were within the frontiers of the Netherlands. Moreover, the French frequently changed the troops quartered in the Netherlands, sending ragged and poorly fed soldiers to take the place of soldiers whom the Dutch had supplied with clothing and food. The Dutch were also compelled to permit the free circulation of assignats. The most serious consequence was that the alliance being offensive as well as defensive the Dutch

CHAP.
XV

1795-97

The
United
Nether-
landsThe
Treaty of
Peace

republic would be dragged into every war in which France might become involved. Its disadvantages were not left to future demonstration, for within a year nearly every Dutch colony in the West or East Indies passed into British control. Soon after he arrived in England the Prince of Orange sent orders to the Dutch colonial governors to admit British ships and troops as those of allies. In only one or two colonies was there serious resistance. Among the colonies occupied were Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope.

In 1795 peace was also made with Prussia. Negotiations had been opened before the invasion of Holland, but the interests of Prussia and France clashed at too many points to render a settlement easy. The French demanded that Prussia cede her territories on the left bank of the Rhine, while the Prussians were anxious to establish a demarcation line beyond which French armies should not penetrate. Delay was disadvantageous to both: to Prussia because her forces were needed to prevent the Austrians from gaining an advantage in the final partition of Poland, to France because the distress of the people was so great that peace was absolutely essential.

Austria and Russia agreed secretly in January to a plan for the partition of Poland, and concluded an alliance to forestall too forcible a protest by the Prussians against the size and location of their share. At the same time Russia agreed that Austria should be permitted to compensate herself for her lack of a share in the partition of 1793 by seizing a part of Venetia, and to make up for the probable loss of the Netherlands elsewhere, presumably in Bavaria. The terms of the agreement were not communicated to Prussia for several months, but the Prussians were aware of their danger and hastened to conclude a treaty with the French.

The treaty was signed on April 5 at Basel. It permitted French troops to occupy the Prussian possessions west of the Rhine until peace should be made between France and the empire. A secret article provided that in case these territories were finally ceded to France, Prussia should receive suitable indemnities in Germany. A year later in a secret convention it was stipulated that part of the indemnity should be found in the domains of the Bishop of Münster. Prussia thus accepted the French policy of secularizing ecclesiastical principalities and restricting the spiritual princes to their purely ecclesiastical duties. By another provision of the treaty a line of demarcation was drawn beyond which the French armies should not advance. Most of the States north of the Rhine and the

Main were thus neutralized. Prussia in appearance became the defender of the empire, although by her secret agreements she was pledged to assist in dismembering it.

CHAP.
XV
1795-97

There was, perhaps, little that was heroic in the attitude of Prussia in 1795 and 1796. But none of the other members of the coalition formed against France was moved by loftier purposes. None was engaged whole-heartedly in the task of defending the liberties of Europe against French aggressions. Even if the treaty signed at Basel has nothing to commend it from a political point of view, it was not without some consequences useful to northern Germany. The peace lasted eleven years, and those years formed the most brilliant period of German literature. They were the years when Goethe and Schiller reached the fullest development of their powers, and when Fichte and Schleiermacher were beginning to exert a wide influence. This intellectual movement was in no sense due to the peace, and yet it might have been seriously hindered by the disturbing incidents which a continuation of the war would have made probable.

The treaty with Prussia was soon followed by peace with Spain, which gave to France the Spanish part of Santo Domingo. Only two formidable enemies remained — Austria and England. The Convention did not wait for further victories over the Austrians to make certain the retention of the Austrian Netherlands, but by a decree in one of its last sessions recognized the annexations made in the spring of 1793, and organized this territory, together with the bishopric of Liège, into departments. The new frontier was regarded as "constitutional," to be defended by the French armies as zealously as any other part of France.

Peace
with
Spain

In England the desire for peace became so strong as to overcome the unwillingness of the ministry to negotiate with the "regicide" republic. The partial failure of the wheat crop in two successive years threatened the country with famine. The government occasionally resorted to the extreme measure of stopping neutral vessels loaded with grain bound for France and compelling them to sell their cargoes in English harbors. The distress of the common people was almost as great as in France. In London immense meetings were held denouncing the war policy. On October 29, 1795, when the King was on his way to open parliament his carriage was mobbed and he was menaced with cries of "Peace, Peace; Bread, Bread; No Pitt; No Famine." Agitators demanded universal suffrage and annual parliaments. The ministry took advantage of the incidents to pass two bills, one making treasonable words which

Condition
of Eng-
land

CHAP.
XV

1795-97

threw contempt on the "established government and constitution of the realm," and another punishing as seditious all persons who attended unauthorized meetings of more than fifty.

The attempt of the British ministry to negotiate for peace was doomed to failure, because the French would not consider the abandonment of any of their conquests, although they demanded the return of their colonies seized during the war. This uncompromising attitude rendered the war less unpopular in England. In the fall of 1796 the situation of England became more difficult, for the Spaniards became active allies of the French, and the English sea power seemed endangered by the combined battle fleets of France, Spain, and Holland. One consequence was that the English fleet was withdrawn from the Mediterranean for eighteen months.

War with
Austria

The French hoped to bring Austria to terms by a simultaneous attack in southern Germany and in Italy. The principal campaign they expected to make in Germany, where they placed two large armies: one under Jourdan to advance on the line of the Main, the other under Moreau to proceed down the Danube. This suited the plans of Austria, for England, whose subsidies the Austrians needed, was unwilling to aid them in rounding out their Lombard territory by the acquisition of Venetia and the Papal Legations. In Germany, therefore, the Austrians organized a large army under the Archduke Charles. The campaign ended disastrously for the French, partly because of the strategy of Carnot, who was one of the directors, and who thought that if Jourdan and Moreau operated on the right and left of the Austrians they would outflank the Archduke's army, defeat its wings, and then crush its center. For a time their plan seemed on the point of triumph. The French armies invaded southern Germany in what seemed overwhelming force, and the South German circles, with Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg, in alarm, negotiated for peace, offering to pay heavy indemnities. Baden and Württemberg abandoned their territories west of the Rhine, and agreed to accept compensation at the expense of the ecclesiastical States. Fortunately for Bavaria, the tide turned before her treaty was approved by the Elector. The Archduke Charles, leaving a screen of troops before Moreau, marched off and crushed Jourdan's army, sending it fleeing in disorder towards the Rhine. Only the skill of Moreau, and the failure of subordinate Austrian officers to carry out the spirit of the Archduke's plan, saved the second French army from like defeat. By the close of October, French prospects in Germany were worse than they had been a year earlier, but

the government could console itself with the unexpected triumphs of French arms in Italy.

The command of the Army of Italy was given to General Bonaparte, who had won the favor of the government by his defense of the Convention, and whose plans for a campaign in Italy were approved by Carnot. The forces with which the French had to contend belonged to the King of Sardinia, the ruler of Piedmont, and to the Austrians, who controlled Lombardy and Mantua. The ancient republics of Genoa and of Venice were neutral. Tuscany had made peace with France. The Pope was hostile but inactive, and Naples would be unable to furnish many troops. The directors hoped to compel the Piedmontese to withdraw from the coalition and to drive the Austrians out of Lombardy. If the campaign should be successful, they believed that Austria would be willing to purchase the recovery of Lombardy by the renunciation of the Netherlands.

The prospect of victory did not appear brilliant. The army of Italy had for two years been fighting over this ground without making much progress. The soldiers were unpaid and destitute, and thousands were barefooted, many without guns. Their food supply was uncertain, because the roads to central France were in bad condition, and most of their grain was drawn from Tuscany and the Barbary States by means of the coasting trade along the Riviera. As the English still had a fleet in the Mediterranean this trade might be interrupted. But many of the disadvantages under which the French labored at first would disappear, if once they succeeded in breaking through the wall of the Apennines into the rich plains of Piedmont or of Lombardy.

The French had advantages as well as disadvantages. Their army was a better instrument of warfare than that of their opponents. In the course of the Revolutionary wars, partly by necessity, because the number of soldiers was becoming very large, partly under the influence of military theorists, their leaders had gradually reorganized the armies and had begun to develop a new art of fighting. A system of divisions had been introduced, each of which was a miniature army, with infantry, artillery, and cavalry, commanded by a general responsible for the details of its management. This gave greater mobility and enabled the commander-in-chief to issue brief orders. Hours so vital in a campaign were thus economized. The somewhat tumultuous methods of fighting, first illustrated in the campaign of 1792, were becoming the usual practice. Instead of drawing

CHAP.
XV

1795-97

Bonaparte
in Italy

The
French
Army

CHAP.

XV

1795-97

up an army in the ancient stiff line of battle still used by the Austrians and Prussians, the French sent forward clouds of skirmishers, under the screen of which columns could advance and strike the enemy's line with the force of a battering ram. As the French did not depend upon long supply trains for food, but spread out in foraging parties, their armies moved forward with unheard of rapidity. In the course of the Italian campaign a division fought a battle on one day, marched during the night sixteen miles to take part in another battle, and the day following that marched twenty-five miles. The most signal advantage of the French was that their new commander proved to be one of the great masters of warfare, capable of perfecting the methods devised by the Revolutionary generals. He was twenty-six years old, a man of extraordinary energy and endurance.

The campaign opened on April 12, 1796, and closed triumphantly a year later with the signature of the Preliminaries of Leoben, when the French army was within sixty miles of Vienna. Its eventual aims far exceeded the original intentions of the directors, diplomacy as well as war having slipped from their hands into the grasp of the young general. Their inability to control the situation was evident as soon as Bonaparte won the first series of startling victories.

At the beginning of the campaign the French army was guarding the roads leading from the Riviera into the valleys of the Apennines. Savona was its base of operations. The Austrians, supposing that Bonaparte planned to seize Genoa, made the mistake of putting the crests of the mountains between two sections of their army. He immediately threw superior forces against the troops they had left in the mountains above Savona and seized the junction of the roads by which alone they could communicate with their allies, the Piedmontese, or Sardinians. He then drove the Austrians down the valley of the Bormida towards Alessandria. Meanwhile he had struck savage blows at the Sardinian army, against which he was now able to concentrate the bulk of his troops. He had sent his divisions from one field of operations to the other with such rapidity that it has been compared to the throwing of a shuttle. The Sardinian army could not withstand his assaults. They were driven back towards Turin and compelled at Cherasco on April 28 to sign an armistice.

Within two weeks more Bonaparte manœuvred the Austrians out of Lombardy, defeating their rear guard in a spectacular fight at Lodi. Before they heard of this success the directors proposed to divide the army, leaving part of it under Kellerman

to hold Lombardy, and sending the rest under Bonaparte on a great raid toward Rome, to seize British merchandise at Leghorn, in the neutral State of Tuscany, and to collect the spoils of the papal State for the support of the bankrupt government in France. Bonaparte replied with dignity that success could not be expected of him if he were constantly interfered with, or the command divided, and he offered to resign. But he was already indispensable; his victories were needed for the prestige of the Directory, and a golden stream of war contributions, beginning to flow towards Paris, was replenishing the empty coffers of the administration. From this time forward, whenever the government made a serious attempt to recover control, he met them with new bulletins of victory and new statements of accomplished facts.

As soon as Bonaparte heard that the directors had consented to transform the armistice of Cherasco into a definitive treaty of peace with the King of Sardinia, he attacked the Austrians again and drove their main army into Tyrol. A large body of troops took refuge in the fortress of Mantua, to which he laid siege. He also crossed the Po into the papal legations and compelled the Pope to sign an armistice. The Austrians did not resign themselves to the loss of Lombardy without three more great efforts; the first toward the end of July, when Marshal Würmser led an army from the valleys of Tyrol. In order to envelop the French and prevent their escape, he divided his army into two parts, sending one to the east, the other to the west of the lake of Garda. The consequence was that by rapid concentration, now on the left and now on the right, Bonaparte crushed both parts separately. A second Austrian advance was made in November, during which the French army was in grave peril near Arcola, but was eventually victorious. A final effort was made in January and ended at Rivoli with another French victory. The Austrians intended to make one more attempt, under the Archduke Charles, but before his army could be concentrated it was attacked by the French and forced back toward Vienna, until the Austrian government was ready to sign the Preliminaries of Leoben.

During the latter part of the Italian campaign the French position in Italy was more secure because of the withdrawal of the British fleet from the Mediterranean. At the same time the death of Catherine II and the accession of the Emperor Paul deprived the Austrians of any hope that Russian troops would be despatched to support them in Italy. But after Jourdan and Moreau were obliged to recross the Rhine, Bonaparte suffered

CHAP.
XV

1795-97

End of
the Cam-
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CHAP.
XV

1795-97


War Con-
tributions

from the danger that the Austrian armies might be heavily reinforced by soldiers drawn from Germany.


In their original instructions to Bonaparte the directors ordered him to levy heavy contributions upon the districts which he occupied. Not only must war pay for war, but half of the indemnities exacted must go toward the maintenance of the government at home. The directors also wrote Bonaparte that Italy owed much of its glory to the fine arts, that this glory should now pass to France, and that the "National Museum should receive the most celebrated monuments of all the arts." At Rome especially they wished him to take statues, pictures, medals, libraries. Commissioners were sent to Italy to select the finest masterpieces. The young general did not find such a program of robbery revolting, and carried it out with merciless severity. The Milanese hailed him as a savior from Austrian tyranny, but soon were chilled by the news that he not only levied millions as the price of their deliverance, but shipped their finest pictures to Paris and seized even the property of the poor in the public pawnshops. The Dukes of Parma and Modena must pay other millions and more paintings for immunity. Leghorn was raided and English merchandise and shipping seized, in spite of Tuscan neutrality. The Pope agreed to pay millions in money and supplies, and promised 500 precious manuscripts, 100 pictures, and especially a bronze bust of Junius Brutus and a marble bust of Marcus Brutus, precursors of the French heroes of liberty and virtue. The French commissioner, Saliceti, reported that by the end of July, 1796, 61 million francs had been levied. This amount did not include what French generals had collected for themselves, nor the plunder carried away by the army furnishers. The soldiers were able to send home a little gold to cheer faces saddened by the sight of worthless assignats. The generals, remembering that victory is a fickle goddess, caused much gold to pass into safe hands in neutral Switzerland. This was part of the price the Italians paid for freedom from Austrian domination and for an opportunity to reconstruct their institutions on a better model.

General Bonaparte's victories in Italy might have resulted simply in forcing the Austrians to make peace with France on the basis of the "natural" limits. This would have satisfied the Directory and French public opinion. But Bonaparte meant to go further, duplicating on a larger scene the action of the French agents in the United Netherlands; he meant to try his hand at the building of states. If the consequence was to substitute an imperialistic for a national policy, this pleased his

Problem
of Peace



NORTHERN ITALY
AT THE PERIOD OF
NAPOLEON'S FIRST CAMPAIGNS



CORSICA



imagination, ready to manœuvre boundary lines, states, and peoples on the map of Europe as battalions on the battle-field, and not too deeply troubled by the risks of such operations. His policy was made apparent by the terms of the Preliminaries of Leoben, which he negotiated while the diplomatic agent of the Directory was absent. In effect he gave the Austrians their choice between the terms of the Directory and his own terms. The directors wished to obtain for France a guarantee of the "natural" limits, regarding the recognition of the independence of Lombardy as desirable, but secondary. He offered as an alternative scheme a guarantee of the "constitutional" limits, that is, the cession to France of the Austrian Netherlands, and the recognition of Lombard independence. If the Austrians accepted his scheme, he promised them indemnities about six times as large as in the other case. Both he and the directors were agreed that the indemnities for Austria should be found in Venetian territory, although the directors would have restored Lombardy rather than fail to gain the "natural" limits. The Austrians accepted his terms, receiving in secret articles the promise of the Terra Firma of Venice between the Oglio, the Po, and the Adriatic, together with Istria and Dalmatia. They regarded the settlement as "miraculous," while he tried to make it palatable to the Directory by showing them that at the final peace the "natural" limits could be gained by offering the Austrians still more Venetian territory.

The movement for Italian reorganization and unity had its beginnings in June, 1796, when Bonaparte entered the papal legations. He had given vague encouragement to the people of Milan, but could not disregard the express instructions of the directors, who wished to use Lombardy, if necessary, to obtain a cession of the Netherlands and a recognition of the left bank of the Rhine as the boundary of France. When Bonaparte entered Bologna, he told the local senate that he had no aim save to restore their ancient liberties. In the latter part of August an uprising in Reggio spread through the Duchy of Modena, and he covered it with his protection. The duke was obliged to yield and early in October the republic of Modena and Reggio was organized. The senate of Bologna was at this time engaged in drawing up a constitution modeled on that of France. Later in October delegates of Reggio, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara met at Bologna and established a federation. There, as has been remarked, the "idea of Italian unity and independence first awoke the enthusiasm of any considerable body of men." The sequel was a congress held in December, which founded the

Begin-
nings of
a New
Italy

CHAP.
XV

1795-97

Cisalpine
Republic

Cispadane Republic, with a constitution similar to that of Bologna.

The Lombards were restive under the restrictions which the necessities of diplomacy put upon their aspirations. In March, 1797, Lombard agitators, with French help, stirred up tumults in the neighboring Venetian territory, and the citadels of Bergamo and Brescia were seized by the inhabitants. The hapless Venetian senate could only send a protest to Bonaparte. After the Preliminaries of Leoben made it clear that peace with Austria would be made at the expense of Venice rather than of the Lombards, Bonaparte set committees at work drafting a constitution for Lombardy, modeled on that of France. As he made the constitution, he did not hesitate to start the machinery by appointing the officials as well as the legislators; fearful, moreover, to expose his work at the outset to the risks of factional conflict, he ventured even to modify the principles of Lombard law before the new legislature came into existence. The new republic was named "Cisalpine," and at its formal inauguration, on July 9, delegates appeared from the Cispadane Republic pleading for a greater federation. Bonaparte consented, and he eventually added the Valtelline and the western part of the Terra Firma of Venice, so that it extended from the Alps beyond Lake Como to the Adriatic at Rimini.

General Bonaparte had already, a month before, accomplished another revolution in Italy, transforming the ancient republic of Genoa into the Ligurian Republic, with a more liberal constitution. The occasion was a tumult, fomented by French agents and Genoese agitators. The conspirators had become the victims, because the Genoese government brought into the city mountaineers, who speedily cleared the streets of the revolutionaries. Bonaparte was angry that the agitators had acted prematurely, and, especially, that they were unsuccessful; but he consoled himself that he now had an excuse for intervention. With threats of dire vengeance he forced the doge and the senate to abdicate, and established a government on the usual French model, but mitigated the injustices which had often characterized the introduction of this system. Nothing should be done contrary to the Catholic religion, and provision was made for the nobles who had been impoverished. But the new dictator would brook no delays, giving the constitutional commission only a month to complete its work. No citizen called upon to serve in the provisional government could decline on pain of a fine of 2,000 crowns. Under guise of protecting the republic a French garrison was maintained in the city at its expense.

Ligurian
Republic

A harder fate was in store for Genoa's ancient rival. During the war both armies had violated Venetian neutrality constantly, and a large part of the campaign was fought within the Terra Firma. While Bonaparte was offering at Leoben to treat Venice as Poland had been treated, a terrible rising at Verona furnished him with an excuse for acting more in accord with traditional practice. This uprising of an exasperated populace was known as the "Veronese Passover," and it began on April 17. Before it was over many Frenchmen were killed, even soldiers in the hospitals. As soon as Bonaparte heard of the massacre, he ordered the Venetians to be treated as enemies, scorning the offers of the senate for reparation. He wrote to the Directory, "The Venetian States are now at our disposal." As a last resource the ancient government abdicated and a democratic republic was formed. With this republic Bonaparte in May signed a treaty, which permitted the French troops to enter the city, ostensibly to restore order, but under promise of withdrawing when their presence was no longer required. Secret articles gave him sixteen millions in indemnities, besides five war vessels fully equipped. He did not forget to stipulate in addition twenty paintings and 500 manuscripts. In a letter to the directors he explained that the treaty provided a simple way of effecting an entrance into the city and offered conveniences for carrying out the proposed agreements with Austria without too much scandal. While he assured the Venetian republicans of his intention to consolidate their liberties, he suggested to the Austrian diplomatic agent that the Austrians might obtain the city of Venice, as well as the territories promised at Leoben, if they would accept the Adige as their western boundary in Italy and would assist France in gaining the left bank of the Rhine. In this case, as he wrote to the directors, he planned to remove from Venice all the ships, the cannon, the contents of the arsenal, and the funds of the bank, leaving the Austrians the empty shell. His sentiments toward Venice later were more favorable, but he did not mean to sacrifice new French armies that she might remain an independent republic.

The original armistice with the Pope was broken off in the summer of 1796 when Bonaparte was obliged to face Würmser's advance, but the victory of Rivoli made submission inevitable, and a treaty was signed at Tolentino, on February 19, 1797. The Pope was obliged to renounce not only Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, but the legations of Bologna and Ferrara. It was expressly stipulated, however, that in the legations no attack should be made upon the Catholic religion. Ancona was

CHAP.

XV

1795-97

Fall of
Venice

CHAP.
XV

1795-97

Peace
with the
Pope

to remain in French hands until the general peace, increasing the influence of the French in the settlement of questions touching the Turkish empire, and giving them control of the Adriatic. The directors hoped that Bonaparte would seize the opportunity to disorganize the Roman Church, or, as they termed the operation, "extinguish the torch of fanaticism" in Italy. He consoled them with the assurance that the antiquated machine would soon fall in pieces. In this case again he met their plans with accomplished facts.

Political
Crisis

While the victorious general was playing the proconsul in Italy, a political storm broke in Paris which threatened the results of his work; and not of his alone, but of other generals who had extended the frontier of French rule. Many conservative Frenchmen were more impressed by the wretchedness of the people and the bankruptcy of the government than by the glories of the Italian campaign. Only army contractors and speculators seemed prospering. The policy of conquest and expansion appeared to make the war interminable. Other men detested the politicians whom the Convention had forced into the councils and the board of directors. They longed to see the end of exceptional legislation and to live under a genuine constitutional government. Still others demanded that religious liberty exist in reality as in name. Such sentiments were controlling factors in the elections of 1797, by which one-third of the members of the councils were renewed. Out of 216 ex-members of the Convention whose term now closed, scarcely a dozen were reelected. Barthélemy, the new director, belonged to the same group as the new councilors. Even Carnot, weary of violence, was inclined to oppose exceptional measures. Newspaper opinion was overwhelmingly against the radical majority of the directors.

As soon as the new councilors took their places they attacked the laws which excluded relatives of emigrants from office and which condemned to banishment priests who refused the required oaths and declarations. One by one such partisan laws were repealed. The National Guard was reorganized, excluding those who paid no taxes. Political excitement became acute, and bitter party epithets—"royalists," "Vendéan," "Chouan," "anarchist"—were hurled back and forth in debate and in the press. Many seriously believed that a Bourbon restoration was at hand, and royalist conspirators hurried to Paris to fish in troubled waters. Purchasers of public lands, once property of the Church or of the emigrant nobles, were afraid of being despoiled. Generals in the field were alarmed and angry.

Hoche in the north and Bonaparte in Italy provoked from their soldiers declarations threatening the royalists and the "friends of England." The majority of the directors, led by Barras, determined to purge the councils and to arrest their colleagues Carnot and Barthélemy. For this work they needed as commander of the troops in Paris a general who could be depended upon. After an abortive attempt to use Hoche, they turned to Bonaparte, who, unwilling to compromise himself personally in the affair, sent General Augereau, a noisy Jacobin.

On September 4, 1797 (18 Fructidor), the expected coup d'état was accomplished. The city gates were closed and the editors and proprietors of opposition newspapers, hostile councilors, and the director Barthélemy, were arrested. Carnot succeeded in escaping. The councils, purged of the opposition, condemned to deportation fifty-three deputies and the editors or proprietors of forty-two journals. The elections in forty-nine departments were annulled, depriving of their seats nearly all deputies recently chosen, including those of Paris and of neighboring departments. The press was subjected to police control, and the laws against the emigrants and the dissident priests were renewed. The consequence was a little reign of terror, a dictatorship of the faction of the ex-Conventionals. Hoche thought the republic was saved, and Bonaparte was glad that the press was silenced and that the legislature was taught to eschew ambition.

Three weeks after the coup d'état the directorial government confessed itself to be bankrupt by paying two-thirds of the public debt in *bons*, which at first could be used in payment for public lands, although at a later time only for buildings upon those lands. The *bons* at once fell to thirty per cent., and before long to three. As they were called in four years later and credited on the public debt at about one-twentieth of their nominal value, the repudiation amounted to sixty-three per cent. of the debt, representing a capital of 1,522,000,000 francs. In February, 1797, the assignats and mandats, a mass of paper money worth nominally forty billions, had been repudiated. This, like the repudiation of the debt, was scarcely more than the recognition of a situation with which public opinion had long been familiar. For some time business had been conducted on the basis of gold and silver. That part of the debt which was not repudiated was called the "Consolidated Third." It was worth very little because the government could not pay the interest.

It was the triumph of the directorial party, rather than the

CHAP.
XV
1795-97

18th
Fructidor

Bank-
ruptcy

CHAP.
XV

1795-97

Treaty
of
Campo
Formio

national bankruptcy, which had its echoes in the negotiations for peace with Austria. Bonaparte's imperialistic policy was not now likely to be interfered with. In order to make the Preliminaries of Leoben palatable to the government he had promised to obtain from Austria concessions in regard to the left bank of the Rhine, which he expected to purchase at the expense of Venice. He also desired to increase the territory of the Cisalpine Republic and to add the Ionian Islands to the French share of the booty. Had the moderates in the councils retained their influence, these advantages would have been sacrificed and France would have contented herself with the "natural" limits, or, it may be, even less. The spirit of compromise disappeared with them, as is indicated by the fact that fresh negotiations with England were broken off summarily. The directors showed a determination to concede so little to Austria that a prolongation of war was probable; but Bonaparte refused to risk his laurels in a new campaign, and completed the negotiations for peace without much attention to their wishes. By the terms of the treaty, dated at Campo Formio, October 17, 1797, Austria was to receive the city of Venice, consenting that the western boundary of its lands in the Terra Firma be the Adige, rather than the Oglio. Istria and Dalmatia, promised at Leoben, were also to be hers. The western part of the Terra Firma was to go to the Cisalpine, and, to facilitate the union of the Cispadane with the Cisalpine, the Duke of Modena was transferred to the Austrian Breisgau. The possession of the Ionian Islands was conceded to France. Austria renounced the Netherlands, and promised to use her good offices with the empire in order that at a congress called to meet at Rastadt France should receive the Rhine frontier from Basel to the Nette above Andernach. Princes holding territory on the left bank should receive compensation on the right bank; doubtless at the expense of the ecclesiastical principalities, for it was expressly agreed that Austria should have the archbishopric of Salzburg, and further that the other indemnities should be selected in "common accord with the French Republic," which since 1792 had been dangling this particular bait before the German princes. Prussia, however, should receive no indemnities, Bonaparte subscribing to the proposition that France would restore to the King his territory on the left bank of the Rhine. In France indignation at the treatment of Venice was lost in joy at the return of peace on the Continent. The only enemy remaining was "Perfidious Albion," and the victorious general was appointed commander

of the "Army of England" to cross the Channel and dictate terms of peace in London.

The chances of a successful attack upon Great Britain were not so good as they seemed a year earlier. In the fall of 1796 an expedition had been fitted out which was to convey an army under Hoche to Ireland. Hoche had the promise of the co-operation of a strong Irish revolutionary party. The expedition was, however, badly managed, and did not secure a foothold on the Irish coast. The alarm in England hastened a financial crisis, for the timid withdrew their deposits in the banks. The demands for coin made at the country banks compelled them to draw their balances from the Bank of England, which was already seriously embarrassed through the withdrawal of specie to pay loans or subsidies to Austria. The government owed the bank more than seven million pounds sterling. On February 25, 1797, only £1,272,000 remained in the vaults, and it was expected that this would be drawn out on the next banking day. The government immediately suspended payments in coin, and shortly afterwards parliament passed a bill prohibiting such payments in amounts above one pound. So strong was the financial system, nevertheless, that the notes of the bank stood at par for several years longer. But the government was obliged to pay higher rates for loans. The national debt was already over four hundred million pounds sterling.

A serious mutiny in the navy enhanced the crisis. The complaints of the sailors were far from being without reason. The special grievance was the refusal of the government to raise the traditional rate of pay, although prices were at famine height. General conditions in the navy were oppressive to the men. A mixture of wise concessions and timely firmness restored order. There was small encouragement for France in these troubles, for both her allies were defeated that very year by English fleets. The first battle was fought on February 14 between the English and the Spaniards off Cape St. Vincent. The victory was due to the energy of Sir John Jervis and the dashing courage of Nelson, his second in command. In October followed a victory over the Dutch at Camperdown. Thus vanished the danger that the sea power should slip from the grasp of the British. The "Army of England" would be obliged to find some other occupation than a descent upon the coast of England.

CHAP.
XV

1795-97

Crisis in
England

CHAPTER XVI

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS A GREAT POWER

CHAP.
XVI

1797-1802

Forward
Policy of
France

THE Peace of Campo Formio marks only a pause in the conflict between France and Europe. This conflict was due quite as much to the spirit of domination which interpreted the rights of neighboring States in terms of French interests as to a persistence of the antagonism between the principles of the Revolution and the antiquated régime which prevailed beyond the French borders. The French seemed to possess no statesman capable of showing them with authoritative clearness the limits beyond which revolutionary zeal and a passion for aggrandizement would not carry them safely. The Directory could have contrived no measures more certain to render French influence odious than those which they now undertook to enforce. For these General Bonaparte was also, in a measure, responsible. The problems of the government were undoubtedly perplexing. For one thing, it was impossible to pay the ordinary expenses out of the receipts from taxation. General Bonaparte had been indispensable, not only because he gained prestige for France, but because he furnished money for the administration. The cessation of conquest checked the refreshing stream of indemnities, and the annual deficits ran up to 300 millions. It was difficult to reduce the army to a peace basis, because the soldiers could not be sent home unpaid. A part might be supported at the expense of vassal republics, and the rest from the profits of new conquests. The most serious difficulty arose from the triumph of Bonaparte's Italian policy, which had engaged the government in a situation likely to cause further conflicts. To recede meant loss of prestige, while to go forward would furnish excuses for another coalition.

Congress
of
Rastadt

The Congress of Rastadt was opened in December, 1797. A deputation appointed by the Diet represented the Empire. The Emperor had promised to use his influence to procure for France the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, but he pursued a policy of delay, apparently hoping that the French would increase the bid made at Campo Formio by abandoning to him the legations, now a part of the Cisalpine Republic. But as his troops evacuated Mainz, which was equivalent to its surrender to the

French, the German princes realized that his public insistence on the integrity of the empire was a mere formality. Prussian support could not be expected and no resource was left except to make the best possible terms with the French, who renewed the proposal that the dispossessed princes should find indemnification in the ecclesiastical States. The lesser princes were generally ready to accept this solution, especially after fear of complete secularization was removed by the assurances of the French diplomats. The deputation then agreed to the cession of the left bank on the understanding that the French troops should be withdrawn from the right bank. This decision, although communicated to the French, was not confirmed by the Emperor, who soon opened negotiations with Russia for a new coalition against France.

The directors did not wait long before they showed the sense in which they interpreted the independence of the republics created in the Low Countries and in Italy. The directors of the Cisalpine Republic were summoned to Paris and forced to sign a treaty agreeing to support a French army of occupation of 25,000 men and to keep on foot an Italian army of 22,000. The treaty was unacceptable to the senior Cisalpine council, and could not be confirmed until, by a new application of the method of Fructidor, two of the directors and four of the senior councilors were excluded from office. Three times within six months the personnel of the councils was changed by military force:—in August, 1798, in the interest of the moderate party; in October, to restore the radicals; and in January, 1799, to undo the work of October. The policy of the French did not possess even the qualified advantage of continuity. All that seemed certain was the continuance of military requisitions. The "intellectuals" throughout Italy were convinced that if the Revolution was to benefit Italians, rather than Frenchmen, they must substitute for the existing governments, weakened by local and dynastic aims, a great republic, strong enough to drive French as well as Austrians from the peninsula. Agents of this party attempted to start a revolution in Piedmont, where French agitators were already at work. The result was a condition of anarchy which rendered the King of Sardinia powerless and gave the French government an excuse for intervention late in 1798. The King abdicated and retired to the island of Sardinia. Within the next three months the French levied over ten million francs in Piedmont. They intended to prepare the country for annexation, but instead prepared it for revolt.

The plight of the Dutch was still worse than that of the north-

CHAP.
XVI

1797-1802

The
Nether-
lands

ern Italians. As the National Assembly which had been chosen to draft a constitution was moderatist in sympathy, the radicals resolved to "Fructidorize" it. They borrowed a French general (Joubert) to play the part of Augereau, and in January, 1798, arrested a sufficient number of their opponents to obtain control. They then drew up a constitution which transformed the United Netherlands into the Batavian Republic "one and indivisible," abolishing the old provinces and dividing the country like France into departments. They also proclaimed separation of Church and State. A new treaty was made with France, promising in addition to the support of 25,000 French soldiers a subsidy of 1,200,000 guilders. The high-handed way in which the victorious faction proceeded led to a split in its own ranks, and as the government at Paris now inclined toward the moderates a new coup d'état in June drove the victors of January out of the administration. Meanwhile the country was beginning to feel the effects of the French alliance. In one year the number of vessels entering Dutch ports declined from 4,300 to 1,600. The trade with Russia, which had required 430 ships, was carried on in sixteen. The East India Company, with a glorious history of two centuries, fell into ruin and was abolished. The financial position of the Bank of Amsterdam was compromised. The poverty in that city increased so rapidly that more than a third of the population had to be given relief in the winter of 1798-1799. Dutch agriculture, however, was in a prosperous condition during this period.

The
Roman
Republic

Meanwhile the Directory was engaged in creating other republics of the same kind, plundering them in the first instance, and afterwards subjecting them to the usual burdens of French protection. The first of these was the Roman Republic. The directors never relished the terms which Bonaparte had granted at Tolentino, and, when a French officer was shot in a riot between radical agitators and papal soldiers, they seized the occasion to despatch an army against Rome. General Bonaparte was asked to draw up the instructions to General Berthier, its commander, who had been his chief-of-staff in the Italian campaign. Berthier was charged to turn everything into money, a task which he accepted with enthusiasm, assuring Bonaparte in a letter that "in sending me to Rome you have named me treasurer of the expedition," meaning an expedition which was being organized at Toulon; and he added, "I will try to fill the fund." The Pope, Pius VI, was given the choice of abdication or imprisonment, and as he refused to abdicate was arrested and taken eventually to Valence, where he died. A French commission

drew up a constitution providing for consuls, senators, and tribunes, a variation from the ordinary model only in the choice of ancient Roman official names, but the important matter was the agreement of the new finance minister to pay France 15,300,000 francs in coin, in addition to the indemnities already exacted, and, besides, other millions in supplies. The French estimated that they had now drawn from papal territory seventy-seven millions, without including sums taken by generals or commissioners, or by contractors and hangers-on. Certainly they could not be charged with holding too cheap the liberty they brought. Their treatment of the Pope embittered the Catholic populations of Europe, and indicated that they were not seeking peace, but the triumph of Jacobin dogma and French domination.

CHAP
XVI

1797-1802

To the Roman Republic was soon added the Helvetic Republic, "one and indivisible." The motive in this case was mainly plunder, and the chief consequence was that the eastern frontier was opened to attack, because the neutrality of Switzerland was destroyed. An excuse for intervention was found in the quarrels between the Swiss democrats and an oligarchic party particularly strong at Berne. Intervention was begun in January, 1798, but the revolution was not over until September, when the stubborn resistance of the last mountain cantons had been crushed. The treasury of Berne, which contained five million francs in coin, was seized, while a commissioner with the suggestive name of Rapinat was sent to levy contributions. The new republic was forced to sign an offensive and defensive treaty with France. The money from Berne was sent to Toulon to pay for the equipment of an expedition about which a veil of mystery still hung. At the same time the republic of Geneva, long allied to the Swiss Confederation, was annexed to France.

Switzer-
land

General Bonaparte as commander of the Army of England was ordered to make preparations for the great venture, but an inspection of the northern coast and of the resources for transport convinced him that such an attempt would be futile, at least for a year. His thoughts were already absorbed by a project of a descent upon Egypt, which twice before his day had been suggested to the government. In September, 1797, he wrote to Talleyrand, recently appointed minister of foreign affairs, urging the retention of the Ionian Islands, and suggesting the seizure of Malta; for with these as a naval base the control of the Mediterranean would be assured. He added that if England should retain the Cape of Good Hope (which she had lately seized from the Dutch), France must take possession of Egypt, and

The Ex-
pedition
to Egypt

CHAP.
XVI

1797-1802

renew by way of the Red Sea the struggle with the English for supremacy in India. In the following February Talleyrand presented a memoir to the French Institute, arguing the advisability of seizing Egypt. The project had the good fortune to please the directors as well as Bonaparte; the first because it would rid them of the burdensome presence of a popular general, the second because such a mission promised freedom from petty governmental interference and an easy triumph in the glorious East. Preparations for the expedition were completed secretly at Toulon. In addition to the army Bonaparte planned to take with him a group of scientific men who might study the resources of Egypt and the remains of its ancient civilization.

None seemed to anticipate the risks of the enterprise, probably because for eighteen months no English fleet had been in the Mediterranean. At this very time, however, the English were organizing a squadron strong enough to destroy the Toulon armament. Nelson, who had distinguished himself at the battle of Cape St. Vincent, was made its commander, but the ships did not reach their rendezvous until three weeks after the French had sailed. Nelson steered for Naples and then to the coast of Sicily, where he learned that the French had effected the capture of Malta and had sailed eastward. Twice within the next few days he nearly overhauled them. This would have been their ruin, for their decks were encumbered with soldiers and army stores and they would have fought under difficulties. Nelson reached Alexandria before the French, but uncertain that this was their destination, missed them by leaving before they arrived, the English topsails disappearing over the eastern horizon just as the French appeared from the west.

Egypt was nominally a vassal state of the Sultan of Turkey, but the Turkish pasha at Cairo was controlled by the Mamelukes, prætorian bands of feudal warriors, recruited from Circassian youths and led by chiefs or beys, of whom the most powerful were Ibrahim and Murad. Besides these bands of horsemen, there was no army to oppose the French. Alexandria was captured without difficulty. The decisive battle was fought near Cairo on July 21. The French army, formed in squares, easily repulsed the few thousand horsemen whom Murad led against it, while Ibrahim's followers for the most part watched the conflict from across the Nile. This affair, eloquently described by Bonaparte, who greatly exaggerated the number of the enemy, has been named the "Battle of the Pyramids." Murad retired into southern Egypt and Ibrahim to the borders of Palestine. Bonaparte entered Cairo, organized provincial administrations or

Battle of
the Pyra-
mids

divans, seeking to allay the fears of the Moslem population by posing as a believer in the message of the Prophet and an instrument in the hands of God which it would be perilous to resist. He was anxious to make it appear that he had come simply to deliver the land from the domination of the Mamelukes and that his acts were not contrary to the Sultan's authority. Hardly had his work of reorganization begun when he received the terrible news that his fleet was destroyed and that the army was now cut off from France.

CHAP.
XVI
1797-1802

Nelson had at last found the French fleet. When he had left Alexandria he sailed for Syria, then for Crete, returning almost in despair to Sicily. Proceeding eastward again, off the coast of Greece he heard of the destination of the French. On his way to Alexandria he decided, in conference with his captains, that if the French were found at anchor he would concentrate his ships against their van and center, crushing them before the ships in the rear could come to the rescue. The French commander, obliged to remain on the coast, and yet unable on account of the shallow water to gain the protection of the harbor of Alexandria, had moored his ships in Aboukir Bay, a few miles east. It was his intention to anchor so close to shoal water that the English could not attack him on the land side, but his captains carelessly left several hundred yards of deep water within his lines. The English fleet arrived in sight of the French position early in the afternoon of August 1; and, although it would not be possible to bring the struggle to a decisive issue before nightfall, Nelson ordered his ships forward. A favoring breeze blew down the French line, and five of his ships ran inside, while the rest sailed along the seaward side. The French fought with stubborn courage, but one after another of their ships was disabled and surrendered. About ten o'clock the admiral's ship blew up. After a lull, the fight went on until morning. Only two French battle-ships and a frigate were able to escape, the remainder of the fleet being captured or destroyed. No victory more decisive was gained on the seas during this long series of wars. One of the first consequences was to embolden the Sultan of Turkey to declare war on the French. This enabled the Czar of Russia, who had been chosen Protector of the Order of St. John, nominally sovereign in Malta, to send a fleet through the Dardanelles to avenge the French attack on the island.

Battle of
the Nile

The news of the disaster at Aboukir Bay, often called the Battle of the Nile, seemed only to stimulate Bonaparte's courage. He declared to one of his generals, "Well! we must remain in these lands, and come forth great, as did the ancients." Nor was

CHAP.
XVI

1797-1802

Scienti-
fic Re-
sults of
the Ex-
pedition

he daunted by a fierce revolt which threatened the destruction of the army at Cairo. Punishing this with a ferocity truly oriental, he devoted himself to the organization of the resources of the conquered land. Monge, Berthollet, Denon, Jomard, and other scientists or savants who accompanied the expedition were formed into an institute, in four sections, two of which were assigned to public economy and to literature and the arts. Practical problems were necessarily emphasized, but the ruins of buildings and monuments were measured by Denon and his companions. Jomard began to decipher the hieroglyphics. Somewhat later the famous Rosetta Stone with its trilingual inscription was unearthed. This work laid the foundation for the scientific investigation of Egyptian history and revealed a long-forgotten world. It is the only permanent result of the ill-fated expedition.

India

Early in 1799 Bonaparte attempted to open communications with Tippoo, the Sultan of Mysore, a formidable enemy of the growing influence of the British East India Company. He ordered two corvettes to be constructed on the Red Sea; and, had he not been diverted from such efforts by the danger of a Turkish attack, his presence in Egypt might have been more than an empty menace to the English in India. As it was, it only hastened the fall of Tippoo, whom Lord Wellesley threatened with war if he did not renounce his dealings with the French. A dilatory answer did not satisfy Wellesley, who assembled an army and stormed Seringapatam, capital of Mysore, in May, 1799. The Sultan perished and his kingdom was divided.

Failure
in Syria

The hostile attitude of the Pasha of Acre, with whom Ibrahim Bey had united his forces, determined Bonaparte to carry the war into the enemy's country. Leaving an adequate force in Egypt, he started for Syria with a small army. No serious obstacle troubled the expedition until it reached Acre, the fortifications of which had been strengthened by a French engineer, a former fellow student of Bonaparte at Brienne, but now an emigrant. Bonaparte's attack was compromised by the loss of a flotilla containing his siege guns; nevertheless, his troops after almost superhuman struggles gained a foothold within the walls of the town. The defenders, encouraged by the English naval commander, clung stubbornly to their inner lines, until Bonaparte, having lost about 5,000 men and not daring to risk further sacrifices, withdrew and retreated towards Egypt. With sublime assurance he reëntered Cairo on June 14 as if he had been triumphant. A month later he did have the good fortune to win a spectacular victory, for, when a Turkish army landed in Egypt

to complete his ruin, he defeated it near Aboukir, inflicting a loss of more than 10,000 men.

During negotiations for an exchange of prisoners the English put into his hands a bundle of European journals, which contained news of another coalition against France, the defeat of the French army in Italy, and the perilous situation of the Republic. He at once resolved to return to France, leaving the army in command of General Kléber. He had originally planned to return before the close of 1798, but the destruction of his fleet made this impossible. In May, 1799, the directors sent a message recalling him, and issued orders for the concentration of a fleet to bring back the army, but neither message nor fleet appeared, nor did Bonaparte know of the project. He kept his own plans secret, telling only those officers and scientists who were to return with him, because the army was so weary of its enforced stay in Egypt that it was not safe to make known his intended departure. This was not a flight nor a desertion, but it was the abandonment of an enterprise which even his genius could not save from ultimate failure, while it left the responsibility for the final collapse to rest upon others. He was to return to France to utilize the greater opportunity which the blunders of the directors and the disasters of the French armies now furnished him. He and his companions embarked during the night of August 22.

The situation had become critical even before General Bonaparte sailed for Egypt. When the Austrians found they were likely to obtain no further concessions of Italian territory, they resolved to check the increasing demands of the French on the Rhine, and appealed to the Czar to mediate between France, Austria, and Prussia in the settlement of the German question. In July, 1798, the Czar promised the aid of an auxiliary force, which in a few weeks was in Galicia, slowly marching southward. Austria also entered upon negotiations with Naples for an offensive and defensive alliance. The Neapolitans had been in an agony of fear lest Bonaparte's expedition was directed against them, the spectacle of the conquest of papal Rome warning other States of their approaching fate. To guard against this danger was part of the reason why the English sent Nelson into the Mediterranean.

The news of Nelson's victory filled the Neapolitan court with exultation. The victorious admiral was received at Naples with effusion, and added the prestige of his influence to the project of war against the French. England and Austria officially warned the Neapolitans against precipitate action, but their counsels were unheeded. Retribution was swift; not long after the Neapolitan

CHAP.
XVI

1797-1802

Bonaparte
leaves
Egypt

A new
European
Crisis

CHAP.
XVI

1797-1802

army crossed the frontiers of the Roman Republic it was defeated in detail by General Championnet and driven disorganized back upon Naples. The Court fled on English ships to Sicily, and the French proclaimed the fall of the Bourbon monarchy, establishing in its place, on January 23, 1799, the Parthenopean Republic. In Naples the story of systematic plunder was repeated. Besides exacting an indemnity of sixty million francs, officers and soldiers were rewarded according to a scale, like pirates at the capture of a rich prize. Championnet, disgusted with the conduct of the French commissioners, expelled them from Neapolitan territory; but they complained to the directors, who removed him and placed in command a general more ready to share in the spoil.

The occupation of Naples weakened the French position in Europe, because the French armies were scattered from the North Sea to southern Italy. Little compensation was to be found in the numbers of the recruits which could be demanded of these ill-affected vassal peoples. Meanwhile England signed a treaty with Russia, promising subsidies for a large army. The presence of the Russian auxiliary force within the Austrian dominions provoked an ultimatum from France, and the War of the Second Coalition began on March 1, 1799.

The war did not proceed far before the fabric reared by victory, but undermined by greed, seemed on the verge of utter ruin. In Germany the French were defeated at Stockach by the Archduke Charles. An allied army, under command of the Russian Suvórof, overran northern Italy in a shorter time than Bonaparte had required to conquer it, entering Milan, the capital of the Cisalpine Republic, before the end of April. The French hastily abandoned Naples and Rome. The Bourbon king returned to Naples and from the deck of Nelson's ship organized a reign of vengeance and terror. In the north the French were driven to Genoa as a final refuge. A supreme effort at Novi, on August 15, led to the death of the commander, General Joubert, and the disastrous defeat of his army.

At this juncture France was saved, as in the previous war, by the jealousies of the Allies. The Austrians, once in possession of Piedmont, refused to recall the King of Sardinia, and the Russians and the English were in no mood to sacrifice men and money for the aggrandizement of Austria in Italy. The English also feared that Russia had designs on certain islands in the Mediterranean as a permanent naval base, while the Russians suspected England of purposing to capture and hold Malta. Prussia, although neutral, was suspected of scheming

to use the difficulties of the other powers as an opportunity to increase her territory in northwestern Germany. These fears and jealousies, some well-grounded, others baseless, brought about a lack of coöperation among the Allies and fatally compromised the successes of the spring and summer. The Russians withdrew from Italy into Switzerland, towards which a second Russian army under Korsakoff was marching. Had the Austrians under the Archduke Charles coöperated with them, the French would have been driven from Switzerland, but the Archduke was directed to move towards the Rhine in order to prevent the Prussians from securing new advantages in case an English-Russian army operating in the Dutch Netherlands should be successful. Masséna seized the opportunity of a divided enemy and defeated Korsakoff at Zürich, on September 25-26, before Suvórof could reach him. After this disaster Suvórof, to avoid capture, plunged into the untrodden paths of the higher Alps and made his way with terrible losses into the Grisons. Three weeks later Brune defeated the English-Russian army in the Netherlands and compelled it to reëmbark.

Unless the French were ready to abandon their territorial pretensions, the victories of Masséna and Brune would bring only respite from the fear of invasion. To recover the position which France occupied at the Peace of Campo Formio was far more difficult, and it seemed hardly likely that the Directory would be equal to the task. In 1797 the directors supposed they had saved the Republic by the proscriptions of the 18th Fructidor, but the elections of the following spring were also hostile, although the menace came from the left, rather than from the right. The directorial party in the councils, accordingly, annulled sixty-four elections, enough to preserve a governmental majority. This was called the coup d'état of the 22nd Floréal. Again in 1799 the elections were unfavorable, but the directors were so discredited that they dared not repeat the manœuvres of Fructidor or Floréal. For several months they had been subjected to a campaign of hostile criticism. To their opponents in the councils they seemed the protectors of speculators, army contractors, and commissioners in vassal republics; indeed, of every one who was fattening upon the public calamities. When the time came to fill the annual vacancy in the Directory, Sieyès was chosen. He held aloof from the other directors and allied himself with the opposition in the councils, some of whose members were more conservative than the directorial group, while others were more radical. This coalition proceeded to annul the election of one of the directors on the ground that it had been

unconstitutional, and forced the resignation of two more. From the day on which the events culminated the incident is commonly called the coup d'état of the 30th Prairial. With success achieved, the allied groups separated in mutual distrust.

Sieyès and his friends now formed the design of revising the constitution. They required the aid of a victorious general, whose prestige would give popularity to the enterprise, and who would, if necessary, use soldiers to overawe the radicals. General Joubert was chosen for the part, but instead met defeat and death. The opponents of Sieyès took advantage of the situation to propose in the Council of Five Hundred a resolution declaring "the country in danger." They approached General Bernadotte, minister of war, with the scheme of seizing the government and organizing an administration of radicals. The tide of discontent among those who had anything to lose was already high. On the excuse of military necessity the councils early in the summer had adopted a decree levying a forced loan of one hundred millions on the rich. It was exacted, first, of those paying taxes on real estate, and increased in amount with the amount of the tax, taking as much as three-quarters of the income of the richer tax-payers. In the second place, those whose wealth consisted of personal property should contribute according to their presumed ability, the basis to be fixed in each case by a jury of inquiry. This feature would enable the government to compel speculators and contractors to disgorge their ill-gotten gains. The mere proposal of the law created a panic in Paris. Men saw that their only escape was in proving that they were not rich; shops were closed, dealers declared themselves bankrupt, and creditors tried to collect their debts in coin and hide the money. Such legislation arrayed against the Republic, or, at least, against the politicians in the councils, the great body of those whom the Revolution had enriched and who desired to enjoy their riches in security. The councils also alienated moderate men by passing a law of hostages, which aimed to restore peace in the regions infested by brigands or by royalist conspirators, by ordering the arrest of former nobles and relatives of emigrants, threatening them with deportation if the disorders continued. Paris was alarmed by the reappearance of the Jacobin Club under another name, omen of an approaching Reign of Terror. With the return of victory political passions had begun to subside. The directors had met the crisis firmly, using the ex-Terrorist Fouché, now minister of police, to close the new club.

Late in September Sieyès resumed his plans. He and his

friends believed that they could count upon a majority of the Council of Elders. They expected serious opposition from many members of the Council of Five Hundred and from several generals, like Augereau, Jourdan, and Bernadotte, who were identified with the radicals. Among the directors Ducos was closely associated with Sieyès, Barras was thoroughly discredited, and Gohier and Moulins anything but formidable. To overawe the opposition Sieyès needed the coöperation of a distinguished and popular general. He thought of Moreau, but Moreau had little taste for political intrigue. As the two were discussing the question one day in October, it was announced that Bonaparte had landed at Fréjus on the southern coast. "There's your man!" exclaimed Moreau. But Sieyès was full of misgivings, for, as Lucien Bonaparte afterward remarked, he feared that Napoleon's "sword was too long."

The news that Bonaparte had landed at Fréjus on October 9 caused great rejoicing. His reputation for invincibility had been enhanced only a few days before by the arrival of a bulletin from Egypt describing in glowing terms his victory over the Turks at Aboukir. All other reputations were dwarfed by comparison. Upon his arrival in Paris his brother told him the details of the Sieyès plan and he agreed to support it, although he refused to see Sieyès at first. He shrewdly contrived to keep all factions in a state of expectation. When finally the interview with Sieyès took place, it was decided to obtain the appointment of three provisional consuls and two legislative commissions, one from each council, to carry on the administration until the necessary constitutional measures could be drawn up and submitted to popular vote. For this purpose the Council of Elders, utilizing the powers conferred upon it by the constitution, was to decree the transfer of both councils to St. Cloud beyond the reach of a hostile Jacobin mob. The excuse was to be found in rumors of a new Jacobin plot. Bonaparte was to be put in command of the troops, in order to block any action by those directors who were not in the scheme. Sieyès and Ducos were to resign, and it was believed that Barras could be bribed or forced to resign, leaving only a minority, which would be powerless. Even in the Council of Five Hundred the conspirators were not helpless, for Lucien Bonaparte had just been elected president out of compliment to his brother. If the Council of Elders should take the initiative, it might be possible by a mixture of parliamentary manœuvring and military force to rush the appointment of a provisional administration through the Council of Five Hundred.

Early on the morning of November 9 (18 Brumaire), the

CHAP.
XVI

1797-1802

Sieyès
and
Bonaparte

CHAP.
XVI

1797-1802

18th
Brumaire

day selected for the coup d'état, the decrees transferring the councils and appointing Bonaparte commander of the troops were adopted by the Elders and announced to the Five Hundred, after which the latter body was immediately adjourned, to give the opposition no time to ask inconvenient questions. Meanwhile the directors Sieyès and Ducos resigned, and Barras, rumor said, was handed a resignation, accompanied by a substantial sum of money; he signed one and put the other in his pocket. Gohier and Moulins, the two remaining directors, refusing to resign, were guarded at the directorial palace by soldiers under command of General Moreau. During the day placards and inspired editorials served to allay public fears. Everybody was aware that the Directory was doomed. But when the councils met the next afternoon at St. Cloud, the Elders, after a night's reflection, had lost their confidence in a scheme the details of which had not been confided to them. Some inquired about the alleged Jacobin conspiracy, but Sieyès and his friends had overlooked the necessity of providing answers to unseasonable curiosity. Disturbed by the vexatious delays, General Bonaparte entered the council, where, unaccustomed to the manners of deliberative assemblies, he became confused and incoherent, and his friends were obliged to lead him out. In the Council of Five Hundred the radicals, who had recently plotted to save the Republic by seizing the government themselves, were swept by a furor of patriotic emotion, denounced the conspiracy, and compelled every member to swear fidelity to the constitution, a proceeding which served the purpose of Lucien Bonaparte and Sieyès, now anxious to gain time until their proposition was voted by the Elders. News of the resignation of a majority of the directors added to the uproar. Suddenly General Bonaparte appeared in the hall, hoping perhaps to provoke an outbreak and justify intervention with troops. His entrance was greeted by cries of "Down with the dictator!" many radicals rushing upon him, shrieking in his ears, and hustling him. Officers and soldiers in the doorway hastened to his rescue and bore him half-fainting from the hall. The radicals first demanded a decree of outlawry, but afterwards hit upon the more practical plan of placing the troops under the immediate orders of the councils, and nothing but the fact of Lucien Bonaparte's presence in the chair prevented its adoption. Finally, Lucien, powerless to resist, made his way out of the hall, and declaring to the troops that the assembly was dominated by a group of conspirators with drawn daggers, called upon the legislative guards to drive them out. The guards en-

tered the hall, with bayonets fixed, and the members fled out of the windows into the gathering darkness.

During the night of November 10 (19 Brumaire), a few of the dispersed councilors reassembled and with the Elders adopted a decree appointing a provisional consular commission, composed of Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Ducos, and two legislative commissions, representing the Council of Elders and the Council of Five Hundred. The legislative commissions received the task of preparing changes in the organic law of the Republic and of adopting, at the suggestion of the consuls, legislative measures immediately necessary. Most of the men who had a share in the events of the 18th and 19th Brumaire believed that they had saved the Republic, and the soldiers marched back to Paris singing revolutionary songs. The "Consolidated Third" rose from 11.38 on the 17th Brumaire to 20 on the 24th Brumaire.

The men who overthrew the Directory were confronted by a double task: they must settle many perplexing constitutional, financial, and social questions, and must also bring to a successful issue the War of the Second Coalition. The first could scarcely be begun before the second must be undertaken, and prestige enough to carry through schemes of reform or reorganization must come primarily from triumphs on the battle-field. Of the political situation it is enough to say here¹ that the provisional government gave way before the close of the year to the Consulate. General Bonaparte was made First Consul, and to him were granted the chief executive powers. He also had a controlling influence over foreign relations and directed the military campaigns, although it was not expected that he would command in the field.

General Bonaparte required no penetrating genius to discover a foreign policy. His program was marked out for him in the terms of the Treaty of Campo Formio, which he had himself negotiated. His administration would soon be discredited unless he could recover the ground in northern Italy lost during the year 1799. When, accordingly, he wrote to George III and to Francis II, offering to negotiate for peace, the obstacle lay not in his personal insincerity, but in the incompatibility of the aims of the Allies with those of France. Peace would come, as in 1795 and 1797, only through new French victories or through the failure of the enemies of France to coöperate heartily. Bonaparte did not have to fear the active hostility of the Czar Paul, who

CHAP.
XVI

1797-1802

A Provisional
Consulate

Campaign of
1800

¹For details of the new political system, see the following chapter.

CHAP.
XVI

1797-1802

looked upon him as a restorer of order in France. The incidents of 1799 had also embittered the Czar against the Austrians.

As in 1796, the most decisive battle was fought in Italy. The strongest forces of the Republic were in Germany under command of Moreau, while the Army of Italy under Masséna was disorganized by the defeats of the previous year. Bonaparte assembled a reserve army in eastern France, intending to reinforce Moreau and himself take personal charge of a campaign in southern Germany. But Moreau was unwilling to play such a subordinate part, and, therefore, the First Consul changed the scene of the principal military effort. He utilized his central position in the upper valley of the Rhone to open the campaign in spectacular fashion and accomplish at a stroke what had required half a dozen battles in 1796. He planned to descend into Italy from the Great St. Bernard pass and cut the Austrian line of communications in the valley of the Po, compelling the Austrians to abandon all northwestern Italy, which they had been occupying since the preceding summer. This would also relieve General Masséna who was shut up with half of his army in Genoa. The reserve army was nominally under command of Berthier, but the real commander was the First Consul. In May everything was ready and the great operation was begun. The passage of the Alps occupied five days, from May 15 to May 20, and took the Austrians completely by surprise, for they did not dream that the French would attempt the higher Alpine passes.

On June 2, Bonaparte entered Milan, the capital of that Cisalpine Republic which he had created in 1797 and which the Austrians had destroyed during his absence in Egypt. He thought that the Austrians would immediately concentrate all their forces and attack him in order to keep open the roads leading into Venetia, and he selected the defile of the Stradella on the southern bank of the Po as the best position at which to check such a movement. A part of the Austrian army attempted to fight its way through, but failed. Bonaparte then advanced into the plain in front of Alessandria. On June 13, afraid that the Austrians would attempt to escape either to the north or the south, he detached divisions to head them off, one under Desaix towards Novi. The following morning at nine he sent orders to Desaix to persist in his movement, but within a little over an hour the Austrian general, Melas, marched out of Alessandria in full force and fell upon the weakened French army. In spite of the most stubborn fighting about the village of Marengo, the French were driven back. By noon Bonaparte sent a frantic

Marengo

appeal to Desaix, which fortunately reached him in time, because he had halted upon the sound of cannonading. When Desaix arrived on the field at five o'clock the French were in full retreat, the battle apparently lost. A vigorous onslaught by the fresh troops, a charge of cavalry, and the victorious Austrians, surprised in turn, were thrown into disorder and driven routed towards Alessandria. By seven o'clock a second battle had been fought and won.

In his bulletin of victory Bonaparte so described the struggle that success seemed due to his forethought in placing Desaix's division. Desaix did not live to claim his share in the glories of the day, for he was killed in the conflict. His contribution to the final triumph need not detract from the honor due to his chief, for Marengo was only an incident, although a culminating incident, of a campaign which ranks amongst Bonaparte's most brilliant successes. The consequences of the victory were immense. The Austrians signed an armistice which gave to the French control as far as the Mincio. It was also a personal triumph for Bonaparte and consolidated his hold upon France. As Pasquier remarked: "What strength did this victory not give him who only had to show himself to conquer Italy in a day!"

The French under Moreau were also successful against the Austrians and compelled them a month after Marengo to agree to another armistice. The negotiations for peace were at first unsuccessful, partly because the Austrians would lose an English subsidy if they should sign a treaty with France before February 1, 1801. Moreau's decisive victory at Hohenlinden in December, opening the road to Vienna, and further French successes in Italy brought the struggle to a close.

The treaty of peace, which was signed at Lunéville, on February 9, 1801, repeated the main features of the Treaty of Campo Formio, but obliged the Emperor to agree, without further consultation of the German diet, that the territories west of the Rhine should go to France. Another blow at Hapsburg influence in Italy was struck by the transfer of the Grand Duke of Tuscany to Germany, leaving the grand duchy, changed into a "Kingdom of Etruria" for the benefit of the Duke of Parma and his wife, the Spanish Infanta. Austria also consented to recognize the Helvetic and Batavian republics, uniting with France in guaranteeing their independence, and the "freedom of the inhabitants to adopt such a form of government as they should see fit."²

CHAP.
XVI
1797-1802

Peace of
Lunéville

² A contemporary caricature represents the French Republic as a large

CHAP.
XVI

1797-1802

Bonaparte did not attempt to restore the Parthenopean Republic, but made a treaty with the King of Naples which permitted the establishment at Taranto of a French expeditionary force destined for Egypt and maintained in the meantime at the expense of Naples. The King also promised to exclude the English from his harbors. The newly elected pope, Pius VII, was assured by Bonaparte that he would not be disturbed in the possession of the States left him at the Peace of Tolentino.

The position of France was strengthened at this time by a union of the northern powers against England, a revival of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, finding its motive in an intolerable extension by the English of the rights of belligerents over neutral commerce. The English wished to include under the term contraband wheat, hemp, pitch, and timber, indeed anything which could facilitate the military or naval enterprises of the French. They also interpreted loosely the conditions of a blockade, seizing on the high seas ships whose papers showed that they were bound for a port nominally in a state of blockade, but not continuously blockaded. The English, however, could not without grave danger permit the neutral to take advantage of his lower insurance risks and underbid the English ship-owner and merchant, for upon their prosperity depended in large part the payment of taxes and the maintenance of a war fleet. They contemptuously refused to accept the neutral doctrine that "free ships make free goods," with its corollary that neutral property must be respected even on ships of the enemy. French diplomacy did all it could to sharpen the antagonism of the northern powers to the English as the most effective way to bring the English to terms. Bonaparte conciliated the Czar by offering to restore Malta to the Knights of St. John, of whom the Czar was now the "protector," calculating that this would alienate the Czar still more from the English, because they were on the point of forcing the French garrison to surrender. The Armed Neutrality, constituted in December, and including—besides Russia—Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, was short-lived. England sent a strong fleet into the Baltic, a part of which under Nelson gained a victory over the Danes at Copenhagen on April 2, 1801. Meantime the eccentric and tyrannical

mushroom surrounded by several smaller mushrooms,—the Batavian, Helvetic, Ligurian, and Cisalpine republics. The three continental monarchs are gazing at it in alarm. The King of Prussia exclaims, "Goodness, how it grows!" The Czar of Russia remarks, "That would be pleasant to eat"; whereat the Emperor protests, "Don't touch it, my friend; it is poisonous."

Czar Paul had been assassinated by his own officers, and his successor, Alexander I, was inclined to come to terms with the English. The members of the league compromised with England on the question of blockades, deciding that they should be effective if maintained by cruising ships. Contraband was interpreted more favorably to the interests of the northern neutral, whose principal exports were wheat and timber. While partially successful in the north, the English received a blow in the south when Portugal was compelled by Spain, at the dictation of France, to close her ports to their trade.

The best argument for peace between England and France was the futility of continuing the war. Both nations had suffered severely, although the English found compensation in the seizure of French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies—the Cape, Ceylon, Malacca, and Amboyna in the East, and, in the West, Trinidad and several of the French West Indies. But their shipping suffered heavily from French privateers, to which more than 3,000 vessels fell a prey from 1793 to 1800. To check these losses, which pushed up insurance rates towards prohibitive figures, the Convoy Act was passed in 1798 and vessels were not permitted to sail without escort. The financial burdens of the country were staggering, with a national debt of £537,000,000, and an interest charge of £20,000,000. Within a decade the expenditures had risen from nineteen to sixty-one millions, and the new income tax took ten per cent. of all incomes over £200. Such a situation called for at least an experiment in the direction of peace.

France equally felt the need of peace. As the year 1801 wore on her position became more isolated. The Armed Neutrality had broken down and Russia drew nearer to England. The army which Bonaparte had left in Egypt on his return to France was obliged to surrender to the English in June, as Malta had been forced to surrender in the previous September. Bonaparte had another motive—his plan to restore the French colonial empire. He already had the secret promise of the Spaniards to return Louisiana. He wished to recover the colonies in the West Indies which the English held, and to reassert French authority in Santo Domingo. One obstacle to peace was removed by the retirement of Pitt, the great war minister. His successor Addington was inclined to try a peace, even if it proved to be only a truce. Actual fighting was ended by the signature of the Preliminaries of London in October, 1801, while the definitive treaty was signed at Amiens on March 27, 1802. The English did not insist upon any agreement in regard to the con-

CHAP.
XVI

1797-1802

France
and Eng-
landPeace of
Amiens

**CHAP.
XVI****1797-1802**

tinental situation, not even in regard to the Dutch, so long their allies. They acted as if the agreements of Lunéville would mark the limits of French advance. They restored the French colonies, retaining only the Dutch Ceylon and the Spanish Trinidad. They also promised to restore Egypt to the Turks and to give Malta back to the Knights of St. John under a guarantee of the powers. The question of a commercial treaty was postponed.

Nearly ten years had passed since the diplomats of the Legislative Assembly had forced Louis XVI to declare war upon Austria. France had been covered with ruins as a result of the civil war into which the foreign war had plunged her. She now stood forth apparently more powerful than even under Louis XIV. The question was, Would she be able to consolidate her conquests by years of peaceful development? The answer was not far to seek, since the wars had also subjected her to the control of an ambitious military chieftain, surrounded by a body of restless soldiery.

CHAPTER XVII

A BENEFICENT DICTATORSHIP

THE revolution of Brumaire was followed by forty-four days of provisional government, giving place on December 25 to the Consulate. In no sense had the Republic been overthrown, although the constitutional system which was adopted offered an opportunity to one man to gather the reins of power into his hands. His success both in the reorganization of the country and in the solution of French financial, industrial, and social problems, as well as in the defense of national interests abroad, was so great that within two years similar and increased powers were conferred upon him for life, with the right to name his successor. His "beneficent dictatorship" became a monarchy thinly veiled. Two years more and the soldier who had "saved the Republic from anarchy" in 1799 was in name as in fact both *princeps* and *imperator*.

To commissions of the councils had been assigned the task of proposing the modifications which should be made in the constitution of 1795. As Sieyès was the originator of the scheme of revision, the commissioners turned to him for definite suggestions. They discovered that he had not committed his views to writing; indeed, he seems to have expounded two projects, varying in detail, but resting on the same fundamental principle,¹ which he regarded as the necessary corrective of the democratic ideal. The voters, he argued, should designate those eligible to office, but should not appoint them. The principle was expressed in the apothegm, "confidence should come from below, authority from above." Both projects provided for a communal list of eligibles, a tenth of the voting population and chosen by it. From this list a tenth, or departmental list, should be selected either by the communal eligibles or by electoral assemblies chosen by the voters. A national list should be formed in similar fashion, and would contain about 6,000 names, from which appointments to offices national in scope might be made. The head of the government according to one plan was an "Elector-Proclaimer,"

CHAP.
XVII
1799-1804

The
Projects
of
Sieyès

¹ For further information in regard to these projects and their origin, see Aulard, IV. 158-159; Vandal, L'Avènement de Bonaparte, I. 495 f.; A. Neton, L'Abbé Sieyès, 393-407; J. H. Clapham, L'Abbé Sieyès, 240-248.

CHAP.
XVII

1799-1804

whose principal business was the appointment of officials, governmental policy and actual administration being entrusted to a council of state and to the ministers. According to the other plan the head of the government was a "Grand Elector," a mere ceremonial chief magistrate, while affairs were managed by two consuls, one for war and one for peace (that is, foreign affairs and domestic administration), and appointments were made by a "College of Conservators," or "Conservative Senate." Legislation should be proposed by a council of state and discussed by a tribunate, councilors and tribunes arguing the matter before a "constitutional jury," or legislative body, which should accept or reject without debate or amendment. It was suggested that Bonaparte should be content with the position of grand elector, a palace at Versailles, and an income of six millions; but Bonaparte had no intention of being, as he expressed it, put out to fatten like a pig. The suggestion of placing the government in the hands of two consuls was equally unsatisfactory to him, although the committees named to report on a constitution appeared to favor it. After one or two further attempts Bonaparte practically dictated a project, using fragments from various schemes which had been proposed. It was not discussed formally in the commissions, although individual members agreed to it, but was submitted to a popular vote, or plebiscite, and was declared in force as soon as the results in the nearer departments showed that it would be accepted. The vote in its favor was overwhelming — 3,011,007 against 1,562.

Constitu-
tion of
1799

^ In the new constitution the substance of power belonged to General Bonaparte as First Consul, for he could appoint all officials except justices of the peace and judges of the supreme court of appeals. Through the Council of State, the members of which he selected, he had the initiative in legislation, including appropriation bills. In many matters of governmental policy he was assisted by the second and third consuls, but in all cases the decision rested with him. He was not expected to command the armies in the field, but their direction belonged to him as head of the board of consuls.

Projects of law originated with the Council of State, and were transmitted to the Legislative Corps, which referred them immediately to the Tribunate for discussion, naming a time for report. After the Tribunate had reached its conclusion, it deputed three of its members, who, with three members of the Council of State, discussed the measure before the Legislative Corps. This body could not amend, but only accept or reject. Opposition might, however, lead the government to withdraw the measure

and submit it again in amended form. The Senate had the power to pronounce decrees inconsistent with the constitution, but this was utilized by Bonaparte to modify rather than safeguard that instrument. The most important function of the Senate was the choice of tribunes, legislators, supreme judges, and consuls, although it never actually chose consuls, for the original consuls were named in the constitution and the Republic ceased to exist before their ten-year term was over. The constitution proclaimed the suffrage universal, but, except for the choice of minor local officials, only gave the voters the privilege of choosing, as Sieyès had suggested, a tenth of their number as a communal list of the notabilities. This tenth in turn was to reduce itself to a tenth, or a departmental list, and this to a tenth, which should be the national list. From these lists appointments were made by the consuls and elections by the Senate for local, departmental, and national offices.

To set the new machinery of government in motion, the constitution not only named the consuls, but also provided that the second and third consuls, with Sieyès and Ducos, who were appointed senators, should select a majority of the sixty original senators, this majority to name the rest. As the list of notabilities was yet to be created, the first choices of tribunes and legislators were made from lists drawn up by Sieyès and his friends. So many ex-members of the Council of Elders and of the Council of Five Hundred were chosen — 65 out of 100 tribunes, and 230 out of 300 legislators — that the Parisians were reminded of the efforts of the Convention to perpetuate itself, and the journals protested; one of them praying, after the manner of the litany, "From the eternal Conventionals, Good Lord deliver us!" The consequence was that when the Tribunal took an attitude of opposition to the consular policy its criticisms counted for little, recalling disagreeably the strife of factions during the whole course of the Revolution. The Senate was composed more wisely of men who had rendered noteworthy services at different periods since 1789. Bonaparte's choice of councilors of state illustrated a still broader principle, because he named men of tried experience in their various fields, whether they had served the old monarchy or the new republic. He also selected his ministers well, maintaining Talleyrand at the foreign office and Gaudin at the ministry of finance, appointments made during the Provisional Consulate, and a little later choosing Chaptal minister of the interior and Decrès minister of the navy.

The Council of State, which was the working body in the new constitutional system, was composed of from forty to forty-

CHAP.
XVII
1799-1804

The New
Officials

CHAP.
XVII

1799-1804

five members, divided into five sections — civil and criminal legislation, domestic affairs, finance, war, and admiralty. Matters matured in the sections were discussed in general sessions, often under the presidency of the First Consul, who favored great freedom of opinion, as the proceedings were not publicly reported. Besides the preparation of consular decrees and projects of law, the Council of State drew up ordinances touching public administration, decisions in administrative disputes, and official interpretations of statutes. Until 1802 the ministers had no seats in the Council, although they could give advice. Eventually it was the only council of ministers, for outside its chamber Bonaparte dealt with the ministers individually and not as a cabinet. It was, therefore, the center of government, as Sieyès had intended, but it served the will of the master who appointed its members.

Policy
of the
Con-
sulate

The policy of the Consulate was foreshadowed during the Provisional Consulate. Three days after the coup d'état the law of hostages was abrogated, and a little later a war tax of twenty-five centimes in the franc was substituted for the obnoxious forced loan, while provision was made for restitution in cases where the loan had been paid. It is not surprising that the bankers came to the rescue of such a government, which sorely needed temporary assistance, for there were only 167,000 francs in the treasury. That the government might not be compelled to live continually from hand to mouth, like the Directory, the minister of finance, supported by a law which centralized responsibility for the preparation of local tax rolls, attacked at once the gigantic evil of arrears in the payment of direct taxes.

Towards the emigrants the government took a conciliatory attitude, authorizing the return of all exiles who had been proscribed by legislative act without trial, and ordering the release of priests imprisoned in consequence of the ordinances issued after the 18th Fructidor. As soon as the adoption of the constitution was announced, the Council of State, organized immediately, declared that the laws which deprived relatives of emigrants and ex-nobles of all share in the political and administrative life of the country were inconsistent with the terms of the constitution and hence null and void. This decision opened the offices under the Consulate to men whom the radical revolutionaries had treated as political suspects.

In the new constitution certain omissions were significant; especially the absence of all reference to the liberty of the press, of conscience, and of meeting. There were evidences of haste.

The judicial system was only sketched and the machinery of local government barely mentioned. One of the first and most important tasks of the consular legislators was, therefore, a local government law. They broke with the theories of decentralization cherished by the Constituent Assembly and entrusted the administration of the department exclusively to a prefect appointed by the First Consul. This was a feature of the plan of Sieyès, and grew out of the need everywhere felt for order. In a sense the prefect was the successor of the intendant, but his task was much simpler, for the Revolution had swept away a mass of privileges which prevented the intendants from achieving the highest success. With the prefect sat a council of prefecture, as a tribunal to consider questions arising between the administration and the citizen, and this gave the individual a measure of assurance that he would be dealt with fairly. The law, disregarding what was implied in article 59 of the constitution, abandoned the idea of cantonal municipalities and restored the communes, large and small, the ex-Constituents in the Council preferring to return in this respect to the system of 1789. The appointment of mayors by the First Consul or by the prefects meant the destruction of local independence in administrative matters and at the same time deprived the citizens of any vital share in the management of their affairs. Paris was divided into twelve districts, each with a mayor, but the city was ruled by the prefect of police, successor of the lieutenant-general of the police under the old régime. This local government law was a triumph of the idea of extreme centralization, according to which the will of the master should be communicated to the prefects, through them to the sub-prefects, and through these to the mayors. It had the advantage of curbing arbitrariness in petty officials, while the tyranny of the State was distant and felt by comparatively few. Pasquier says that the people were glad to see the last of the multitude of mediocrities whom the Revolution had introduced into local administration and who were delighted to display their authority.

The reorganization of colonial government was inspired by similar impulses towards centralization of authority, but with less happy results. Several of the most important colonies were in possession of the English in 1800, and it was necessary to wait until the Peace of Amiens before creating a colonial system. The situation in Santo Domingo, formerly the richest of the West India colonies, was not much better. Out of the confusion of the slave insurrections in the Revolution had emerged

CHAP.
XVII

1799-1804

Local
Govern-
mentThe
Colonies

CHAP.
XVII

1799-1804

a unique figure, Toussaint Louverture, a negro, who had entered the service of France in 1794 as a brigadier-general, and who saved the island from falling completely under control of the Spaniards and English. In the year following Spain ceded the eastern part of the island to the French, but they could do nothing to secure possession until Toussaint overran it and entered the capital in January, 1801. Meantime he had begun a course of independent action, expelling commissioners sent to assert French authority, and making a commercial agreement with the United States, in order to preserve a trade necessary to Santo Domingo at a time when France and the United States were temporarily involved in hostilities. A statesman, as well as a soldier, he saw that the prosperity of Santo Domingo could only be restored if the planters were persuaded to return and if they were assured of a supply of black laborers. This could not be accomplished, if the negroes were permitted to acquire land and were not obliged to find employment with the planters. His supporters, white as well as black, drew up a constitution, making him governor for life with the right to name his successor. As he did not intend Santo Domingo to be independent, he sent an officer with this constitution to Paris in July, 1801, to obtain governmental approval. Such a plan of local autonomy, going beyond anything conceded even by the Constituent Assembly, with a negro ruler whose powers exceeded those of the First Consul, was utterly abhorrent to Bonaparte, and in 1802 the organization of a colonial régime was by law left solely to the government. The system created by the Council of State did not provide for a local legislature, but placed administration in the hands of officials who under other names reproduced the machinery of colonial government before the Revolution—a captain-general, a colonial prefect, and a commissioner of justice. As if these reactionary measures were not enough, a decree in May, 1802, reëstablished slavery and the slave trade. Such a policy had to reckon with obstacles more serious than the existence of Toussaint Louverture and foredoomed to failure the great schemes of colonial restoration which French statesmen had not ceased to ponder.

Louisiana

The successors of Genêt had called renewed attention to the strategic value of New Orleans in controlling the fate of the Mississippi Valley. At the peace of 1795 the French negotiators tried to recover Louisiana, and French statesmen condemned the privileges of deposit granted by Spain to the Americans that same year. When Talleyrand became minister of foreign affairs he schemed to bar the progress of the Americans beyond

the Alleghanies. The triumph of Bonaparte at Marengo intimidated the Spaniards, and they agreed to restore Louisiana on the understanding that France should transform Tuscany into a Kingdom of Etruria for the Duke of Parma and his wife, the Infanta of Spain. Of this secret agreement the American government had no authentic information until May, 1802, although rumors had reached President Jefferson the year previous, and had provoked from him these memorable words sent to the American minister at Paris: "It completely reverses all the political relations of the United States. . . . There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and political enemy. It is New Orleans. . . . The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her within her low-water mark. . . . From that time we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation."

The stepping-stone to Louisiana was Santo Domingo and Bonaparte's reply to Toussaint's appeal for recognition was an expedition of 35,000 men, under General Leclerc, Bonaparte's brother-in-law. The expedition started as soon as the Preliminaries of London made the sailing of a French fleet possible, and early in 1802 crushed opposition in Santo Domingo with apparent ease. Trusting to promises of Leclerc, Toussaint surrendered in May, and was sent to France to die a prisoner in the fortress of Joux on the chilly heights of the Jura. But another enemy awaited the French: yellow fever, which by September left only 4,000 men fit for duty. Leclerc died two months later. This prevented an expedition which had been planned for New Orleans, because the troops were needed in Santo Domingo. The decree restoring slavery led to a negro revolt, although the government intended to preserve slavery only in the Spanish part of the island. The consequence of all these disastrous events was that before the King of Spain issued orders for the effective transfer of Louisiana, Bonaparte was weary of his futile enterprise and sold Louisiana to the United States for \$15,000,000. Its transfer to France in November, 1803, was therefore merely a formality.

The most serious difficulty which confronted the consular administration at the outset was the lack of money. The new central agency created to supervise the collection of taxes found that not only the current lists, but those for the years V, VI, and VII, were still to be prepared. Bonaparte sought to teach the people that payment of taxes was a public duty in the performance of which different parts of the country should vie with each other, offering to name a Paris square for the depart-

CHAP.
XVII

1799-1804

Bona-
parte's
Plan Fails

Consular
Finances

CHAP.
XVII

1799-1804

ment which should pay most promptly. The lists or rolls in arrears were made out, those of the current year completed, and those of the next year prepared, so that the work of collection for the year IX might commence at its beginning in September, 1800. The budget had been estimated at 800 millions, but was cut down to 600, while only 563 were actually expended. As the navy could be of no present service, Bonaparte did not hesitate to strike 90 millions from its credit. In place of extravagance and corruption, characteristic of the Directory, there were severe economy and rigid inspection. Although the government was at first compelled to resort to financial expedients not unlike the practices of its predecessors, it succeeded better, because of the air of order and honesty which pervaded the administration. Gaudin believed that the indirect taxes which the Revolution had abolished should be restored in part, but Bonaparte refused to commence by introducing new taxes, and he also refused to countenance a loan, contenting himself with what temporary assistance he could get from favored bankers.

The treasury was embarrassed by a mass of State obligations of all sorts, issued in previous years, which might appear in tax collections, and some of which enjoyed a privileged claim on the coin which was collected. Among the latter were sixty-five million francs in "delegations," which authorized the holders to levy on the coin obtained by the receivers of taxes. After some hesitation, and upon Gaudin's advice, the government suspended this privilege, with the excuse that the "delegations" had often been given in payment for supplies never delivered, but finally agreed to recognize such debts after the contractors consented to furnish in coin a loan of equivalent amount. Other state paper of the directorial period was exchanged for annuities, but on the basis of a revaluation, while the bonds given in 1797 for two-thirds of the national debt were converted into annuities with a capital value of five per cent. of their nominal value, or about twice their current valuation.

The news of Marengo enhanced the credit of a government still trembling on the verge of financial ruin, and by the middle of the summer it was able to announce that holders of annuities or pensions should be paid in coin. The announcement was at first received with skepticism, and creditors who had so often been defrauded wondered if this was the prelude to another bankruptcy. All the greater were their surprise and gratitude when the promise of the government was kept strictly. So successful was the financial policy of the Consulate that the budget of the year X (1801-2) showed a slight surplus. The

only unfavorable symptom was that annuities rose no higher than 53, and this was due to the precariousness of a situation which seemed dependent upon a single life and upon a will uncontrolled by representatives of the nation.

The payments of annuities were made over the counter of the Bank of France, founded by consular decree in January, 1800, replacing a prosperous institution known as the Bank of Current Accounts. The new bank was intended to do for France what the Bank of England had long accomplished for England. The First Consul, members of his family, and other high officials subscribed to shares of its stock. Its success was immediate, and in a short time its shares doubled in value. In 1803 it received the exclusive privilege of issuing bank notes. As the government did not repeat the mistake of subordinating its management to the financial necessities of the administration, it had a happier fate than the former Bank of Discount.

The chief obstacle to the pacification of France was the open or secret antagonism of the ancient Church. The affections of the rural population turned generally towards the priests who had repudiated the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, and they looked for guidance to their old bishops, eighty-one of whom were still living, most of them abroad, particularly in London and Germany, under influences hostile to the Republic. Bishops and people acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope, who recognized Louis XVIII as King of France. The majority of the dissident priests who had returned did not care to mingle in politics, but they could not avoid being affected by such influences. To Bonaparte, therefore, it seemed wise, if not absolutely necessary, to break the connection between the priesthood and an emigrant and hostile episcopate, and to separate the interests of the Church from the claims of the Bourbons.

No sooner was the new government organized than a consular decree ordered that only a declaration of submission should be demanded of the clergy, and soon afterward another order permitted the opening of churches on other than the official *décadis*. Fouché attempted to distort Bonaparte's intentions by interpreting the decree to mean that the promise of submission should be made by those who had already taken the prescribed oaths. Bonaparte corrected this interpretation in his conversations, but he did not feel strong enough until after Marengo to ignore the anti-Catholic ministers and councilors by whom he was surrounded. He took immediate advantage of the prestige of victory, issuing a decree which made the ceremonies of *décadi* obligatory only for office-holders, and which deprived these cere-

CHAP.
XVII

1799-1804

The Non-
Jurors

monies of their special attraction by allowing civil marriages to take place elsewhere.² This resulted in a revival of the observance of Sunday and a desertion of the *décadi* ceremonies. A still more important step was the ruling that the laws against the emigrants did not apply to the dissident priests—a ruling which made their return legal.

Such measures of pacification did not put an end to the principal difficulties, because the majority of the returned priests would not make a declaration of submission, feeling that they would thereby condone the confiscation of church property and other acts of the Revolution. In dealing with the religious question the policy of the government varied with the region. In the West complete liberty was granted in order to prevent fresh Vendéan outbreaks, but even there the priests preferred not to enter the churches and frequently celebrated the offices of religion in fields or barns or private houses, being encouraged in this attitude by the emigrant bishops. In so doing they manifested publicly the desire not to be compromised by the favors of the Republic.

The Con-
cordat

The victory of Marengo enabled General Bonaparte to open negotiations for a settlement which transformed the French Church from a hostile political force into a well-disciplined army, willing to support the consular government, and especially the First Consul. He broke immediately with Revolutionary tradition by attending a *Te Deum* in the cathedral of Milan and by publishing in one of his bulletins the fact of his splendid reception by the clergy. He sent word to Pius VII that the situation required a new episcopate, appointed by the First Consul and receiving its bulls of institution from the Pope. He was willing that the Church should be *dominant*, if it was loyal to his government. But the Pope and the Roman clergy hoped that a turn in the tide of victory might enable them to negotiate to better advantage, and so the affair dragged on through the winter, until peace with Austria and Naples left papal territory at the discretion of the French. A few months later, on July 15, 1801, the papal consent was given by Cardinal Consalvi to a Convention, or Concordat.

The Pope and his advisers were unwilling to concede the resignation of the bishops who had remained faithful to the

² By a law of the 13th Fructidor, year VI, local officials, as well as representatives of the central government, must attend these ceremonies in costume. Laws and public acts of the preceding ten days should be read, along with a bulletin giving information of events or heroic deeds. Civil (that is, legal) marriages must take place on such occasions.

Church unless the Roman Catholic religion was declared the religion of France, dominant therefore in a sense which Bonaparte did not intend, and unless the Church should receive again its property, at least that which remained unsold. Such concessions were politically impossible, even if Bonaparte had wished to make them, and the papal negotiators were obliged to yield. They also permitted the insertion in one of the articles of an agreement that the Catholic worship should "conform to the police regulations which the government should deem necessary for public tranquillity," enabling Bonaparte under cover of this vague phraseology to mature the details of a scheme for the further subjection of the clergy. The Pope undertook, in case any of the non-juring bishops refused to resign, to deprive them of jurisdiction, and consented, in return for a salary list for the clergy, and for the sake of peace, to abandon the claim to the confiscated lands, accepting the use of cathedrals and other church buildings needed for worship. A new distribution of bishoprics should be made, and the incumbents were to be named by the First Consul and instituted by the Pope. The parish priests were appointed by the bishops with the approval of the government in every case. Cathedral chapters were restored, and seminaries organized, but nothing was said about monastic orders. It was agreed that public prayers should be recited for the Republic and the consuls, and that the clergy should take the oaths customary under the old régime.

Although the Concordat was signed in July, it was not proclaimed until April, 1802. This was due to difficulties on both sides. After repeated efforts the Pope obtained the resignation of only forty-five of the dissident bishops. A group residing in London, followed by others in Germany, refused, encouraged in this attitude by the pretender, Louis XVIII, but they were forbidden by the Pope to exercise any jurisdiction within their ancient dioceses. All the constitutional bishops, with one or two exceptions, handed their resignations to the government. Bonaparte, to make the treaty palatable to French public opinion, drew up in the Council of State the "police regulations" under the name "Organic Articles," embodying an interpretation of the treaty repugnant to its terms and more in harmony with militant Gallicanism. He also planned to proclaim on the day the Concordat was promulgated Organic Articles of the Protestant Religions, in order to show that the Concordat would not interfere with liberty of worship. When he first read the text of the Concordat to his Council, it was received in silence. He anticipated opposition in the Tribune and in the Legislative

Reorgani-
zation
of the
Church

CHAP.
XVII

1799-1804

Corps, but it was disorganized by the Senate's shrewd assumption of the right to designate the individuals whose two years' term of service was just expiring, using the right to include in the list every prominent person who had appeared lukewarm towards the consular policy. After a summary discussion the Concordat was accepted and the two sets of Organic Articles adopted.

A new difficulty arose in the refusal of the papal representative to institute any of the ex-constitutional clergy who should not confess penitence for the sin of schism, but the obstacle was overcome through a well-conceived series of misunderstandings.³ Of the sixty bishops and archbishops nearly five-sixths came from the dissident clergy. The most of the constitutional clergy were received again into the Church and became parish priests. At the Te Deum celebrating the return of peace in 1802 the re-constituted Church appeared with all its ancient ceremonial. The official world expressed its dissatisfaction in bitter sarcasms, but the mass of the French people rejoiced that the decade of strife was over. The Church officially hailed the First Consul as a new Constantine, a restorer of religion.

Chateaubriand

The religious history of France since 1795 illustrated the futility of the efforts of the Jacobin rulers during the Reign of Terror to destroy what they were pleased to call fanaticism. The most that they had accomplished was to cure the middle class and the nobility of Voltairianism. The new attitude of thoughtful France was eloquently set forth in the year of the Concordat by Chateaubriand, a returned emigrant, in his *Genius of Christianity*. Chateaubriand sought to prove that Christianity, far from being the enemy of literature, art, and liberty, was the most "poetic, the most human, the most favorable to liberty, to the arts, and to letters, of all the religions that have ever existed." The book was the sensation of the day. Not only was its religious influence profound, but its appearance marked a new tendency in literature, which culminated a few years later in the Romantic movement.

Lycées

In 1802 also a beginning was made of the reorganization of the system of public instruction. The Central Schools decreed by the Convention gave way to *Lycées*, which were government boarding schools, with rigid discipline, and with a course of study which embodied more of the older classical training and gave less attention to natural science. Several thousand scholarships were provided, part of which were reserved for the sons

³ The Abbé Bernier, made bishop and afterwards cardinal, declared that the ex-constitutionals had retracted in his presence. His statement was accepted, although the individuals in question denied having done so.

of civil or military officers. The creation of primary schools was left to the care of the communes. Nothing was done until after the Consulate to reorganize the universities. The surviving members of the ancient French Academy hoped that it would now be reestablished in its former position and privileges, but the most that Bonaparte and his advisers would concede was the reorganization of the Institute, in which the second of the four classes was devoted to the "French Language and Literature" and contained forty members, the number fixed for the membership of the old academy. The survivors of the three academies were then given seats in the Institute.

CHAP.
XVII
1799-1804

In the year of the Concordat still another wound of the Revolution received healing treatment. This was the affair of the emigrants. Bonaparte first attempted to deal with cases individually by a commission in the ministry of justice, but when he returned from Marengo he found that the commission had become a center of intrigue and corruption, so great were the temptations offered by the intense desire of emigrants or their friends to obtain favorable decisions. Fouché believed that the best method was to reduce the list arbitrarily by removing from it whole classes of names belonging to persons who had been driven from the country by fear, and who were not emigrants in any true sense, much less enemies. It was obviously impossible to consider each case separately for they numbered more than 100,000. The first concession to Fouché's system was a consular decree of September, 1800, which struck about 50,000 from the list, including names of relatives of emigrants, of their servants, and of others, which had been inserted in order to facilitate seizure of property. A final settlement of the question was made by *senatus consulte* ⁴ in April, 1802, in accordance with which all emigrants, except about 1,000 militant royalists, received the legal right to return, provided they availed themselves of the privilege within five months. If their estates had not been sold, they were restored.

Return of
the Emi-
grants

Beside the old nobility of birth Bonaparte sought to place a new aristocracy of achievement. In May, 1802, he created a Legion of Honor, and became like the ancient kings a dispenser of rewards and distinctions. According to the original plan the Legion was to number about 6,000 members, chosen by a council over which the First Consul should preside. The grounds of choice were distinguished services, civil as well as military. Bonaparte had been accustomed to reward his soldiers with

Legion
of Honor

⁴ A decision of the Senate in interpretation of the constitution.

CHAP.
XVII

1799-1804

"arms of honor," and the plan of the Legion embodied the same idea in a more developed form. At first the scheme was regarded as un-republican and was opposed more vigorously than most of Bonaparte's projects. Perhaps the size of the hostile vote in the legislative bodies measures the real opposition to the ambitious plans to secure greater personal power which he was pushing forward at the same time. The project passed the Council of State by a vote of 14 to 10; the Tribunate by 56 to 38, and the Legislative Corps by 166 to 110.

Industry

The Consulate not only reestablished the national credit, it opened an era of industrial progress and prosperity. In 1800 French industries had not recovered the position they occupied before the Revolution. Another decade was to elapse before the statistics were decidedly favorable to the new rather than to the old régime. Chaptal, the minister of the interior, was a distinguished chemist, and what was more, an administrator with a broad interest in every branch of industrial development. With Berthollet, Monge, and some others, he founded in 1801 a Society for the Encouragement of National Industry. He recognized the enormous advantage which mechanical inventions had given to the English and concluded that success in competition with them could be obtained only by introducing similar machinery.⁵ He invited to Paris Douglas, an expert English constructor, assigned to him a large building on an island in the Seine, lent him money, and promised an annual subsidy. The experiment was a success, for within a year fifty complete equipments were introduced. It was at this time also that the flying shuttle was first used by French weavers. The printing of muslins by means of engraved copper cylinders was begun. A distinctly French contribution was the improvement by Jacquart of the machinery for the production of silks. The progress in the application of the new machinery to manufacturing was, however, slow. Natural conservatism is the partial explanation of this. Another reason was the failure to introduce the steam engine, although it had been in successful use in English mills for more than ten years. Not until 1810 was a French spinning mill equipped with a steam engine.

It is an interesting fact that Robert Fulton's first success in propelling a boat by means of steam was gained at Paris in April, 1803. His boat moved up the river at the rate of six kilometers an hour. Bonaparte and his advisers were apparently not impressed by the importance of the invention, although

⁵ Mes Souvenirs sur Napoléon, 99.

at a later time when he was planning a descent upon the English coast he asked for a report from the Institute upon it. In his letter he declared that such an invention might "change the face of the world." But nothing came of this spasmodic interest.

The progress of manufacture by machinery was also dependent, as it had been in England, upon the development of the iron industry. In this the French were nearly half a century behind the English. Only tentative beginnings were made of the use of mined coal in smelting iron, and it was not until 1810 that the process of puddling was used at the Creusot works.

In order to stimulate public interest in the efforts made by French manufacturers, Chaptal organized an exposition late in the summer of 1801. It was so successful that another was organized in 1802, and the number of exhibitors was increased from 220 to 540. The First Consul took a keen interest in the display and examined with minute attention the goods which were on exhibition. What he saw increased his determination to apply a rigorously protectionist policy and enforce the Revolutionary laws against the importation of British products. One of the greatest benefits conferred by the new régime upon manufacturing and trade was internal peace and the improvement of the roads, which in many places had become almost impassable.

Some of the French manufacturers and tradesmen would have been glad to see the ancient guild system reëstablished, but the First Consul permitted this only in the meat and bread trades, where regulation by the State seemed necessary to the public health. The legislation against strikes or even unions of employees or employers was strengthened. The law also sought to secure on the part of workmen the fulfilment of their agreements by requiring them to present to a new employer a *livret* signed by the former employer showing that the previous contract had been completed. In spite of this legislation Bonaparte was popular among the Paris workmen. Employment was steady and wages were good, and the workmen were weary of being used as pawns in the political game. They were intensely French in their sympathies and were proud of the national policy that the First Consul seemed to pursue. Their desire for peace was far less earnest than that of the middle class.

Every legislature of the Revolution had planned to embody in a code the new principles of law which had been established, adjusting them to whatever of the old still remained. Immediately after the overthrow of the Directory a committee had undertaken to prepare such a code, but its work was inferior

CHAP.
XVII

1799-1804

and was not considered. The first serious step, in August, 1800, was the appointment of a committee of four eminent lawyers, who were expected to have a project ready in three months. This draft was printed in January, 1801, sent to the law courts for criticism, revised in the legislative section of the Council of State, and finally discussed in full council under the presidency of Bonaparte. Of eighty-seven general sessions he presided at thirty-five, and although his knowledge of law was limited to what he had picked up in desultory reading and in conversations with Portalis, Tronchet, and other councilors, he contributed not a little to the success of the discussions by reason of his capacity to go straight to the heart of a question. Thibaudeau, one of the ablest of his councilors, says that "he spoke without any preparation, embarrassment, or affectation; using the freedom of an ordinary conversation. . . . He was never inferior in tone or knowledge of the subject to any member of the Council; he usually equalled the most experienced of them in the facility with which he got at the root of a question, in the justice of his ideas, and in the force of his arguments. He often surpassed them all by the turn of his sentences and the originality of his expressions."⁶

The civil code was not completed during the first period of the Consulate, because its first "titles" were rejected by the Tribune and the Legislative Corps. In April, 1802, Bonaparte put an end to the general discussion of successive titles in the Tribune, ordering them submitted to the legislative section, which should send its criticisms to the Council. They were then presented to the Legislative Corps without further action of the Tribune, being explained by councilors chosen for this purpose. It was, however, two years before the project was carried to completion.

The civil code, like most other achievements of the Consulate, was a work of reconciliation and compromise, although it embodied some ideas decidedly reactionary. The legislation of the Revolution had seriously menaced the stability of the family, which the code sought to strengthen by depriving natural children of the favors conferred by the Convention, surrounding even adoption with restrictions, and by enhancing paternal authority. The father could now dispose freely by will of from one-fourth to one-half of his property. He was given the right of disciplinary arrest, a revival of the practice of issuing *lettres de cachet* to protect family honor or to compel obedience. In

⁶ Bonaparte and the Consulate, 168.

such cases he had only to apply to the district judge for the order, which must be made without inquiry. The position of woman was weakened. She had no share in the family property and must obey as a child. Divorce was preserved, but mutual consent was necessary unless grave specific reasons offered ground for an action in court. For the sake of Catholic consciences, judicial separation was reestablished. The code was not free from defects, due in some instances to haste and to lack of exact knowledge, but Bonaparte justly regarded it as one of the great achievements of his government. At a later period of his career, when French influence was dominant in Western Europe, it was an effective instrument for the spread of the principles of the Revolution applied to civil order.

Neither the program nor the ambitions of the First Consul were subjected to control by the press. As the Parisian journals during the Provisional Consulate had shown tendencies towards frank independent criticism, no sooner was the Consulate organized than the *Moniteur*, the principal newspaper, was bridled by making it the official journal, and all others except thirteen designated by name were suppressed on the ground that they served the interests of the enemy rather than those of France. Bonaparte regarded a journal and its subscribers as forming a species of club, and, as clubs were not tolerated, he saw no reason for preserving journals. Among those permitted to exist were, however, one or two belonging to the opposition. All were warned in vague terms, recalling the worst legislation of the Jacobins, against printing articles contrary to the sovereignty of the people or the glory of the armies, or which might disturb public opinion and trouble commerce, and were ordered more specifically to publish no military news or references to religion. Outside of Paris it became the policy to have a single newspaper in each department, carefully supervised by the prefect. Bonaparte wished the newspapers to preserve an air of liberty, but he rigorously repressed any tendencies towards independence. By 1803 only eight newspapers, besides the *Moniteur*, were published in Paris, and their subscription list contained 18,680 names.

The general feeling of gratitude, created by the achievements of the Consulate, and especially by the successful negotiation of the Treaty of Amiens, was skilfully utilized by Bonaparte and his supporters to make his power virtually monarchical. Many professed to see in the permanence of his control the only effective barrier against the return of the anarchy of the Directory. His admirers were so ardent that their schemes often outran his most

CHAP.
XVII

1799-1804

The
Press

Consulate
for Life

CHAP.
XVII

1799-1804

venturesome resolutions and gave to these an air of moderation. On May 6, the day the Peace of Amiens was formally announced, the Tribune, prompted by the second consul, Cambacérès, spoke in favor of according to General Bonaparte a "signal pledge of national gratitude." Individual members of the Senate were asked to give this the form of an election as Consul for Life. The proposal was brought up at a session of the Senate, but the majority tried to head off the demand by voting to reelect Bonaparte for a second term, prolonging his tenure of office until 1819. In a letter to the Senate he pretended that he could not consider the burdens of a second term (whose beginnings were still seven years distant) unless the people should impose such a sacrifice.

When the terms of a referendum or plebiscite were discussed by the Council of State, his partisans argued that it would not be right to restrict the question to the confirmation or rejection of the Senate's vote, and that the people should have an opportunity to decide the larger question. Under guise of offering such an opportunity the Council decided that the voters should be asked to vote "Yes" or "No" on the question, "Shall Napoleon Bonaparte become Consul for Life?" The question was embodied in a consular decree and the votes were recorded on open registers. There was some talk that the Senate would intervene, but timidity soon got the better of the impulse to safeguard the republican constitution. The plebiscite was an immense success for the Bonapartists—if the group which engineered the enterprise may be so named—for, out of 3,577,259 persons voting, only 8,374 voted "No." Among these was Lafayette, who owed his return from prison and exile to Bonaparte, but who wrote the First Consul that he would vote for the Consulship for Life when the First Consul should add to the benefits of his "reparatory" dictatorship the greater benefit of the reestablishment of political liberty.

Bonaparte took advantage of the overwhelming vote in his favor to revise the constitution in such a way as to leave no effective obstacle to the realization of his will. He inserted a right to designate his successor, although he had stricken this out of the question submitted to the voters. He secured control of the Senate through the privilege of naming for each of the fourteen vacancies still remaining two candidates, of whom the Senate should choose one, and the further privilege of appointing forty other senators. The possibility of opposition in the Council was lessened by the creation of a Privy Council, whose personnel should be chosen for each session by Bonaparte

from the ministers and councilors. Treaties were to be referred to this body for confirmation, instead of being subject to the chances of ordinary legislative measures as before. The new council also received the right to lay before the Senate projects for the interpretation of the constitution and the regulation of matters not provided for in its text. Such projects, if accepted by the Senate, were promulgated as *senatus consultes* and enjoyed the same authority as other parts of the constitution.

In the new constitutional arrangements an attempt was made to conciliate or hoodwink public opinion by adding to the duties of the voter. A hierarchy of electoral assemblies was organized, beginning with primary assemblies made up of all voters in each canton. But the electoral assemblies received only rights of nomination, the appointing power resting as before with the First Consul. Indeed, his power of appointment was increased, for he named even the justices of the peace, who had been elected up to this time. Moreover, the original electoral assemblies were chosen by the notables on the communal list and held their positions for life, with the consequence that the primary assemblies organized two years later could only fill vacancies, and not even these until two-thirds of the places were vacant.

The change in the constitution was accompanied by a return to monarchical manners, requiring an expenditure correspondingly royal. The civil list of the First Consul was increased from 500,000 francs to 6,000,000. Henceforward the Republic existed only in name. The Empire was not far off.

CHAPTER XVIII

BEGINNINGS OF REVOLUTION IN GERMANY

CHAP.
XVIII

1795-1803

Attitude
toward the
Revolution

AFTER the signature of the Treaty of Lunéville a revolution in German affairs was inevitable. The only question was, How far would it go? Would it mean simply the shifting of a few boundary lines, a slight modification of the constitution of the empire, or would it lead to changes which in the end would bring into being a new Germany, capable of assuming a greater rôle? The answer to these questions is to be found in the tendencies of German life and thought in the decade which followed the Peace of Basel quite as much as in any conclusions reached by the diplomats to whom the problems presented by the Treaty of Lunéville were referred.

In outward appearance the Germany of 1801 was altogether similar to the Germany of 1763. The old régime had been modified in no essential particular. Some changes had been made, but they were not profound enough to affect the general situation. Were it not for the reforms which were to follow, these changes might be regarded as belated efforts of "Enlightened Despotism" rather than as precursors of a reorganization far more radical. The moral influence of the French Revolution in Germany had not been great or lasting. Public opinion was confused by the spectacle of Jacobin violence, and early enthusiasms were chilled by the miseries of a war which involved nearly all Western Europe. The philosopher Kant, it is true, still retained his conviction that the Revolution was essentially sound and declared that the acts of the Jacobins were no worse than the misdeeds of many tyrannical rulers. The direct influence of the movement did not, however, penetrate far beyond the Rhine, and even in that region the conduct of French generals and civil commissioners did not serve the cause of the propaganda.

A New
Periclean
Age

The principal reason why Revolutionary ideas found so little lodgment in German minds was that Germany had won her intellectual and moral independence. She had ceased to look to France for leadership in literature or in philosophy. By 1795 it was Kant's teaching that controlled the reflections of the most thoughtful minds. The achievements of Goethe and Schiller

were fast giving Germany the right to claim for her literature a place beside the literatures of France and England. The period from 1794 to 1805 was a new Periclean Age, with Weimar as the modern Athens. Of the older poets Wieland was still there. Goethe had been there for twenty years and Schiller for nearly ten. Herder was also there until his death in 1803. The intimate association of Goethe and Schiller began in 1794, three years after Goethe had been made director of the court theater. In rapid succession came Schiller's greatest plays — *Wallenstein*, *Maria Stuart*, *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*, and *Wilhelm Tell*, the last the year before Schiller died. In 1796 Goethe had published *Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre* and the next year *Hermann und Dorothea*. He did not complete the second version of *Faust* until three years after Schiller's death.

It is not without significance that at a time when Germany was about to sink to the depths of humiliation politically the German language reached its full maturity as an instrument for the expression of lofty ideals and the interpretation of experience. This meant that the disunion of the German people was only apparent and temporary. The power for a moral renaissance and a political reconstruction was simply waiting to be roused. Schiller and Goethe, and Lessing and Herder, who preceded them, were "the true representatives of public life," "the true upholders of national honor," and the creators of the soul which in the nineteenth century "at last wrought for itself a body."¹

The German poets and philosophers of this period have been accused of being too much concerned with the problems of the individual and indifferent to dangers which threatened their land with political enslavement. It is true that for a long time they had seemed to be content with a social order which left them at leisure to cultivate poetry and the arts or to study scientific problems, dwelling serene on the far slopes of thought or feeling, while below plodded peasant and townsman, the one with the task of furnishing recruits to the army and servants to the nobles, the other with the duty of enriching the State by industry and trade. This is not a surprising attitude considering the rigid political framework of German society under the old régime. The most thoughtful minds, hedged in on every side by barriers upon which neither caustic satire nor vigorous criticism made much impression, were naturally thrown back upon questions of individual experience. Some great impact from without was apparently needed to wreck and discredit the

CHAP.
XVIII
1795-1803

Tenden-
cies in
German
Literature

¹ Francke, *History of German Literature*, 397, 398.

CHAP.
XVIII

1795-1803

Romantic
Movement

old system before a broader and more healthful public spirit could find room to live and breathe. To furnish that impact was Napoleon's function. Meanwhile, however, there were German thinkers who were disgusted with their isolation from public life and the concerns of the common people. In the *Mono-logues* which Schleiermacher published in 1800 he asked, "Where is the devotion which would rather sacrifice the narrow consciousness of personality . . . which would rather risk the individual life than that the fatherland should perish?" And he added, "So far removed is this age from even the dimmest conception of what the highest form of human life means, that they think that State the best which is felt the least. . . ." ²

That tendency in German literature which has been described as the Romantic Movement was also beginning to make itself felt in the first years of the new century. One of its consequences was to interest Germans in their early folk songs and tales and in their earlier history. In 1805 two writers of this Romantic School published a collection of folk songs called *Des Knaben Wunderhorn*, the predecessor of the more famous *Kinder- und Hausmärchen* published by the brothers Grimm seven years later. As has been remarked: "Naturally the common folk who had created all this began to appear in a new light. The plain man had suddenly become as the hero of a long-neglected romance." ³ A new German patriotism was nourished by such poems and tales, since the people gained a stronger feeling for their land and its associations.

As the leaders of the Romantic School turned to the Middle Ages for their inspiration, their writings quickened the interest in the history of medieval Germany. Herder's teaching that the literature of a people at any epoch is an expression of the national development exercised an influence in the same direction. The idea which the Romanticists had formed of medieval life was often sentimental and fanciful, but it was corrected with the progress of historical studies. The main thing at the time was the creation of a genuine interest. Already in F. A. Wolf's discussion of the Homeric question an excellent example had been presented of the application of the historical method to a literary problem. Young German scholars were being trained in the Greek seminaries of Beck and Hermann at Leipzig to use the same exact method. It was only a question of a few years before some of these students would apply it in investigations of the earlier history of Germany.

² Francke, 431.

³ Thomas, German Literature, 341.

The old régime was undermined in another direction by the spread of sound ideas upon economic conditions. A new translation of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, published in 1794, exercised a wide influence. Its doctrines were championed especially by Professor Kraus, a colleague of Kant at Königsberg, who had turned from philosophy to economics. In 1796 he declared that "since the time of the New Testament no work has had more beneficial effects than this will have if it should be more . . . deeply impressed upon the minds of all who have to do with public affairs."⁴ Kraus made it his business to "possess some excellent heads with it," a very important achievement indeed because these very men were to have a share in the reorganization of Prussia a few years later.

CHAP.
XVIII
1795-1803
Reformers

The men who were soon to lead in the revival of German public spirit and to undertake definite tasks of reform were already in the service of various German States, particularly of Prussia. The most notable example was Baron vom Stein, an imperial knight, who had been a Prussian official since the closing years of Frederick's reign. From 1796 to 1804 he was provincial governor of Westphalia. Hardenberg, who had negotiated the Treaty of Basel, and who was also to have an important share in the regeneration of Prussia, was originally from Hanover. Scharnhorst, to whom the army of the Wars of Liberation was to owe its organization, was another Hanoverian, and he did not become a Prussian officer until 1801. Schön, one of the authors of the Emancipation Edict of 1807, had begun his administrative career in 1793. His father had been a friend of Kant and he had been influenced by Kraus at the University of Königsberg. This official class, recruited often from young men of ideas and capacity, was an important center of public opinion, partly making up for the lack of an organized "third estate."

Stein

Moreover, serious attempts to remove the obstacles to a healthier social and industrial life were made. If they did not save Germany from disaster, it was that they were belated, were not radical enough, were not wide enough in scope, and did not always receive the hearty support of the administration. During the reign of Frederick William II, Prussia suffered from a natural reaction against the severe system of Frederick the Great as well as from the blighting influence of royal favorites and mistresses. Frederick William III, who became King in 1797, was a prince of attractive private virtues, but timid and

Reform in
Prussia

⁴ Seeley, *Life and Times of Stein*, I. 409.

CHAP.
XVIII

1795-1803

hesitant, to whom men of greater energy of character and originality of mind were uncongenial. From the beginning, however, he showed an anxious desire to improve the condition of the peasantry, regarding the French Revolution as a warning to unjust princes. His apparent zeal aroused enthusiasm in Berlin, and men looked for a revolution from above which in beneficent results should put to shame the Jacobin upheaval. One of the most serious obstacles to reform was the burden of Polish territory, the spoil of the second and third partitions of Poland, since the German element in the Hohenzollern States was not strong enough to render easy the assimilation of so large a Slavic population. The seizure of these lands had also opened opportunities for the enrichment of officials, bringing scandal and disorganization into the Prussian service. Fortunately a Napoleonic amputation soon relieved the Prussian State of the incubus.

The peasant reforms attempted by Frederick William III were the logical continuation of efforts begun in the reigns of Frederick William I and Frederick the Great. The condition of the peasants was, on the whole, pitiful, although the burdens differed in different provinces. Even in some western provinces, where more rapid progress might have been looked for, the peasants were still serfs, subject to dues like the heriot, which permitted the lord at the peasant's death to take half his personal property. The law was more severe than the practice, but the nobles were loath to abandon any of their rights without a compensation which government officials thought excessive. In the last year of the reign of Frederick William II a reform had been begun in Westphalia, transforming labor dues into money payments on the lands of the royal domain and encouraging the peasants to become proprietors of their farms. Frederick William III pursued this policy in other parts of the domain, not everywhere with the same success. In Silesia the redemption of obligatory services went on slowly, while in Prussia proper little progress was made in the creation of peasant properties. The peasants were more eager to be rid of the burdens of compulsory labor than to acquire proprietorship, since with proprietorship would cease the assistance which the State as ultimate owner was wont to grant in times of war, famine, and pestilence. The King's advisers were anxious to avoid the danger that the freedom of the peasants would result in their abandoning the soil. In Pomerania and the central Marks the creation of peasant properties was more successful. The conviction

that a thoroughgoing reform was needed was not strong enough to enable the King to impose similar plans upon the nobles.

This period saw also the beginnings of administrative reform in Prussia. Stein was one of the leaders in the movement. The early sphere of his activity was in Westphalia, where the excise system of the eastern provinces, with its rigid distinction between town and open country, had never been fully introduced. His most useful work was the readjustment of the tax system in order to harmonize the interests of peasants and townsmen. Among other things, the tariff was rearranged, freeing raw material, and taxing merchants who dealt in foreign manufactured articles. In the county of Mark he abolished internal customs barriers, collecting the tariff at the frontiers, a first step toward the complete reorganization of the Prussian customs system which was made long afterwards in 1818. Such changes were excellent, but slight in amount compared with the need. The forces of conservatism and privilege were still too strong. It was the rude hand of the spoiler, rather than the projects of enlightened reformers, which pushed Germany on toward fundamental changes.

The reform movement was not limited to Prussia. In southern Germany its most significant incidents occurred in Bavaria. The Elector's principal minister, the Count de Montgelas, an illuminist of Savoyard extraction, was inclined to reforms of the type attempted by Joseph II, and was especially eager to attack the supremacy of the Church, which had held undisputed sway in Bavaria since the days of the Catholic Reformation. The clerical order numbered one for every 166 inhabitants, and half of the number were monks or nuns. In a series of edicts from 1800 to 1803, the Bavarian Protestants were granted toleration and the right to acquire landed property. The protests of the aristocracy were met with the reminder that the example of Prussia and Hanover proved that prosperity was not dependent upon unity of faith. Two years later followed an attack on the monastic orders; some were dissolved, others consolidated in fewer cloisters, none were permitted to receive novices. The aim was mainly fiscal, but much of the property was dissipated because the work was entrusted to unskilful or dishonest hands.

Germany had long been the principal battle-ground of Europe and had been frequently sacrificed at treaties of peace. This hard fate was the consequence of political disintegration. There was a "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation," and yet Germany had ceased to be much more than a geographical ex-

CHAP.
XVIII

1795-1803

Bavaria

Holy
Roman
Empire

CHAP.
XVIII

1795-1803

pression. The Empire was composed of more than three hundred and fifty States, ranging in size from the electorate of Brandenburg, ruled by the Prussian king, and the Austrian duchies, possessed by the Hapsburgs, to lordships or counties a few miles square. A day's journey "might take a traveler through the territories of a free city, a sovereign abbot, a village belonging to an imperial knight, and the dominions of a landgrave, a duke, a prince, and a king, so small, so numerous, and so diverse were the principalities."⁵ If the imperial baronies, situated in Swabia, Franconia, and the Rhine country, be counted the number of German sovereign States was over twelve hundred. These States recognized no master except the distant Emperor, who had succeeded in preserving only a shadow of his former prerogatives. Their only means of common action was the imperial diet, at which many of them no longer took the trouble to be represented. It was nominally made up of a college of electors, a college of princes, and a college of free cities. If these colleges reached a common conclusion, this must receive the approval of the Emperor. The rivalries of Prussia and Austria, which had been especially keen since the accession of Frederick II in 1740, had still further weakened the crumbling structure of imperial government. They exposed Germany to exactly that kind of meddling on the part of outside powers which followed the Treaty of Lunéville.

Peace of
Lunéville

The Emperor Francis had agreed in the treaty that the princes dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine should be indemnified according to the plan adopted tentatively at the Congress of Rastadt. The situation offered France an opportunity to intervene in regulating the indemnities and to work for the organization of a group of minor States dependent upon her. This danger could be lessened only by hastening a settlement of the question before the French should have their hands freed by peace with England. The imperial diet ratified the Treaty of Lunéville promptly, but there unanimity ceased and conflicting interests made themselves felt.

The German ecclesiastical princes — archbishops, bishops, and abbots — menaced by the plan of seizing their territories in order to furnish compensation for the dispossessed, argued that the losses should be distributed among all classes of States. They hoped for the support of the Emperor, because they had been the bulwark of Hapsburg power. His inclination was to insist that only enough ecclesiastical territory should be secularized

⁵ Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire*, 2nd ed., 405, n.

to meet actual losses. He was also in favor of preserving the electorates of Mainz, Treves, and Cologne, endowing them with territory belonging to minor ecclesiastical rulers.

CHAP.
XVIII

1795-1803

The policy of the Austrians, however, went beyond the project of indemnities for losses incurred by the cession to France of a part of the Empire. In the first place they sought compensation for the Hapsburg grand duke who had been deprived of Tuscany. They also were intent upon reviving earlier schemes of aggrandizement. They wished particularly to push their frontiers westward at the expense of Bavaria, and suggested that the Elector take in exchange enough baronies, cities, and other petty States along the upper Danube and the Neckar. Such schemes, emanating from their historic enemy, were unpalatable to the Bavarians, and hinted, moreover, that other classes of weak States besides ecclesiastical principalities were threatened with ruin. A chief element in the Austrian policy was the desire to prevent the enlargement of Prussia.

Rival
Schemes

The Hohenzollerns abandoned their attitude as guardians of Germany more completely than the Hapsburgs, and they were so intent upon gaining the utmost which the occasion afforded that they appeared mainly as beneficiaries of French partiality. Bonaparte, like his predecessors in the Committee of Public Safety and the Directory, pursued the policy of a Prussian alliance, which he was ready to purchase by large concessions of territory. This did not prevent his attempting to bring to an end Prussian interests in South Germany by arranging an exchange by which they should give up Ansbach and Baireuth and receive Mecklenburg, together with some Westphalian bishoprics or abbeys. This would facilitate his plan of constructing a "Third Germany," composed of the minor southern States jealous of both Prussia and Austria. But the Prussians had a plan of their own altogether contrary to this, proposing to receive part of their indemnities in Bamberg and Würzburg, which with Ansbach and Baireuth would form a large block of territory in the heart of southern Germany. Since the German powers were hopelessly divided and given over to selfish aims, the solution of the problem of conflicting covetousness belonged to Bonaparte and to France.

The rivalry of Austria and Prussia was illustrated during the summer of 1801 in the affair of the archbishopric of Cologne, to which was also attached the bishopric of Münster. The archbishop died on July 27, and Austria immediately took steps to promote the election of a successor, hoping to throw an obstacle in the way of secularization. As a part of the Münster lands

CHAP.
XVIII

1795-1803

Imperial
Deputa-
tion

had been promised to Prussia as indemnity, the Prussians protested that no election should take place until the question of indemnities was settled. The members of both cathedral chapters naturally took the Austrian view of the matter and elected to the vacant see the Archduke Anton, the brother of the Emperor. The Prussians declared that they would not recognize the election, whereupon the Austrians, not wishing the matter to assume too serious an aspect, conceded that the election should have no bearing upon the question of indemnities.

After the diet had confirmed the treaty it was necessary to find a basis for the detailed settlement of indemnities. The secular princes, particularly Prussia and Bavaria, were ready to abandon to the Emperor the odious responsibility of proposing a definite plan of despoiling the victims. This he declined to do, although he was willing to arrange the indemnities if his decisions should be accepted as final, for he would thus become the dispenser of enormous patronage. The matter dragged on through the summer, and in September the Emperor proposed that a deputation of eight members should undertake the task. The *Reichsdeputation*, or Imperial Deputation, as finally constituted, was made up of four electoral States — Mainz, Saxony, Brandenburg (representing Prussia), and Bohemia (representing Austria) — and four members of the college of princes — Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Württemberg, and the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order. Only two of these, Bohemia and the Grand Master, were likely to accept the Hapsburg view of the situation, although Mainz and Saxony were not ready to go so far as the remaining four. But the deputation accomplished nothing, serving merely as the instrument which French diplomacy used to work its will.

The
French
Plan

As it became apparent that the question of indemnities was to be settled in Paris the German princes who had something to gain or lose hastened to the capital of France or sent their representatives. Rumor declared that French officials had their price and were ready to utilize a unique opportunity to establish their fortunes. The salon of Talleyrand, Bonaparte's minister of foreign affairs, was the center of these manœuvres. "Princes and dukes, princesses and duchesses, paid huge sums to be comprehended in the indemnities. Some of the money was intercepted by swindling agents: much found its way into the long purse of Talleyrand, whose enormous fortune was largely built out of the complimentary gifts which he received for his services upon this occasion."⁶ In August, 1801, Bonaparte signed a

⁶ Fisher, *Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany*, 41.

treaty with Bavaria, promising compensation for losses on the left bank of the Rhine as well as for all other losses, and thus guaranteeing the Elector against Austrian schemes. The terms of the treaty showed also that the question of indemnity was becoming merged in the larger question of the territorial reorganization of Germany. Before the year was over France was freer to take the initiative in German matters, because the signature of the Preliminaries of London had ended the war with England, and especially because a treaty of peace with Russia pledged the Czar to act in agreement with the French on the German question. In May, 1802, the French plan was embodied in separate treaties with Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, and Hesse-Cassel, and was accepted by Russia as a basis for joint mediation.

Although half of the States in the Imperial Deputation were now bound by treaty to support the French plan, months passed before the business was completed. As soon as the Emperor Francis heard of the proceedings he issued a rescript declaring that the integrity of the empire must be preserved and that the usual mode of procedure must be followed. The Prussians, however, regarded the matter as so far settled that they despatched troops to occupy the lands allotted to them, including Münster. The Bavarians attempted to occupy Passau, but the bishop appealed to the Austrians, and they reached the city first. When the deputation reassembled, the Emperor insisted that each claim for indemnity be examined separately, denying that the preservation of a balance of interests between the various States was the principal question. At this juncture the representatives of France and Russia at Regensburg (Ratisbon), the seat of the diet, notified the deputation that a final decision must be reached within two months. The princes were satisfied with their own prospects and anxious to accept the Franco-Russian plan as a basis, but the Emperor still resisted, evidently holding out for better terms. These the French conceded, increasing the compensation of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena, and giving Austria the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen. The Emperor now consented to bring the "Conclusion" of the "Imperial Deputation" before the diet. New delays would have ensued had the victims been permitted a voice in the question of their own destruction, but it was decided to call the names of the spiritual princes and declare them absent. In this way the "Conclusion" was adopted in March, 1803, and, a month later, was ratified by the Emperor — with

CHAP.
XVIII

1795-1803

The
"Conclu-
sion"

CHAP.
XVIII

1795-1803

Gains
and
Losses

reservations, touching particularly the distribution of votes in the reorganized college of princes.

From the details of the settlement it is clear that the necessity of indemnifying the dispossessed princes had served as an occasion for a new distribution of power amounting to a veritable revolution. Prussia had lost only 127,000 inhabitants by her cession of territory on the left bank, and she received in compensation 500,000. Bavaria's gain was not relatively as large, but Baden and Württemberg were given ten times as much as they lost, partly because of Bonaparte's scheme of a "Third Germany," and partly because their ruling princes were relatives of the Czar. So much territory was assigned to the larger States that not enough could be found to indemnify dispossessed counts and barons, and many lost both their property and their status in the empire. They and the ecclesiastical princes were not the only victims. Of over fifty free cities only six remained: Hamburg, Augsburg, Nuremberg, Lübeck, Bremen, and Frankfurt — two or three of these receiving slight territorial gains.

The settlement influenced the fortunes of individual States, the constitution of the empire, and the position of the Church. The most obvious result was the simplification of the map of Germany. Two classes of States, one with a single exception, the other with only six, disappeared. The ecclesiastical States had been especially extensive in the south and west, where the tide of the Lutheran Reformation had been stayed. They now vanished from the map. The Archbishop-Elector of Mainz was indemnified with the principality and bishopric of Regensburg, besides other ecclesiastical and secular lands, and was made Elector of Regensburg, Archbishop of Regensburg and Prince-Primate of Germany. The largest of the destroyed ecclesiastical States were Salzburg, Würzburg, and Münster. The suppression of most of the free cities affected the map less obviously because their rule did not extend far beyond their walls. The States which received ecclesiastical lands and free cities acquired continuity of territory and ceased to be a puzzling patchwork of color. In the case of Münster the complexity was increased, for it was divided between six or seven States besides Prussia. The annexations to Prussia still left the map of western Germany intricate, and many Berliners declared that Prussia had received merely a few more "islands" in Westphalia.

The future of Bavaria was affected by annexation of the better part of Würzburg, part of Bamberg, of Passau, and of Freising, besides many towns and abbeys. Her territory was extended northward toward the center of Germany, and she

gained a population more progressive and cultured. The Prussian gains were not to be despised, for they were large relatively to the losses, but the chief advantage was a population purely German, which in its influence upon the development of this group of States would offset the addition of a large Slavic population from the partitions of Poland. The acquisition of Münster was especially valuable, because under the rule of the later bishops it had become a center of civilization in the best sense. With other annexed territory — the bishopric of Paderborn and the abbeys of Essen and Werden — it was so situated as to facilitate communication between provinces already possessed.

CHAP.
XVIII
1795-1803

The settlement of 1803 meant the ruin of the Holy Roman Empire. The disappearance of 112 States affected the organization of the diet, of the imperial court, and of the circles. The college of free cities, one of the constituent elements of the diet, was practically annihilated. The most serious consequence was the destruction of the alliance with the Church, upon which in theory the empire rested. Two ecclesiastical electors, Treves and Cologne, were suppressed, and four lay electorates added — Baden, Württemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and Salzburg. Moreover, a Catholic majority was changed into a Protestant majority of six to four, making the succession of another Hapsburg on the throne of the empire doubtful. The majority in the college of princes was also changed; the total number being reduced from 100 to 82, of which the Protestants controlled 52 or 53 and the Catholics 29 or 30. The Emperor, insisting that it was necessary to preserve the parity between the religions, desired to increase the number of Catholic votes; but the empire disappeared before the question was settled. The Pope now referred to it as *Imperium Germanicum*, rather than as *Imperium Romanum*, and turned to the First Consul for a protector of Catholic interests in Germany.

Effect
upon the
Empire

The results to the Catholic Church in Germany were hardly less revolutionary. The property of the monasteries, not only of those deprived of sovereignty by the "Conclusion," but also of those lying within the States of indemnified princes, was placed at the disposition of rulers for educational, religious, or even ordinary governmental expenditures. The property of convents for women could, however, be touched only with the consent of the local bishop. Universities were sometimes affected, a part of their revenues coming from religious foundations. Several had already lost similar property situated west of the Rhine. The foundations for the support of the clergy of the

The
Catholic
Church

CHAP.
XVIII
1795-1803

cathedral chapters, over 700 in number, were confiscated, depriving Catholic noblemen of an opportunity of obtaining lucrative prebends for younger sons. Henceforward the priesthood was recruited more largely from the middle class and the peasantry; during the remainder of this period no nobleman of ancient family entered the German priesthood. The position of bishop was less attractive, now that it was divorced from sovereignty, and the change affected the attitude as well as the interests of the clergy. The higher church dignitaries, no longer rulers, responsible for interests purely German, became in policy ultramontane, papal, like the French clergy whom the Revolution had despoiled.

The old imperial constitution had been the bulwark of weak States as well as the safeguard of the Catholic Church. The glamour which had hitherto protected privileges possessed for centuries had received as rude a blow as that inflicted by the Lutheran movement in the sixteenth century, and the dynastic ambitions of a few houses had become the dominant element in the situation. More than ever before Germany was open to those who desired to add to their territories or to create new States. In southern Germany a group of secondary States had been formed, which were to serve as a make-weight against both Hapsburg and Hohenzollern ambitions. At the same time the trend of the Hapsburg power eastward was emphasized by the loss of its westernmost territories, pointing to a time when Germany would be organized without Austria.

Münster

After the work of division ended the task of assimilation began. For Prussia the treatment of Münster, its most important acquisition, may be considered as typical. The administration was entrusted to Stein, whose attitude was conciliatory. He wished to preserve the old organization as far as possible in order to give opportunity for the growth of a spirit of co-operation. Already distrustful of the work of uncontrolled bureaucracies, he believed that the administration would need the counsel and the criticism of the local estates. His Prussian superiors, however, only promised that the Münster estates should be treated like those of the older provinces, which meant that they would have little to do. The monastic and other foundations devoted to educational work, to the care of hospitals, or to the training of nurses and teachers were maintained, although much of the property was used for ordinary governmental expenditure. The problem of taxation was perplexing, for, evidently, the usual excise system could not be introduced in complete form. In most of the territories west of the Weser

a moderate tariff system was established, on the understanding that the merchants would purchase part of their stock in regions where the excise was in force.

CHAP.
XVIII

1795-1803

In South Germany the changes were more radical and were shaped consciously upon French models. The general aim was to substitute the machinery of a centralized State for the confusion of numberless jurisdictions and antiquated privileges. The instrument was an efficient bureaucracy. One consequence was higher taxation to meet the expenses of the new system and to put an army on foot. In Bavaria an interesting attempt was made to improve the tenant right of the peasantry, but neither there nor in Baden did such efforts lead to much more than changes in terminology descriptive of peasant obligations and burdens.⁷ The Elector of Württemberg regarded the time as opportune for the consolidation of his personal power; but his methods displayed the vices as well as the benefits of centralized administration, and gained him the bad repute of a tyrant.

South
Germany

Among the questions which were not settled in 1803 was the status of the Imperial Knights. Bavaria had already begun to encroach upon the rights of the Franconian Knights, on the theory that the knights had once been simply nobles, and that they should now be reduced to that position. In October, 1803, a patent was issued embodying this view, and it was followed by a forcible occupation of many knightly lands. Other States were more than ready to imitate so profitable an example. Even petty princes, with territories only a little larger than those of the knights, seized the opportunity to round out their possessions. One seizure proved more historic than the rest. On the last day of 1803 the Duke of Nassau-Usingen sent officials and soldiers to occupy two villages belonging to the Baron vom Stein. Stein immediately summoned him to the bar of German opinion, declaring in an open letter, apropos of the duke's published reasons, "Germany's independence will be little helped through the absorption of the knightly possessions by the small lands which surround them. If a great and advantageous end is to be accomplished, these small States must be united to the two great monarchies upon whose existence depends the fate of the German name." And he added a prayer that he might live to see this done. The action of Bavaria and her imitators was premature. The Emperor for the last time vigorously asserted his powers and through the imperial court annulled the annexa-

Imperial
Knights

⁷ For a more favorable view of changes in Bavaria, see Doeberl, *Entwicklungsgeschichte Bayerns*, II, 396.

**CHAP.
XVIII**

1795-1803

tions. This was decisive because France was unwilling to intervene actively in the affair, and Prussia, although jealous of Austria's attitude, did not support Bavaria.

Meanwhile the German question had been reopened in another form by the French occupation of Hanover, situated in northern Germany beyond the demarcation line drawn in 1795. This was an incident in a larger struggle commenced in 1803.

CHAPTER XIX

FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE

BEFORE the Treaty of Amiens was signed the First Consul entered upon a course of conduct which made the long continuance of peace improbable. To what extent he was carrying out with greater intelligence policies which had been adopted by the Directory, and to what extent he gave them a more aggressive turn and a new character, is not easy to determine. In his attempt to recover the earlier French colonial empire it was not his fault if the projected transfer of Louisiana aroused the fears of the United States and threatened to turn the peace-loving Jefferson into a resolute and irreconcilable enemy, for the scheme was well under way before he became master of the destinies of France. This is less true of the ideas which guided him in dealing with the European situation, although his acts may be considered as only a successful application of the principles which had directed French foreign policy since 1795. He flattered the conviction of the French that they were the "*grande nation*," and convinced them that their version of their own rights or of the rights of their neighbors was not subject to protest or revision; but, at the same time, he prepared a cruel disappointment of their genuine desire for peace. Moreover, while he strengthened the control of France beyond her borders, he associated it with his personal supremacy. He became an imperial figure long before the Republic was transformed into the Empire.

Bonaparte's policy, its benefits as well as its dangers, is well illustrated in the history of Italy from 1800 to 1805. The French were welcomed in 1800, although the year before they had been so unpopular that some Italian republicans fought on the side of the Allies. The Austrians had proved to be masters as harsh as the French in their exactions and more detestable in their policy, imprisoning all identified with French rule. New victories did not change the character of the French, whose army of occupation was commanded by Murat, now Bonaparte's brother-in-law. The country was levied on without compunction by generals and by civil agents, and, while spoliation was

CHAP.
XIX

1803-04

Treatment
of Italy

CHAP.

XIX

1803-04

less irregular, the result was a more complete exhaustion. The Cisalpine Republic was at once restored, with a provisional administration, assisted by an assembly of notables. It was not proposed to put in force the former constitution, but to draw up another, on the lines of the new French constitution, and to place at the head of the government a president and a vice-president. Bonaparte's original intention was to make his brother Joseph president, but Joseph had no relish for the rôle of puppet, and demanded as conditions of his acceptance that the army of occupation be withdrawn and that the territory of the republic be enlarged by the addition of Piedmont. Bonaparte concluded to take the presidency himself. A "Consulta," composed of 454 Italian delegates, was brought together at Lyons in December and January, 1801-1802, and Talleyrand was sent from Paris to win over a majority for Bonaparte's plan before the assembly was formally convened. A committee was appointed to consider the draft of the new constitution and to prepare a list of officials. When the question of the presidency arose, the members voted first for Count Melzi, a distinguished Lombard noble, but, upon a hint from Talleyrand, elected Bonaparte, choosing Melzi as vice-president. Bonaparte then proceeded to Lyons for the formal session. He addressed the delegates in Italian, and before reading the text of the constitution inquired whether they wished to inscribe at the head "Cisalpine" or "Italian." When some cried out "Italian," he decided that this should be the name of the new republic. The national hopes of the delegates were flattered, and they looked forward to the Italy dreamed of by Alfieri, an "*Italia virtuosa, magnanima, libera ed una.*"

Bonaparte was determined to secure French supremacy in Italy, and kept an army of occupation in the new republic at its expense, but he meant to make an end of the injustice and robbery from which the Italians had suffered. The two men whom he chose to inaugurate his policies were Melzi, the vice-president, and Prina, a former councilor of the King of Sardinia. Melzi was a serious student of public affairs, as well as a man of ancient family and great wealth. The only class which he found it difficult to conciliate were politicians of the Jacobin type, who had pushed their way up to prominence during the anarchy of the series of revolutions. He also had to contend against the particularist tendencies of the region south of the Po, which did not wish to remain under the domination of Milan. The constant presence of a French army, under an officer like Murat, with the airs of a conqueror and a leader of faction, was a source

of irritation to the sensitive Italian population, which was hostile to dependence upon France.

Count Melzi, with the aid of Prina, commenced an important work of reorganization. Universal military service was introduced, and the army increased from about 8,000 irregulars to 20,000 citizen soldiers. Military schools were established. A *gendarmerie* was created to put down brigandage. In spite of the heavy cost of such changes, order was restored in the finances and the budget of 1804 saw an end of the deficit. The question of the Church was treated much as it was in France. The old calendar was restored and liberty of worship was conceded. Count Melzi was present at public worship. The difficulties of his position as mediator between French demands and Italian sentiment wearied him of his position and before his term ended he urged Bonaparte to accept his resignation.

Bonaparte's treatment of the question of Piedmont influenced the course of European politics more immediately than did his control of the Italian Republic. As long as the Czar Paul lived he had not ventured to decide the fate of this land, because Paul took a deep interest in the fair treatment of the King of Sardinia. With Paul's death Piedmont apparently lost its diplomatic importance and Bonaparte determined to annex it to France. To minimize the alarm which the step would certainly arouse, he contented himself in April, 1801, with dividing it into military districts of the size of departments, introducing French machinery for the collection of taxes and the administration of justice. The general commanding the army of occupation was made administrator-general. Final annexation was delayed until September, 1802, several months after the Peace of Amiens. Bonaparte also changed the government of the Ligurian Republic, imposing a new constitution, with a doge chosen by him, controlling in this way the port of Genoa, the natural outlet of Piedmont, and doubly valuable in case of new difficulties with the English. At the same time his hold upon northern Italy was facilitated through a firmer control of the Simplon road, secured by forcing the separation of the canton Valais from Switzerland and placing it under the protection of the French and Italian republics. Further south the French exercised a controlling influence in the new kingdom of Etruria, using it to keep the English out of Leghorn.

Bonaparte determined, as the Directory had done, that Switzerland should form one of the barrier States which should safeguard the frontiers of France. The Treaty of Lunéville had guaranteed the independence of the Swiss, but it had not fore-

CHAP.
XIX

1803-04

Act of
Mediation

stalled intervention to restore political peace. The constitution imposed by the Directors on the Helvetic Republic "one and indivisible" had never been acceptable to a majority of the people. The partisans of the older aristocratic constitution, with its variety of traditional local privileges, had not abandoned hope of a restoration. But there was an increasing number ready for compromise, desiring to preserve the advantageous reforms which the revolution had brought in, and yet anxious to restore those elements of the ancient order closely associated with local habits. This group was borne into power in January, 1800, partly through the influence of the Brumaire revolution in France. Bonaparte favored their aims, but he was unwilling that the Swiss should settle their controversies independently of France; and, when the new party attempted to prepare a constitution, he imposed the "constitution of Malmaison," in some respects an excellent solution of the problem, but unacceptable to the Swiss without revision. The consequence was a period of turmoil, ending in civil war, skilfully fomented in order to justify a thorough-going French intervention. In October, 1802, a "mediation" was announced, delegates were summoned to Paris, and a commission, drawn equally from the two principal factions, prepared the draft of another constitution, which was embodied in an Act of Mediation, February 19, 1803, and signed by the commission in the "name of the Swiss nation." The compromise was adjusted so shrewdly to the habits and aspirations of the Swiss that turmoil ceased and the cantons had an opportunity to develop in peace the sources of their prosperity. Bonaparte regarded this as one of the most successful strokes of his career; his popularity was assured and the dependence of Switzerland was put beyond all question.

The Helvetic Republic now became the Swiss Confederation, with nineteen equal, sovereign cantons and three types of local organization: one for rural cantons, which recovered their democratic organization, with popular assemblies voting on projects submitted by a grand council; another, more aristocratic, for urban cantons; and still another, politically between the two, for cantons which were formerly dependent districts. The common affairs of the federation were administered by a landammann and a diet, but there was no army and only a small common fund, and no means of guarding the national independence. Later in the year the Swiss were compelled to sign a treaty of alliance with France, promising to furnish 16,000 men.

On the left flank of advancing French dominion lay the Dutch Republic, the control of which was as important to the schemes

of the First Consul as that of Switzerland or Italy, if England's influence on the Continent was to be held in check. Some change in the government was required, because, patterned after the fallen Directory, it had been discredited by the levy of a forced loan necessitated by the heavy financial demands of the French. Bonaparte, aided by the Dutch delegate in Paris, drew up a new constitution, in which the functions of the legislature were restricted as carefully as under the consular system, and a Council of State, instead of a single individual, was placed at the head of the government. When the Dutch chambers rejected the scheme, they were dissolved by French troops under General Augereau, whose first lessons in managing legislatures had been taken in Paris on the 18th Fructidor. After the French manner also a plebiscite was ordered, at which 68,988 out of 416,419 voters took part, only 16,771 voting for the constitution; but this did not confuse the purposes of the First Consul, who announced that the constitution was accepted, as the great majority had not opposed it. One of the tasks of the new government was to collect sixty-five million florins, the balance of the indemnity due France, and to furnish supplies to the French army of occupation, which was not withdrawn after the Peace of Amiens, as had been agreed with the Dutch.

The continental powers watched with increasing alarm the Bonapartist interpretations of the eleventh article of the Treaty of Lunéville, which guaranteed the independence of the Dutch, Swiss, and Italian republics. The situation was especially vexatious to the English, for every extension of French influence meant the withdrawal of another region from English trade. They had expected that the Treaty of Amiens would be followed by a commercial agreement, but Bonaparte took no serious steps in that direction, while he enforced the decrees on the statute books which excluded from France goods of British origin. A similar policy was pursued in lands under French control, including Spanish and Dutch colonies, which the English gave up when peace was made. This made itself felt by a marked falling off in the volume of British exports, and the merchants concluded that peace was more disastrous than war. Every diplomatic question between the two countries was discussed in a spirit of increasing bitterness.

In the fall of 1802 the growth of French influence on the Continent seemed so dangerous that the English began to make difficulties about the evacuation of Malta. One after another came Bonaparte's agreement with the Czar Alexander upon the German question, the annexation of Piedmont, and the media-

CHAP.

XIX

1803-04

The
Dutch
RepublicAttitude
of Great
Britain

Malta

CHAP.

XIX

1803-04

tion in Switzerland. Although in each case the affair went back to the period before the Preliminaries of London, so that the English had ample warning, the cumulative effect of these assertions of influence appeared to violate the tacit understanding upon which the terms of the peace were based. General Bonaparte insisted upon the letter of the document, asking the English to point out where mention was made of Switzerland, or Germany, or Holland. Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador at Paris, was ordered to declare that George III would "never forego his right of interfering in the affairs of the Continent on any occasion in which the interests of his own dominions or those of Europe in general may appear to him to require it."¹ The English took the attitude that the annexation of Piedmont had so strengthened French influence in the Mediterranean that they would be justified in retaining Malta as an offset.

The return of the Cape to the Dutch was equivalent, they saw, to its control by France, since the French army was not withdrawn from the Batavian Republic, and this rendered the Cape route to the Indies precarious, and thereby made necessary some provision for the safety of the overland routes from the Mediterranean, which could hardly be done if they abandoned both Malta and Egypt. The English availed themselves of the excuse that the terms of the guarantee of the independence of Malta agreed upon in the treaty had not yet been carried out. The Czar Alexander was so indignant at the annexation of Piedmont without any compensation to the King of Sardinia, that he intimated to the English the wisdom of keeping hold of Malta. An act of the First Consul made the situation still graver. In September, 1802, he sent Colonel Sébastiani to Egypt to study the condition of the country, the state of the Turkish and British garrisons, and the attitude of the inhabitants towards the French. Sébastiani returned in January, 1803, and in his report, published in the official *Moniteur*, he accused the commander of the British garrison of provoking the natives to murder him. He also gave the numbers of the British force, describing the Turkish army as beneath contempt, and following this by the statement that "6,000 Frenchmen would suffice to-day to conquer Egypt."² The English now refused to discuss

¹ Quoted by Rose, J. H., *Life of Napoleon*, I, 373.

² The reason ordinarily ascribed to Bonaparte for raising the Egyptian question so abruptly was the desire to cover his retreat from the disastrous venture in Santo Domingo, for in January came also the news of General Leclerc's death and the decimation of his troops by disease.

the question of Malta until Bonaparte should offer a satisfactory explanation of the report, although they withdrew their troops from Alexandria two months later. The menacing tone of the First Consul's communications with Whitworth led the English to arm. News of this angered Bonaparte, who declared before a group of assembled diplomats that no compromise could be made on the question of Malta, crying out as he left the room, "Malta or war, woe to those who break treaties!" He too began preparations for war, but the final rupture did not come until May. He signaled his rage at British truculence by ordering the arrest of all British subjects traveling in France, alleging in justification that the English had seized two French ships before the outbreak of war, although the capture had been made four days after war was declared.³ Such an act only popularized the war in England.

If the sudden outbreak of war with Great Britain in a measure forestalled Bonaparte's expectations and disconcerted him, it was a serious disappointment to the French people, to whom the Treaty of Amiens had brought the peace which the leaders of the Republic had always declared they were fighting for. Their hopes were now exchanged for the anxieties of a war, the scope of which might be extended until the perilous situation of 1799 or even 1793 reappeared. The hatreds sprung from many long conflicts were all that awakened enthusiasm for the struggle, but these could not be felt by the more discerning persons who saw that the First Consul's aggressive policy was partly responsible for the failure of the peace. In England all those interested in foreign trade and high prices were eager for a renewal of war as the only means of obtaining profitable markets. Political leaders who did not think the terms arranged at Amiens had sufficiently protected British interests were glad when that peace broke down.

With the exception of Fox and a few others, the small group of liberals, who had sympathized with the earlier Revolution, never learned to admire Bonaparte, and regarded him as a despot rather than as a reformer and restorer. During the Peace of Amiens when many Englishmen hastened to Paris full of curiosity about the new ruler of French destinies, Wordsworth also crossed the Channel, but lingered on the coast. The eagerness of his fellow-countrymen to see Bonaparte provoked in him the scornful question:

³ These ships, however, had received no notice of the declaration of war.

CHAP.
XIX
1803-04

Outbreak
of War

English
Feeling

CHAP.

XIX

1803-04

"Is it a reed that's shaken by the wind,
Or what is it that ye go forth to see?
Lords, lawyers, statesmen, squires of low degree,
Men known, and men unknown, sick, lame, and blind,
Post forward all, like creatures of one kind,
With first-fruit offerings crowd to bend the knee
In France before the new-born Majesty."

And he added:

"When truth, when sense, when liberty were flown,
What hardship had it been to wait an hour?"

Romilly was one of the Englishmen to visit Paris in 1802, but he was so "disgusted at the eagerness with which the English crowded to do homage at the new court of a usurper and a tyrant," as he explains in his diary, that when Talleyrand offered to present him to the First Consul, he "made an excuse." If men who sympathized with France felt this way, it is not surprising that the outbreak of war was greeted by most Englishmen with a fierce joy, and that Bonaparte's order for the arrest of travelers roused public sentiment to fury.

The contest at first appeared like a struggle between an elephant and a whale. Although Bonaparte assembled a large army on the coast, particularly at Boulogne, the marked inferiority of the French navy made immediate invasion impossible. If the war was to come to an issue, it would be through English attacks on the French and Dutch colonies and by the organization of a new coalition, or by French attempts to ruin the English market on the Continent. One of the consequences was the return of Pitt, the great war minister, to the helm of state in England.⁴ He alone was regarded as able to marshal the energies of the English against the desperate assaults of Bonaparte.

As soon as war began Napoleon strengthened the laws against English trade by ordering that colonial products or merchandise coming from British ports, of whatever origin, or covered by whatever flag, should be excluded from the ports of France and of her allies. He sought further to embarrass England by occupying Hanover, of which George III was Elector, but the British government did not consider the protection of this principality one of its duties. The Prussians made an ineffective protest, Hanover lying north of the line fixed by the Treaty of Basel. The resistance of the Hanoverians could be only formal, and they were soon forced to place the resources of the electorate at the disposition of the French. The free cities of Hamburg and

Seizure
of Han-
over

⁴ In 1804.

Bremen were also subjected to French control. The exclusion of British commerce from the Elbe and the Weser, and the blockade which the English established in retaliation, affected the Hanoverian income disastrously and within three years the debt was increased by 22,000,000 francs. Meanwhile 67,000,000 were paid into the French military chest and 25,000 or 30,000 troops were quartered on the country. The Hanoverians were docile, but even the commanders of the army of occupation realized that the burden was too great.

Soon after the invasion of Hanover, Bonaparte ordered the Neapolitan ports of Brindisi, Otranto, and Taranto to be occupied, alleging as an excuse the unjustifiable retention of Malta by the English. It was at this time that the Swiss were forced to sign a treaty promising auxiliary troops, and that the Dutch signed a new agreement, promising to support 18,000 French troops besides 16,000 of their own. By a proceeding akin to blackmail, Godoy, the powerful Spanish minister, was compelled to persuade his master, Charles IV, to pay into the French treasury six million francs a month, instead of furnishing the less valuable forms of aid promised in the Treaty of San Ildefonso. Portugal purchased neutrality at an expense of sixteen millions more. The Spanish subsidies offered the English an excuse a few months later for the seizure of a Spanish treasure fleet, and this brought on open war between Spain and England. Bonaparte had begun the conquest of Europe in order to coerce the British.

It is not surprising that States just beyond the line of danger should consider new alliances, anxious to guard themselves from attack, if not to reduce the overgrown power of the French. The principal difficulties in organizing a coalition against France were Austria's financial weakness and Prussia's conviction that neutrality was more profitable. The Czar Alexander, who at first desired to signalize his reign by domestic reforms and economy, had concluded that an assertion of Russian influence abroad would find in Russia fewer enemies. The failure of a half-hearted offer to mediate between the English and the French had left him among the opponents of France, although not yet openly hostile.

By the occupation of Hanover and of the Neapolitan ports, as well as by the coercion of Holland, Spain, and Portugal, Napoleon had closed the European coast line from the Elbe to Taranto, but he could not hope by such means alone to compel England to make terms, and he was anxious to push forward preparations for a descent upon the English coast. The Chan-

CHAP.
XIX

1803-04

French
Violations
of Neu-
trality

Project
of an
Invasion
of Eng-
land

CHAP.
XIX

1803-04

nel was the most serious barrier to success, because of the inferiority of the French fleet, even if combined with the fleets of Holland and Spain. Bonaparte's first plan set the passage of the Channel for the late fall or winter of 1803, and proposed to embark 100,000 men on fishing vessels, escorted by light gunboats which could be rowed. A few days of fog or calm would eliminate the fighting value of the English fleet and "the ditch might be leaped." Bonaparte thought that the English could not check him if he made a landing, and that a rapid march on London must lead to immediate peace on his terms. He was influenced by the notion, held a decade earlier by the Revolutionists, that an English rebellion would support an invader, failing to comprehend the lesson of the Prussian invasion of 1792. Moreover, it was not sure that he could overcome the English forces. Everything was done to render certain a stubborn defense. Martello towers were built, and a semaphore system of telegraphing installed, along the threatened coast. Preparations were made to remove food and other supplies, and to transfer the state treasure and the contents of Woolwich arsenal to Worcester. But, although the English were really alarmed, and were put to great expense, the danger was slight. Their powerful fleets would have destroyed the expedition, if it had started. Moreover, no such expedition could start; actual experiment revealed the fact that six days were required to take the whole flotilla outside the harbor of Boulogne, while no period of six days of favorable weather occurred during the years 1803 and 1804. When Bonaparte understood these practical difficulties he considered the plan of assembling a fleet sufficiently powerful to control the Channel for a few days, only to discover a new set of difficulties; so that the scheme of a descent on the English coast fell into the background and the Boulogne camp was utilized to train a large army for instant service in case a new coalition were formed against France.

Conspiracies
against
Bonaparte

If anything were required to strengthen Bonaparte's power, it would be either the perils of a war which should emphasize the value of his military leadership, or a dangerous conspiracy which should threaten to destroy him and his policies together. His dictatorship since the 18th Brumaire had been beneficial in so many ways that he was regarded as indispensable. Prominent office holders, and a multitude of persons whose property was of Revolutionary origin, feared that the destruction of the system would be their own ruin.

The conspiracies during the Consulate are difficult to disentangle, because mixed with genuine plots were operations of a

secret police seeking to obtain credit with the government by serving up plots spiced to the taste of their patrons. The most serious attempt on the First Consul's life had, however, surprised the police as well as the government. The means selected was the explosion of an infernal machine on Christmas Eve, 1800, in a narrow street through which the carriage of the First Consul was to pass on the way to the opera. The explosion was mistimed and did not injure Bonaparte, although it killed several others. The police pretended that it was the work of the Jacobins, and, by order of the Senate, 130 were proscribed, and 50 of these deported to the colonies. The real conspirators were obscure royalists, two of whom were afterwards caught and executed. A second affair, the "libel plot," or conspiracy of Rennes, which grew out of the discontent of many army officers at Bonaparte's policy, especially after the Peace of Amiens, aimed to replace the Consulate by a government of republican generals, or, perhaps, to bring back some of the conditions existing prior to Brumaire. The dénouement was a fiasco, and came at the time when Bonaparte was made Consul for Life. He wisely concluded that, if the affair gained too much notoriety, it would blur his glory, and it was permitted to sink into deeper obscurity. A year later another plot, in its form due partly to operations of police, became politically profitable.

Georges Cadoudal, one of the Chouan leaders, had fled to England in 1800. He and the members of the emigrant group in London believed that the elimination of Bonaparte would bring the revolutionary system to destruction and open the way to a restoration. This was a new version of an old theory, held during the Revolution by the emigrants, and shared by foreign officials, and the only change was the substitution of Bonaparte for the Jacobins. Before the outbreak of war in 1803 made the English eager to foment insurrection in France, a police agent named Méhée appeared in London, giving out that he was one of the irreconcilable republicans, anxious to bring about co-operation with the exiles in London for the overthrow of the "tyrant." In France he was still classified as a Jacobin and a "*septembriseur*," and had been expelled after the conspiracy of the infernal machine, but was apparently employed by Fouché, not now titular minister of police, though provided with secret funds by Bonaparte. Méhée convinced the emigrants and the English officials that the Jacobins were eager to join forces with them. Encouraged by this prospect, Cadoudal and other royalist plotters built large designs of insurrection in Normandy and Brittany, and planned also the abduction of Bonaparte, intend-

CHAP.
XIX
1803-04

The
Cadoudal
Plot

CHAP.

XIX

1803-04

Pichegru
and
Moreau

ing to surprise him some day on the road from Paris to Malmaison. If Bonaparte or his escort resisted, a fight would ensue, and if Bonaparte were killed, the ends of the enterprise would be secured. Nothing was said to English government officials about assassination, but the assassins were on their pay roll. After Méhée had done what was possible in London, he went to Munich, where he furnished Drake, the English diplomatic agent, with manufactured secrets and in return obtained his confidences. The English agent at Stuttgart also dabbled in conspiracy.

In August, 1803, Cadoudal crossed over to France in an English government cutter. He was supplied with a million francs in drafts. Accompanying him was a man named Quérél, probably also an agent of Fouché. The royalist General Pichegru followed Cadoudal in January, 1804, hoping to influence General Moreau, the hero of Hohenlinden, to join in attempting Bonaparte's overthrow. Moreau was ready to assist in making an end of Bonaparte's personal power, but he would have nothing to do with the royalist plotters. Meanwhile the regular police discovered some of the threads of the plot, and Bonaparte, who through Fouché knew more about it than they, jeered at their lack of skill. But neither he nor Fouché knew all that was planned, for a conspirator like Cadoudal did not reveal the details of his designs to men like Méhée and Quérél. As the atmosphere of conspiracy thickened, Bonaparte's irritation, if not his alarm, became intense. The police arrested Quérél, who told what he knew — among other things, that Cadoudal was in Paris and that a prince of the House of Bourbon was soon to appear in France. Evidence of Moreau's complicity was found and he was arrested. A little later followed the arrest of Pichegru and the capture of Cadoudal.

The Duke
d'Enghien

It was first expected that the "prince" would land in Normandy, but when this did not happen news came that at Ettenheim, just across the frontier of France in Baden, resided the Duke d'Enghien, grandson of the Prince of Condé, and that he was plotting with Dumouriez and other emigrants. The news was incorrect, for Dumouriez was in England, and the duke was not a conspirator, but, before the government discovered the actual situation, it had decided upon the serious step of abducting the duke. This was done on the night of March 14. His papers showed the falsity of the police reports, but Bonaparte and his advisers concluded to transfer the duke to Vincennes and try him before a military court on the charge of being an emigrant who had fought against France. His grave was dug before he



arrived, his trial was hurried through, and early on the morning of March 21 he was shot. This deed warned the Bourbons and their followers that the game of abduction and assassination was not one of the divine rights of kings, but the resource of any disciple of Machiavelli who might be armed with power. And the radical Revolutionists were reassured, for what difference was discernible between men who had voted the execution of Louis XVI and him who ordered the judicial murder of the Duke d'Enghien, of the same sacred Bourbon blood?

Soon after the sinister tragedy at Vincennes, Pichegru was found strangled in prison, and Moreau was brought to trial for treason. A record of English intrigues was also laid before the Senate. Public indignation was aroused against the government which made itself officially responsible for attacks on the life of the chosen head of the Republic. From all sides came addresses of citizens and declarations of civic bodies, congratulating the First Consul upon his escape and condemning the diabolical manœuvres of the English and of the exiled princes.

A group of men, among them Fouché, promoters of Bonaparte's fortunes, resolved to seize the occasion and consolidate the Bonapartist régime. Schemes which the First Consul had been revolving in his mind since 1802 now became politically practical. A week after the execution of the Duke d'Enghien the Senate was persuaded to petition him in vague terms to "complete his work by making it, like his glory, immortal." But there was opposition; even men like Talleyrand, minister of foreign affairs, and Cambacérès, the second consul, expressed fears and reservations, and several weeks were required to give the movement the appearance of a general demand, irrespective of the factions which had divided France since 1792. When all was arranged, an ex-member of the Convention was selected to introduce in the Tribunal a motion that "Napoleon Bonaparte be declared Emperor of the French, and that this dignity be declared hereditary in his family." This motion was seconded by an ex-councilor proscribed as a royalist on the 18th Fructidor. After a conference in the Privy Council, Bonaparte asked the Senate for a full expression of the thought suggested in the petition of March 27. The senators, consulted individually, consented, for the most part, to what the Tribunal should recommend. The Tribunal then passed the motion, Carnot alone voting against it. On May 18 the Senate adopted a decree transforming the consular constitution into the constitution of a Napoleonic empire.

The Republic did not cease to exist in name, for the first

CHAP.

XIX

1803-04

Creation
of the
Empire

CHAP.
XIX

1803-04

The
Imperial
Régime

clause of the new constitution declared that the "government of the Republic is entrusted to an Emperor," and the last vestige of the name survived until 1809, when the word "empire" replaced it on the coinage. The principal changes in the machinery of government concerned the work of legislation. The Tribunal, divided into three sections, deliberating behind closed doors, could no longer subject the proposals of the government to public criticism. The Legislative Body was authorized to discuss measures, but the discussions were not public unless the government so ordered. In practice the legislative process took the course of decrees rendered in the Council of State and embodied in *senatus consultes*. The Senate was completely in the Emperor's hands, for he could appoint new members at pleasure. Although the constitution included clauses wearing the guise of liberal checks upon arbitrary power, they were either illusory or ineffective.

The imperial republic speedily took on the aspects of monarchy. General Bonaparte, known henceforth as Napoleon I, was surrounded by "Grand Dignitaries" and "Grand Officers," "Grand Marshals," and a host of minor title bearers. His brother Joseph was "Grand Elector"; his brother Louis, "Constable"; his brother-in-law Murat, "Grand Admiral." His uncle Fesch, now cardinal, was not forgotten, and became "Grand Almoner." The second consul, Cambacérès, was "Mon cousin" the "Arch-Chancellor" of the Empire, and the third consul, Lebrun, was "Arch-Treasurer." Among the "officers" were names distinguished in the old court — Talleyrand, "Grand Chamberlain," and Ségur, "Grand Master of Ceremonies." The principal generals became "Marshals of the Empire." And this was merely a beginning.

The Cor-
onation

The Empire needed two consecrations — one by plebiscite, the other by unction of the Church. The constitution as a whole was not submitted to popular approval, but only the question whether the people wished "the imperial dignity to be hereditary in the line of descent, direct, natural, legitimate, or adoptive, of Napoleon Bonaparte, and in the direct, natural, and legitimate descent of Joseph Bonaparte and of Louis Bonaparte." The "yeas" numbered a few thousand more than in 1802, while the "noes" were reduced to the ridiculous proportions of 2,569. The Empire seemed popular even among the workmen of Paris, who had furnished recruits for all the uprisings of the Revolution, wages being good and work abundant. Long negotiations were necessary to persuade Pope Pius VII to grace with his presence the ceremony of coronation, which took place in De-

cember. He desired that his compliance should mean substantial concessions to the Church, the withdrawal of the obnoxious Organic Articles, the restoration of the Church to a "dominant" position, or the return of the Legations. The only concession which Napoleon made was the restoration of the Gregorian calendar. The Pope was not even permitted to place the crown upon the Emperor's head: it was arranged expressly that Napoleon should crown himself and then crown Josephine as Empress. But the holy oil was poured on his head: he ceased to be a parvenu of genius, raised to power by the will of the sovereign people, and became the "anointed of the Lord."

Napoleon did not find entry into the brotherhood of European monarchs a mere formality. Diplomatic relations with the Czar Alexander had become strained before the close of 1803 and in the fall of 1804 they ceased. No recognition was expected from Great Britain, although Bonaparte made a personal appeal to George III for peace, as he had done after Brumaire. Of the German powers, Prussia was obsequious, pursuing the policy of profitable neutrality, with the hope that some way might be found of obtaining Hanover. The Hapsburg Francis II took the precaution of proclaiming himself "Hereditary Emperor of Austria," and made the recognition of this title the condition of recognizing Napoleon as Emperor, with the further understanding that the title "Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire," should retain its honorary precedence. Napoleon consented, but required the recognition of the French Empire to be made while he was at Aachen, the ancient capital of Charlemagne. There also he received the homage of the south German princes, whose dominions were so close to the French frontier that they could hardly choose their line of conduct. To them in return he hinted of promotions and crowns.

In the background of European politics were ominous signs that this empire would not mean peace. Not a week after it was proclaimed, even Prussia agreed by a "declaration," which was a defensive treaty in everything but in name, that further encroachments of France in northern Germany would be resisted by the two powers Prussia and Austria. This agreement barely missed becoming effective in October, when by Napoleon's orders French soldiers seized Sir George Rumbold, the British diplomatic agent at Hamburg, accredited also to the Lower Saxon Circle, of which Frederick William was "director." At Frederick William's request, couched in terms of embarrassed friendship, Rumbold was released. Meanwhile Austria was alarmed at the negotiations in Italy to transform the Italian Republic into a

CHAP.
XIX

1803-04

Napoleon's
Recogni-
tion

Origin of
the
Third
Coalition

CHAP.**XIX****1803-04**

Napoleonic monarchy. A month before the coronation at Nôtre Dame, Russia signed a defensive alliance with Austria, pledging the two States to resist encroachments either in Italy or in Germany. It was difficult for the ancient rivals of France to accept a system of interpreting treaties which set no barriers to French expansion, no limits to the ambitions of Napoleon.

CHAPTER XX

THE NEW CHARLEMAGNE

AS Emperor, Napoleon gave new proofs of his military genius and his capacity for organization, but he did not increase his reputation for statesmanship. In his conduct of foreign affairs he exaggerated the worst policies of the Convention or the Directory, besides identifying the interests of France with his personal or family ambitions. His administrative successes and the glories he brought to French arms formed a sort of "Treasury of Merit," drawn upon to cover sins of reckless pride, ambition, and tyranny, of which he was repeatedly guilty. His career from 1805 to 1815 showed what could be accomplished by transcendent ability directing tremendous forces, but unrestrained by a sense of measure or by an adequate conception of the permanent welfare of European peoples. He asserted constantly that he was struggling for peace, and that it was either British gold, Austrian perfidy, or Prussian folly which deferred the day of its attainment; but his conception of a reasonable peace could be accepted by other nations only at the point of the sword. Many years of moderate and conciliatory conduct were required to render acceptable to them the settlements of Lunéville and Amiens, which were contrary to the historic position of two such States as Great Britain and Austria; but Napoleon's policy never allowed the experiment to be tried on its merits. The consequence was that even while his French Empire was being organized, a new coalition against France was coming into existence.

A new coalition was desired anxiously by the English, to draw pressure away from the threatened southern coast and end the nightmare of invasion. Russia was inclined to it partly on account of Napoleon's attitude towards the affairs of the Turkish Empire, his occupation of Neapolitan ports on the Adriatic indicating a definite eastern policy. Austria, though crippled by the losses of the preceding war, might be driven to fight by peril on the side of Italy. Austrian leaders had not finally abandoned the intention to recover the predominance in Italian affairs which the campaigns of 1796 and 1797 had destroyed and which had been restored for a few months by the victories of 1799. Since November, 1804, Alexander and Pitt had been endeavoring to

CHAP.
XX

1804-07

The Em-
pire and
Peace

CHAP.
XX

1804-07

reach an agreement, but it was delayed by England's refusal to withdraw from Malta and to abate her extravagant claims in regard to the treatment of neutral property at sea. Such differences were Napoleon's opportunity, but he made no serious attempt to utilize them. The first public intimation that a new coalition was imminent was made at the opening of parliament, on January 15, 1805, when the King's speech declared that the French offers of peace could not be considered except after communication with the continental powers, and especially with the Emperor of Russia, to whom King George was united in a confidential manner.

Alarm in
Austria

Napoleon's treatment of the Italian question meanwhile alarmed Austria. The positions of President of the Italian Republic and Emperor of the French seemed incongruous, and, accordingly, he planned to transform the republic into a kingdom, and place his brother Joseph on the throne, allaying the fears of Austria by exacting a renunciation of Joseph's rights of succession in France. Joseph consented, but afterwards withdrew his consent, insisting on his rights in the French empire. Louis Bonaparte refused the crown for his son, and Napoleon, after considering Eugène de Beauharnais, Josephine's son, whom he adopted, decided to take the crown himself as a temporary measure of settlement. Austria, informed of these plans, did not stir at once, because the Archduke Charles argued the impossibility of reopening the struggle with fair prospects of success, but before Napoleon proceeded to Italy for his coronation the archduke lost his influence, and Austria watched the progress of events with increasing hostility.

England
and
Russia

England and Russia came to terms by the treaty of April 11, 1805. This treaty possesses a double interest, showing the permanent hostility of the leading European States to the settlement of 1801 and 1802, and bringing forward at least two characteristic features of the settlement of 1814-1815—a Holland enlarged by most of the former Austrian Netherlands, to serve as a barrier against France on the north, and an enlarged kingdom of Sardinia, to furnish a barrier on the side of Italy. According to the plan Prussia might expect to gain much of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine, in addition to what she lost by the Treaty of Basel. If Prussia and Austria acceded to the treaty of April 11, they were to receive, like Russia, an annual subsidy of £1,250,000 from the English for every 100,000 men they put in the field. In the meantime Napoleon seemed intent upon his project of a direct attack upon England.

This project now involved the sudden concentration of a su-

perior force of fighting ships, which should give command of the Channel for a few days. Such a superiority could be gained only if the British naval authorities were deluded into dispersing their forces in order to guard against expected attacks in the Mediterranean, and in the East and West Indies. The scheme assumed that squadrons blockaded at Toulon, Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, could escape, could unite with the Spanish fleet, outmanœuver the tried seamen of England, and appear in the Channel at the time appointed. Napoleon issued orders and wrote letters as if he believed that such a series of fortunate strokes was possible. At the close of 1804 there were in European waters about the same number of ships belonging to Napoleon and his allies as to the English, but his naval officials reckoned that French ships were only two-thirds as efficient as English ships. The expedition to the West Indies, in which he hoped to concentrate the Toulon, Rochefort, and Brest squadrons, had as a first object injury to the British colonies and trade, but it would naturally compel the English to dispatch a fleet to the rescue, and if this weakened seriously their home stations the combined French and Spanish fleet would seize the opportunity to occupy the Channel. But had Napoleon considered this more than a remote possibility, he would have pursued a less aggressive policy in Europe. It seems more likely that he meant to do all the damage he could to the English incidentally, and to find in a successful campaign on the Continent a brilliant alternative to almost certain failure with the Boulogne project.

Whatever may have been Napoleon's conception of his "immense project," the manner in which it failed gave a dramatic setting to the opening of the war against the Third Coalition. Admiral Villeneuve, in command at Toulon, escaped on March 30, 1805, while Nelson was temporarily off the station. He passed the straits of Gibraltar on April 9, united with the Spanish squadron at Cadiz, and sailed for the West Indies. Not until he was on his way did Nelson know that he had passed the straits, and he had been gone a month before Nelson learned his destination. But Nelson made a quick voyage to the islands and arrived before Villeneuve had done much damage. British shipping had suffered from the operations of the Rochefort squadron, which had escaped the English blockaders in January, but which, through a misunderstanding, returned to Rochefort without waiting for Villeneuve.

When Villeneuve heard that Nelson was in the West Indies, he sailed for Europe, regarding his fleet as inferior in equipment and quality, although superior in numbers. Not many days

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

Napoleon's
Naval
SchemeManœu-
vers of
Villeneuve

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

elapsed before Nelson was in his wake, sending ahead a swift brig to advise the admiralty of the movements of the allied fleet. The brig overhauled Villeneuve's fleet, noted its direction, and went on to Plymouth, arriving on July 7. The admiralty immediately concentrated a fleet off Cape Finistère to check Villeneuve. Nelson was on the coast of Spain on July 18, but found it necessary to sail to Gibraltar for water and provisions. Four days later an inconclusive battle was fought off Cape Finistère by the allied fleet and the English. Villeneuve now formed a junction with the Ferrol squadron at the neighboring port of Corunna, while the English fleet, not feeling strong enough to blockade him, retired to Brest. Nelson joined them on August 15, but soon returned to England for a brief rest.

At this juncture the commander of the English fleet off Brest made the tactical error of dividing his forces, sending twenty ships southward to meet Villeneuve and thus giving Villeneuve a chance to elude him and to crush between two fires the rest of the ships blockading Brest. However, this was only a chance; it presumed too much English blundering, and too many successive gifts of good fortune to the French. Villeneuve had received orders to proceed to the Channel, but they permitted him to go first to Cadiz for reinforcements. He made an attempt to sail northward, until strong head winds and rumors of an approaching English fleet led him to use his discretionary powers and turn (August 15) toward Cadiz. Seven days later Napoleon, perhaps on the supposition that Villeneuve was approaching Brest, sent a message by semaphore, commanding him not to "lose a moment . . . [but] enter the Channel. England is ours! We are ready, everything is embarked. Appear for twenty-four hours, and all is finished!" This telegram was an effective manner of bringing on the dramatic climax, but probably nothing more. Had Villeneuve reached the Channel without a fight, and Napoleon embarked his army for the shores of Great Britain, the consequences would have been a disaster in comparison with which the Battle of the Nile and the enforced stay in Egypt would have sunk into insignificance.¹

While Nelson and Villeneuve were playing a game of hide and seek in the Mediterranean and on the ocean, events in Italy had reached a crisis. On May 26 Napoleon placed the iron crown

¹ For the controversy upon Napoleon's intentions, see A. Fournier, *Napoleon I* (German ed.), II. 74 f., especially note p. 86. Cf. A. Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, VI. 448-459. The principal authority is E. Desbrière, *Projets et Tentatives de Debarquement aux Îles Britanniques*, 1793-1805, vol. IV.

Fate of
the "Im-
mense
Project"

Austria
Joins the
Coalition

of Lombardy on his head, and followed this a few days later by the annexation of Genoa to the French empire, alleging as a reason the need of redressing the balance of power disturbed by the two partitions of Poland, Russian advance at the expense of Turkey, and English seizures in the colonies. Such explanations were unlikely to reassure Austria, especially as the coat of arms and the scepter of the new Italian kingdom included the Venetian lion. On July 7 the Emperor Francis gave orders to mobilize his army and a month later formally entered the coalition. As soon as Napoleon's agents told him of the movements of Austrian troops in Tyrol he hastened back to Paris. On August 2 he was informed that Nelson had returned and that the British possessed a naval superiority in European waters. Napoleon's next move is significant. In three successive notes, with intervals carefully timed, and with increasing sharpness, he demanded that Austria disarm, although he was aware that the consequence must be war, since the peace party had lost its influence at Vienna. At the same time he attempted to win an alliance from Prussia by the offer of Hanover, and his agents exerted pressure on the South German courts to obtain offensive and defensive alliances. He declared privately that his army was on the march against Austria before he was informed that Villeneuve had turned southward toward Cadiz. Even if Villeneuve had proceeded to Boulogne, he would have found on his arrival only the rear guard of the Army of England, now transformed into the Grand Army.

In the War of the Third Coalition, Napoleon had the advantage of an army highly trained and ready to march at a moment's notice. It was organized into corps, each corps composed of several divisions and commanded by a marshal. As an instrument of warfare adaptable to the requirements of a strategy which was bold in conception and wide in its field of operation, the French army had reached the highest development. Napoleon resolved to concentrate this magnificent force for a stroke at the heart of Austria, forestalling the Allies, who entertained a cumbrous scheme of separate attacks upon his corps, scattered, as they supposed, from southern Italy to Hanover. The Austrian plan of campaign assigned to an army commanded by General Mack the task of saving the resources of southern Germany for the Allies, while the principal operation was directed by the Archduke Charles against the new kingdom of Italy. It was not expected that Mack would do any fighting before the Russians reached the River Inn about the middle of October. The folly of Mack and the astounding quickness of the French concentra-

Capture
of Ulm

tion along the Danube, a large part of the army marching 200 miles in 14 days, resulted in a great Austrian disaster. As Mack did not penetrate into Bavaria soon enough to prevent an alliance with Napoleon, he should have retired to the Inn and waited for the Russians; but, instead, he advanced to Ulm, near the confluence of the Iller and the Danube, planning to defend the passes of the Black Forest. Napoleon's army turned these, seized the line of the Lech below Ulm, and was on the point of cutting Mack's communications with Austria. When the French soldiers were already marching southeastward to complete the operation, Mack supposed they were flying in disorder toward the Rhine, and made no attempt to break through to the north while a chance still remained. The result was the surrender of his army on October 20, and the destruction of the only force which covered the approach to Vienna.

On the day after the capture of the Austrian army the French effort to recover control of the sea came to a disastrous close off Cape Trafalgar. As soon as Villeneuve had entered Cadiz, the English established a blockade, at first with a few ships, afterward with a large force. Late in September Nelson arrived in the *Victory* and assumed command. To lure Villeneuve from Cadiz, he withdrew to the open sea, leaving only a few ships off the port. Villeneuve, goaded by the contemptuous reproaches of Napoleon, who publicly blamed him for the failure of the "immense project," resolved to make the Mediterranean, as fresh orders directed, and to fight if the British fleet was not preponderant. Nelson, warned by his guard ships on October 19, prepared for battle, which he expected on the 21st. When Villeneuve on that day saw the British bearing down upon him, he turned northward, in order to have the port of Cadiz on his lee. His line, composed of thirty-three ships, was bent into an obtuse angle, with the Spanish ships interspersed, because he was afraid of their conduct. According to Nelson's plan the British fleet of twenty-seven ships came on in two columns; the right under Collinwood steering toward the allied rear division, while Nelson, with the left, undertook to hold off their van and pierce the center. Nelson's plan was skilfully covered until the final onslaught, each column, as it approached, sailing almost parallel to the enemy's line. By sharp turns to right and left both columns pierced the line, Collinwood behind the thirteenth ship from the rear, and Nelson behind the tenth ship from the van. A ship to ship action followed. The French and Spaniards fought until they were decimated, but surrenders began at one o'clock, an hour after the battle opened. Early in the fight Nelson was mortally

wounded by a French sharpshooter, although he lived long enough to know that a great victory had been won. More than half the allied fleet were captured, but the important result was the ruin of French sea power and the undisputed supremacy of the British on the ocean for more than two generations.

The surrender of Mack compelled the Austrians to withdraw from Italy and Tyrol, but these armies were too remote to save Vienna. In one respect the Austrian situation seemed for a time to improve. In the advance upon the Danube one of the French corps had marched across the Hohenzollern territory of Ansbach. This did not occur without warning, for Napoleon had sent Duroc to Berlin with an offer of Hanover as the price of an alliance, at the same time requesting permission for the passage of troops. But Frederick William did not wish to abandon the much vaunted neutrality, and he had already declined a request of the Russians for similar privileges. Napoleon had not waited for a reply, and had ordered his troops to cross Ansbach. The news of this outrage threw the Berliners into a passion, and Frederick William seemed ready for war. He opened his frontiers to the Russian troops, and on November 3, at a personal interview with Alexander at Potsdam, signed an agreement to impose armed mediation upon Napoleon, with the treaty of Lunéville as a basis, promising to join the Allies if Napoleon did not accept his proposals within a month. He also discussed with the British the terms of a subsidy treaty. Their refusal to listen to any plan of territorial exchange by which Prussia could obtain Hanover, together with continued French successes, cooled Frederick William's warlike ardor, and when Haugwitz, his minister of foreign affairs, set out with the ultimatum for Napoleon's headquarters, the King told him privately to preserve peace between Prussia and France.

Napoleon hoped to defeat the Russian army, which had advanced to form a junction with Mack, and, entering Vienna in triumph, to dictate a peace in the Austrian capital. The Russians, however, retired skilfully before him, resolved to unite with a second Russian army in Moravia, and await the coming of the Archduke Charles from Italy. Napoleon entered Vienna unopposed, and the same day Murat by a dubious ruse gained possession of the Tabor bridge leading to the northern bank of the Danube, although he was unable to prevent the union of the two Russian armies.

Napoleon's position was fast becoming precarious. By following the Russians into Moravia his line of communications was dangerously long, especially if Frederick William persisted in

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

Danger
of Prus-
sian Inter-
vention

Napo-
leon at
Vienna

CHAP.
XX

1804-07

The Cam-
paign in
Moravia

the policy to which he was pledged at Potsdam. But Haugwitz proceeded slowly toward the French headquarters, and, when admitted to Napoleon's presence, spoke only of friendly mediation, a guarantee that neither side would be overreached during the negotiations. He agreed that if the Prussian project was accepted the Allies should not attack Holland. Such conduct may have suited the King's secret purposes, but Prussian statesmen like Stein and Hardenberg did not so understand the responsibilities of the occasion. Whether the menace of Prussian intervention was serious or not, Napoleon was soon rescued from a delicate situation by the blunders of the Czar Alexander's military advisers.

Alexander, instead of listening to the veteran Kutusoff, who counseled delay until all the allied forces were concentrated, yielded to the persuasions of younger officers, who thought that the French numbered only 50,000 and could easily be cut off from Vienna. Accordingly he ordered an advance upon Brünn, Napoleon's headquarters. As soon as Napoleon heard of this, he divined the blunder his enemies were making and prepared a trap for them, meanwhile summoning two of his lieutenants, in order to bring the numbers of his army to the size of the allied forces. One division of these reinforcements marched seventy miles in forty-four hours in order to reach the field in time. To draw the enemy on, Napoleon withdrew his lines from Austerlitz, and abandoned even the heights of Pratzen. For the same reason he left his right wing in an isolated and exposed position, which encouraged the Allies in their design of outflanking him and induced them to weaken their center. Their movements on December 1 showed that the ruse was successful, and Napoleon prepared to crush their weakened center the following day when the manœuvre was fully developed. So confident was he of success that in the evening he went from camp-fire to camp-fire and explained to his soldiers what the course of the battle would be.

Auster-
litz

The battle of Austerlitz was fought on the first anniversary of Napoleon's coronation. It has always been regarded as peculiarly his battle, for although success was due to the excellent fighting qualities of his soldiers and the skilful leadership of corps commanders, it was fought as he planned and the decisive character of the victory is accounted for by the nature of the plan. The battle also illustrated more than Napoleon's previous battles a method of handling armies which became an essential feature of the art of war as practiced in the nineteenth century. The line which the French occupied was about seven miles long. It was Napoleon's plan to hazard his right wing — if necessary

permitting it to be driven back — in order to lead the enemy to weaken the position against which he proposed to launch his heaviest masses. If he succeeded in breaking their line at that point, which was their center on the plateau of Pratzen, the fact that they had extended their line in pursuing his right wing, would be an advantage because he could now fall upon the pursuers, isolated from the rest of their troops, and destroy them. Such is the story of the battle on that December day when the sun of Austerlitz finally broke through the wintry mists of the morning. The Russians fought well, but eventually their center was pierced, their army thrown into confusion, and their left wing, over 30,000 strong, utterly crushed, dispersed, or captured amidst the frozen marshes where it was fighting.² Napoleon's situation ceased to be dangerous and became glorious. And he meant to sign a glorious peace. But his use of the power brought by victory was no more likely to satisfy the permanent interests of rival States than did his policy after Lunéville and Amiens, and so this victory was merely one of a series of brilliant rescues from perils which were of his own creation.

Austerlitz opened the way for the formation of what is called the "Grand Empire," which was a fresh Bonapartist interpretation of the Jacobin scheme of surrounding the Republic with a barrier of dependent States. As the Jacobins collected indemnities in return for the blessings of liberty, Napoleon exacted tribute for the benefits of improved administration. They cantoned French soldiers in these States, and so did he, but he also sought to bind them closely to his personal fortunes by erecting thrones for the members of his family and constituting fiefs for his chief civil and military officers. Incidentally, changes were made in Italy and Germany which were to become permanent, and significant turns were given to the fortunes of powers like Austria and Prussia.

The
Grand
Empire

The immediate consequences of Austerlitz were the withdrawal of the Russian army from Austrian territory, the transformation of the armed mediation of Prussia into alliance with France, and terms of peace more disastrous to Austria than had ever been accepted by her Hapsburg rulers. When the Emperor Francis learned that the Czar Alexander was unwilling to try the further chances of war near the scene of his recent overthrow, he was obliged to sign an armistice with Napoleon, in accordance with which all foreign troops should be excluded from his lands, a provision aimed primarily at Prussia. Haugwitz, cowed by Na-

Conduct
of Prus-
sia

² For the legend of the drowning of thousands of Russians in the Lake of Telnitz, see Fournier (Ger. ed.), II. 110.

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

Treaty
of Press-
burg

pooleon, now denied the agreements of Potsdam, and signed, on December 15, a treaty which pledged Prussia to an alliance with France, and brought her the coveted Hanover, but which required the cession of Neuchâtel to France, Ansbach to Bavaria, and Cleves to a prince to be named by Napoleon. The terms also pledged Prussia to guarantee the changes which he proposed to make in Italy and Germany. The Austrians could not wait to learn whether Frederick William would ratify this treaty, the terms of which they did not know, because Napoleon's appetite, as Talleyrand told them, "increased with eating," and his conditions grew harder every day. The result was the Treaty of Pressburg which cost Austria all the Venetian territory gained at Campo Formio and Lunéville, leaving her on the Adriatic only the port of Trieste. The Hapsburg lands in South Germany were abandoned to the rulers of Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, who were freed from imperial suzerainty, and two of whom were recognized by Napoleon as kings.

Talleyrand had proposed a plan to end the ancient rivalries of France and Austria. He had advised that Austria receive compensation in the Balkan peninsula for her losses in Italy and Germany, and that her cessions to France be formed into buffer States, so that the frontiers of the two powers should be separated. Napoleon, however, refused to listen to counsels of moderation. The most important consequence of the settlement at Pressburg was the expulsion of the Hapsburg power from southern Germany, emphasizing once more its trend eastward. For the first time Venice formed part of a great Italian kingdom, a prophecy of her eventual destiny. The acquisition of the Dalmatian coast, temporarily annexed to the kingdom of Italy, pointed once more to Napoleon's desire to obtain an influence in the affairs of the Turkish empire. He also intended to seize Montenegro and was enraged when the Austrians surrendered Cattaro to a Russian force.

The Prus-
sian Alli-
ance

Haugwitz was received with indignation when he returned to Berlin with his treaty, but the King, instead of rejecting it, attempted to change it into an agreement for a defensive alliance, and to make the occupation of Hanover provisional until a general peace. Before he knew whether Napoleon would accept such modifications, he made the fatal blunder of reducing his army to a peace basis, in spite of the fact that over 200,000 French troops were still quartered in South Germany, ready to move on Berlin. Napoleon had explained their presence, alleging Austria's surrender of Cattaro to the Russians. It had the additional advantage of throwing the principal burden of sup-

porting the French army on the Germans. Frederick William sent Haugwitz to Paris with the revised draft of the treaty, and meanwhile marched his troops into Hanover. It is not surprising that Haugwitz brought back a new edition of the Vienna agreement, with the terms rendered harsher, pledging Prussia to annex Hanover and close the rivers of northern Germany, together with the Hanseatic port of Lübeck, against English trade. Under menace of immediate attack Frederick William signed the treaty. This led to British reprisals, seizure of Prussian ships, blockade of German rivers, and (April 20) a declaration of war, bringing to a grim and costly conclusion Prussia's decade of profitable neutrality.

The collapse of the Third Coalition and the defection of Prussia had already given the death blow to England's great minister, William Pitt. There is a story that when he heard of the battle of Austerlitz he asked for a map of Europe to see where the place was, and then said sadly: "Roll up that map: it will not be wanted these ten years." But it was the situation to which Austerlitz led, and which imperiled the British empire, that hastened the ravages of a fatal disease. The end came on January 23, 1806.

As soon as the Treaty of Pressburg was signed, Napoleon, by a simple order addressed to his soldiers, deposed Ferdinand IV and Marie Caroline of Naples, and soon despatched his brother Joseph to take the kingdom. This was the punishment inflicted upon the sister of Marie Antoinette, aunt of the Austrian emperor, for breaking a promise of neutrality and admitting British and Russian troops to Neapolitan harbors when Napoleon was deeply involved in the Austrian campaign. On March 30, 1806, he sent a decree to the French Senate, declaring that Joseph was made King of Naples and Sicily, and providing that while the crowns of France and Naples were to be separate Joseph was to remain a grand dignitary of the French empire and a member of his family, subject, therefore, to his control as its head. In his proclamation he had said with the pictorial eloquence upon which he fed the imaginations of his soldiers and his subjects, "Go! Hurl into the waves, if, indeed, they await you, the feeble battalions of the tyrants of the sea." Joseph occupied Naples, but he could become king of Sicily only "in partibus," for the tyrants of the sea held the island. Moreover, they crossed into Calabria, and the first French force which came into conflict with them "was defeated and broken up in a few minutes."

Joseph was not the first Bonaparte whom Napoleon raised to the throne, for he had made his sister Elise Princess of Piom-

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

Death
of PittNapoleon
and
Naples

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

Principal-
ities for
the Bona-
partes

bino in 1805. He now hurried forward the task of throne making. Elise became Princess of Lucca, Massa, and Carrara. His brother Louis, who had married his step-daughter Hortense, he appointed to a throne in Holland, persuading the reluctant Dutch that otherwise they could not hope at the coming peace with England to receive again their lost colonies. His step-son Eugène was already his viceroy in the kingdom of Italy. His brother-in-law Murat became Grand Duke of Berg, a Rhenish territory, part of the heritage of Cleves which in the seventeenth century had been divided between the Hohenzollerns and the Wittelsbachs, and his sister Pauline, Princess Borghese, was made Duchess of Guastalla. Bernadotte, who had married the sister of Joseph's wife, received the principality of Ponte Corvo. Nor were officials and generals forgotten. Berthier, chief of staff, became Prince of Neuchâtel, and Talleyrand, minister of foreign affairs, Prince of Benevento. One-fifteenth of the income of a multitude of domain lands in the kingdom of Italy, of Naples, Lucca, Parma, and Piacenza, went to endow twenty dukedoms, held as fiefs of the empire by favored officers. To enrich his extraordinary fund from which future benefits might be drawn, he reserved 1,200,000 francs on the revenue of the kingdom of Italy and a million on that of Naples.

His brothers Lucien and Jerome remained unprovided for. Lucien was shut out from imperial favor by a marriage which for a time seemed to compromise the succession. He was eventually made Prince of Canino, but by favor of the Pope, his brother's enemy. Jerome must wait for the next turn in the European kaleidoscope. As a stay to the new dynasties, dynastic marriages were ordered: the marriage of Eugène to a Bavarian princess, the marriage of Josephine's niece to the heir of Baden, while a princess of Württemberg was destined for Jerome as soon as he could be separated from his American wife.³

Napoleon now frequently referred to himself as a second Charlemagne, a pose which had no element of humor for those within marching distance of his French battalions. The Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire were both the designated victims of this curious historical analogy. Napoleon was already on bad terms with Pius VII because the Pope had protested vigorously against the occupation of Ancona in November, 1805. Napoleon took this step, he said, to protect the city against a landing of the English or the Russians. He upbraided the Pope for listening to evil counselors and declared that "God has revealed by the suc-

³ Elizabeth Patterson of Baltimore.

cess with which he has favored my arms the protection he has accorded to my cause. . . . I consider myself, like my predecessors of the second and third races, the eldest son of the Church." Writing to his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, his ambassador at Rome, he threatened to appoint a senator to command there in his name, and added, "For the Pope I am Charlemagne, since as Charlemagne I unite the crown of France and the crown of Italy." The medieval phraseology of royal controversy with the Papacy now offered him no greater difficulty than did the stylistic peculiarities of Moslem piety in 1798. But theories and menaces alike were lost on Pius VII, who changed merely his secretary of state. Napoleon began to reduce theory to practice by sending troops to occupy Civita Vecchia.

Charlemagne had been master in southern and western Germany, and this mastery was Napoleon's next aim, influenced not so much by the Charlemagne illusion as by a policy which had attracted French statesmen since the days of Richelieu. A "Third Germany" had been one of the projects of 1802 and 1803, and Napoleon spoke of his "Confederation" in 1805. When Austerlitz destroyed the effective power of Austria and Prussia over German affairs, the only obstacle to the creation of such a confederation was Napoleon's uncertainty as to the form it should take. His German clients were not likely to object, for he could hold out to them a prospect of annexations as profitable as those of 1803. One of the most subservient, Dalberg, arch-chancellor of the Holy Roman Empire, whose archiepiscopal see was now formally transferred from Mainz to Regensburg, discovered that in Napoleon the Germans had the possibility of the revival of the Western Empire of Charlemagne. He agreed that Cardinal Fesch should be made his coadjutor, although remaining archbishop of Lyons and primate of the Gauls. As in 1802, Paris was the center of bargaining for States which hoped to gain territory and for those which were afraid of being handed over to others. Napoleon did not wish the scheme to raise new difficulties on the side of Prussia and Austria, and threw an air of mystery about the negotiations, but the series of treaties was finally ready and on July 17 the sixteen States admitted to the Confederation of the Rhine were given the alternative of signing or running the risk of being absorbed, or at least of losing all chance of territorial gain. Several of the fortunate States were large, like Bavaria and Württemberg, while others were so small that they must have possessed a magical formula for conjuring away a fate reserved for their neighbors. The annexations absorbed sixty-seven States,

CHAP.
XX
1804-07

Remaking
the Map
of Ger-
many

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

Confeder-
ation of
the Rhine

including three cities, all the countships, and many petty principalities. In addition, all the imperial knights were deprived of sovereign rights. The process was called mediatization, because the annexed States lost their immediate relation to the suzerain authority, which had been the Emperor, and became subjects. The loss of sovereignty did not, however, entail the loss of property or of aristocratic and social privileges. To their 1,200,000 subjects the change was a benefit, ridding them of many petty, expensive, and pretentious courts. It was also another step in the simplification of the German state system, with unification as the goal. But the immediate result was to subject the States of the Confederation to the will of Napoleon, who was declared its protector, and whom they promised to follow in his wars, furnishing a contingent of 63,000.

End of
the Holy
Roman
Empire

The creation of the Rhenish Confederation gave the *coup de grace* to the agonizing Holy Roman Empire. The States that belonged to it formally withdrew from the empire, and neither they nor Napoleon any longer recognized its existence. This compelled the Emperor Francis to renounce his titles and prerogatives as its head and to be henceforward simply Francis I of Austria. So perished an empire a thousand years old, but one which had ceased to do more than give occupation to lawyers and themes to political philosophers. Its place was taken by a real empire resting on military success rather than upon traditions or ideals.

Quarrel
with
Prussia

Before the negotiations for the establishment of the Confederation were completed, futile attempts were made to patch up a peace with Great Britain and with Russia. The only interest that attaches to the negotiations with Russia arises from the Czar's evident desire to persuade the French to withdraw from Dalmatia, a position which threatened his sphere of action in the Balkan peninsula. Napoleon frightened the Czar's diplomatic agent into signing a draft treaty which left the French in Dalmatia. The negotiations with the English were important because they helped to precipitate war between France and Prussia. In order to reach a basis of settlement he showed no hesitation in promising to return Hanover, although it was already occupied by Prussia, planning to offer Prussia an equivalent at the expense of the minor German States. Nevertheless, while the negotiations were proceeding, he assured the Prussians that his insistence upon their retention of Hanover was the only obstacle standing in the way of peace. They heard of his duplicity through an after-dinner confidence of an English diplomatist to the Prussian minister at Paris. Frederick William had already been alarmed by

the organization of the Rhenish Confederation, and he was only partially reassured by Napoleon's suggestion that he organize a North German Confederation and take the title of Emperor, for, when he made overtures to Hesse-Cassel, Saxony, the Mecklenburgs, and the Hanseatic towns, he discovered that French diplomacy was stirring up a feeling of jealous opposition. The news of the contemptuous treatment of Prussia in the affair of Hanover brought on a climax, and Frederick William put his army on a war footing, alleging in explanation the movements of French troops in southern and western Germany. The fear that restrained him for a time was the chance that the Czar might ratify the treaty which his agent had signed. Late in August he was informed that Alexander had rejected the treaty, and war became inevitable.

Not all the voices of Germany echoed the sentiments of Arch-chancellor Dalberg. The feeling of nationality was fast becoming a moving force, stimulated by the preaching of Schleiermacher at Berlin, and influenced also by Arndt's *The Spirit of the Age*, which argued for the freedom and brotherhood of Germans. From Vienna came a book of Gentz on the recent revolution in Germany, which condemned in unmeasured terms the subservient friends of France. In South Germany, upon which rested the burden of supporting the French soldiery, were circulated many pamphlets full of criticism and complaint. When information of this rising tide of sentiment reached Napoleon, who thought peoples had no sacred right except that of being well administered, he determined to terrify it into silence, declaring that the publications imperiled his army. A bookseller named Palm, who lived in Nuremberg, recently annexed to the dominions of the newly crowned King of Bavaria, was responsible for the circulation of a pamphlet which was milder than its title might suggest — *Deutschland in seiner tiefen Erniedrigung*. He was selected as an example, was arrested, taken to Braunau, an Austrian fortress still occupied by the French, and executed on August 25. This act was a pendant to the deed of 1804, when Napoleon showed that he could execute a prince with less compunction than the members of the Convention in their first mood. It proved that he was like them in their second mood and could judicially murder ordinary men also. The act produced a profound impression throughout Germany, and became one of the principal causes of the intense hatred later felt against the French. Even at the time Gentz remarked that a single defeat of the French armies would bring on another Sicilian Vespers.

Prussia was not a match for France. It is true Prussia might

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

National
Spirit in
Germany

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

Strength
of Prus-
sia

not be obliged to meet the French single-handed, for the Czar was her ally, and as the conflict with England could be brought to an end, England might also become an ally. The principal disadvantages under which Prussia suffered were due to her own faulty organization. To all outward appearance the State which Frederick II had raised to the position of a great power was still unchanged in its characteristic features. The chief solicitude of her rulers was that there should be peasants enough to meet the requirements of the recruiting system and enough nobles to command them. This concern prevented Frederick William and his advisers from radically modifying the condition of the peasants or from reducing the privileges of the nobles. Men of the citizen class were not expected to serve in the army, and they viewed its fate with comparative indifference. Nor could the peasant soldier, often ill-treated in his native village by his noble master, be expected to follow another noble enthusiastically into battle. The consequences of defeat were certain to be disastrous, because there was little unity of feeling between the provinces, and no national uprising, like that of France in 1792, would follow the news that the enemy's army had crossed the frontiers.

There were reasons more specific why Prussia's chances were few. Frederick William's army was nominally 250,000 strong; equal, therefore, to that of Napoleon, but he could put only half the number into the field. Most of his generals were old, without sufficient energy or initiative. The chief command was entrusted to the Duke of Brunswick, who had led the Prussians in the ill-fated Valmy campaign. He was an advocate of peace, was afraid of losing his duchy, and was overawed by Napoleon's military prestige.

The management of Prussian policy since Haugwitz signed the Treaty of Vienna ⁴ had convinced a group of Prussian officials, among them the Baron vom Stein, that the way of safety and honor was through a radical change of men and system. Stein had been a minister since 1804, without being in any sense responsible for the policy of the government, for the ministers, with the exception of the minister of foreign affairs, were administrators, entrusted with specific tasks and brought rarely into direct contact with the King. It was the "cabinet-ministry," composed of cabinet councilors and often including the minister of foreign affairs, which determined with the King questions of general policy. To this ministry belonged especially Haugwitz, Lombard, and Beyme, all partisans of Frederick William's policy

⁴ Also called the Treaty of Schönbrunn, from the palace where it was signed.

Stein
and the
Ministry

of peace with profit. In April, 1806, Stein prepared a memorial, urging the substitution of a ministerial council, between which and the King should stand no cabinet councilors. His memorial was couched in such passionate language that his friends thought it would do more harm than good. In this opinion Queen Louise, to whom it was shown, concurred. Nevertheless, in August, when it appeared necessary to give a firmer direction to affairs, before disaster should overwhelm, the group united in a petition for the removal of Haugwitz, Lombard, and Beyme, only to be severely rebuked by the King. Nothing remained but to await the lessons of defeat.

Late in September Frederick William sent an ultimatum to Napoleon, demanding that as a condition of peace he should withdraw French troops across the Rhine and acknowledge in principle the formation of a North German Confederation. But Napoleon's army was already in motion, with the heads of columns ready to advance towards Berlin. Believing that he was in the presence of a combination similar to the one which he had broken up a year before, and learning that the Prussians, without waiting for the Russian army, were marching into Thuringia, apparently to cut him off from the Rhine, he decided to repeat the strategy of the Ulm campaign. He concentrated his army about Bamberg, in the upper valley of the Main, about eighty miles east of Frankfort. He could afford to ignore the advance of the Prussians toward the Rhine Valley, for if he threatened their line of communications with Berlin, they would be obliged to turn back and fight. In the inevitable battle he proposed to outnumber them two to one. Before he knew where that battlefield was to be, he wrote Marshal Soult: "You may well believe what a fine thing it would be to reach the neighborhood of Dresden in a battalion square of 200,000 men. Nevertheless, all that requires a little art." Between his position and the Prussian line of communications, however, was the watershed separating the upper Main and the upper Saale. This mountainous region is called the Franconian Wood, and is a prolongation eastwards of the Thuringian Forest. To cross it would require three marches. The danger was that a vigilant enemy might attack and destroy isolated corps, strung out along the mountain roads. To decrease the risks Napoleon formed his army into three great columns, each column composed of two or three corps, separated from one another by a distance of half a day's or a day's march. The columns were to take parallel roads and at the end of three days were to stream out into the plains of Saxony with a front of thirty-eight miles. The army could then be concentrated in

CHAP.
XX

1804-07

Advance
of Napo-
leon

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

Jena and
Auerstädt

forty-eight or at most seventy-two hours. The manœuvre was successfully completed, and as soon as the three columns were again in the open country the whole army swung around toward the left, as on a pivot, and marched directly toward the Prussian lines.

The movements of the Prussian army offered a pitiable contrast. Frederick William felt that honor required his presence with the troops, but as soon as he arrived the Duke of Brunswick no longer acted as full commander-in-chief. Prince Hohenlohe did not wish to serve under Brunswick, and a separate army was constituted for him. The plans of campaign were repeatedly changed, and the soldiers were wearied by frequent counter-marches or by long delays while councils of war debated. The rapid advance of the French took the Prussian leaders completely by surprise, but instead of concentrating for battle or ordering a retreat they debated once more. They finally adopted the plan of retreating upon Magdeburg, and Hohenlohe was given the task of protecting the movement by taking up a defensive position on the plateau west of Jena. On October 14 Napoleon attacked Hohenlohe and crushed his army by the weight of numbers. Twelve miles away to the north, as the main army was pursuing its retreat, its columns stumbled upon a heavy French corps at Auerstädt commanded by Marshal Davout. There the odds were reversed, the Prussians outnumbering the French two to one, and yet they were unable to drive back the French, who fought skilfully and stubbornly. Early in the action Brunswick was fatally wounded, after which neither the King nor any one else seemed capable of giving unity to the struggle. Davout finally took the offensive and the Prussians fell back. They had not gone far before they came upon a stream of fugitives from the field of Jena, and the whole army, panic-stricken, was hopelessly disorganized. Many soldiers threw away their guns and went home, and no large body of them came together again.

Collapse
of Prus-
sia

The defeat of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstädt would not have been so memorable, had it not been followed by the total collapse of the national defense. The remnants of the army attempted to retreat upon Magdeburg, closely pursued by the relentless French marshals. Berlin was left defenseless and was occupied by Napoleon's troops on October 25. Frederick William retired first to Küstrin, then to Graudenz. Fortress after fortress, badly prepared to stand siege, and commanded by old men without energy, surrendered — Stettin to a brigade of hussars which was simply reconnoitering, and Magdeburg, with a garrison of 24,000, to Marshal Ney, whose corps numbered only

16,000. Soon the seat of war was transferred to the region between the Oder and the Vistula, and even east of the Vistula, while the Court took refuge in Memel, on the extreme eastern limits of the Prussian kingdom.

Napoleon believed that he had overthrown the monarchy of Frederick the Great, and prepared the draft of a decree of deposition, awaiting merely the psychological moment to proclaim this new decision of fate. The sword and insignia of Frederick were removed from the tomb at Potsdam and sent to the Hotel des Invalides at Paris. Napoleon also signaled his presence in Berlin by declaring the British Isles in a state of blockade, and making all communication with the British unlawful within his dominions and the dominions of his allies.⁵ Even before the seizure of the capital, he treated the Prussian territories west of the Elbe as stuff from which to carve new principalities, or, perhaps, a kingdom for Jerome; and he had laid a war contribution of 160,000,000 francs on Prussia and her German allies. Saxony, one of these, was soon detached, the Elector raised to royal dignity, and admitted to the Confederation of the Rhine. Meanwhile Napoleon had deposed the Elector of Hesse-Cassel and the Duke of Brunswick.

Although Napoleon dallied with the idea of dethroning Frederick William, he was ready to treat with him, if the Prussians would submit to his terms, which included the cession of the western provinces, the dismissal of the Russian allies, and the pledge to join in war upon Alexander if he attempted to seize any Turkish territory. With each new display of Prussian weakness the French terms grew harsher, until Frederick William abandoned hope of peace and threw himself fully upon Russian support.

In the midst of the crisis the controversy over the organization of the royal government came to a climax. Haugwitz and Lombard had retired, driven out by public opinion, and the King, although unwilling to adopt the plan of a cabinet council, tried to induce Stein to enter a council of three ministers in which Beyme should control the distribution of business and the final reports. Stein refused to have anything to do with a scheme which embodied the most vicious feature of the old system, the interposition of such a councilor between the King and his ministerial advisers. His manner of giving his refusal offended the King, who angrily accepted his resignation from the Prussian service. Governmental affairs drifted for a time, but gradually passed under the control of Hardenberg.

⁵ See next chapter, The Continental System.

CHAP.
XX

1804-07

The
Winter
Campaign

As soon as the French armies approached the Polish provinces of Prussia, the spoil of the partitions of 1793 and 1795, the hopes of the Poles for the recovery of independence were stirred. Murat entered Warsaw on November 28 amid the plaudits of the inhabitants. But the only answer Napoleon would give to the appeals of the Poles was that they must first show themselves worthy of independence by forming an army capable of defending it. He needed troops for the inevitable struggle with the Russians, and yet it was by no means clear that he could satisfy the aspirations of the Poles without gaining the enmity of Austria, which had Polish provinces to lose, and this would menace a line of communications as long as his line a year before on the eve of Austerlitz. The danger increased as he attempted to march late in December along the fathomless roads and over the desolate plains of Poland. The soldiers, suffering from hunger and disease, began to grumble because they were used to support schemes which had no real relation to the interests of France. In February, Napoleon received a serious check at Eylau, not far from Königsberg, and, had the Russians followed up their advantage, he would have been obliged to withdraw west of the Vistula. He now renewed his efforts to persuade the Turks to attack the Russians, and negotiated a treaty with the Persians, both to secure aid for the Turks, and to prepare for an eventual attack upon India.

Napoleon's enemies gave him time to conjure the peril as they had done in 1805. Austria did not stir, resolved to husband her resources for a better day; and England was exasperatingly slow, given to small expeditions, chiefly in regions which would strengthen her maritime power. In 1806 she seized the Cape, but failed at Buenos Ayres. A temporary success in southern Italy had been followed by futile expeditions to Constantinople and Egypt. A change of ministry in March, 1807, with George Canning at the ministry of foreign affairs, raised the hopes of the Russians and Prussians; but three more months were allowed to pass, and then it was too late.

Napo-
leon's
Triumph

In April Alexander and Frederick William signed the Treaty of Bartenstein, to which Austria, England, and the minor powers were asked to give adhesion. The treaty stated the aims of the alliance to be the deliverance of both Germany and Italy from French control, without meaning, necessarily, that Napoleonic dynasties should cease to rule in Naples, in the kingdom of Italy, and in Holland. Napoleon used the late winter and spring to organize an army which should outnumber the Russian troops and the small Prussian contingent nearly two to one, with a re-

serve army in central Germany to keep the Austrians from interfering. To accomplish this he was obliged to demand of the French 80,000 conscripts of the year 1808. By such sacrifices victory was assured, and at Friedland, June 14, it was made crushing through the bad strategy of the Russians, a reminiscence of the blunders at Austerlitz.

The consequences of Friedland were a diplomatic revolution which transformed the Czar Alexander from the defender of Europe against the enterprises of a military upstart into his close ally, proposing to divide with him the spoils of the East and the West. Alexander had been serious with his schemes of liberation, but he had gained no support from either Austria or England, and Prussia was too feeble to assist effectively in her own deliverance. Many Russians were bitterly opposed to what they regarded as a Quixotic policy, believing that Russian arms should be directed toward the conquest of the Danubian provinces or Swedish Finland. Moreover, Alexander was astonished to find that after his defeat Napoleon said nothing of territorial sacrifices, but only of accessions, offering all the land east of the Vistula for an alliance against the English. Before Alexander's mind hovered visions of an Empire of the East and an Empire of the West which should share the control of Europe. Negotiations began formally with a conference on a raft anchored in the Nieman near Tilsit. It is said that Alexander's first words were, "I hate the English as much as you do, and I will second you in all your actions against them," and that Napoleon's reply was, "In that case all can be arranged and peace is made."

Nevertheless obstacles were soon discovered, especially in the Polish and Turkish problems. Although the Czar declined to accept Napoleon's offer of the crown of a restored Poland, he was unwilling that this crown should be placed on the head of Napoleon's brother Jerome, as Napoleon suggested. While they were discussing the Turkish question, Alexander placed his finger significantly upon Constantinople, and Napoleon instantly exclaimed, "Never! That would be the empire of the world!" The Polish problem was solved provisionally by constituting out of New East Prussia and South Prussia — mainly the provinces Prussia gained in 1793 and 1795 — the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which under the King of Saxony as grand duke should enter the Confederation of the Rhine. The solution of the Eastern question provided that France should mediate between Russia and Turkey, and that in case the mediation was unsuccessful the Turks should be deprived of their European lands except Rumelia and Constantinople; but it did not state definitely what the Rus-

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

Napoleon
and
Alexander

Treaty
of Tilsit

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

sians should get. Alexander's friendly intervention saved the King of Prussia from total ruin, and Napoleon promised to restore all lands east of the Elbe upon payment of an indemnity, the amount of which was, unfortunately, not specified. The district of Bialystock was, however, to be given to the Czar. Such were the important features of the treaty which the two emperors signed at Tilsit on July 7, 1807. In it Alexander also recognized Napoleonic creations in Germany and Italy, including a new kingdom of Westphalia, composed mainly of Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, the west-Elbe provinces of Prussia and Hanover. With Napoleon the principal advantage was Alexander's promise to exclude English trade and declare war upon England in case the English refused to make peace. The minor courts of Stockholm, Lisbon, and Copenhagen were to be invited to join in the continental crusade, and, if they refused, were to be treated as enemies.

The chief provisions of the Treaty of Tilsit were repeated in a treaty which Napoleon signed with Frederick William immediately afterward. Queen Louise sought by personal entreaties to save at least Magdeburg, but her efforts were unavailing. Prussia also agreed to declare war upon England in case Alexander's intervention did not bring about peace.

Two or three startling incidents served as pendants to the Tilsit agreement. The British ministry, receiving inexact reports of the arrangement in regard to the minor neutrals, particularly Denmark, resolved to be beforehand with Napoleon. An agent was sent to Denmark with an offer of alliance, asking that England hold the Danish fleet as a pledge, and, when the Danes declined, an expedition of overwhelming force was sent to Copenhagen, on the supposition that they would see that resistance was useless. But the Danes felt in honor bound to resist, and the fleet bombarded the city for three days, finally compelling the surrender of the Danish ships. This high-handed proceeding diverted attention from Napoleon's manner of persuading neutrals to accept his offers of protection. At that very time he was engaged upon plans to coerce the Portuguese, whom he had begun to threaten as soon as he returned from Tilsit, and in October he negotiated a treaty with Spain looking to the partition of Portugal. A French force reached Lisbon on November 30, only to find that the Court, with the treasure and the archives, had sailed for Brazil under the protection of a British fleet. The attack on Copenhagen added the Danes to the allies of Napoleon, but Sweden refused to abandon its alliance with the English and Alexander invaded Finland and drove out the Swedish troops. To check a rising of Finns he formally recognized the rights of

the Grand Duchy and assumed the title of Grand Duke of Finland.

CHAP.

XX

1804-07

In the bitter controversies which preceded the outbreak of war in 1803 Napoleon had declared to the English that if through their machinations a new coalition was formed against France he would be forced to conquer Europe and bring into being that "Empire of the Gauls" which they affected to dread. He had now apparently made good his threat. The question was, Would his triumph lead to the humiliation of the English?

CHAPTER XXI

THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

CHAP.
XXI

1806-12

“THE time approaches when England shall be declared in a state of continental blockade.” With these words, inserted in the army bulletin issued nine days after Jena, Napoleon indicated the final step which must render inevitable the ruin of the English. Before he published the decree which should make known the destiny of another presumptuous nation, he waited until he had entered in triumph the capital of the humiliated Prussians. In a setting so dramatic appeared, on November 21, 1806, the Berlin Decree, which is commonly taken as the formal establishment of the Continental System. But this decree, comprehensive in scope, and sententious in form, provided for a continuation, rather than a beginning, and in its more violent features was a resumption of threats first used by the Convention and the Committee of Public Safety. Napoleon and his advisers were engaged in applying on a grander scale policies which their predecessors had tried to carry into effect with insufficient means. After the Treaty of Tilsit the means at his disposal were such that success seemed not far from his grasp, but he soon spoiled the plan and compassed his own ruin by the blunder of attempting to treat the Spaniards as clay of the same texture as the Neapolitans, the Dutch, and the Germans of the Rhenish Confederation.

The origin of the Continental System must be sought at least as far back as 1793. A month after war broke out in February of that year the Convention proscribed English merchandise, and a little later ordered the arrest of all British subjects. Not only were importers of British goods threatened with the severest punishment, but those who used such goods were declared suspicious persons. Under the Directory this policy was rendered more systematic by the law of October 31, 1796, which prohibited the entry of several classes of manufactured goods, particularly cotton and woolen fabrics, iron and steel products, and refined sugar, on the ground that they were English, whatever certificates of origin accompanied them. England's control of the sea made necessary the modification of the rule regarding refined sugar, and in 1799 a high duty was substituted for abso-

Origin
of the
System

lute prohibition, but importers were obliged to pretend that the sugar was not English. Meanwhile, other articles, either necessary in the processes of French manufacture or demanded by fashion, were obtained through the medium of the contraband trade, which had grown to enormous proportions. In the summer of 1800 the prefect of police reported that Paris was full of English goods and that although they were openly displayed it was impossible to effect seizures. He estimated that within five months English cottons to the value of three millions of francs had been sold. The First Consul reproached the women because they wore muslins, undoubtedly made in England, instead of French silks or linens. This was the situation when the Peace of Amiens was signed and the proscription of English merchandise lost the character of a war measure.

The theory of such war measures was that the English were a nation of traders, that out of the profits of trade they maintained their navy, subsidized the enemies of France, and paid for the plots which kept her in a state of ferment, and that as they could not be reached directly, because the French navy was disorganized, the surest method of forcing them to beg for peace was to close their continental market. Wherever French armies went, therefore, one of their objects was to put an end to trade with England. Just before the Committee of Public Safety ceased to direct the policies of the Republic, it expressed the hope of excluding the English "from the Continent, and closing it to them from Gibraltar to the Texel." General Bonaparte's successes made it possible for the Directory to extend the limits of this exclusion. The development of the contraband trade, however, left the plan still mainly in a state of theory.

Aim

These measures had another motive, equally powerful, although it remained in the background during the war. Many French manufacturers believed that the treaty of commerce of 1786 between France and England had exposed them to a ruinous competition and they welcomed the opportunity to return to the policy of prohibitions, characteristic of the older commercial régime. They aspired to control the French market and to gain every new market from which the English, their most serious competitors, were excluded. In the Continental System, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the elements which were parts of the permanent commercial policy of France from those which had the more temporary aim of ruining a dangerous enemy.

The tariff of 1791 had contained few prohibitions and these were of little consequence; and with good reason, for England

CHAP.
XXI

1806-12

French
Tariffs

was protected against such prohibitions until 1798, the term of the treaty of commerce. French manufacturers were forced to wait until war furnished an excuse for the abandonment of the treaty stipulations, and when, eight years later, peace was made, they did not mean to return to the régime of English competition. At an early stage in the negotiations the First Consul had offered to agree to the preparation of a treaty of commerce, the special prohibitions of English merchandise being suspended, but nothing was stipulated with regard to the matter in the Preliminaries of London, or in the Treaty of Amiens. By that time pressure had been brought to bear upon him by the manufacturers, increasing his own preference for strongly protective measures. It was intimated in the official *Moniteur* in October, 1801, that treaties of commerce were suitable to nations which were not rivals in the manufacture of similar articles. Although the merchants of Paris, whose interest was different from that of the manufacturers, clamored for the re-opening of trade, the influence of the manufacturers was greater, and none of the prohibitions were removed or abated. In May, 1802, the government received authority provisionally to raise or lower rates, to introduce or revoke prohibitions, but the only use the First Consul made of the power was to place a high duty on certain cotton fabrics, of non-British origin, which the French manufacturers wanted to exclude altogether. The policy of the government was displayed again in the tariff law of April 28, 1803, which made no concessions to English commerce, and which is regarded as one of the causes of the renewal of war a month later. With the war it was natural to enforce more rigidly the plan of prohibitions as well as to place further restrictions upon neutral ships which offered facilities to the contraband trade, but side by side with these extraordinary devices went the development of the policy of assuring to the French manufacturer the monopoly of the home market. The makers of textile goods, especially of cottons, urged the government to adopt the plan of absolute exclusion.

Tariff
of 1806

The tariff of April 30, 1806, marks the adoption of a definite policy. Indeed, it remained the basis of all subsequent French tariffs until 1881. This excluded all manufactures of cotton with the exception of certain grades of thread, some of which could not be produced in France. These were subjected to a high duty. For the first time raw cotton became dutiable, but a drawback was allowed in case the goods were manufactured for export. Heavy duties were placed on all colonial products. While the law was under discussion Napoleon intimated to his Council

of State that he wanted to go further. He said: "Forty-eight hours after peace with England, I shall proscribe foreign products and shall promulgate an act of navigation, which will permit entry to our ports only to French ships. . . . There will be clamor, because commerce in France has a bad spirit, but six years afterward we shall be in the greatest prosperity." He was evidently determined to establish the industrial and commercial supremacy of France on the Continent. He meant not only to close the home market to foreigners, but through his political power to secure a favored position for French products in the markets of allied or friendly States. Although he appeared to single out the English for attack, his measures, sooner or later, would affect every industrial rival of France whether friend or foe.

The warfare of commerce between Great Britain and France inevitably affected the trade of neutrals. Even during an ordinary war between States it is a delicate matter to adjust the rights of neutral and belligerent. As France remained weaker on the sea, the highway of trade, the French were at first inclined to facilitate neutral commerce so far as it offered to do what it had become impossible for their ships to do, that is, provide them with their own colonial products. It was equally natural that England should attack such trading by neutrals. In the first war, to placate the United States, England finally permitted the "broken" voyage by which French, Spanish, or Dutch colonial goods could be carried by American ships to some port of the United States, entered for import, landed, reloaded, receiving as a drawback the money paid for duty, and dispatched on the same vessel to a port of France, Holland, or Spain. But England interpreted in her own interest the right of search, extended the list of contraband of war, and resorted to the impressment of foreign seamen. It was to abate such practices that the Armed Neutrality of 1801 had been formed.

While much might be said in excuse of the practices of the English, their policy was not wholly defensive. The shipping and mercantile interests were very strong with the government, and as the French manufacturers seized the occasion of the war to establish a monopoly of the home market, the English merchants used the war to strengthen the supremacy of English trade. In any case the neutral was narrowly watched, his rights trampled on if possible, and his unique opportunity of becoming enriched while most of the nations were engaged in destroying their neighbors and ruining themselves was seriously interfered with. In spite of the restriction imposed by both British and

CHAP.
XXI

1806-12

Position
of Neu-
trals

American
Trade

CHAP.
XXI

1806-12

Seizure
of
American
Ships

French, the profits of the neutral, and especially of the American, who was near the French and Dutch colonies, were very great. This is shown by the fact that the Americans during the year 1800 exported 82,000,000 pounds of sugar and 47,000,000 pounds of coffee, undoubtedly the product of foreign colonies. When peace came and French and Dutch were able to take charge of their own colonial trade, American exports of sugar and coffee fell to twenty and ten millions each.

With the outbreak of war in 1803 a new golden opportunity opened before the neutral, and it seemed as if the bulk of the colonial trade with the Continent would pass into the hands of the Americans. In one respect the northern neutrals were in a still more favorable position, for they could clear from some port in the West Indies for a home port, and their voyage would carry them close to the ports of Spain, France, and Holland, so that they could seize a favorable opportunity to slip in. The Americans, however, could use the same commercial strategy. To protect her own mercantile and shipping interest, and to assist the sale of her colonial products, England reversed in 1805 her decision about the broken voyage, and did it by the mouth of the same judge who had delivered the previous opinion. This was done in the case of the ship *Essex*, which sailed from Barcelona, landed her cargo at Salem, refitted, reloaded the cargo, which meanwhile had been regularly imported, received the drawback on the duties paid, and sailed for Havana. The judge held that in deciding whether the rule of 1756 had been infringed the intention of the shippers must be examined. Under the new ruling many ships were seized, the owners of which were acting on the understanding that the previous decisions were still authoritative. Even before this decision struck a severe blow at the American trade with the West Indies, it had suffered from the rapacity of the British prize courts, which had a pecuniary interest in condemning all prizes brought in. The situation was modified again in the spring of 1806, when the trouble with Prussia led the English to proclaim a blockade of the Continent from the river Elbe to the port of Brest.

The treatment of the American neutral was peculiarly obnoxious, the American coast was closely watched, and some harbors practically blockaded by British ships of war or privateers. In 1806 the British ship *Leander* off Sandy Hook fired a shot across the bows of a vessel which her commander wished to search, and the shot ricocheting across the waters killed the steersman of a coasting schooner. When British ships were

not about, French ships were likely to appear. It was unfortunately true that the United States was not strong enough to enforce respect for her rights as a neutral, and that in a struggle so fierce the officials of neither France nor England were likely to be over punctilious in dealing with the weak who got in the way. Jefferson's administration attempted to procure better treatment by the threat of a non-importation act in accordance with which certain classes of goods of British origin might be prohibited.¹

One of the most serious grievances of the American neutral arose from the English practice of impressing seamen. Conditions in the navy had not been markedly improved since the great mutinies of 1797. The discipline was harsh, the wages low, and no reliance was placed upon voluntary enlistment, because the service was unpopular. In the ports the press gang swept up sailors loitering in their usual resorts, while on the sea ships of war stopped merchant vessels and took off the men they wanted, without being over curious about the question of nationality. As the English conception of the indefeasibility of allegiance did not recognize the right of naturalization, Englishmen who had become American citizens were still regarded as liable to impressment. In this the English were not ideally consistent, for parliamentary legislation during the colonial period was the basis of the American system of naturalization, but they were not ready to see these principles applied to their disadvantage. They found excuse in the fact that deserters from the English marine could often obtain naturalization papers without the requirement of the ordinary term of residence. As the profits of neutral commerce grew the demand for sailors increased, and wages on American ships rose from nine to forty-two dollars a month. The English believed that 30,000 or 40,000 seamen of British birth were on American ships, engaged in building up a trade which was bound to cripple their own. It seemed intolerable to them that deserters even from their navy should be received on board American vessels. Their exasperation was increased by a feeling of contempt for the Americans. For this reason a question which could have been adjusted by calm negotiation became hopelessly involved, and not merely acted as a cause of war, but also remained an irritating recollection in the American national tradition. The English also were angry because the Americans appeared to be the allies of Napoleon in his attempts to force them to submission.

Such was the general situation when by the Berlin Decree,

¹ Made effective in November, 1806, and again in December, 1807.

CHAP.

XXI

1806-12

The Ber-
lin Decree

Napoleon sought to make as wide as the Continent his attack upon the English manufacturer, planter, merchant, and shipper. In the "considerations" which prefaced the decree he enumerated England's offenses against international law in order to justify his pose as champion of the liberty of the seas. There were, indeed, enough of these offenses, but by adding several articles to the international code of practice he increased their number. For example, he pretended to regard it as extraordinary that England should blockade any but strong places and claimed for private property at sea an immunity which he had not granted to private property on land. If the neutrals had been inclined to accept seriously his championship of their rights, they were soon disillusioned, for the decree practically ordered them to cease trading with the British Isles, and made British goods wherever found liable to seizure. This was a more serious menace to the few neutrals still within reach of Napoleon's armies than to those, like the Americans, who were guarded from his attacks by a vast expanse of ocean. The declaration that the British Isles were in a state of blockade, however, was not even mere stage thunder, for it exposed neutral ships to capture by French privateers or wandering cruisers. The American minister at Paris was assured that the decree did not apply to his fellow-countrymen. Its principal immediate consequence was to bring a rejoinder from the British, cutting off neutrals from the coasting trade between ports from which British ships were excluded. Napoleon was for several months deeply absorbed in the winter and spring campaign in Poland and Prussia, and he could give little attention to the enforcement of his Continental System. He merely illustrated the method by confiscating vast quantities of British goods in the Hanseatic cities.

The Treaty of Tilsit set Napoleon's hands free and added to the number of England's enemies. Soon Russia, Prussia, and, through her own violent conduct, Denmark, were allied with the French against her. In order to defend her market against so formidable a combination, her ministers resolved that if Napoleon meant to prevent English wares from entering the markets of the Continent, they would see to it that the much-desired colonial goods — especially sugar, coffee, and cotton — should reach the Continent only through the medium of the English shipper or after paying duty at an English port. The method was embodied in the famous Orders in Council of November 11, 1807. These left to the neutral the direct trade between his own ports and the enemy's colonies, but no ship was to be permitted to sail to a European port without first entering a British port and paying

Orders in
Council

charges on its cargo amounting practically to an import duty. The news of these orders found Napoleon in Italy, and his reply was the Milan Decree, which declared denationalized and fair prize any ship which should comply with the British requirements. It is obvious that a situation had now been created which theoretically isolated Napoleon and his allies from all contact with neutrals by way of the sea, and isolated the British from all except their own colonies. In practice the French decrees added only slightly to the risks of trade with the English, but the British regulations threatened honest neutral trade with ruin. Both orders and decrees were, however, subject to exceptions.

The resentment in the United States against the English policy toward neutrals had meanwhile been much heightened by the attack of the British frigate *Leopard* on the American frigate *Chesapeake* in July, 1807, in order to force the surrender of deserters who were said to have been accepted as part of the crew of the *Chesapeake*. After a brief and unequal conflict four men were taken from the *Chesapeake*, three of whom were native Americans previously impressed into the British service. One, who was an Englishman, was carried to Halifax and hanged. The ineffectiveness of Jefferson's retaliatory measures did not improve the situation. In the fall came news that Napoleon was beginning to enforce the Berlin Decree against American vessels, and a little while later arrived newspapers forecasting the contents of the new orders in council of November 11. Jefferson was convinced that America's only defense was an embargo which should keep her ships in port. Congress responded promptly to the President's request and in December the embargo went into effect. This prevented American ships from leaving port and permitted European ships to carry with them only the amount of cargo on board at the time of the passage of the act. It did not prevent foreign ships from entering American ports, and the consequences were therefore more serious to the American than to the British shipper. The Americans attempted to avoid the effects of the law by keeping their ships away from the ports of the United States or by transforming them into coasters, which once clear of port sailed for the West Indies or Europe. Supplementary acts and finally a Force Bill made such evasions increasingly difficult and threatened to involve the coast and river trade in the ruin of the foreign trade. Grass began to grow in the streets of the seaports, sailors were in distress, and even the farmer in remote valleys felt the effects of the falling off of the exports, because his market for grain and lumber was destroyed.

The fate of the ships that kept the seas or evaded the law and

CHAP.
XXI
1806-12

The Em-
bargo

CHAP.

XXI

1806-12

Conse-
quences of
the Sys-
tem

sailed for Europe was hardly better. Napoleon replied to the embargo by ordering the seizure of all American ships, on the ground that they were either English ships under American colors or American ships which had complied with the British orders. As the seas were covered with British cruisers it was perilous not to comply with these orders, and yet they put a heavy charge upon the profits of the voyage. The supporters of the embargo estimated that a ship with 400,000 pounds of tobacco, bound for Holland, and returning with six hundred pipes of gin, would pay \$31,000 to the English in duties, charges, and license fees.²

The Continental System meant that the French manufacturer enjoyed the monopoly of the home market and that in nearly all European markets he was protected from English competition. Had it been possible to suppress smuggling, this protection would have been absolute. Although the Napoleonic decrees made the introduction of English goods expensive, their relative cheapness rendered such transactions profitable. The rapid development of the factory system in England since the beginning of the Revolutionary period accounts for this; machinery, for example, having reduced the cost of weaving a piece of cloth from 39s. 9d. in 1795 to fifteen shillings in 1810. As the French were still where the English were prior to 1795, the expenses and risks of the smuggling were covered by the large margin of profit. Moreover, the French could not obtain raw cotton and certain kinds of cotton fabrics except from England or through neutral commerce which had paid for English toleration. The prices of sugar and coffee in Paris at this time were so high that many could not buy them at all, but the desire of the Parisians for these articles was no less keen than before the development of Napoleon's grandiose schemes. The smuggler's profits were generally from forty to fifty per cent.

Smuggling

It was through Holland and western Germany that the most active trade went on. Napoleon constantly found fault with his brother Louis for winking at such transactions, but Louis sympathized with the sufferings of a maritime people like the Dutch. Jersey, Sardinia, Sicily, and Malta served also as points from which smugglers could start for the European coast; but the history of Heligoland, a small island thirty miles from the mouth of the Weser, offers the most startling illustration of the extent of smuggling operations. When the English occupied it in September, 1807, so many merchants made it their headquarters that a chamber of commerce was formed. Within the space of three

² Summarized by MacMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, III, 308.

months in 1808, 120 vessels were said to have discharged cargoes there, and the annual volume of business amounted to eight million pounds sterling. "When the French government prohibited refined sugar, the traders of Heligoland deluged the Continent with *eau sucré*. Coffee passed as horse beans, sugar as starch, the aliases of pepper were legion."³ It is said that citizens of Hamburg crossed the Danish border to Altona, and walked back with all the sugar, coffee, and indigo they could carry concealed. "Mock funerals were organized in which consignments of colonial goods played the rôle of corpse." More roundabout routes were also attempted. Goods were landed at Salonica and carried overland into Hungary, from whence they found their way up the Danube to the markets of central Europe. The French, in order to obtain raw cotton from the Levant, tried to establish a route from Marseilles and Genoa through Bosnia into the Balkan Peninsula, where they hoped also to sell the cloths of Languedoc.

The Continent was nominally closed to English commerce, but this situation was modified not merely by the operations of smugglers, but by the fact that several of England's enemies were so only in the sense that they were bound to Napoleon's chariot wheels. Many Prussian, Russian, and, later, Swedish ships were saved from capture by English war vessels because they possessed English licenses to trade. These licenses could, it is said, be purchased in blank in Europe. The States of southern Europe were also weak spots in the System. This was true of the kingdom of Etruria and the States of the Church, whose annexation was approaching. The situation in the Spanish Peninsula was peculiarly unsatisfactory. Portugal in 1807 was dependent upon England, and must, Napoleon decided, be driven into hostility to her, but this was a business of little moment compared with the problem of Spain.

Licenses

Napoleon had reasons for attacking the Spanish Bourbons, besides the inefficiency of their administration, which compromised the success of the System. He had deposed the Bourbons in Naples; his Revolutionary predecessors had driven the Bourbons from France; the work was incomplete as long as Bourbons reigned in Spain. He had a special grievance. Before the battle of Jena, when the Prussian army still enjoyed its prestige, and men believed that Napoleon might be defeated, Godoy, the Spanish minister, had persuaded King Charles IV to issue a call to arms. Although the particular enemy was not designated, it was

Spain

³ Fisher, Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany, 339.

CHAP.

XXI

1806-12

evident that Spain desired to free herself from a burdensome alliance. After the Prussian defeat at Jena, Godoy gave out that the mobilization had been directed against Portugal, but Napoleon was not deceived, for the despatches of the Prussian ministry at Madrid had been seized, and he knew their contents. Had Jena been another Austerlitz, he might have given a repetition of the last act in the Neapolitan drama. Eylau was still to be fought and Tilsit was months away, and he contented himself by demanding the services of a Spanish corps of 15,000 at the mouth of the Elbe, the union of the Spanish with the French fleet at Toulon, and the rigorous application of the Berlin Decree. Not until he was in the midst of his operation to coerce Portugal did he see an opportunity to hasten the fate of the Bourbons.

Portugal

The Portuguese were unable to satisfy Napoleon by breaking off relations with the English; they must in some form come under his control. On October 27, 1807, he signed a treaty at Fontainebleau with Spain providing for a partition of Portugal. The suspicious part of it was the concession of a province to Godoy, who was to be made prince, a strange requital for the bellicose proclamation of the year before. Another part of Portugal was assigned to the King of Etruria in exchange for the cession of his kingdom, the former grand duchy of Tuscany. While these plans were being matured a bitter family quarrel between Charles IV and his son Ferdinand, growing out of the scandalous influence of Godoy, and the appeal of each to Napoleon for support, offered him the opportunity to pose as judge of this decadent house. The terms agreed upon at Fontainebleau could be utilized to disarm Spain quite as much as to procure a partition of Portugal. An army under Junot had already set out for Lisbon, and it was stipulated that a Spanish corps should take part in the expedition, while a reserve French army should be gathered at Bayonne, to cross into Spain if the English landed a force in Portugal. The Portuguese phase of the affair was apparently terminated late the next month when Junot arrived at Lisbon only to find that the Portuguese Court, with the state treasure, had taken refuge on board ships of war protected by an English fleet and had sailed for Brazil.

Napoleon
and
Spain

The Spanish phase of the affair opened before Junot reached Lisbon, the reserve army having crossed the Bidassoa without excuse or notice. In December the Spaniards were alarmed by rumors of invasion, and with reason, for, although Napoleon had not fixed the details of his solution of the Spanish problem to his own satisfaction, he had been persuaded by the analogy of Louis XIV to place a Bonaparte upon the Spanish throne. The

marriage of Ferdinand with a princess of the imperial house offered one method, although not as satisfactory as the substitution of either Louis or Joseph Bonaparte for the Bourbon monarch. Early in January another corps entered northern Spain and in February a mixed army of French and Italians invaded Catalonia, while Murat was appointed "Lieutenant for the Emperor in Spain." To explain the entry of these troops Napoleon's ambassador spoke of an expedition against Gibraltar.

When Murat was within striking distance of Madrid, Godoy persuaded Charles IV to emulate the example of the Portuguese house, but at the news of this, Spanish rage burst out against the man who had made Spain so long subservient to French interests. On the night of March 17, terrified by a riot, Charles abdicated in favor of his son Ferdinand. Murat now saw a chance to bring the royal family into Napoleon's power, and, when he reached Madrid, he refused to recognize Ferdinand, persuading Charles to declare that his abdication had been procured by force. Murat had not been informed of all Napoleon's plans and hoped he was erecting a throne for himself. At this juncture it was announced that Napoleon was coming to Madrid, although he did not intend to leave Bayonne, and, by a sinister coincidence, General Savary, the executioner of the Bourbon Duke d'Enghien, was chosen to persuade Ferdinand to meet Napoleon first at Burgos and afterwards at Vittoria. At Vittoria he was intimidated into crossing the frontier to Bayonne, where a few days later his parents and Godoy appeared. At first Napoleon could not frighten Ferdinand into an act of renunciation, but early in May the news of an uprising against the French army in Madrid, like another "Veronese Passover" extricated Napoleon from the impasse, enabling him to threaten Ferdinand with a trial for treason if he did not abdicate. Ferdinand had no desire to have his name added to the list of Bourbon martyrs and yielded. His father had already abandoned all his rights to Napoleon as "the only one," so he declared, "who could reestablish order." Charles IV, the Queen, and Godoy became Napoleon's pensioners, and Ferdinand was strictly guarded at the château of Valençay, with Talleyrand as his jailer.

Another act had to be presented before the comedy turned to tragedy. Murat appointed a Junta of Regency from Madrid office holders with the function of requesting that Joseph Bonaparte be granted to them as king. When they had done this, 150 notables were summoned to Bayonne in order to beg the same boon, and ninety-one appeared and acted the part assigned to them. This body also gave the semblance of national authority

CHAP.
XXI

1806-12

Napoleon
and the
Pope

to a constitution proclaimed early in July. The incident apparently terminated when Joseph accepted a formal cession of the rights held by Napoleon and when Murat was chosen for the vacated throne of Naples. Towards the close of his life Napoleon characterized the whole transaction in the words, "I embarked very badly on the Spanish affair, I confess: the immorality of it was too patent, the injustice too cynical."⁴

At the time when Napoleon was treating with brutal contempt the national honor of the Spaniards, he roused their religious passions by despoiling the Pope of several of his provinces and by holding him practically a prisoner in his own capital. General Miollis had occupied Rome in February, 1808, and in April, Ancona, the duchies of Urbino, Macerata, and Camerino were annexed to the kingdom of Italy. Pope Pius VII forbade the inhabitants to take the oath to their new sovereign under penalty of jeopardizing their eternal salvation, and for this the papal secretary of state was expelled. In May, Tuscany was transformed into French departments. All Italy was now under Bonapartes, although the formal annexation of Rome to the French empire did not come until a year later.

Insurrec-
tion in
Spain

Long before Joseph could set out for his capital, insurrection had broken out in all parts of Spain. The people and the priests refused to believe that they had been voluntarily abandoned by their princes, and they looked upon Napoleon with horror as the jailer of king and pope. The movements in the different provinces were isolated, and under control of local juntas or committees, which displayed no zeal for union, so that it was not until the latter part of September that a central junta was organized. Even then no single commander was appointed, and the junta attempted to direct the operations of troops in regions widely separated. At first few competent leaders came forward. Many of the notables had concluded that submission was inevitable and had taken the oath to the new régime. The absence of responsible leadership gave to resistance too often the character of sanguinary insurrection. Mobs attacked not merely small bodies of French soldiers, but defenseless merchants, and even Spanish officials who thought resistance to Napoleon futile. The patriotic party contained many impelled by a self-sacrificing and enlightened spirit of national independence, and many others who detested the French mainly because for two decades they had represented liberty and progress. Smugglers and bandits joined in the fray as soon as the fighting began. When the reach

⁴ Quoted by Rose, II. 153.

and strength of the movement was perceived, those who had tamely submitted to the decisions of Bayonne began to rally to the popular cause.

CHAP.
XXI
1806-12

From the beginning Napoleon made the mistake of underestimating the strength and persistence of the forces with which he had to contend. He was so anxious to keep the Grand Army cantoned in Germany, at the expense of the Prussians and his German allies, and for the sake of the influence its presence might have upon the politics of central and northern Europe, that he sent into Spain an army made up chiefly of the raw conscripts of 1807. The result was disastrous. A column of 20,000 under General Dupont pushed southward from Madrid towards Seville, but was checked by a larger number of Spanish troops and was soon afterwards compelled to surrender. This incident at Baylen, on July 23, stirred not only Spain, but Europe. A still greater feat was the repulse after weeks of fighting of a French army from the streets of Saragossa, practically by the exertions of the inhabitants, for few regular Spanish troops were present. Napoleon was beside himself with rage, and, although he was quite as responsible as Dupont, exacted vengeance upon the hapless officer by keeping him in prison as long as the empire lasted.

Capitulation of
Baylen

The uprising in Spain gave England for the first time a satisfactory opportunity to place a large army on European soil. Early in June deputies from the Asturias were enthusiastically welcomed in London, and Spain was at once stricken from the list of England's enemies. Help was promised, the more gladly because the resistance of the Spaniards was not an affair of professional diplomacy, but was due to a genuine national aversion, like the aversion which the English had felt since 1793, and particularly since 1803. The enterprise bade fair also to be profitable, for it might rob the French and the Continental System of the Iberian Peninsula. Indeed, the exports from France to Spain sank in one year from sixty-five to thirty-three million francs. This loss brought corresponding gains to the English. The friendship of the Spaniards might also open to them the ports of the Spanish colonies far better than naval expeditions had succeeded in doing. The English instinctively perceived the magnitude of Napoleon's error, and resolved to profit by it. The first consequence was the landing in Portugal in August of an expeditionary force under Sir Arthur Wellesley, a general already distinguished for his services in India, and brother of a governor-general. This force repulsed Junot decisively, and but for the appearance on the scene of superior officers, dispatched thither by factional jealousy, Wellesley would probably have compelled

Convention of
Cintra

CHAP.

XXI

1806-12

Junot to surrender unconditionally. Wellesley's successor signed a convention at Cintra, granting Junot the privilege of a return with his army to France on British ships. Public opinion in England condemned the convention, but this did not render it more palatable to Napoleon, especially as the English about the same time rescued most of the Spanish soldiers whom he was retaining in Northern Germany.

Joseph Bonaparte entered his capital on July 20, but the news of Baylen caused him to withdraw ten days later. By the end of August the French held nothing of importance south of the Ebro and had lost control of Portugal. Joseph feelingly wrote to his brother, "Your Majesty can form no idea of the hatred felt here for your name. Two hundred thousand Frenchmen would be necessary to conquer Spain, and one hundred thousand scaffolds would also be needed to maintain here the prince condemned to reign over it." Napoleon was ready to sacrifice more than two hundred thousand in the effort to complete the task undertaken, but he was to discover that even this was not enough. Before he undertook the conquest he must see that the System did not totter and collapse at the other end of Europe.

The agreements at Tilsit had left certain questions for the future to answer. One of these concerned Turkey. The Czar still had his eyes upon Constantinople, and was anxious to annex at least the Danubian principalities. Before Napoleon went to Bayonne he desired a personal interview with the Czar, in order to bind him more closely to the Continental System, and to divert his mind from immediate gains along the Danube by the prospect of a joint expedition against the Indies. Meantime Alexander would serve as policeman for central Europe while Napoleon attacked the Spanish problem. But Alexander refused an interview without a previous understanding about the partition of Turkey. Napoleon started for Bayonne with the expectation that the seizure of Spain and the annexation of Tuscany and of the Papal States would give him control of the Mediterranean, bringing the Eastern question within the sphere of influence of the Grand Empire, and reducing Alexander to the position of a suppliant for favors. The sinister termination of the Spanish affair upset these calculations and in a measure reversed the rôles. An interview became necessary to Napoleon to overawe the restive Austrians and put an end to agitation in Germany prompted by the news from Spain. Alexander consented to meet Napoleon at Erfurt, although many of his advisers warned him against a closer alliance with the French Emperor. He thought that the time had not yet come to overthrow the colossus, and

Napoleon
and
Alexander

that Russia, Prussia, and Austria must wait until it had begun to crumble of its own weight.

The two Emperors met on September 27 and remained together two weeks. Napoleon tried to dazzle Europe by the spectacle of kings and princes forming a magnificent court of which he was the center. Before a theater filled with princes and monarchs the members of the *Comédie Française* played the classical pieces. Goethe and Wieland paid their homage to the conqueror and administrator of half the world. In the midst of these festivities there were many interviews between Napoleon and Alexander. Napoleon wished Russia to unite with him in compelling Austria to cease her military preparations, or in forcing her to join in the war against England. When arguments did not succeed, he tried exhibitions of rage. He threw his hat on the floor and stamped on it, but the Czar quietly declared, "Let us talk, let us reason, or I go." The result was a secret convention upon terms of a possible peace with Great Britain, with the basis *uti possidetis*, meaning that the Russians were to gain Finland and the Danubian principalities and that the new situation in Spain was to be recognized. France was to withdraw her mediation between Russia and Turkey and intervene only in case the Austrians took sides with the Sultan. In the event that Austria should attack France, Russia should come to her assistance.

A few weeks before, on September 8, the Prussians had signed a treaty which seemed to bind them to the Napoleonic system still more effectively, although most of the Grand Army was withdrawn from Prussia to fight in Spain. Several fortresses on the Oder were still to be garrisoned by French troops and the Prussian army was limited for ten years to 42,000 men, a number which was not to be increased by "any extraordinary levy of militia or of citizen guards, nor any mustering that tends to augment the forces specified." In case of war with Austria in 1809 Prussia was to furnish 12,000 men. One of the reasons why the Prussians consented to these hard terms was the seizure of a letter from the King's principal minister Stein, in which he rejoiced in the success of the Spanish party of resistance and urged that the same spirit be everywhere stimulated in Germany.

Napoleon after his return from Erfurt hurried south into Spain, where already an army, composed mainly of veterans of the Grand Army, had been concentrated. The Spaniards did not have more than half that number and were unskillfully handled. The result was a foregone conclusion; defeats disorganized each of their principal armies and by December Napoleon

CHAP.
XXI

1806-12

Prussia

Spanish
Campaign

CHAP.

XXI

1806-12

Wellington's
Defense of
Portugal

was in Madrid. He took the attitude of a conqueror, as if the determinations of Bayonne had been destroyed by the war that had followed; hoping, perhaps, to make the acceptance of Joseph appear to the Spaniards their only means of escaping annexation. During his stay in Madrid he issued a series of decrees abolishing the Inquisition, sweeping away the remains of feudalism, removing provincial customs boundaries, and reducing the number of monasteries by two-thirds. To most Spaniards this was another instance of the "Greeks bearing gifts," aggravated by the fact that the gifts were detestable, reminding them of revolutionary and atheistic France. Napoleon intended to send columns to attack Seville and Lisbon, but, hearing that Sir John Moore with a British army was within striking distance, set off in December to capture him. The British made good their retreat on Corunna, and Napoleon gave over the pursuit to Marshal Soult, while he returned to Paris. Soult attempted to attack Corunna while the British were embarking, but was repulsed. It was in this fight that Sir John Moore was killed.

For the next two years the struggle in Spain went on with varying fortunes. In 1809 Napoleon was too much absorbed in a new conflict with Austria to give it much attention, relying on his marshals to effect the capture of Lisbon and to occupy southern Spain. In Portugal, Soult got no further than Oporto, when he was attacked by Wellesley, who in April had returned with supreme command of the British forces. Soult was glad to escape across the mountains into Galicia with the sacrifice of his baggage and artillery. Through the faulty coöperation of his Spanish colleagues Wellesley was less successful against Victor, who had Seville as his objective point. He won the bloody battle of Talavera in July, but was soon obliged to retreat into Portugal to escape a large army sent under Soult to cut his line of communications. When the Austrian campaign was over heavy reinforcements were despatched to Spain by Napoleon, and early in 1810 the French successfully occupied Andalusia and drove the Spaniards back upon Cadiz. In August a French army under Masséna began a march upon Lisbon, to defend which Wellesley, now Viscount Wellington, devised a remarkable plan. He constructed three lines from the Tagus to the sea, the first of which was 29 miles long, and which, altogether, included 126 closed redoubts, mounting 427 guns. The inhabitants of the region through which the French army would advance were required to remove or destroy their food supplies, and withdraw to Lisbon or Oporto, possibly to the mountains. While the Anglo-Portuguese army should man the "Lines of Torres Vedras," as the fortifications

were called, bodies of militia should hang on the flanks and rear of the French force, cut off their communications, seize foragers or stragglers, and prevent their control of any except the ground on which they stood. Masséna reached Wellington's lines on October 12, after suffering a smart repulse at Busaco on September 27. He speedily realized that assault was futile, and, after lingering about Santarém until his army was in a starving condition, in March, 1811, he began his retreat into Spain.

In Austria, as well as in Germany, every phase of the tragedy of 1808 had been watched with intense interest. The loyal subjects of the House of Hapsburg could not regard as final a situation which had excluded Austria from her traditional position in Europe. Events had followed one another in a series which also awakened forebodings. Pressburg had been supplemented by the agreements with the States of the Rhenish Confederation, and these by Tilsit. In the negotiations for the settlement of the question of the Turkish empire Austria had not been consulted, although early in 1808 she was forced to adhere to the Continental System. Still more ominous seemed the overthrow of the Bourbons in Spain, especially because this had been accomplished without protest from Russia, the only great independent power besides Austria left on the Continent. Austrian statesmen looked upon their empire as peculiarly open to a new Napoleonic venture, because the French federative system might be extended by breaking up their own federation. It is not surprising, therefore, that rumors that Austria was arming reached Paris early in the summer. In June the Emperor Francis had initiated the reorganization of the army by creating a *landwehr* in which all men from eighteen to twenty-five should be enrolled, and the Archduke Charles addressed himself to the task of improving the different branches of the service. What Francis would attempt depended upon the attitude of other States, but it was certain that he would not be ready for a struggle until 1809, and consequently Metternich, his ambassador at Paris, denied emphatically the reports of hostility.

During the winter the war party at Vienna gained the ascendant, arguing that the stubborn resistance of the Spaniards and the presence of the English in Portugal would cripple Napoleon so that he could not place more than 200,000 men on the Austrian frontier. They hoped that if war broke out the Prussians would rise and they did not despair even of the Russians, being confidentially informed of the misunderstandings at Erfurt between Napoleon and Alexander. They also counted on financial aid from the English and a possible diversion made by the

CHAP.

XXI

1806-12

Fears of
Austria

CHAP.
XXI

1806-12

landing of English troops in northwestern Germany. These hopes were quickened by the fear that Napoleon would attack them anyway, for financial reasons if for no other. Spain was proving a heavy drain upon his resources, and some means had to be found to fill his treasury. He would not abandon the profitable principle which he had learned from the Revolutionists, that war must pay for war. The Austrians found that they could expect no assistance from either Prussia or Russia, and yet in February, 1809, they decided to fight. Unfortunately for them they had also miscalculated the ability of Napoleon to raise troops for the campaign. He summoned the conscripts of 1810 in September, 1808, and in 1809 he called to the colors all who had not served in the classes from 1806 to 1809. By such means the number of soldiers was forced up to 800,000, including 200,000 German auxiliaries. Of these 300,000 were kept in Spain. The quality of the troops was, however, beginning to deteriorate, because of the youthfulness of the conscripts, called a year or a year and a half before the regular age.

The Aus-
trian
Campaign

The campaign opened with the Austrian invasion of Bavaria in April. In a proclamation to his soldiers the Archduke Charles declared, "The freedom of Europe has taken refuge under your banners, your victories will loose her chains, and your German brethren, now in the enemy's ranks, await their deliverance." At the outset the Austrians had the advantage of earlier concentration, for Napoleon had misjudged the time at which the war would begin, but the disorganization of their commissariat, resulting in movements unusually slow, cost them this advantage, and a few days after Napoleon's arrival they were driven in full retreat into the Bohemian mountains. Napoleon pressed on to Vienna, believing that the possession of the capital would enable him to dictate terms of peace, but the Austrians were not ready to yield. He used his presence in the enemy's capital, however, to announce the annexation of Rome to the French empire, revoking the gift made by his "august predecessor," "Charlemagne, Emperor of the French." A few days later when he attempted to cross the northern bank of the Danube and attack the Archduke Charles, he was awakened rudely to actualities. Before the movement was completed, he was attacked by the Austrians at Aspern-Essling and his bridge of boats, over which reinforcements must be brought, was broken by masses of material which they floated down upon it. After a day of the most stubborn fighting he was forced back to the island of Lobau. This defeat deprived him of the glamour of invincibility, but six weeks later he was more successful in establishing a position on the northern bank, and

defeated the Austrians at Wagram, almost on the same field. Francis I was ready to abandon the struggle, and on October 14, after waiting several weeks in the hope of English or Prussian intervention, signed the Treaty of Schönbrunn.⁵ His loyal subjects in Tyrol carried on a desperate struggle against the French and Bavarians until December. Their leader, Andreas Hofer, was finally betrayed, taken to Mantua and shot. The hope of assistance from the Germans had seemed at one time not altogether illusory. Colonel Schill led his cavalry regiment out of Berlin in April to give the signal, but the people did not stir and he was killed a few weeks later at Stralsund. In the summer the young Duke of Brunswick startled Germany by a raid from Bohemia across Saxony to Brunswick, eventually taking refuge on board the English fleet.

The terms of peace embodied in the Treaty of Schönbrunn were hard. They did not constitute a settlement, but, rather, reasons for another war a few years later. The Austrians were obliged to cede Austrian Galicia to the grand duchy of Warsaw, a portion of East Galicia to Alexander, and certain western districts to Bavaria. The greatest blow was the creation of the Illyrian Provinces out of Carniola, a part of Carinthia and Croatia, with the coast about Trieste. Nor was money forgotten. In addition to the contribution levied during the war, 85,000,000 in coin were now required. Austria also agreed to reduce her active army to 150,000.

The question of the succession had perplexed Napoleon ever since the possibility of imperial power first appealed to his imagination. It troubled his adherents also, for upon its proper solution depended the stability of the régime to which they owed titles, incomes, and worldly influence. Even Napoleon's settlement of the controversies inherited from the Revolution, and his work of reorganization, appeared to depend too much on the chances of his life. The solution of the problem seemed to lie in a dynastic marriage, which might also serve as a pledge of peace after the long struggle of France against the world. This accounts for the rumors that Napoleon intended to divorce Josephine, who had borne him no children. At Erfurt he spoke vaguely to Alexander about a marriage alliance. After he returned from Vienna in 1809 he intimated to Josephine the necessity of divorce. Negotiations were opened once more with Russia for a sister of the Czar, and with Austria for an archduchess. Alexander's answer was bound to be unfavorable, because

CHAP.

XXI

1806-12

Peace
with Aus-
tria

Marriage
Alliance

⁵ Also called the Treaty of Vienna.

CHAP.

XXI

1806-12

Annexa-
tion of
Holland

he referred the matter to his mother, who hated Napoleon bitterly. Napoleon's advisers, therefore, favored an Austrian marriage, and Francis was ready to sacrifice his daughter Maria Louisa to preserve the remnants of his empire. The ever convenient instrument of a *senatus consulte* freed Napoleon from the civil bond and the metropolitan of Paris declared that the religious ceremony, performed in 1804, had been irregular and was, therefore, invalid. Josephine retired to Malmaison, followed by public sympathy, while Maria Louisa reigned in her stead. Already a place and title were prepared for an heir who was to be called "The Prince Imperial" and to "bear the title and receive the honors of King of Rome."

In 1810, when the Continental System had broken down in Spain and Portugal, Napoleon attempted to strengthen it along the coast of the North Sea by annexing Holland and northwestern Germany. King Louis Bonaparte had not enforced the system to the satisfaction of his brother, and he was plainly told that he could retain his crown only if he kept English goods out of Holland. American ships had begun to visit Dutch ports again, since the Non-Intercourse Act had replaced the embargo. As these ships had complied with the requirements of the British Orders in Council he demanded that Louis order their confiscation. Louis regarded the situation as intolerable, and, abdicating the throne on July 1, fled to the dominions of the Emperor Francis. Annexation followed in a few days. The first punishment visited upon the Dutch was the exaction of a tax of fifty per cent. on the colonial products discovered in their warehouses. Northwestern Germany, another sphere for the operations of smugglers, was annexed in December, and this carried the French frontier up to the shores of the Baltic just beyond Lübeck. With the exception of the Iberian Peninsula, the coast of Europe from the borders of Denmark to the kingdom of Naples was now in the hands of Napoleon's officials. The consequences for Great Britain must have been serious except for the outcome of the Spanish adventure and the results of the French license system.

The
Spanish
Colonies

As soon as Great Britain undertook to aid the Spanish party of resistance English ships were welcome wherever the French were not actually in possession. Portugal was also under British control almost continuously from the summer of 1808. England regained the trade with Brazil after the reestablishment of friendly relations with the exiled royal house. In the Spanish colonies she had long profited by a large contraband trade. When she was involved in war with Spain the only way to control these colonial markets was through conquest. In 1806 Buenos Ayres

had been captured, but it was recaptured by the inhabitants within six weeks. Montevideo was seized and held for several months, while English ships flocked to the harbors and English merchants enjoyed a thriving trade in goods of which the inhabitants had long been deprived. It is said that people came from the slopes of the Andes attracted by the new market. This was merely a temporary advantage, but when Napoleon deposed the Bourbon monarchs the Spanish colonies revolted. The Spanish Central Junta and the Regency that succeeded could not expect to maintain the old commercial monopoly in its rigor and one after another the Spanish colonial ports were opened to British and neutral commerce. This gave the British the opportunity to sell part of their accumulated stocks of merchandise, and British exports rose from £37,275,000 in 1808 to £48,438,000 in 1810. The principal element in this increase appeared to have been the proscribed cottons, the exports of which were £18,616,000 in 1810, and only £9,846,000 in 1808.

In the United States the policy of the embargo had proved so ineffective and unpopular that just before Jefferson's second term closed the act was repealed. It was replaced by a Non-Inter-course Act, forbidding trade with the offending States until their obnoxious decrees and orders should be withdrawn. This provoked reprisals from Napoleon, and by the Rambouillet decree in March, 1810, he ordered the seizure of American ships, although he did not publish the decree for two months after its adoption. He utilized the opportunity to seize many American ships which meanwhile entered Dutch, Neapolitan, and Spanish ports in good faith. The Non-Inter-course Act gave way in turn to a bill authorizing the President by proclamation to impose non-intercourse with one of the two powers, should the other agree to withdraw its decrees. As soon as Napoleon heard this he confronted the Americans with a dilemma, for he promised to revoke the Berlin and Milan decrees, so far as they were concerned, if England withdrew her orders or the Americans caused her to respect their rights as neutrals. When the English took no steps towards this, Madison imposed non-intercourse with them, after reopening trade with France.

While Napoleon was urging his allies to enforce the Continental System against the English, he prepared to share with the English the profits of the monopoly they continued to enjoy in colonial goods. His practice of issuing licenses, regularized in 1806 and developed in 1810, permitted the entry of most English goods with the exception of cottons. The question had early been raised, What should be done with prize cargoes? and in Jan-

CHAP.

XXI

1806-12

Repeal
of the
Embargo

Napo-
leon's
License

CHAP.
XXI

1806-12

System
Tariffs
and De-
crees

uary, 1810, the government authorized the sale of such cargoes, even if the goods belonged to the prohibited classes, provided that a seal was appended indicating that they were "prize-goods" and that a duty amounting to forty per cent. was paid. From this source the government hoped to increase its income substantially, and as not enough prizes were taken to assure the estimated income, the officials winked at the introduction of prohibited articles, labeling them "prize-goods." Cottons, however, were destroyed, the government indemnifying the captors. The extra-legal trade was increased by the issue of licenses, effective for limited periods, permitting the importation of prohibited goods in case the merchant should export an equivalent amount of French products. As these products were excluded from England the merchants sometimes turned their exports over to smugglers, or loaded boxes of sand marked with deceptive labels, and threw them overboard when the ships were out of sight of land. The license system incidentally opened the way to the corruption of officials, and provoked vehement protests from manufacturers and traders who could not enjoy its expensive privileges.

When Napoleon was convinced that the colonial trade was completely under the control of the English, and that smugglers were obtaining the profits of the demand which still existed, he sought by the Trianon tariff of August 5, 1810, to add these profits to the government revenue. This tariff charged about fifty per cent. on coffee, cocoa, sugar, and raw cotton. In the case of cotton the duty varied with the place of origin, that is, Levant cotton was charged two francs a pound and American cotton twice as much. This was a heavy blow for the cotton manufacturers and threatened their business with ruin. It also increased the difficulties of the dealers in colonial products, and on both accounts is to be regarded as one of the causes of the terrible panic from which France suffered from the fall of 1810 to the summer of 1811. The situation was rendered still worse by the Fontainebleau decree of October 18, 1810, in which he ordered the destruction of all products of British manufacture, except such as had been admitted under his licenses. Seizures were especially frequent in Germany, upon the pretext that goods accumulated within four days' march of the imperial frontier were destined to the contraband trade. Some of these goods were taken to Antwerp and sold, but the cottons were publicly burnt. Napoleon urged the Czar to imitate this action and to seize the neutral vessels, chiefly American, in the Baltic ports, on the ground that they were carrying British goods. He wrote to Alexander that such a blow would be decisive and would bring

the English to terms at once. Alexander, however, would not listen to these proposals which were contrary not only to the stand Russia had taken ten years before on the rights of neutrals but also to the interests of Russian merchants.

About the time when Napoleon's license system assumed large proportions the English began to restrict the issue of licenses, especially as they discovered that he thought it necessary to reopen trade to this extent. They had also resorted to other devices to keep open trade with the Continent. One was to send out American vessels which had never seen America, and "whose papers were manufactured in London."⁶ Napoleon's willingness to permit French exports to England relieved the English in a notable crisis. The grain crop of 1809 was a partial failure, and that of 1810 an almost total failure, with the result that the average price of wheat in August, 1810, was 116 shillings a quarter. There would have been actual famine had not quantities of grain been obtained from France and her dependencies.

The consequences of such a vast system of government interference with the ordinary currents of trade were serious. There was much suffering, principally beyond the borders of France, but also in those French towns which depended on maritime commerce. For example, the number of ships fitted out in Bordeaux in 1802 had been 224, and in 1810 it was only 29. A German traveler wrote in his journal in September, 1809, that La Rochelle was as still as death. "You may go up and down the streets," he added, "without seeing a living soul. The grass in the streets is as undisturbed as in the fields. The population has fallen to a half."⁷ This did not mean a decrease in exports, because the continental market was steadily widening. Trade found new land routes or reopened old ones. In 1806 the exports were 143 millions more than they had been in 1802, the year of maritime peace. On this trade Strasbourg in France, and Frankfort and Leipzig in Germany, where great fairs were held, were rapidly growing rich. But when the rigors of the Continental System were fully developed, there followed a sharp decline in trade, and exports and imports fell from 933 millions in 1806 to 621 in 1809. A slight recovery took place in 1810, but was not lasting. Napoleon's policy of wars, military contributions, heavy taxes, commercial discrimination, was bound to cripple the continental market. The consequence would be the

CHAP.
XXI
1806-12

French
Exports

⁶ Quoted by W. E. Lingelbach, from a report of an American Consul, *American Historical Review*, XIX, 269-270.

⁷ Quoted by Paul Darmstädter, *Studien zur napoleonischen Wirtschaftspolitik*, in *Vierteljahrsschrift für Social-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, II. 577.

CHAP.
XXI

1806-12

The Sys-
tem and
Dependent
States

ruin of that industrial supremacy which it had been his purpose to give to France.

Political association with the French empire did not carry with it the reduction of French tariffs. Only by annexation to France was the area of freedom of trade on the Continent extended, and even in this case the change was not immediate. The industrial fortunes of the grand duchy of Berg may illustrate the situation of allied States. It was there that the famous Remscheid steel was manufactured. The exports of the region before the war had amounted to 60,000,000 francs, but by 1811 they had fallen to 18,000,000. Cotton goods were affected by the tariff of 1806, made to protect French cottons, although, after Murat was moved to Naples, Berg was ruled by Napoleon. When Holland was annexed the coal miners on the Ruhr expected to find a market for their coal, but it was practically prohibited by a rate established in January, 1811. The final blow was the confiscation of all colonial goods found in the grand duchy, which was, on Napoleon's part, an act of mad self-consistency, if the date — 1813 — be noted, for this was when his empire beyond the Rhine was collapsing.

A more striking illustration of the treatment of an allied State is to be found in the case of the kingdom of Italy, over which Napoleon himself ruled. Shortly after his coronation he issued a decree prohibiting the importation of British goods. This was followed a year later by a decree declaring certain kinds of cottons and woollens, together with buttons and pottery, to be English. As Italy manufactured few such goods, the decree conferred a monopoly upon France, and deprived several friendly States, notably Switzerland and Saxony, of a good market. In 1807 Napoleon learned that Swiss calicoes were sold in large quantities in Italy, and in December he issued a decree which barred all cottons not of French origin. The next year as King of Italy he negotiated a commercial treaty with himself as Emperor of the French, according to which the Italians conceded to France substantial advantages in return for benefits which looked better in the treaty than anywhere else. Two years later he subjected Italian silk to a high export duty if it was sent to any other country than France. This injured the Italian manufacturer, while it secured to the manufacturer of Lyons an adequate supply of raw silk. Napoleon's motto was "France first," as he said to the Viceroy Eugène. His measures immensely increased the French exports to the kingdom of Italy, forcing them up from 12,900,000 francs in 1802 to 40,000,000 in 1806 and 51,600,000 in 1810.

For a few years French manufacturers had the benefit of an extraordinary expansion of their market, while they were protected from English competition. Certain industries, especially the manufacture of hardware and of cotton goods, received such a stimulus that the Continental System marks an epoch in their development. The woolen manufactures also profited. In the case of silk, an article of luxury, the expansion of the business was so rapid until the fall of 1810 that the manufacturers could not keep pace with the demand. The number of looms was nearly double that under the old régime, although the silk industry had been reduced to ruin by the Revolution. In 1808 it was reported that were there looms enough 10,000 more persons could be profitably employed. The panic of 1810, however, put an end to this prosperity.

It should not be forgotten that some districts beyond the frontiers of France profited, as did many French cities, by the temporary cessation of British competition. England was equipped, as they were not, with the new machinery. In their case, therefore, the Continental System acted like a highly protective tariff. Behind such a wall ventures in manufacturing might be safely attempted. The cotton industry made rapid progress, especially in Saxony, where so many spinning machines were set up that the number of spindles rose from 13,200 in 1806 to 210,150 in 1812.

It was a part of the irony of the situation that the British orders, which were designed to safeguard British trade, should in America have resulted in bringing into being strong rival industries. The capital which had been invested in the shipping business was diverted by the operation of the embargo and the Non-Intercourse Acts into the new manufactures of cotton, wool, and steel. From 1807 to 1811 the number of cotton mills increased from fifteen to eighty-seven, while during the next four years the rate of increase was still greater. The progress with woollens was slower, but the foundations of this important industry were laid.

One of the most curious incidents of the struggle between Napoleon and England was the French effort to find substitutes for cane sugar and colonial dyewoods. By 1810 sugar was four francs a pound in Paris. It happened that a decade earlier a Berlin chemist had succeeded in producing a few lumps of sugar from the treatment of the beet root, and that a report on the subject had been read before the French Institute. The high price of sugar tempted manufacturers to carry the processes to perfection so that the product might become commercially profit-

CHAP.
XXI

1806-12

Growth of
French
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Manufac-
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Sugar

able. By 1811 a French chemist produced certain lumps which Napoleon could not distinguish from lumps made of cane sugar. A year later the success of Benjamin Delessert, a manufacturer of Passy, seemed so undoubted that Napoleon visited his factory and decorated him with the cross of the Legion of Honor. A decree had already been issued declaring that after January 1, 1813, the importation of cane sugar should be prohibited. As sugar of this kind could then not be made at a cost less than four francs a pound, it was evident that the industry would collapse if the stringency of the Continental System was relaxed. Similar efforts were made to substitute woad, madder, and saffron for colonial dyewoods. Even the experiment of raising cotton in Corsica and Italy was attempted.

The fires fed by confiscated British merchandise in 1810 appeared to signalize the triumph of the Napoleonic policy. The French manufacturers hastened to congratulate the Emperor because he had delivered a "fatal blow at English commerce." They were mistaken. Most of the goods destroyed had already been paid for by French or continental merchants. A financial and industrial panic, the consequence of the Napoleonic policy, had begun to sweep over France. Events were at the door which were to add to the defection of Spain the far more serious defection of Russia. The annexation of the northwestern coast of Germany, which was intended to strengthen the Continental System, prepared its final ruin. Among the States annexed was the duchy of Oldenburg, the ruler of which was a relative of the Czar Alexander.

CHAPTER XXII

THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA

“**N**EVER were sowing and reaping, spinning and weaving, buying and selling, so much a patriotic duty.” Such is the comment of a German historian upon the desperate situation of Prussia after the Peace of Tilsit. For the Hohenzollern monarchy it was a hard fate to lose half its territories. The sacrifice of the lands west of the Elbe was the serious part of the loss, since the Polish provinces, out of which the grand duchy of Warsaw was formed, had proved difficult to assimilate. But the menace of the situation lay not in the size or the meaning of these losses; it lay in the fact that the royal administration did not for months recover control of the larger portion of what was left. Nor was this all. With inconceivable carelessness Field Marshal Kalckreuth had signed a convention (July 12, 1807), according to which the withdrawal of the French was contingent upon the payment of a war contribution, but which did not specify its size or the basis for reckoning it. Nor could the King collect his revenue within the region occupied by French troops until the contribution was paid. The Prussian monarchy was apparently caught on the horns of a cruel dilemma. One of the King’s officials declared that a man who could sign such an agreement should be sent to the madhouse or the gallows.

The ambiguities of the Convention of Königsberg were not due to the indifference of a generous victor in matters of detail. Napoleon meant to complete the ruin of Prussia as a great power in Europe. In his later life he regretted that he had not destroyed the kingdom altogether. That Frederick William was spared was due to the importance of the Russian alliance in the development of the Continental System. At the same time the distrust that Napoleon felt in regard to Alexander’s real attitude and policy made it convenient for him to have an army in a position which menaced both Russia and Austria, especially if that army were supported at the expense of the defeated Prussians. In case Alexander showed an intention to act in good faith, he might be repaid in favors to his friend Frederick William, by reducing the war contribution or by withdrawing the army a little further westward. Similar concessions might also be of-

CHAP.
XXII

1807-12

Conse-
quences
of Tilsit

CHAP.

XXII

1807-12

Recall of
Stein

ferred in reply to embarrassing Russian requests. As the months passed Alexander showed no disposition to withdraw his troops from the Danubian principalities. Napoleon offered to accept the situation if he received Silesia as compensation; but this Alexander refused.

Whether the Prussian monarchy should survive depended upon the character of the intelligence and courage which was to preside over its counsels. Hardenberg, as the negotiator at Bartenstein of that intimate union with Russia before the battle of Friedland, had become impossible, and he advised the King to recall Stein, to whom the reform party among the officials had begun to look as the person fitted by his clearness of vision, by his energy and independence, and by his long administrative experience, to carry the State through the present crisis. The selection was disagreeable to the King, but he yielded and dispatched the summons to Stein, who was living in retirement on his estates in Nassau. It was the close of September before he reached Memel, where the Court was then living. Up to that time, except for foreign affairs, the administration had been entrusted to an Intermediate Commission, composed of Hardenberg's associates. Their jurisdiction was not extensive, for not until the following December did the French army withdraw even to the Vistula. Within the occupied provinces the journals were not permitted to publish royal ordinances, officials were obliged to take an oath of fidelity to the French Emperor, and the revenues were collected for the current requirements of administration and the support of the French army. The kingdom of Frederick William was reduced to the province of East Prussia and a small part of West Prussia.

Financial
Situation

When negotiations were opened to fix the amount of the war contribution, it was discovered how far apart Napoleon and the Prussians were in their reckoning, although, to deceive the Czar, Napoleon asserted that he asked simply for the amounts levied before the close of the war. The Prussians claimed that the contributions already made in the provinces should be subtracted and that only 19,800,000 francs remained due, while the French estimated the balance at 154,500,000. The French claim was one and one-half times the annual income, assuming that Frederick William could dispose of the revenue of the territories left to him at Tilsit. But how could it be paid from the revenues of a single province; one, moreover, which had felt the full weight of war?

For the months of November and December, 1807, only ten per cent. of the Prussian income came from revenue receipts, the

remainder being drawn from existing funds, among them what was left of an English subsidy. Every element of expenditure, from that of the Court to that of the most obscure branch of the service, was severely scrutinized, to discover possible economies. Strong percentages were taken off the higher official salaries and appropriations for the army were cut again and again; but ruin seemed inevitable unless the French could be persuaded to evacuate other provinces, so that all sources of revenue would become available. The desperate situation accounts for the strange willingness of Stein to sign a treaty of alliance with France which should place a large Prussian corps at Napoleon's service, and to agree that Prussia should enter the Confederation of the Rhine. The King's brother was despatched to Paris with the hope that Napoleon might be moved to leniency by such proposals, but Napoleon had given the Prussians so many reasons to detest him that these hollow overtures were made in vain.

Among the resources considered by Stein the most important was the royal domain, the value of which was estimated at 68,000,000 thalers. If a portion could be sold, it might be possible to pay the contribution and be rid of the French. Napoleon was willing to take domains to the amount of 45,000,000 francs, but Stein had no desire to find among the troublesome vassals of the King a group of French paladins. He was ready to sell a part of the domain to ordinary purchasers, but the difficulty was to obtain a satisfactory price under the circumstances. There was another possibility. To save noblemen whose fortunes had been compromised in the wars of the eighteenth century, Frederick the Great had founded credit societies, of which the noble landowners of a province were members, and which lent money to individual nobles to enable them to restore their estates. The notes of these societies, secured by vast masses of property, easily found purchasers, so that there was no trouble in obtaining money.¹ It was now proposed that the royal domains in the several provinces should enter these associations, and that a part of the debt should be paid with the new notes which might then be marketed. The opposition of the nobles, who feared for the effect upon their associations and their own property, was finally overcome by the insistence of the administration, and the domains entered the credit societies. By this means Stein was able to obtain 71,000,000 francs towards the payment of the debt.

Stein's efforts to reach a settlement in regard to the amount of the war contribution were unavailing until the treaty of Sep-

The
Royal
Domain

¹ See page 51.

tember 8, 1808, fixed it at 140,000,000 francs. This was only a small portion of the sums extracted from the hapless kingdom for the support of the army of occupation, the replenishment of Napoleon's extraordinary fund, and the enrichment of French officials. Napoleon acknowledged that he obtained a thousand millions, and German historians estimate the amount at two hundred millions more. After Napoleon's army was needed for the war in Spain the evil was abated, for the French soldiers remained only in Berlin and a few fortress towns, so that the expense of maintenance as well as opportunities of oppression were greatly decreased.

Something more was necessary than the payment of the French war contribution. The old monarchy and the old social order had been pitilessly condemned at Jena. Had it been proposed after Tilsit to continue in the beaten paths, few officials would have had the courage to order the sacrifices necessitated by the payment of the contribution. Even before the Peace of Tilsit was signed, Frederick William had asked of Hardenberg a memoir upon the reorganization of the Prussian State. As the weeks passed the need for action became imperative, for in the Polish provinces of Prussia incorporated in the grand duchy of Warsaw a new constitution abolished serfdom. The same step was soon to be taken in Westphalia, which also contained former Hohenzollern lands. Towards these States it was likely that a tide of discontented peasants would turn, if the Prussian statesmen proved incapable of vigorous action. And there were other things besides serfdom to be swept away. All except drowsy or stubborn reactionaries realized that the rigid classification of the inhabitants as peasants, citizens, or nobles, must be abolished, implying, as it did, a similarly rigid classification of work and of land and a sharp distinction between town and open country. If independence was to be reconquered it would be by a new Prussia, freed from the trammels of antiquated law and custom, and with plenty of elbow room for hard work.

When Stein reached Memel he found a reform decree ready for his approval or for any revision which he might see fit to introduce. The scheme had been drawn up by the Intermediate Commission, and its terms were mainly the work of Schön, a councilor who, as already remarked, was an ardent disciple of the English Adam Smith. The principal change which Stein made was to extend its application to all the lands that remained to the King, the commission having in view only the provinces of East and West Prussia. The ideas of the project were acceptable to the King, who declared, in regard to serfdom, that

he had been working towards its abolition throughout his reign. The fundamental aim of the plan was, in Hardenberg's words, to embody "democratic ideas in a monarchical state"; that is, revolution from above. The part Stein was to play is suggested in Hardenberg's remark that "the principal question of all is to what chief the execution [of the plan] is committed, and that unlimited scope . . . should be given to such a leading mind, if only it is equal to the great task."² The chance of success would be increased by the prestige of a leader who would not listen to counsels of timidity. A more hesitant statesmanship would invite obstruction from every single interest bound up in the defense of the existing order of things.

The great edict was signed October 9, 1807. The first two articles removed the restrictions upon the holding of land and upon the choice of occupation. Although safeguards were thrown about the acquisition of peasant land, the general principle was laid down that any man, peasant, citizen, or noble, may acquire, without special authorization, any land hitherto called noble, or citizen, or peasant. Work, too, ceased to be classified. The noble might engage in citizen occupations, and the peasant and the citizen might exchange places. It is obvious that in these provisions the newer spirit of economic enterprise burst through the bonds that long had obstructed its action. One of the aims of the commission was to attract capital towards agriculture. Noble estates, whose owners had become impoverished, and which were unproductive, could now pass into the hands of enterprising burghers or peasants or of other nobles who had money to develop them. Similarly good results must be produced by the freedom of all occupations from social stigma. The nobleman who had strong business instincts might utilize them to the enrichment not merely of himself but of his province. The citizen need not dawdle in some traditional city employment, if he was inclined to be a farmer, but he might acquire peasant land and live among the other peasant farmers.

These provisions, however, have not attracted so much attention to the edict as the articles abolishing serfdom, which declared that serfs with hereditary claims to their lands were free, and that all others would be in November, 1810. This applied especially to peasants on the estates of the nobles, for little was left of serfdom on the domains of the State. The edict did not specify the obligations from which the peasants were freed. They were not freed from what were called feudal dues; that

CHAP.
XXII

1807-12

The
Emancipa-
tion

² Seeley, Stein, I. 410.

CHAP.

XXII

1807-12

Difficult
Questions

is, payments in work, in products, or in money, which were connected with their tenure of land; for it was stated expressly that they were still subject "to all the obligations which bind them as free persons by virtue of the possession of an estate or by virtue of a special contract." On the other hand, they retained some of the safeguards which the State had previously thrown about them, and as its wards they could not be coerced or even induced to sell their holdings to their landlords except under conditions defined in instructions sent to the provincial authorities.

The obscurities of the situation were increased by the confusion in several provinces between dues paid to a lord as master and similar dues paid to him as magistrate. Stein, in a memoir which he had prepared before he became a minister, had urged the withdrawal from the nobility of their functions as magistrates; that is, their control of manorial justice, and the performance of such duties by state officials; but the edict of October 9 did not raise the question. The terms upon which nobles might acquire land of former serfs affected the ancient policy of preserving peasant holdings in order that the peasant population might not be decreased and that the army might not lack recruits. Several officials felt that it would be contrary to the spirit of the edict, which had introduced freedom in the purchase and sale of land, to place special restrictions upon the acquisition of peasant land, and argued that the peasant as a free man was a better judge as to whether he would gain or lose by selling his rights to his former landlord. When the question of population was raised, they replied that the population was likely to increase with better methods of cultivation, but they were willing to concede that, for every peasant-holding the landlord purchased, he be required to establish a cottager provided with three acres. On the margin of this proposition Stein wrote "*cessat in totum*." His own impulse was to protect all peasant-holdings against purchase by former landlords, except in cases where the lords, on account of the devastations of the war, were unable to restore the buildings and restock the farms, or where the holdings were very small. He finally accepted a compromise, which protected long-established tenures, and provided that, in case the newer tenures were consolidated or added to the lord's domain, the lord was to create a peasant farm of equal size, free from all feudal services. Unfortunately this excluded from protection most of the holdings created by the peasant colonizing work of Frederick II.

If the provisions of the October edict be compared with the work of the Constituent Assembly embodied in the laws of March and May, 1790, it is apparent that their consequences ended where the work of the French reformers began. The principal aim of the French legislation was to extinguish the feudal dues as well as to remove every trace of feudal superiority and substitute state for manorial courts. Even Louis the Sixteenth's declaration of June 23 had promised that the remnants of serfdom should be destroyed. It should, however, be remembered that Stein did not intend to pause with the work of October, 1807, although he was more deeply interested in administrative or constitutional reform than in social reorganization and the relief of the peasants.

An important outgrowth of the October reform was an edict doing for the peasants on the domain in East and West Prussia what had in the earlier part of the reign been attempted for the peasants of Pomerania and the Marks. In this case the State did not ask the peasant to decide whether he would become a proprietor, nor did it demand any payment in return for its abandonment of its superior property right. Its profit was found in a release from the obligations previously resting upon the administration of the domain as a proprietor. The peasant would henceforth be obliged to stand on his own feet. As for the feudal dues, three-quarters were to be paid off by installments, leaving one-quarter as a land tax. Schön wanted those who could not go on without state aid to be evicted, but Stein, remembering how the peasants had been impoverished by the war, decided that the State should continue its help for two years. The final result of this legislation was the creation of over 45,000 peasant proprietors in East and West Prussia and Lithuania. If Stein contemplated similar reforms on the estates of the lords, he did not have time to propose definite plans.

The decree of October 9 had improved the situation of the citizens of the towns, destroying their isolation from the other classes, conceding the right to purchase noble or peasant land, and permitting a wider range of choice of occupation. Before complete industrial freedom was established the distinction between town and country, commercial monopolies, and the system of guilds must be removed. Stein made a beginning of these changes, but left their fuller accomplishment to his successors. His most important work for the towns was the restoration of the right of self-government, secured by the decree of November 19, 1808, a few days before his second removal from office.

In this municipal corporations act Stein's share was greater

CHAP.
XXII
1807-12

Comparative
Merits of
Prussian
Reform

Peasant
Proprietors

CHAP.
XXII

1807-12

Prussian
Cities

than in the Emancipation Edict, but he owed the development of the project especially to the work of a Königsberg official named Frey. Like other enlightened Königsbergers, Frey had been led by Kant to admire the work of the Constituent Assembly and his project bears upon it marks of the study of the French municipal code of December 14, 1789. Stein's latest biographer, Professor Lehmann, says that it was a "combination of the ideas of the Constituent Assembly with legal relationships which either still existed or had existed in Prussia."³

The most remarkable thing about the law was that in a group of territories, with different historical origins and differing systems of administration, it applied a uniform method of organization to all towns having more than 800 inhabitants. Elements of continuity were not lacking and yet the break with the past in many a locality was sharp. The project had at first been devised for East and West Prussia, but Stein decided that it was to apply to all the provinces of the King. The details of governmental machinery were determined by extent of population rather than by the character of special privileges. The towns were divided into great, middle, and small, with a population of 10,000, 3,500, and 800 as the lower limit of the different classes. The inhabitants were to be of two kinds, citizens and residents, although the distinction here was not exactly like that between "active" and "passive" citizens in France. Any one owning a house in town or qualified to pursue a trade was necessarily a citizen, and even non-residents who paid taxes of a certain amount possessed the privilege of voting. Women could be admitted to citizenship, but not qualified to vote. The citizen's control of municipal affairs must be through a wise use of his vote, for he was not permitted to instruct his representatives in the council, the framers of the law also sharing the prejudice of the Constituent Assembly against instructions to deputies. But the citizen could take a direct part in administrative work, and it was intended that such matters as education, care of the poor, prisons, sanitation, and public buildings should be managed by deputations made up partly of councilors and partly of citizens.

Govern-
ment Con-
trol

The only matter of local administration reserved for more immediate state supervision or control was the police. The royal government might appoint a special magistrate to exercise this function or it might delegate the power to the burgomaster. The amount of expenditures for police and justice were also fixed by the State, while other expenditures were to be determined by

³ II. 462.

the councilors as a representative assembly. The chief official, the "burgomaster," was in a measure a state appointee, for in the "middle" and "small" towns the choice of the representatives was to be confirmed by the provincial administration, while in the case of the "great" towns the representatives were to name three candidates from which the King was to select. It was the management of the police power that opened the door to state interference on a large scale. If the burgomaster represented the State in the matter, he acquired a double relation difficult to manage. The men who framed this law were not of the opinion that the State should be deprived of effective control over local administration. The State retained the power to confirm new statutes adopted by the council and to inspect the accounts of the municipality.

The aim of Stein to train the citizens for public affairs and to quicken their sense of responsibility is seen not merely in the provision that citizens may be appointed on commissions, but also in the fact that there were two kinds of councilors, paid and unpaid, only those being paid who devoted their whole time to the business of administration. It was expected that every public-spirited citizen would willingly undertake such honorable duties, with permission to retire at the close of three years. Paid councilors were chosen for periods of six, and, in some cases, twelve years.

For over forty years this law provided the only semblance of popular government in an absolute State, and, modified by the laws of 1831 and 1853, it still lies at the basis of Prussian municipal rule. The reform of municipal administration should have been accompanied by reform for villages, but there Stein would have encountered formidable opposition, because the structure of the rural communities was affected by the jealously guarded police and governmental powers of the nobility. He intended to create provincial estates, and to place at the head of a hierarchy of self-governing bodies an assembly representing the varied interests of all communities and authorized to advise in matters of administration, in the levy of taxes, and upon projects of law.

Perma-
nence of
the Re-
form

According to Stein's own view the most immediate need was a reorganization of the central administration and of the chambers or boards which were its agents in the circles or districts. He was particularly anxious to rid the administration of the ills characteristic of bureaucratic government, the interminable correspondence between departments, the accumulation of reports, and of official red tape of every sort. His remedy was discussion

CHAP.
XXII
1807-12

among ministers and responsible chiefs of administrative services in an organized cabinet or council. Another crying need was the redistribution of work according to its character, rather than by provinces. The details of the scheme were ready by the close of 1807, but the negotiations about the war contribution absorbed so much of Stein's attention that the plan was not completed before his retirement in November, 1808. His successors, however, put its main features into effect.

The most important change was the creation of a real responsibility on the part of individual ministers, and, especially, of the head of the ministry. This was accomplished by establishing the principle that business was to be laid before the ministers by the First Minister and that councilors were not to be the agents through whom the King was to act. The importance of the ministers was also increased by abandoning the practice of appointing several men to a single ministry.

Stein planned a royal council made up of princes, ministers, and other high officials, meeting under the presidency of the King, which should receive projects of policy or legislation, should discuss them and receive the decision of the King. But Frederick William had an unconquerable aversion to such a method of work, and Stein did not get beyond a "general conference," over which he presided and in which were convened heads of departments as well as ministers. The final outcome, after Stein had ceased to be minister, was a ministerial council, nominally under the presidency of the King, although during the ministry of Hardenberg this council played a secondary part.

Among the specific reforms which Stein introduced was the separation of justice from administration, a change demanded by public opinion since the days of Montesquieu. The citizen was protected against abuse of power through an appeal to the ordinary courts. Another reform was the consolidation of the various treasuries, which numbered eleven towards the end of the old régime, into a single central treasury. It was no longer the rule, as in the days of Frederick the Great, that no one except the King and, perhaps, a confidential cabinet councilor, understood the financial situation of the government.

The reform of the local government turned the circles into districts and the chambers into administrations, which again were divided into sections corresponding to the ministries or parts of ministries. Stein introduced into these administrations small groups of proprietors, chosen by the local estates. Between these administrations and the central government were the "Su-

perior-presidents," who would have general duties as inspectors over one or two provinces.

The reorganization of the army was one of the most important reforms begun during Stein's ministry. Two tasks were undertaken: first, the punishment of the officers responsible for the disgraceful collapse of Prussian resistance in 1806; and, second, the recasting of the army in a national mold. For the first the King showed more persistence of purpose than for the second. He appointed a commission of inquiry which pitilessly struck off the army list the old, the incompetent, and the disgraced. Seven officers were condemned to death by military tribunals, although the King did not permit the penalties to be inflicted. Out of 143 generals in 1806 only eight remained on the list six years later and only two commanded in the Wars of Liberation. The significance of this work can be understood if it is remembered that the disgraced officers were nobles and had many relatives and friends among the nobility. Unfortunately the King showed little zeal or comprehension when it came to radical reform, and the first commission on the reorganization of the army contained three conservative members over against the reformers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.

Both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had grasped the lesson taught by the success of the French Revolutionary armies. They saw that forces of unsuspected magnitude had lain dormant in the life of nations, and that the day was past for an army like that of Frederick, recruited in part from the vagabonds of Europe. With these reformers the King refused to go to the extent of introducing universal service, but he gave up the practice of hiring mercenaries and relied upon the cantonal system. The new attitude toward the Prussian peasant had as its corollary the abolition of cruel and humiliating punishments, and for the majority of the soldiers corporal punishment gave place to imprisonment. A still more important measure was the withdrawal of the exclusive privilege of the nobles to be officers in the army. Up till this time the appointment of citizens as officers had been exceptional and irregular. The bulk of the officers were still nobles, but sons of the citizen class could hope for appointment by passing the examinations. Furthermore, the officers ceased to be purveyors for their troops. It was also decided that in time of war the army should live by requisitions and should not be delayed by heavy baggage trains and by the necessity of establishing supply stations.

Such was the penury of the government during 1807 and 1808

CHAP.
XXII

1807-12

The
Army

CHAP.
XXII

1807-12

The
Krümpers
System

that the reduction of the army could not be avoided, and only 1,638 out of 7,000 officers remained on the active list, some of these being obliged to accept half pay. In September, 1808, Bonaparte compelled Prussia to sign a treaty limiting the army for ten years to 42,000 and forbidding the organization of a militia. As the reformers cherished the idea of a national uprising, it was obvious that an army of this size would be too weak to begin the conflict. Scharnhorst solved the problem by devising the *Krümpers* system, in accordance with which the effectives of the regiments were severely reduced and the cantonists were called to the colors for a month's hard training and then sent home. During festival days officers found them again in their cantons and gave them additional training. In this way before the crisis came Prussia had 150,000 fairly trained soldiers. The remark has been made that, when it was necessary to hoodwink the French, Scharnhorst had as many wrinkles in his conscience as upon his simple face.

Resigna-
tion of
Stein

Stein's ministry closed November 24, 1808. Three times before he finally withdrew he had offered his resignation. He thoroughly disapproved the policy of the King, illustrated in the acceptance of the Convention of September 8, unless it was done to gain time, because he believed Prussia should make ready to strike when Austria and France should be at war. Indeed, he had felt that the first successes of the Spanish insurrection were the signal for all Prussians to be prepared to rise. Late in the summer his position in the ministry was fatally undermined by the publication of a letter, which the French had intercepted, and in which he said that Spanish affairs were making a lively impression in Germany and that it would be useful to spread the news prudently. He expressed the hope that connections could be made in Hesse and Westphalia and added that at Königsberg war between Austria and France was considered inevitable, and that upon its issue rested the fate of Europe, and, particularly, of Prussia. Napoleon caused the letter to be published in the *Moniteur* of September 8, with the commentary that the King of Prussia was to be pitied for having such unskilful and perverse ministers, but he did not demand Stein's dismissal, for his situation at the time was too precarious to run the risk of a refusal or of an uprising in northern Germany. He simply utilized the incident to force the September convention upon the Prussians. The publication of the letter strengthened the enemies of Stein, those who looked upon him as a dangerous revolutionist, as well as those who disbelieved in the policy of resistance. Even Hardenberg advised his dismissal. As these

manœuvres were for the most part secret, Stein was enabled to withdraw feeling that he retained the King's confidence.⁴

Hardenberg did not follow Stein as principal minister until June, 1810. The crushing burden of the French war contribution kept the intervening ministry from accomplishing anything comparable to the work which Stein had undertaken before and which Hardenberg was to resume afterwards. Scharnhorst was in this ministry, and he continued his work for the army. The most notable achievement was the foundation of the University of Berlin, the result of the effort of William von Humboldt, another of the group of ministers. One consequence of the defeats of 1806 had been the loss of Halle, the seat of one of the three older universities of the King's dominions, and public opinion turned towards Berlin, already an intellectual center, as the place in which the work of Halle should be carried on. It was there that in the winter of 1807-8 the philosopher Fichte delivered his "Addresses to the German Nation," which have been regarded as the prophetic call to the sacrifices of the Wars of Liberation. They were couched in academic language, and therefore escaped the rigors of French censorship, although many feared that Fichte would meet the fate of Palm. Fichte asked why the ancient Germans had resisted Rome, and replied that "To them freedom meant just remaining Germans, continuing to settle their own affairs independently and spontaneously, according to their own disposition . . . ; while slavery to them meant all the advantages the Romans offered, because they would force them to be something different from German, to become half Romans."⁵ If the French censor had remembered the use Camille Desmoulins made of Tacitus, he might have conceived a suspicion of this philosopher turned historian. In a still plainer passage Fichte declared that "A nation that is capable of fixing its eyes firmly on the vision from the spiritual world, Independence, and of being possessed with the love of it, like our earliest ancestors, will assuredly prevail over a nation that is used only as the tool of foreign aggressiveness and for the subjugation of independent nations, like the Roman armies." Humboldt's plans were matured by 1809 and a royal order announced the creation of the university. It is significant that, at a time when the State was too poor to pay in full the salaries of its officers, 150,000 thalers a year were appropriated for the new university. On the teaching staff were men already dis-

CHAP.
XXII

1807-12

Univer-
sity of
Berlin

⁴ Napoleon now issued a decree of proscription against Stein, who took refuge in the Austrian dominions.

⁵ Seeley, II. 33-34.

CHAP.
XXII
1807-12

tinguished, Schleiermacher, Fichte, Savigny, Wolf, and Niebuhr. The University of Breslau was created at the same period out of the older University of Frankfort-on-the-Oder and a college at Breslau. In building up a newer Prussia the teacher and the investigator were to labor beside the statesman and the soldier.

During this period the Court moved back to Berlin, because its continued stay at Königsberg, on the eastern border of the Hohenzollern dominions, seemed to Napoleon a plain manifestation of distrust and a disagreeable protest against his policy. A few months afterwards Queen Louise, whom Napoleon's insults had made a national heroine, died, broken by the misfortunes of her house and the sufferings of her people.

Hardenberg's ministry opened in June, 1810, with large prospects of reform. Like Stein he believed that the Prussian State needed a complete regeneration, but he did not seek as much as Stein the coöperation of the citizens, desiring to reorganize the administration in such a way as to strengthen the action of the State. He ventured to attack the local governing powers of the nobles by his *gendarmérie* edict, which placed in the circles or districts a director with some of the powers of a French prefect, but in the face of the opposition of the nobles he was obliged to recede. His treatment of the question of a national parliament illustrated his attitude towards one of the ultimate aims of Stein. The first body in any sense representative was a small assembly composed mainly of crown nominees, officials, nobles, townsmen, and peasants, which sat for several months in 1811. A second body, meeting a year later, was equally small, but was chosen in the provinces. Each was regarded simply as an intermediary between the government and the people, although the first assembly was permitted to modify Hardenberg's plans of peasant reform.

The financial question was of immediate importance, and in dealing with this Hardenberg took a long step towards the destruction of the privileges and exemptions characteristic of the old régime and which hindered an effective increase in the governmental income. He did not venture to touch the exemption of noble land from the old land tax or "contribution," but he abolished exemptions from the operation of the excise and the tariff laws. The excise was extended from the towns to the country, and, while it increased the already heavy burdens of the peasants, it rendered possible the development of manufactures outside the town limits and broke down the old barrier between town and open country. He also removed restrictions from internal trade and established industrial freedom in place of the

Harden-
berg's
Ministry

old guild system. As in France, this was accomplished by substituting the payment of a tax called a patent for the previous conditions of entry into trade or the mechanic arts. The need of a larger revenue led him to institute an oppressive milling tax, and forbid the use of handmills, with the consequence that in some places the peasants could not afford to eat bread; but after a few months the tax was modified and he adopted the plan of income taxes, which he had once opposed.

His most interesting effort undertook to solve the problem which Stein had indicated in the edict of October, 1807, although, as in the case of taxation, what he accomplished was far smaller than either his principles or his proposals called for. The peasants had been freed from serfdom by the October edict, but, except on the royal domain, nothing had been done about the dues by which they were still burdened. It was now proposed, first, to concede to the peasants who held land by an hereditary or life tenure the proprietorship of their holdings, and, second, to determine whether the lord or the peasant was the loser through the complete abandonment of the old system. The lord lost services, but was relieved of duties, and in some cases might gain more than he would lose by the change. If so, he should pay the peasant the difference. In most cases the peasant would be the gainer and must pay the lord an indemnity. This project did not contemplate any change in the relations of the lord and of those peasants who did not possess at least life tenure, although the lord might give such a peasant half his holding free from dues and annex the rest. Where indemnity was due, the peasants could pay in money or in land; that is, they might abandon a portion of the holding in order to retain the remainder in full property and free from burdensome dues.

This project suffered material transformation through the influence of the assembly of notables, before which it was laid in 1811. In the first place, the most numerous class of peasants, who enjoyed simply a life tenure, was grouped with simple renters. Secondly, the right of proprietorship was not conceded until the balance of gain and loss had been determined. The most important change was the assumption that the peasants in all cases owed the lords an indemnity amounting to one-third of the holding. If an arrangement was reached between the peasants of the second class and the lords, the peasants were to give up half of the holding. Even in this form, embodied in the edict of September 14, 1811, the revolution might be hailed as the end of an outworn and oppressive system; but the publication of the edict did not close the affair. Little was done in the months that

CHAP.

XXII

1807-12

followed, on account of the outbreak of the French war with Russia. As the years went on the lords steadily recovered the influence of which the calamities of 1806 and 1807 had deprived them and pressed for a declaration which should restrict the number of holdings affected by the plan. They were successful in 1816, when a declaration restricted the application of the edict to the larger holdings, and, even in their case, to those only about which Stein had placed special safeguards. At the same time those safeguards were withdrawn and the peasant was left to deal as best he could with his former master, who retained the powers of a magistrate. The consequence was that the lords utilized the coveted opportunity to enlarge their estates and that many peasants were made landless.

The effort for reform of which the Prussian peoples and leaders were capable in the hour of defeat and under the burden of foreign military occupation showed that the moral strength of these north Germans should not be estimated by the ease with which Napoleon's armies overran the country in 1806. Side by side with this effort developed a passionate desire to drive out the oppressor. Stein was the real interpreter of the nation's aspirations in 1808, and the luckless Colonel Schill was not regarded as a traitor, but as a hero who had died gloriously. Brunswick's ride across Germany, and the joy with which he was hailed in his old domains, had revealed the sentiments of the people. The poems and letters of the day make them still clearer. Napoleon's influence had waned and his control would be gone as soon as a great disaster should render him less terrifying.

Attitude
of the
German
People

CHAPTER XXIII

THE SCOPE OF REFORM IN EUROPE

THE influence of France during the Napoleonic era cannot be grasped fully without a study of its more permanent social and political consequences for the countries lying beyond the borders of the old Bourbon kingdom. Peoples whose main concern was defense against the aggressions of the new Charlemagne were unable to undertake long series of important reforms, even if to them the very name of reform was not discredited by its association with the deeds of the French revolutionists and their imperial continuator. The story of reform during this period in Austria, Russia, and Great Britain may therefore soon be told. In countries more immediately under the influence of the French the reforms were well nigh as thorough-going as in France herself, although effected in a different manner. In none was the work equal in far reaching results to what was accomplished in Prussia by Stein, Hardenberg, and their friends.

CHAP.
XXIII
1800-12

Upon the lands of the Hapsburgs during the whole period fell the weight of French attack. The English were more persistent enemies, but, except indirectly through Hanover, they could not be reached by French armies. The territorial losses of Austria would have been disastrous for a less loosely organized group of lands, and the financial strain might have overwhelmed an industrial State in similar circumstances. For Austria the consequences were greater poverty and a closer dependence upon English subsidies. The principal political change was the assumption by Francis I of the title of Hereditary Emperor of Austria two years before he was obliged by Napoleon to give up his imperial title in Germany.

Austria

The Emperor Francis was an industrious plodder. The administration was so badly organized that affairs which minor officials should have decided were referred to him, and it is said that at one time two thousand reports were piled on his table awaiting attention. His policy may be "summed up in the word immobility." It is not astonishing that the nephew of Marie Antoinette should fear popular movements. Count Stadion, his principal minister from 1805 to 1809, seemed likely to lend a

revolutionary color to the acts of the government. He was friendly to Stein and the Prussian reformers, and did what he could to give the campaign of 1809 the attitude of a national uprising. The collapse of that movement caused his withdrawal and in his place was appointed Count Metternich, a man of great diplomatic talents, who could discover and formulate excellent reasons for the policy which Francis instinctively followed. The work for the serfs which Joseph II had begun, and which Leopold had been inclined to pursue, was not resumed, and the condition of the peasantry was not materially changed until the Revolution of 1848. The fear of peasant revolts led the Hungarian nobles to be submissively loyal and to consent to increases in the army and in the revenues of the Crown. They fought with genuine national enthusiasm at Essling and Wagram.

Alexander I, Czar of Russia, in his early years had admired the French Revolution, and even after he became emperor he called the four confidential advisers who counseled him to undertake fundamental reforms his "Committee of Public Safety." One of these friends remarked afterwards, when illusions had vanished, that the Emperor "loved the forms of liberty as one loves the theater," and that "he would have consented willingly that everybody should be free on the condition that everybody should voluntarily do his will alone." The consequence was that the only serious reform during these years was a much-needed reorganization of the central administration, the substitution of a ministry divided into eight departments for boards and for officials with the powers of satraps. The new department of "public instruction," created at a time when not even France possessed one, accomplished important results in the establishment of three new universities, including the University of St. Petersburg. The Emperor entertained the project of transforming the senate, a body of officials clothed with mixed administrative and judicial powers, into a council sharing with him the work of legislation, but when it ventured to protest against one of his measures it was promptly rebuked for meddling. He also seriously considered the question of freeing the serfs, without, however, planning to concede to them the proprietorship of the land they cultivated, but he only issued a decree forbidding peasants to be sold separately from the estates and limiting the number of blows which might be inflicted upon them in punishment. Even these measures were not carried into effect. Alexander later came under the influence of an able administrator named Speranski, the son of a parish priest, who hoped not merely to free the serfs but also to give Russia a hierarchy of deliberative

assemblies or dumas, each composed of delegates from the body next below, but he was driven from office by an opposition of nobles. The blame for the lack of progress in a reign which opened with such promise must fall mainly upon this opposition, which Alexander had to reckon with, if he would avoid the fate of his father.

One of the strange consequences of the Peace of Tilsit was a change of dynasty in Sweden. The Swedes refused to accede to Napoleon's Continental System without a struggle and Alexander declared war upon them, compelling them to surrender Finland as well as to join the combination against Great Britain. They vented their rage upon King Gustavus IV, who had proved unequal to his task, and a military insurrection in March, 1809, led to his deposition. His successor had no direct heir and the Swedes took the novel course of proposing the adoption of Marshal Bernadotte, who had made a favorable impression upon them while he commanded in northern Germany. Napoleon gave a reluctant consent and in 1810 Bernadotte became Prince Royal of Sweden.

Sweden

Upon England the effect of the desperate struggle with Napoleon was to strengthen the conservative reaction which had been originally provoked by Jacobin violence. Even attempts to reform the cruel penal code with its long list of death penalties were regarded as showing a dangerous spirit of innovation. In 1810 when Sir Samuel Romilly's bill to "abolish capital punishment for the crime of stealing privately to the amount of five shillings in a shop" was before the House of Lords, he was reproached with having been the "author of the act, passed two years ago, to abolish the punishment of death for the crime of picking pockets. . . ." ¹ The political situation is illustrated by the fact that the Tories were in control of parliament not only during the war, with the exception of one year, but also for fifteen years afterward. Beyond the walls of parliament liberal ideas seemed to be gaining new adherents. In 1802 Sidney Smith, Jeffrey, and Brougham founded the *Edinburgh Review*, which became the great champion of liberalism. William Cobbett in his *Political Register* appealed to a more democratic constituency. Jeremy Bentham, the political philosopher, lent his prestige in the unequal contest against triumphant Toryism.

England

The period did not pass without some important laws. One of the most significant was the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, for it prophesied the abolition of slavery also. Its pas-

¹ Memoirs of Sir Samuel Romilly, II, 332.

CHAP.

XXIII

1800-12

Factory
Laws

sage indicated that the planters no longer wielded the influence they once possessed. The first of the long series of Factory Acts was equally significant. It aimed to prevent slavery of a new kind from becoming established in England as one of the incidental results of the introduction of the factory system. Mill owners, who often had difficulty in obtaining enough hands from the neighborhood, hit upon the plan of taking children from the poorhouses of the large cities. They agreed to feed, clothe, and educate the children, but they often shamefully neglected these wards. The hours of labor were long—in many cases fourteen—and the children were frequently forced to work on night shifts. It was such abuses that the Act sought to check.

The high cost of living, which was one of the consequences of the war, caused great suffering among the common people. From 1809 to 1813 the price of wheat averaged 107 shillings a quarter. This was in spite of the fact that five million acres were added to the cultivated land of England and Wales before the war was over. Indeed, the increase in the amount of land put under the plow was indirectly a cause of suffering, for it frequently meant the loss by the poorer villagers of rights of pasturage which they had hitherto possessed. If they received a small sum of money in compensation, this was soon exhausted. Their misfortunes did not come singly, since spinning and weaving and other village industries were being transferred to the towns or at least to villages which possessed good water-power.

Taxation

The burden of taxation which all classes had to bear became almost intolerable. The finance minister declared in 1811: "There is not an article of dress—boots, shoes, leather, breeches, etc.,—not an article in the house—locks, keys, bells, etc.,—which has not been recommended to him as objects of taxation." The public debt rose to the stupendous figure of £800,000,000, with an annual interest charge of £30,000,000. Bank notes fell to a discount of nearly fourteen per cent. The leaders who realized the cost of the struggle with Napoleon may, perhaps, be pardoned because they declined to increase the number of uncertain factors by entering upon a series of reforms. Their motives, however, were not always unselfish nor do they seem to have used much boldness of conception in determining what might, and what would not, add to the dangers and confusion of the situation.

In striking contrast to the laggard steps of Austria and Russia, and even of England, was the feverish activity of those subject to Napoleon's authority, or within his sphere of influence, although measurably independent in the management of their

internal affairs. It is true that several members of the Rhenish Confederation successfully guarded their borders from the inroads of change, but they lay in central and northern Germany and not directly under the master's eye. To obtain a clear understanding of the situation it is necessary to recall the political geography of Europe at the close of 1810, when the Napoleonic process of state-building reached its climax.

In Napoleonic Europe lay everything from the borders of Russia and Austria to the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. The limits of the French empire had recently been pushed both northward and southward. In the north the annexation of Holland, after the abdication of Napoleon's brother Louis, had been followed by the seizure of the northwestern coast of Germany, made up of the Hanseatic towns, the duchy of Oldenburg, the northern part of the electorate of Hanover, and a portion of those Prussian provinces which had originally gone to the creation of the kingdom of Westphalia. Their historic past was hardly suggested by new departmental names like "Western Ems," "Upper Ems," and "Mouths of the Elbe." In the south, beyond Piedmont, annexed in the days of the Republic, Genoa had been added in 1805, Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany three years later, and the Patrimony of St. Peter in 1809. Parma became the department of the Taro, Tuscany the departments of the Arno, Ombrone, and Méditerranée, and the remnant of the papal state the departments of Trasimene and of Rome. At this time Napoleon also ruled directly over the kingdom of Italy, to which, since its establishment in 1805, had been added Venetia, Italian Tyrol, and the northern part of the Papal states. Beyond the Adriatic he administered the Illyrian Provinces, including Dalmatia and parts of Carinthia, Carniola, and Croatia. When Murat was transferred to Naples Napoleon became ruler of Berg. The States he controlled through members of his imperial family were Spain, Naples, and Westphalia. As the creator of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and because its most powerful official was his "Resident," his will there also was law, although the nominal ruler was the new King of Saxony. He was Mediator in Switzerland, and Protector in the Rhenish Confederation. The Confederation contained all the princes of Germany except the King of Prussia, but the number was small as a result of the secularizations of 1803, of the mediatizations of 1806, and of the readjustments of 1807. Within the Confederation there was some territory which like Erfurt was occupied by French troops for military purposes and never received a civil organization.

CHAP.
XXIII

1800-12

The an-
nexed
Lands

In the lands annexed to France it is natural to look for a more complete realization of the Napoleonic program. Even there a distinction should be made between regions like the left bank of the Rhine, which had been occupied since 1794, and of which the departmental organization had been complete since September, 1802, and Northwestern Germany, annexed in December, 1810, where the intermediate commission completed the work of reorganization only a few months before the collapse of the empire began. The process of assimilation was necessarily slow, and, in the case of the latest annexations, the changes were slight and temporary, and the period one of confusion rather than of progress. It seemed a simple matter to declare that the feudal system was abolished, but to determine the legal consequences and to adjust conflicting claims was another affair. In the Rhine country ten years elapsed after the first occupation before the mode of dealing with these questions was determined clearly. In Italy connection with the empire had most chance of justifying itself in Piedmont, annexed in 1802.

Problem
of Assim-
ilation

The benefits of annexation were mixed, even from the point of view of those who regarded the French system of civil equality as far superior to the débris of historic rights, privileges, and oppressions which it swept away. On the one hand there were the French codes and new judicial organization, the admirable system of public works, the stimulus which came from connection with a great State, the center of European action; on the other hand were the conscription, or blood tax, a heavier burden of taxation, and the more rigid enforcement of the Continental System. Annexation did not always bring immediate access to the French market. Moreover, habits of trade are not readily established, so that no large amount of trade developed between the Rhenish departments and the interior of France, and the customs frontier along the Rhine served mainly as an obstacle in the trade with Germany which they still continued to carry on, while their commerce down the Rhine was ruined by the Continental System.

No magic in the formulæ of annexation could make over Germans, Dutchmen, and Italians into Frenchmen, and the practical problem of adjusting the new system to the old always remained. In dealing with the Piedmontese, the Tuscans, and the Romans, a special effort was made to conciliate their pride as peoples with a separate history. This Napoleon could do and at the same time provide a splendid position for two of his sisters and associate his son's name with that medieval empire of which he declared his to be the successor. Camillo Borghese, husband to

Pauline Bonaparte, was made governor-general of the departments beyond the Alps, with actual jurisdiction over Piedmont and Genoa and with a capital at Turin. A similar government was set up in Florence for Elise Bonaparte, who had married Pascal Baccocchi, and who now styled herself Grand Duchess of Tuscany. After his second marriage, Napoleon caused the promulgation of a senatus consulte declaring that the future prince imperial should be called King of Rome and providing that Rome should be the second city of the empire. Rome was also to have a senate of 60 members, nominally in charge of the business of the city. Neither this arrangement nor the provision for his sisters prevented the strict administration of the Italian departments like other departments of France.

The question of language was also important. In the Hanseatic departments the solution was a version of the codes in both languages and the simultaneous use of both in court proceedings and important administrative documents. In Piedmont French was official. The governmental newspaper, the *Courier de Turin*, was published in both languages. In Tuscany and Rome Italian continued to be authorized. Indeed, in Rome the government affected to encourage the cultivation of Italian by the offer of prizes for the best productions in prose or verse.

The fate of Holland was harder than that of any other annexed territory. Although the Dutch tongue was not driven from official usage, and Amsterdam was declared the third city of the empire, almost everything that might recall the ancient constitution and local peculiarities of the United Netherlands was changed. The two most important departments, with capitals at Amsterdam and Rotterdam, were administered by Belgians. The conscription was enforced rigorously. The rate of taxation was pushed up until it equaled thirty florins per inhabitant, and the income of sixty millions was expended principally on dockyards, ships, and soldiers. Books were subjected to a rigid censorship. It was small compensation for such a régime that Dutchmen were to sit in the French Senate, Legislative Body, and Council of State; but it did not last long, for within three years French control was ended.

Holland

In the countries outside the empire but governed by Napoleon or by members of his family the program of reform was not essentially different. Whether the history of Naples or of Westphalia, of the grand duchy of Berg or of the Illyrian Provinces or of the kingdom of Italy be considered, there are certain constant features, although the success with which they were introduced varied with the circumstances and the previous condition

Dependent
States

of the people. The dependent relation of these lands was also made evident, occasionally in ways that were painful.

All such allied peoples were obliged to endure the presence and provide for the support of bodies of French troops. The French army in the kingdom of Italy cost the budget of that State 30,000,000 francs a year. In Westphalia, a smaller kingdom, 12,500 French troops were maintained at a cost of ten millions, and it was also stipulated that 6,000 other Frenchmen should serve in the Westphalian army. Even in Naples, under the rule of Napoleon's ablest cavalry leader, Joachim Murat, where the finances could ill support the burden, a large French contingent was stationed. Naples and the other Napoleonic states were also obliged to furnish expeditionary forces to take part at their own expense in Napoleon's campaigns.

The presence of a French army might be defended on the ground that the local troops were not strong enough to give stability to their governments, but another form of tribute had even less color of right or reason. Napoleon continued the practice of reserving in newly created states a part, sometimes a half, sometimes even a larger amount, of the princely domains from the revenues of which he replenished his extraordinary fund kept in the Tuileries, or endowed his generals. In the case of Hanover, he took practically all the domains, but in Westphalia one-half. Even the little grand duchy of Frankfort paid him annually 600,000 francs on domains in Fulda and Hanau and provided an endowment for the dukes of Eckmühl and Wagram, made illustrious in the campaign of 1809. Westphalia was unfortunate enough also to have charged against it a heavy war contribution, because it had been once territory of the king of Prussia and the elector of Hesse-Cassel. Napoleon also levied contributions in works of art, according to the practice which he learned from Revolutionary France. From the galleries at Cassel, for example, he took no fewer than 299 pictures, one of which, by Leonardo da Vinci, did not have the good fortune to be safely guarded in the Louvre until a better day should restore it to its place.

Against these darker aspects of French domination must be placed the undoubted benefits of constructive reform. Wherever French control was undisputed the remnants of the feudal régime and its oppressions were swept away. No country needed reform more than the kingdom of Naples, in which lingered over a thousand kinds of feudal dues. The Neapolitan lords took little interest in the peasants, abandoning their estates to the management of stewards. Not only was feudalism abol-

ished when Joseph Bonaparte became King, but steps were taken to sell the royal domains, divide communal property, and break up large private estates by annulling the right of primogeniture and the right of entail. Although this work was hardly begun when Joseph was transferred to Spain, it was pushed forward under Murat by a commission, directed by Giuseppe Zurlo, the minister of the interior. The case of Westphalia illustrates a different application of the same principles. The German deputies who were summoned to Paris to behold King Jerome, their new monarch, and state their wishes, feared that noble rights would be treated as they had been in France by the Convention, and petitioned that the lords should receive compensation for the loss of agricultural services. Their wishes were respected, and, although the new constitution of Westphalia abolished serfdom, later laws provided that only such dues were abolished without indemnity as were neither defined by contract nor recorded on the rolls of the estate, besides marriage-dues and heriots, and the obligation of domestic service. Others were made redeemable, but the peasants were too poor to purchase relief from services, and the legislation did little to decrease the power of the lords.

A still greater benefit was the introduction of the French codes and of French judicial procedure. It is true that laws are an outgrowth of the needs of a people, the result of a large body of local experience, and that it is not generally advisable to force the legal customs of one people upon another; but, when custom loses its flexibility and becomes a heavy yoke, any event which weakens it even temporarily may be looked upon as progress. In some cases the French system, once introduced, lasted for many years and became the basis for a permanent settlement of law and procedure. It survived the Napoleonic régime in Naples and was extended to Sicily. In Holland, the later Belgium, in Baden, in part of Switzerland, and in Russian Poland its main features were also preserved. This meant not only civil equality, but also a just recognition of the rights of persons accused of crime, and an abolition of cruel punishments. The Westphalian deputies petitioned that the civil code should not be introduced for three years, but their prayer was not granted, and within three years the code was working as smoothly as if it had been made expressly for Westphalians, so skilful was the French administrator Siméon in establishing the new order of affairs.

Although French control increased the burden of expenditure, it brought with it a reorganization of financial systems, so that

CHAP.
XXIII

1800-12

Financial
Reform

the heavier burden was more evenly distributed and could be carried. In Westphalia the system "displayed for the first time in Germany the leading principles of enlightened finance." With the disappearance of the guild system came the tax called in France the "patent." The land tax was heavy, but it was free from the ancient abuse of exemptions. The tariff was low, and, except in the case of iron and copper, was designed to raise a revenue and not to protect local industries. The attempt to introduce the French plan of personal property taxes did not succeed as well. In the kingdom of Italy, Prina displayed astonishing energy in raising unprecedented sums of money, the budget being nearly doubled in the seven years from 1805 to 1812. Some of his expedients, like the milling tax, were burdensome, not to say oppressive, but his work had the merit of bringing order out of confusion and establishing an equilibrium between receipts and expenditures without resort to loans. In Naples Roederer had similar success in more than balancing a heavy budget. The public debt was reduced out of the proceeds of the sale of monastic property. For over a hundred kinds of direct taxes, resting almost wholly upon the poor, he substituted a single land tax, from the payment of which none was exempt. The work accomplished by such men as Siméon in Westphalia, Beugnot in Berg, Prina in Italy, and Roederer in Naples, should soften the memory of the exactions which were always incidents of French rule.

Kingdom
of Italy

The kingdom of Italy was the most successful of Napoleon's creations beyond the confines of France. Its name embodied an aspiration of the enlightened Italians, and they were filled with enthusiasm when its borders were enlarged by the addition in 1806 of the territory of Venetia. Even the burdens laid upon the country had incidental advantages. It is said that, although the Lombards were taxed more heavily than under the mild rule of Maria Theresa and her sons, they learned to practise economy and emerged from the experience richer than before. The young men were at first disinclined to bear arms, but became excellent soldiers after they had been subjected to discipline and proved their courage and skill on many a battlefield. They never forgot the days of triumph under the star of their emperor-king, and men are still living who have seen the aged veterans of those wars weep at the very mention of the great leader's name. The opposition of the middle class to the conscription was weakened by the concession that substitutes could be furnished. The sons of the richer men were expected to join the royal guard or some other select corps. By 1812 Italy had an army of 80,000, with

a highly trained body of officers. Through this comradeship in arms men from Lombardy, Venetia, Modena, or the March of Ancona, learned a common sentiment of loyalty to Italy. Local feeling with its narrow fidelities was fast disappearing.

The completion of important roads also rendered easier communication between different parts of Italy and between Italy and France. After five years' labor the Simplon road was finished. In commemoration of the event a triumphal arch was erected in Milan, the termination of the route. The harbor of Venice was improved and more securely fortified. The attempt was made to develop agriculture through training in special schools. Furthermore, an example was given of a well ordered state, endowed with a highly developed administrative system, drawing upon all the resources of its scattered communities, and dealing with its citizens according to clearly defined principles of law, the same for the noble as for the peasant who had once been his serf, and holding out to all the promise of equal access to the offices of the State. All this was valuable preparation for the movement later in the century which was to bring about the unification of Italy.

In this and other ways Napoleon's government showed the better qualities of enlightened despotism. But criticism was not tolerated. An editor who gave untimely announcement of the seizure of Tuscany was thrust into an insane asylum, and the new legislature which ventured to criticize the first budget was dismissed, never to be summoned again. In the government Napoleon was represented by his step-son, Eugène de Beauharnais, as viceroy. Prince Eugène was an able general, a man of attractive personality, full of excellent aims, but he labored in everything to serve his master, and the welfare of the Italians was a secondary consideration.

The work of reform in Naples would have been more thorough had not Bonapartist rule remained from the first precarious. When Joseph entered Naples in February, 1806, the principal solicitude of the inhabitants was lest his rule might be as brief as that of the Parthenopean Republic in 1799 and might offer the Bourbon monarchs another chance to exact a bloodthirsty vengeance. It was several months before the fortress of Gaëta surrendered, and in July the French army in Calabria was defeated by an English force brought over from Sicily. The English had also seized the island of Capri, just outside the Bay of Naples, and held this until October, 1808, when Murat captured it by a brilliant feat of arms. In 1809 again a large force of British, while the French were weakened by the campaign about

CHAP.
XXIII
1800-12

Naples

CHAP.
XXIII

1800-12

Spain

Vienna, moved up the coast from Sicily, ostensibly to overthrow the kingdom, and captured the island of Ischia. The news of Austrian defeat at Wagram prompted the retreat of the expedition before any serious attack had been made upon Naples.

Joseph's reign at Madrid was not as productive of good results, for its history is principally recorded in the series of victories and defeats beginning with the capitulation of Baylen and ending five years later with the disastrous overthrow at Vittoria. Napoleon had not forgotten to promulgate a constitution at the outset, the first that modern Spain received; but, even if this constitution had been more liberal, it would not have suited the Spaniards, because it came from the hands of the man who had basely tricked them as well as their princes. Joseph's reign was of consequence only in the national movement which it provoked. One feature of this movement, much heard of in the later history of Spain and Italy, was the Constitution of 1812. The loyal Spaniards had been obliged to take refuge in Cadiz, where their cause was nominally under the control of a central junta and later of a "committee of regency." In 1810 an extraordinary cortes was elected, delegates coming even from parts of Spain overrun by the French armies. After two years this cortes promulgated a constitution, which was liberal except in its refusal to tolerate any religion other than the Roman Catholic. A legislature, or ordinary cortes, was chosen in 1813, and at the beginning of the next year took up its work in Madrid which had been evacuated by the French. From these events date the struggle for liberal institutions in Spain.

The
Illyrian
Provinces

Another Mediterranean land, the Illyrian Provinces, felt the effects of Bonapartist rule, since after 1809 they were imperial territory, although not formally annexed to France. Most of them — Croatia, Carniola, Carinthia, and Istria — had long been parts of the Hapsburg dominions, Dalmatia had belonged to Venice, and Ragusa had been a republic. Marmont, one of Napoleon's ablest marshals, became governor-general, and the French system was introduced with discrimination, the principles of August 4th being hardly applicable to Military Croatia. The chief benefits of French control were the suppression of brigandage, the construction of roads, like the coast road between Zara and Spalatro, and the organization of public education. Marmont's name is still remembered in the region and many a town has named a street or square for him. Unfortunately along with benefits went heavy taxation and the oppressions of the Continental System.

Germany did not escape being treated as a part of the Bona-

parte family domain. The first example had been the grant of the duchies of Cleves and Berg in 1806 to Murat, Napoleon's brother-in-law. This State soon became a grand duchy, and received after Tilsit a portion of Prussia's lands west of the Elbe. After Murat was transferred to Naples, it remained vacant for a year and was then ruled in the name of King Louis Napoleon's son, Napoleon Louis. From this time forward it was practically a part of the Napoleonic Empire in the narrower sense of the term, but without the advantages which generally came from annexation, especially access to the French market. A second example was Westphalia, made up at first of the remainder of the Prussian Westphalian provinces, the duchy of Brunswick, and the electorate of Hesse-Cassel. The King of Westphalia was Napoleon's youngest brother, Jerome, who received his appointment immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Tilsit. Hardly less dependent upon Napoleon was the grand duchy of Frankfort, composed of Frankfort, the county of Hanau and the former bishopric of Fulda, finally constituted in 1810 for Dalberg, Prince Primate of the Rhenish Confederation. There were also marriage alliances which signalized the influence of Napoleon over other States—the marriage of Prince Eugène and the daughter of the King of Bavaria, of King Jerome and the daughter of the King of Württemberg, of the heir of the grand duke of Baden and the niece of the Empress Josephine.

A French program of reform was not the only thing that gave to the kingdom of Westphalia the character of a dependency of Napoleonic France. Another illustration was the concurrent use of the French language in official procedure. The delegates of the new kingdom, who visited Paris in August, 1807, had petitioned Napoleon for the exclusive use of German, but they had to be satisfied with a mixed system. The official text of decrees was French, although the text of the civil code was German. In each case it was accompanied by a translation. Debates in the Council of State were in French, but German was used in the courts and in the legislature. Certain ministries used French, others German. German officials on the whole occupied the offices, although several important posts were held by Frenchmen. The crowds of adventurers who descended upon the capital of the kingdom were soon discontented and went away.

The constitution was an adaptation of the constitution of the French empire. There was no tribunate, for this body had already disappeared from the French constitution, and in its place a commission of the legislators with a delegation of the Council of State discussed measures. The legislature, or "estates," was

CHAP.
XXIII

1800-12

Berg

West-
phaliaConstitu-
tion of
West-
phalia

CHAP.

XXIII

1800-12

not constituted as in France; of the 100 members, 70 were to be landed proprietors, 15 merchants or manufacturers, and 15 men distinguished by learning or practical achievement. Distrust of democracy was shown by the fact that the electors who chose the legislators were appointed by the King for life. In spite of such an origin the Westphalian estates at the first session ventured to throw out a bill in order to compel a modification of an obnoxious article. Under the advice of the judicious Siméon the Council of State showed itself ready to introduce the necessary amendments and the bill was passed by 83 to 7. The local government was patterned after the French system, with departments and prefects. Little lasting opposition was shown to the new régime, although the change of government had been resented in the Prussian provinces and in Hesse. If the experiment cannot be regarded as a success, it was due to the personal qualities of the King, who dissipated the public resources, and to the heavy demands made upon the kingdom by Napoleon, its real ruler. By 1812 it was necessary to resort to practices that savored of the methods of the French Directory, the repudiation of two-thirds of the old debt and the levy of a forced loan. The benefits of the French régime had less chance in Westphalia than elsewhere of being permanent, because the State was an artificial creation, which would fall apart into its former elements as soon as the power of Napoleon, the external compelling force of union, should be destroyed.

Napoleon's principal interest in the other lands of the Rhenish Confederation was in their ability to contribute men to his armies, and he did not regard the Confederation as a State, but rather as a group of states, acting together in foreign affairs, and independently in the administration of local affairs. This did not prevent occasional meddling on his part. The rulers utilized the support he was ready to give as an opportunity to reorganize their administrative systems and to sweep away the inequalities and oppressions which hindered the work of a modern government. None of the larger northern states conceded much to French influence, although the King of Saxony as grand duke of Warsaw countenanced the application of the French program among his Polish subjects. In Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria the policies adopted after the annexations of 1803 were carried out more thoroughly. The result was accomplished in Baden with some respect for historic rights, but with brutal severity in Württemberg. The story is told of King Frederick of Württemberg that when he complained to Napoleon that the local estates raised all sorts of difficulties in his way, the

general of Brumaire exclaimed, "Drive the stupid creatures away." Frederick took the hint, and the loss to the kingdom was not serious, because the South German diets were hardly better than coteries of privileged persons.

The work accomplished in Bavaria was in scope and importance hardly second to that done in Prussia. This was due mainly to the clear-sighted and forceful leadership of Montgelas. The problem before the Bavarians was complex. The older Bavaria had been hardly more than a group of lordships and cities united by a common bond of allegiance to the Elector, whose sovereignty was not complete, for he in turn owed duties to the Emperor, the head of the Holy Roman Empire. The power of the Elector was also hedged in by the prerogatives of the Church, whose supremacy in Bavaria had been unquestioned since the sixteenth century. To this situation, already sufficiently complicated, were added new elements by the annexations of 1803 and 1806. By that time, however, the government had made some progress in the direction of reform. The exclusive privileges of the Church had been taken away, but the plan of transforming the Bavarian Catholic Church into a national Church, no part of which should be subject to outside bishops or archbishops, had not been carried out. The negotiations with the Pope for a special concordat dragged on without result all through the period.

In the reorganization of the State Montgelas was more successful, aided by the fact that in 1805 the Elector became a king and that in 1806 he was relieved of his relation of vassalage to the empire. A year later Montgelas issued an edict affirming the principle of equality of taxation and depriving the provincial estates of all right to meddle with the assessment or collection of taxes. In 1808 a new constitution, modeled on that of Westphalia, was proclaimed, which among other things promised a national assembly. The promise remained without performance, and yet the seed was sown and the fruit might appear at some future time. For the older provinces were substituted circles, marked out, as the French departments, to satisfy geographical considerations. Although the system of taxation was wisely arranged, and an appraisal of landed property was completed, the finances of the new State were never equal to the burdens imposed by the connection with France. The expenses were about four times the receipts. This was one reason why the government was obliged to give up the policy of a low tariff introduced in 1799. The main reason was, however, Napoleon's Continental System, to which Bavaria was obliged to

Bavaria

Montgelas

adhere. In connection with this part of the financial administration the most significant change was the abolition of provincial customs frontiers and the substitution of a single system for the whole country, a reform accomplished earlier than in any other German State. Montgelas did not abolish feudal dues, nor manorial courts, nor guilds, but he succeeded in correcting the arbitrariness of both landlords and guild-masters, besides depriving them of their most injurious privileges. He also re-organized education, making it compulsory and freeing it from the control of the Church. The universities were consolidated and the principle was laid down that investigation should be unhampered. The defect in the work of reform was the tendency to excessive centralization, which treated local institutions simply as parts of a great machine instead of instruments to facilitate vigorous local activities. The success of Montgelas and his advisers excited the envy of the Austrian statesman Metternich, who wrote that Bavaria's religious, civil, political and military revolution, accomplished with such boldness and persistence, would bear imitating by other states. It was indeed a revolution, not as far-reaching in social changes as that of France, but in other respects as thorough. And it was accomplished without turmoil and bloodshed.

The grand duchy of Warsaw cannot be compared with the older Poland in extent of territory or size of population, for even after the treaty of Schönbrunn added to it a portion of Galicia, the population numbered only four million; and yet the duchy had the advantage that the people were purely Polish. They cherished the illusion that Napoleon would one day re-establish the ancient kingdom, in spite of the fact that at Tilsit he had given the province of Bialystock to Alexander. Fate had in store for them a cruel disillusionment, for the creation of the state was eventually to result in the absorption of almost all of its lands by Russia rather than the recovery from Russia of those lost in the three partitions. The constitution of the grand duchy was significant, carrying far into the northeast the French program of equality. The reforms of 1791 had not ventured to touch the social structure of Poland, while the new constitution revolutionized this at least in theory, proclaiming that serfdom was abolished. As no provision was made for the redemption of agricultural services and similar dues, the position of the peasant was not changed materially. He had the right to leave his holding, but in that case he became landless. His new position had more favorable consequences in the army, where he was treated as a free man and where he might win

the cross of honor. The economic situation of the grand duchy was unfortunate, because Danzig was occupied by French soldiers and the Continental System hindered the export of Polish lumber and wheat. At the same time the war between Russia and Turkey cut off trade with the Turkish empire. It is not surprising that the financiers of Warsaw were never able to balance receipts and expenditures. The situation was not improved by the necessity of paying to French generals revenues of estates which amounted to over twenty-six million francs. After all, the chief meaning of the establishment of the grand duchy was that Napoleon might possess a march on the borders of Russia. He had not divided Europe with Alexander at Tilsit; he had secured a position from which he might control the politics of eastern as well as western Europe.

Much that Napoleon attempted beyond the ancient frontiers of France was lost by his overthrow; much, however, remained. Only through a careful analysis of the progress of institutions after 1815 would it be possible to estimate the permanent influence of his efforts. His deficiencies as a reformer sprang from a systematic, intolerant spirit, only slightly conscious of the value of historical forces in the growth of peoples. The redeeming feature of his policy was his ideal of ordered, reasonable administration and of civil equality.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT

CHAP.
XXIV

1807-12

NOTHING that Napoleon did within France after he became Emperor was comparable in lasting effect with what he accomplished beyond the ancient frontiers in the larger empire which his triumph at Austerlitz enabled him to create. Much that he undertook was a continuation of reforms begun under the Consulate. He displayed the same governing energy, the same sense for the value of administrative efficiency, but the account in promises of reform opened by the Revolution was nearly closed before the four years of the Consulate were over. His time was also absorbed for many consecutive months in struggles with European states anxious to check the growth of French supremacy. From September, 1805, to January, 1806, he was absent in Austria. In September, 1806, he left Paris again for the campaign against Prussia and Russia, and did not return until August, 1807. He was in Spain during the fall of 1808 and in Austria once more in the spring and summer of 1809. After the war with Austria was over he resided in Paris or in the different imperial palaces until the Russian campaign of 1812. During this period his restless eagerness for work seemed to slacken. The marriage alliance with the ancient House of Hapsburg and the birth of an heir increased his pride, while they dulled his perception of what had been the actual sources of his prodigious fortune. Nevertheless, important work for France was accomplished during the empire.

In Napoleon, France possessed a real king, a center whence impulses to activity radiated in all directions, a force the lack of which had been the ruin of the old monarchy. His powers of attention, of memory, of pertinent suggestion or command, seemed inexhaustible. He understood the influence which comes from a knowledge of each situation and an acquaintance with all its personal factors. In order that his officials might believe that nothing could escape him, he examined constantly details of administration and was not sorry when blunders enabled him to bring even a minister to book. He fashioned the machinery of memory with such skill that his performances astonished his contemporaries, many of whom could not discover the hidden

Napoleon a
Real
King

wires in motion. Twice a month there were laid before him *livrets* or reports, volumes in octavo or quarto, containing pertinent facts about each government service, classified according to his directions, so that he could instantly lay his finger upon information which he desired. Eighteen of these volumes were prepared concerning the army alone, with the record of each regiment, brought down to date, telling not merely the numbers ready for duty, but mentioning the region from which the regiment was recruited, and recalling every important affair in which it had taken part. "If he reviewed a body of troops," wrote Baron Fain, one of his secretaries, "he knew where to find things to address to the general or colonel. If he paused before old soldiers, he knew of what battles or what campaigns to speak to them; if he wished to bring a smile to the faces of young conscripts, there sprang to his lips at once the name of the region where they were born." One of the *livrets* concerned the strength and movements of foreign armies, and it was composed of items brought together from every quarter, from reports of his ambassadors, of his agents civil or military, from hints of travelers or deserters. He sometimes amused himself by casually mentioning to a foreign minister a particular movement of his monarch's armies of which the puzzled diplomat had not heard and the meaning of which he was left to surmise. The Emperor also watched closely the variations of the price of wheat, and for this purpose a map was constructed, upon which in little squares representing each department the local price was written, with a device indicating the average price over whole regions, and a statement of the place of lowest and highest prices. His interest in this was due to his conviction that there was a close connection between the cost of bread and public peace. His sense for realities made his conversation interesting even to those who had patriotic reasons to dislike and fear him. Prince Metternich said he always seized "the essential points of subjects, stripping them of useless accessories, developing his thought and never ceasing to elaborate it till he had made it perfectly clear and conclusive, always finding the fitting word for the thing."

In his methods of work Napoleon was orderly. Every paper or petition of importance found its way to his table. More serious matters were reserved for the quiet hours of the night, and he frequently rose at two o'clock in the morning and worked with his secretary until five, when he went to bed again. A secretary was always at hand in his workroom to write at his dictation. He dictated so hurriedly that it was impossible for the most

CHAP.
XXIV

1807-12

His
Method
of Work

CHAP.
XXIV

1807-12

rapid writer to keep up with him and when his letters were written in full it was often necessary to guess what he had actually said. Even when he was absent from France on distant campaigns he sought to govern the country after the same methodical fashion. Despatch-bearers were continually on the road. Each rider carried the bag of despatches one post and handed it to another ready to push forward at full speed to the next post. "A courier stops from time to time to drink or to eat, or when the journey is long to sleep. The *estafette* neither drank nor ate nor slept, but always rushed on." This was as true when Napoleon was in the depths of Russia as when he was not far from the French border. At headquarters a workroom was speedily arranged, and leather portfolios containing official papers, the livrets, his library, transported in boxes of acacia, which might be used as shelving, were placed on improvised tables or planks. If he was at a chateau or some palace of an ally or a conquered enemy, matters took on the appearance of a Parisian imperial administration. His aim was partly to satisfy his own restless desire to organize work effectively, and partly to convince France that her interests were not suffering when he was far away on errands which seemed remote from her real interests.

His Sys-
tem of
Reward

Napoleon was conscious that his hold upon France was precarious, and he sought to bind the leaders of the nation to his cause through their self-interest, not only his generals and soldiers but also the directing classes of the country. Several of the fiefs which his generals received in Italy and Germany were endowed with enormous incomes. Twelve millions were distributed among the soldiers. After 1808 the holders of fiefs outside the empire were in some cases authorized to sell them and purchase estates in France producing similar incomes. Permission was usually not given, because Napoleon feared that the zeal of his generals to preserve French control, especially over Germany, would be lessened if the collapse of the great structure would not jeopardize seriously their private fortunes. In 1808 titles were attached to certain official positions, and these titles could be made hereditary if the holder connected with them estates producing an income sufficiently large to maintain the dignity. In this way, for example, senators and archbishops became counts, and bishops and mayors of the "good towns" were made barons. During the later empire Napoleon showed an increasing eagerness to attract members of the old nobility to Court as officials. His two ablest officials, Talleyrand and Fouché, no longer served him. Fouché had been dismissed as an intriguer and Talleyrand had become a "grand dignitary," yielding his place in the minis-

try of foreign affairs to men of smaller capacity and less comprehension of the necessities of European politics.

The reorganization of the legal system of France begun during the Consulate was not completed until toward the close of the Empire. The character and tendencies of the later legislation were seriously affected by Napoleon's growing inclination to adopt harsh measures of repression and despotic methods of government. The civil code had been promulgated just before the Consulate disappeared. A code of civil procedure was its natural complement and a commission had been at work upon it since 1802, but it was not ready until 1806. While it preserved in part the plans of conciliation which the Constituent Assembly had associated with the work of the justice of the peace, the new code was mainly a revival of the procedure under the old régime. Napoleon took little personal interest in the matter and was present at only one discussion in the Council of State. Indeed, it is said that so many of the councilors were unfamiliar with the technicalities of the question that little real discussion occurred and the long code of 1042 articles was disposed of in twenty-three sittings of the council. Much deeper interest, naturally, was felt in the code of criminal procedure and the penal code, where the reaction against the liberal work of the Revolution threatened the system of trial by jury and succeeded in reintroducing some of the cruel punishments of the old régime. Napoleon finally took up the defense of the right of trial by jury, although he opposed the retention of the practice of leaving to a preliminary jury the task of drawing up indictments. The selection of jurors was placed in the hands of the prefects, who might also assume the rôle of judges for the indictment of the accused. This was entrusting a dangerous power to a despotic government, even if the accused still possessed the right of a public trial with all the ordinary safeguards. Another sign of strong government was the withdrawal from the ordinary courts of the prosecution of counterfeiting, smuggling, and similar offenses, if done by armed men. No adequate provision was made against false imprisonment, and the requirements in regard to bail were so severe as to make release extremely difficult. The penal code applied the death penalty not only in cases of murder, but also of arson and of robbery where life was endangered. The right hand of the parricide was to be struck off before he was executed, and for certain offenses the convicted criminal was branded or his property confiscated. During the Empire a commercial code also was prepared, the most notable feature of which was its severity toward bankrupts.

The constitution of the Consulate had not been liberal in the

CHAP.
XXIV

1807-12

The
Codes

CHAP.
XXIV

1807-12

Changes
in the
Constitu-
tion

sense of making possible effective opposition to projects of government, but it opened the way for wholesome criticism, which might compel measures to be withdrawn for modification or deferred. Of such criticism the Tribune was the peculiar organ. Even as First Consul, Napoleon had become impatient of control and in the imperial constitution the Tribune, divided into three sections, roughly corresponding to the sections of the Council of State, ceased to be a deliberative assembly. It was thus degraded to the position of a fifth wheel and marked for early disappearance. The prestige of Tilsit furnished the occasion for its elimination, and the Senate, the special guardian of the constitution, was used as the instrument. The method was the appointment of three commissions in the legislative body, which were to discuss before that body as a whole measures defended by the orators of the Council of State. The tribunes either became legislators or were provided with other offices. As the years passed Napoleon used the procedure of the *senatus consulte* or a simple decree of the Council of State in enacting his measures into law. In this way the importance of the Council of State was enhanced. Over six thousand questions, for example, were brought to its attention in 1811.

Financial
Affairs

Under the Republic the cost of great measures of reform, the burdens of a war against all Europe, and the inability of the government to establish its system of collecting taxes, had led to the bankruptcy of 1797. No such disaster menaced the last days of the Empire because it was not necessary to buy off the beneficiaries of an old régime while preparing the foundations of the new. The reforms of the Consulate had been in the direction of efficiency and the result had been economy, while the burdens of continued war were thrown mainly upon conquered or dependent states. The consequence was that, although the Empire sank in the midst of financial depression, it did not leave behind new masses of public indebtedness or a credit ruined by repudiation. An increase of seventeen millions in the interest charge was the result of a reorganization of previous indebtedness rather than of new loans. Indeed, the government could not have borrowed to advantage; the bankruptcy of 1797 was too recent a memory.

The work of reorganizing the administration of the taxes was pursued steadily. The most important achievement was the appraisal of real estate, begun in 1807, which by 1814 comprehended the lands in 9,000 communes. This was the first effective measure against the arbitrariness of apportionment, which was one

of the crying evils of the old régime. The changes in the system of indirect taxes affected the tariff, important in connection with the Continental System, and included a partial reintroduction of the old and obnoxious taxes on liquors, tobacco, and salt. The collection of these taxes, entrusted to an administration of *droits réunis*, was accompanied by so many vexations that the term *droits réunis* became hateful throughout the country.

The financial system of the Empire was better than the system which had preceded, but as yet there was nothing which could be termed a budget. The nominal list of receipts and expenditures does not explain the situation, because after the Austerlitz campaign Napoleon created a special fund, called at first "War Treasure" or "Army Treasure," and finally "Extraordinary Domain," which was fed by indemnities paid at the close of wars and by revenues charged permanently upon the income of dependent countries or produced by estates lying within them. The exact amount of the extraordinary fund is not known, because Napoleon guarded it as jealously as Frederick the Great his "Dispositions-Kasse." It received a special organization, with an intendant-general, by a senatus consulte of 1810. Although it was to serve mainly as a "rainy-day" reserve, the Emperor charged against it expenses like the maintenance of the army in the field, so far as this was not provided for by direct requisitions, rewards to officers and pensions to soldiers, the repair of palaces, and a part of the expenditure for public works. When the industrial crisis began, he drew upon it for loans to merchants and manufacturers in distress. He also used it occasionally to balance the ordinary budget.

The relations of the Bank of France and of the Government became closer during the Empire. This was partly the result of a panic in 1805, which grew out of extensive loans made by the bank to the "Company of United Merchants." The Company, which dealt in government contracts, had been speculating, particularly upon receipts from the Spanish colonies, and when war broke out between England and Spain it was threatened with ruin. The Bank of France attempted to relieve the strain by issuing notes which it lent to the Company. The depreciation of the notes and the failures of important business houses alarmed Napoleon, who was absent in Austria and Moravia. The coin he brought back at the Peace of Pressburg enabled him to put an end to the panic, but he reorganized the administration of the bank, bringing it more directly under government control. He believed that the bank was an instrument of state and that not

CHAP.
XXIV
1807-12

Bank of
France

CHAP.
XXIV
1807-12

even such a matter as the rate of discount should be left to the course of business. In 1807, for example, he arbitrarily reduced the rate to four per cent.

The confidence which the imperial financial administration enjoyed under such men as Gaudin and Mollien is indicated by the steady rise in the price of government stock, which in August, 1807, reached the figure of 93.40. This price was also due to the feeling of hope and confidence created by the news of the Peace of Tilsit. The following year in March it was 88.15, but from this time forward it gradually sank until with the entry of the Allies into Paris in the spring of 1814 it was quoted at 45.

Prosper-
ity of
France

For France the Empire was a period of prosperity, at least until 1810. The national industries which had not recovered at the close of the Consulate the ground lost during the Revolution had time enough to equal and in many cases to exceed the best years of the old régime. For over a decade, while much of Europe was torn by war, France was not even threatened by invasion. Successive annexations added to the area within which trade was unrestricted. To such normal causes of growth was added the extraordinary stimulus due to the favored position created by the Continental System. Moreover, the *parvenu* nobility which Napoleon had richly endowed from the spoils of subject states had an abundance of money to expend upon luxuries. Progress in certain industries had more permanent causes, such as the introduction of machinery, patterned after English inventions, or the application to industrial needs of the results of scientific discovery, especially in chemistry. In the silk industry, with its center in Lyons, an ingenious loom was invented by Jacquard, which produced the most complex and beautiful patterns. The general introduction of the factory system, however, belongs to a later period.

Agriculture also showed marked gains. The farmer understood better the rotation of crops and gradually freed himself from the trammels of the ancient practice of permitting a third or a half of his arable land to lie fallow. Vegetables like the potato were more widely used. There was also a large increase in the total amount of land under cultivation. This progress was not uniform all over the country. In certain regions the farmers still clung to the methods their fathers had used.

Trade

The foreign commerce of France suffered from the uncertainties of war and the Continental System. Even where the English cruiser could not go, along the land frontiers of France, international trade did not develop rapidly. Old habits could not

be easily overcome. Nor was the international trade of France large by comparison with what it became in later decades of the nineteenth century. Partnerships, rather than stock companies, were a satisfactory form of organization considering the volume of business. Two achievements improved the prospects of business for the future. One was the establishment under the Consulate of a fixed monetary standard, and the other the rapid building of roads. At this time the roads were further classified as imperial, departmental, and vicinal, and great efforts were made towards the completion on a national scale of the imperial and departmental roads. Connections with Turin and Milan were made by the construction of roads across the Alps.

The prosperity of France was gone long before the outbreak of war with Russia in 1812. The steady drain of campaign after campaign, especially of the unceasing struggle in the Spanish peninsula, made the situation critical in the spring of 1810. The trade in colonial products had become highly speculative, because the supply of sugar, coffee, and tobacco was uncertain. Prices were liable to sudden variations, which offered extraordinary opportunities for profit, but also threatened the unwary with ruin. In the month of May prices rose to such a height that purchases fell off and several merchants in Paris were unable to meet their payments. A little later there were failures in western France, whose prosperity had been compromised by the loss of the Spanish market. The condition of the cotton industry became precarious. The protection which the Continental System had given to the French manufacturer had led him to act as if business would expand indefinitely. The result was an inflation of which the rapid increase in discounts after 1808 is an evidence. New mills had been erected at lavish expense on borrowed money. Credit was strained to the breaking point. Then came the tariff of 1810 which enhanced the price of raw material. The manufacturer found it impossible to throw the whole burden of the increased cost upon purchasers and his own resources were unequal to any added load. The Bank of France began to pursue a policy of caution in making loans and other banks followed its example. All that was necessary to tumble down the whole house of cards was a blow from some direction. The first great failure was in Lübeck in September, 1810. In October an important Amsterdam concern failed. Both involved merchants in Paris. The excitement was great and a feeling of distrust became general. In January, 1811, Richard-Lenoir, the principal cotton manufacturer of France, wrote: "The situation of trade becomes daily more critical; sales have almost ceased, and pay-

Panic
of 1810

ments are slow and uncertain. My credit is ruined.”¹ The panic lasted well into the summer of 1811. The number of looms at work in Lyons was reduced from 14,000 to 5,630. The depression in the silk trade has often been attributed to a decree which the Czar Alexander issued in December, 1810, excluding articles of luxury from Russia. But the Russian merchants had already ceased to purchase their usual quantities of silk because the enforcement of the Continental System prevented them from paying in exports of wheat, timber, and other bulky products. In this case Napoleon’s policy directly compromised the prosperity of his own merchants and manufacturers. Although he did not understand the causes of the disaster, he was not indifferent to the situation. He attempted to restore prosperity by making liberal advances to embarrassed merchants and manufacturers. In the year 1812 alone he lent them eighteen million francs out of his Extraordinary Domain.

To the other misfortunes of 1811 was added a partial failure of the wheat crop. In order to forestall a rise of the price of bread Napoleon appointed a Food Commission, which began to stock public granaries. This was noised about and led to a further rise in the price of grain, which the commission tried to correct by selling below the market rate. The market now was thrown into a panic and the price was nearly doubled. Napoleon resorted to the remedy of 1793 and practically established a maximum. With many thousands out of employment the outlook at the close of the year was somber.

A social order or a political system generally expects loyalty from the schools which it supports or tolerates. In the case of a long established régime this seems natural, but when a parvenu dynasty, like that of Napoleon, makes similar demands it causes surprise, irritation, or, perhaps, amusement. Never was the demand formulated with greater preciseness than in the imperial organization of the public schools of France. A law of the Consulate had provided for the establishment of communal colleges and state lycées as well as of special schools, but little was done until after the Peace of Tilsit, when by the law of March 17, 1808, the University of France was created. The first article established what has been called the régime of monopoly, declaring that “Public instruction is entrusted exclusively to the University.” This did not mean that no other educational institutions could exist, for Napoleon was satisfied with a rigid control over private or church schools, but that they must be authorized by the Grand Master of the University and be subject to inspection

¹ Quoted by Darmstädter, *op. cit.*

by state officials. For example, the religious order known as the "Brethren of the Christian Schools" was encouraged to take up the work of primary instruction. The teachers and masters of private schools, even, were required to hold degrees from the University. The aim of education was to form citizens who would be attached to their prince, as well as to their country, their religion, and their family. The basis of education was to be the Catholic religion, and to this was added "Fidelity to the Emperor, to the imperial monarchy depository of the welfare of peoples, and to the Napoleonic dynasty conservator of the unity of France and of all the liberal ideas proclaimed by the constitutions." The last qualification was suited rather to edify young minds than to record the Emperor's attitude in the later years of his reign. The instructors were to serve as a sort of moral police, and were expected to inform the grand master of anything in the public schools unsound from the point of view of imperial doctrine. Napoleon would have been glad if he could have built up a teaching force with a unity of command and the cohesion of the Jesuit Order. A military organization was imposed on the pupils of the lycées, and they proceeded to the exercises of the school at tap of drum. Those in residence were not to appear outside the precincts of the school except in full uniform. Private schools paid to the University fees amounting to a twentieth of their revenue from tuition. Even then their condition was precarious; the master of an ancient "college" in Paris being ordered in 1810 to send his 400 pupils to a lycée within a month. In spite of Napoleon's attempts to reduce the competition of the private schools, there were at his overthrow 3,000 more pupils in private institutes and boarding schools than in the communal colleges and lycées. The organization as a whole was to prove, however, one of his most lasting achievements, for in its broad outlines it still exists, although now freed from its dubious task of supporting a Napoleonic régime, and has entered upon a nobler rivalry with private schools.

The Church was a still more potent instrument of government. To it Napoleon, in the language of Pope Pius VII, had been a second Constantine. In the official catechism the children were taught that the Emperor was the "minister of God's power and His image upon earth," and that those who fail in their duty to him would, "according to the Apostle Paul, be resisting the order established by God himself, and would render themselves worthy of eternal damnation." It is a question how much zeal the clergy put into the teaching of these assertions of the catechism, for in 1806, when it was imposed by law, the Emperor

was already involved in a serious controversy with the Pope. The struggle was of peculiar interest, because on the one hand was the master of the mightiest armies and the most subservient officials of Europe, and, on the other, the Pope, an individual, strong only in the fact that his sanctions were necessary to the orderly administration of the Church, upon which multitudes believed their salvation dependent. The issue proved that force must reckon with ideas, especially if these have long been intimately connected with the practices and the scruples of the religious conscience. Napoleon had almost forgotten the lessons of the fate of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy.

Not long after the Empire was created both the Pope and the Emperor discovered grounds of discontent with the situation. Napoleon wished to have in the Pope an ally in Italy, and he pretended not to see the special obligation of the Pope to maintain a neutral position. Before Napoleon attacked his neutrality Pope Pius VII saw that the rights of the Church were ignored whenever they ran counter to Napoleonic policy. The publication of the Organic Articles had set a good precedent for this. When Napoleon became King of Italy, he introduced the civil code, some of whose provisions were in conflict with the Concordat which he had previously negotiated for the Cisalpine Republic. In France he made membership in an unauthorized religious order ground for a criminal charge. His treatment of the Pope at the time of the coronation had filled Pius with chagrin, the Emperor appearing to regard him as a sort of "grand almoner."

The controversy became acute during the war of 1805. It was in the course of this controversy, as already explained, that Napoleon called himself "Charlemagne," since like Charlemagne he united the crowns of France and Italy. When Joseph was made King of Naples, the Pope refused to recognize the change of dynasty unless his historic rights of suzerainty were acknowledged. After the Peace of Tilsit Napoleon demanded an alliance, asking the Pope to promise that he would select a third of the cardinals within the French empire and that he would refrain from any act likely to alarm the consciences of Frenchmen. As the quarrel became embittered, the Pope, confusing temporal and spiritual matters, ceased to institute the clergy named by Napoleon for vacant bishoprics.

The controversy passed beyond the region of correspondence when General Miollis occupied Rome, took possession of journals, printing presses, and the postal administration, and expelled the cardinals who were not natives of the Papal States.

This was followed by the annexation to the kingdom of Italy of four provinces, including Ancona. The climax came during the Austrian campaign of 1809, when from Vienna Napoleon pronounced the annexation to the empire of the last provinces of the Pope, including Rome. In anticipation of such an act Pius VII and his counselors had prepared a decree of excommunication against those who should plan or bring to pass such a usurpation. Napoleon was not specifically named and all persons were warned in the bull against attacking in any manner either the goods or the rights of those involved in the condemnation. The bull was secretly placarded on the walls of Rome on the night of June 10. When the Emperor heard of the Papal decree, he wrote to Murat, who represented him in these proceedings, "No more half measures; the Pope is a raging maniac whom we must lock up. Arrest Cardinal Pacca and the other supporters of the Pope." This was done and Pope Pius was taken, a close prisoner, to Savona, while Pacca, his secretary of state, was shut up in the fortress of Fenestrella.

The situation was now extremely delicate. The spectacle of the new Constantine, the restorer of the Church, acting as the jailor of the Pope, was neither edifying nor free from embarrassment. By causing the Pope's arrest Napoleon had given him an excuse for refusing to institute nominees to vacant bishoprics, a refusal previously made on questionable grounds. He could argue the impossibility of performing his proper functions when deprived of his liberty and without the counsel of his official advisers. Although the press was silent upon the affair, the spectacle of the vacant sees, numbering eventually 27, was an effective protest against what was being done.

Napoleon taxed the ingenuity of his lawyers to devise a way by which he could dispense with the aid of the Pope in filling vacancies. Recourse could not be had to a general council because such a council could not be called without the consent of the Pope. If a national council were summoned and the desperate situation of the Church laid before it, it would probably refuse to ignore the terms of a solemn treaty like the Concordat and to put in force the method of institution provided by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy or the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges. The most that could be done was to ask the chapters of the vacant cathedrals to designate the nominated bishops as provisional administrators of the diocese. But the attempt of Napoleon to transfer two bishops from their sees to the metropolitan sees of Paris and Florence brought from the Pope reprimands for the two ecclesiastics and bulls forbidding the chapters to obey them.

CHAP.
XXIV

1807-12

Excom-
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Napoleon

Attempts
to dis-
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with
Papal
Authority

The bulls were delivered by members of the "Congregation," a secret order organized at first for the cultivation of piety and later furnishing invisible aides-de-camp to the imprisoned pontiff.

Without waiting for a settlement of the question, Napoleon decreed by *senatus consulte*, February 17, 1810, that Rome should be the second city of the Empire, that the Pope should have palaces there and at Paris, that he should be assigned an income of two millions a year, and that he should take an oath to do nothing contrary to the liberties of the Gallican Church set forth in the four articles of 1682. The quarrel became still more notorious when thirteen cardinals who refused to be present at the religious ceremony of the marriage of Napoleon and Marie Louise were placed practically under arrest, forbidden to use their titles, and ordered to wear a black *soutane*. This treatment, which gained for the unfortunate ecclesiastics the name "black cardinals," was mild compared with that of nineteen bishops within the States of the Church, who were shut up in fortresses for refusing to take the oath to the Emperor.

In 1811 it looked as if the Pope, worn out by the strain of the controversy and moved by the condition of so many dioceses, was ready to yield. Four bishops, carefully chosen, who were sent to bring every possible argument to bear upon his resolution, finally succeeded in obtaining his consent to the proposal that he should grant bulls of institution to the nominated bishops and that hereafter, if he did not grant bulls within six months of a nomination, the candidate might be instituted by his metropolitan or by the oldest bishop in the diocese. On the strength of this success Napoleon convened a national council in order that it might embody the compromise in a decree, but he dismissed it angrily on account of its deference to the papal will. After the leaders of the opposition had returned to their dioceses, and his officials had taken the precaution of obtaining the agreement of the others individually to the compromise, he reconvened the council. Even this carefully selected assembly made its consent subject to the approval of the Pope. Pius VII, when the decision was laid before him, ignorant of the circumstances surrounding the affair, gave a conditional approval; but, as Napoleon rejected the conditions, the matter was not advanced. By this time he was absorbed by the approaching war with Russia. When he was well on his way toward the Niemen, the Pope was hurried across the Alps into France and was brought to Fontainebleau, where he was to wait until the disasters of 1812 modified the situation profoundly.

The Church was not the only form of moral and intellectual

activity that Napoleon sought to control. He established a rigorous censorship of literature and of the press. The theaters were reduced in numbers and classified. It was dangerous to publish or produce plays which contained lines with ambiguous meanings, and even plays of classical origin were expurgated. Chateaubriand, the greatest prose writer of the period, fell into disfavor because of his condemnation of the judicial murder of the Duke d'Enghien. The most notable case of persecution for literary opposition was that of Mme. de Staël, a member of the group of "ideologists" whom Napoleon detested. In 1803 he had ordered her to reside at least forty leagues from Paris. She preferred to go to Germany, to which he consented. At Weimar she made the acquaintance of Goethe and Schiller and deepened her interest in the German intellectual movement. A few years later she undertook to interpret this movement to the French in a book entitled *l'Allemagne*. In 1810 in order to see it through the press she went to Blois on the Loire. Her frank admiration of the German genius and her silence upon the work which Napoleon had attempted to accomplish in Germany were too much for the imperial censors and they demanded changes. A little later she received the news that the edition of 10,000 copies had been seized. At the same time she was ordered to leave France within three days. It was in England three years later that she finally succeeded in publishing her book.

Napoleon wished to make literature march with the same precision which he exacted of his battalions. He demanded that the historians show the weakness and confusion of the Bourbon government and the "benefits due to the unity of the laws, of administration, and of territory." In 1808 as he became involved in a quarrel with the Pope, he wished history to exhibit "the dangerous influence of a foreign priest, whose ambitions might destroy the repose of France." The control exercised over newspapers was still more rigorous, and by October, 1811, only four existed in Paris. The *Journal des Débats* had been forced to adopt the less untimely name of *Journal de l'Empire*, and later was confiscated. Printers were restricted in number and required to take an oath, and no book could be published until it was approved by the censors, and even then its sale might be suspended. In the neutral territory of the fine arts and of the mathematical and physical sciences, rendered illustrious by the names of David, Laplace, and Cuvier, work of permanent value was accomplished, but France lacked that intellectual life which thrives in the invigorating atmosphere of freedom.

CHAP.
XXIV

1807-12

Litera-
ture

CHAPTER XXV

THE LAST GREAT VENTURE

CHAP.
XXV

1810-13

THE strongest single motive in the development of Bonaparte's later policy sprang from the requirements of the Continental System as an effective weapon against the English. Each successive step toward the accomplishment of their ruin seemed not only justified but inevitable; and all were so adapted to the general scheme of personal domination, that Bonaparte saw no reason to take account of obstacles created by the local necessities of peoples or by the ambitions of their rulers. This had already involved him in a fateful struggle in the Spanish peninsula and had prompted acts which became the occasion of a still more disastrous conflict within the boundaries of the Russian empire.

Russia
and the
Conti-
nental
System

The war with England caused Russia serious losses because her export trade was mainly in wheat, timber, and shipping supplies. The deficit in the imperial treasury by 1810 equaled the income, and the value of the paper ruble had fallen to twenty-five per cent. To the injury of this situation was added the insult of the annexation of Oldenburg, of which a near relative of Alexander was ruler. By a curious irony of fate Alexander's retort was made before he heard of this step. It was embodied in the tariff of December 31, 1810, which was designed to protect Russia against the consequences of the System by either prohibiting or levying high duties on luxuries like French wines, brandies and silks, while facilitating the commerce of neutrals.

A question of scarcely less importance had been raised by Napoleon's policy in Poland. It was not so much what he had done as the possibility that he might do more that caused the Russians anxiety. The administrative, legal, and social reforms in the grand duchy of Warsaw might render restive those subjects of the old kingdom of Poland now Russian, and might predispose them to clamor for its restoration. The addition of a million and a half inhabitants to the grand duchy, by the terms of peace with Austria, appeared to encourage their hopes. At the same time the obstacle of the dual alliance seemed less formidable, now that the Austrian marriage indicated a change in Napoleon's foreign policy. He alarmed Alexander by refusing to ratify an agree-

Question
of Poland

ment drawn by his own ambassador pledging him never to permit the reconstitution of the Polish kingdom and even agreeing that the name Poland should not be used in public documents.

Napoleon's attitude towards the war between the Russians and the Turks was also a continual source of irritation. The Russian arms were gaining successes which opened a prospect of an advantageous peace, but the French agents strove to prolong Turkish resistance.

Before the measures of December, 1810, started rumors of war, Alexander had begun to sound the Poles upon their attitude towards a proposal by him to reconstitute the old kingdom, with him as monarch, but otherwise independent of Russia. Early in 1811 he began to move troops towards his western frontier, to be ready to enter instantly upon a campaign against Napoleonic domination in Warsaw and northern Germany if this and kindred negotiations should succeed. With great secrecy he proposed to the Austrians that they accept certain Danubian lands in exchange for Galicia, which was to belong to the restored kingdom. His apparent design was to add the lands of the old duchy of Lithuania, that is to say, the part of Russia acquired at the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795. Before the winter was over he found that the Austrians would give him no encouragement. Indeed, the proposal was one of the reasons why they were ready to ally themselves with Napoleon in the coming war. The greatest disappointment was the persistence of the Poles in their attachment to the French cause; though it was natural, for who except the French and Napoleon had done anything but harm to the cause of Poland? By the spring of 1811, therefore, Alexander was inclined to patch up some arrangement with Napoleon by which the alliance might be continued.

Prepara-
tions for
War

Napoleon had not received information of Alexander's decree of December 31, 1810, when he began to reinforce his army in northern Germany, with the aim of tightening the joints of the Continental System. The news from Russia suggested that the new army might have a more strenuous task than keeping the German ports closed against the English. Still later came reports of the movement of Russian troops along the frontier of Warsaw. This reached Paris at a time when the troops were being withdrawn and when an agent of the Czar appeared with proposals for a settlement of the difficulties. The question of Poland was now involved with the question of indemnities for the Duke of Oldenburg. In these negotiations the agents of neither Napoleon nor Alexander ventured to say definitely what they desired or were ready to do, fearing that the proposition

CHAP.
XXV

1810-13

would be used as a weapon against them. After all, the Polish question was secondary, and the important question of the policy of Russia towards commerce was not discussed. In an interview with Kurakin, the Russian ambassador, on August 15, Napoleon chose to defy Russia as he had defied England at the famous Whitworth interview of 1803. In the presence of other ambassadors he warned Kurakin not "to flatter himself that he would indemnify the Czar on the side of Warsaw," adding, "No, though your armies were encamped on the heights of Montmartre, I would not yield an inch of Warsaw's territory." Both Napoleon and Alexander now expected war, but neither desired it to open before 1812. Napoleon bent all the efforts of his diplomacy to prevent Alexander from carrying the war into Germany, while Alexander was already inclined to profit by the lesson Wellington had taught in Portugal and to lure his enemy far within the vast plains of Russia.

The approach of war placed Prussia in a precarious position. On the one hand the success of Napoleon would deprive Frederick William of the support which had come from the friendly intervention of Alexander. Napoleon might seize the occasion to carry out the thought of destroying the Prussian monarchy which he had meditated since Jena; indeed, rumors that the details of such a scheme had already been worked out found their way to Berlin. On the other hand, a decisive Russian success might lead to the annexation of the grand duchy of Warsaw, made up of former Prussian Polish possessions, in which case Prussia would simply change masters.

Alexander was Frederick William's natural ally, but such an alliance meant ruin unless Alexander, anticipating Napoleon's action, pushed his columns far into Germany before the Grand Army of France and her dependent States was assembled. One favorable element in the situation was the retention of many thousand French troops in Spain, so that it did not seem possible to assemble another army large enough to meet a vigorous onslaught of the northern powers. Such men as Scharnhorst thought the hour to strike had come, but Frederick William hesitated and Hardenberg despatched to Paris the proposal of a closer alliance with France, which would ward off destruction and which might move Napoleon to release Prussia from a part of the war contribution as well as remove the limitation upon the size of the army. Preparations for war were at the same time pushed forward with the excuse that these were necessary if Prussia's alliance was to be valuable. Napoleon was angered by the Prussian preparations because he feared that they might pre-

Position
of Prus-
sia

cipitate war with Russia, and, although he did not altogether penetrate the policy of double dealing that Prussia was pursuing, he resolved to seize Prussia unless the preparations ceased. Scharnhorst had already been sent secretly to St. Petersburg to learn if the Czar could be counted upon in case of French attack, and in November he brought back Alexander's consent to an alliance and a promise to abandon his plan of awaiting the French attack within his own dominions. Meanwhile Prussia had received assurances of English subsidies. Before Frederick William finally decided what to do he sent Scharnhorst to Vienna, only to discover that Count Metternich and his master had determined to maintain their alliance with France. Frederick William was now obliged to accept a settlement with Napoleon much severer than Hardenberg had anticipated, promising to furnish 20,000 troops, subject to the orders of Napoleon, and to place the remainder of the army, separated in garrisons, under the command of neighboring French generals. The alliance was offensive and defensive against all States except Spain, Italy, and Turkey. If the French armies marched through Prussian territory they should issue requisitions for food, the value of which should be credited toward the payment of the old war debt. This humiliating treaty was signed February 24, 1812, when the war with Russia seemed a few weeks distant.

The attitude of Austria was prompted partly by distrust of Alexander's Polish policy and irritation at his territorial ambitions on the lower Danube. Metternich also hoped that the Prussians would ally themselves with Russia and that this would afford Napoleon the excuse for seizing Silesia and handing it over to his father-in-law. He had received assurances from Napoleon that Austria would recover a part of the lost Illyrian provinces and the boundary of the Inn towards Bavaria in return for support during a war with Russia. The Austrians were confident that France would be victorious if the struggle were begun, and Metternich, wishing that Prussia might become seriously compromised in the affair, actually advised Prussia to unite with the Russians. A treaty was signed in March, 1812, pledging to Napoleon the support of an army of 30,000, which, however, should be under the orders of an Austrian general, although its movements were to conform to Napoleon's plans.

The attitude of Sweden became of importance because Bernadotte, ex-marshal of France, was the crown prince, and a Swedish army led by him might be a decisive weight in the scale. Bernadotte wished to commend himself to his future subjects and demanded as the price of an alliance the cession of Norway, which

CHAP.
XXV

1810-13

Attitude
of Aus-
tria

Sweden

CHAP.
XXV

1810-13

belonged to Denmark. Napoleon could not concede this, for the Danes were his faithful allies. Moreover, he required of Sweden the rigorous enforcement of the Continental System, threatening to occupy Swedish Pomerania if this were not done. For the Swedes, as for the Russians, the Continental System was too high a price to pay for immunity from attack, and Bernadotte turned to Alexander to obtain from him what Napoleon refused. A treaty signed in April, 1812, promised the Russians the aid of a Swedish corps in making a diversion in northern Germany, and Bernadotte received in return the promise that at the peace Sweden should annex Norway.

In May, Napoleon received another blow. This was a treaty of peace between Russia and the Turks, which freed a large Russian army for the campaign against the French. Napoleon had demanded of the Turks an army of 100,000, promising them the restoration of all the territories Russia had taken away in a generation, but the Turks distrusted his promises and gave more weight to the threats of the English, who declared that they would bombard Constantinople if the Sultan joined Napoleon.

With a new and stupendous task confronting the French the necessity of keeping 300,000 soldiers in Spain was embarrassing. The results there were not commensurate with the effort. To maintain a semblance of authority the troops were scattered throughout the peninsula, and it was impossible to bring together an army large enough to crush Wellington after his expulsion of Masséna from Portugal. Although the year did not pass without some successes in other parts of Spain, Wellington's hold on the borders of Portugal was strengthened by the capture, early in 1812, of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. It was not of favorable augury to the cause of King Joseph that his brother was obliged to draw from Spain 30,000 veterans to form part of the great army which he proposed to launch against Russia.

For the next two years the British efforts against Napoleon were hampered by a diversion across the Atlantic. The quarrel over the rights of neutral commerce and the impressment of seamen had become embittered and a party in the American Congress, principally representing the interior, clamored for war. Although the United States had no war fleet, and only a few frigates and smaller vessels, and although the army contained only half a dozen regiments, war was declared upon Great Britain in June, 1812. It subsequently appeared that the British had withdrawn their obnoxious Orders in Council two days before the declaration of war. As the conflict proceeded, England suffered more from the additional burden of risk to her commerce,

The
TurksWellington in
SpainThe
American
War

liable to attack by swift-sailing American privateers, than from the cost of defending her colonies against the weak and ill-organized forces of the United States. The issue of the great struggle on the Continent was not seriously affected by the affair.

The war of France and Russia, or rather of Napoleon and Russia, for France was neither consulted nor deeply interested,—except that her sons might return alive—began without formal declaration. When the French engineers were constructing the bridges at the Niemen they were not opposed by the Russians, although a few horsemen rode up and inquired what the purpose of the bridges might be. The break between the two emperors did not occur until Napoleon was already at Wilna, fifty miles from the frontier.

The Grand Army was the largest force operating in any field of modern warfare. When the invasion began 450,000 effective troops crossed the Niemen, and 160,000 followed before its close. About one-half were Frenchmen, one-fourth Germans, and one-eighth Italians. There were 100,000 cavalry, 1,242 field pieces, and more than 100 siege guns. At the head of the army were some of the greatest paladins of the imperial period, Murat, Davout, Ney, and Eugène. Berthier was chief of staff. To have brought together such a body of men argued extraordinary genius for organization; to maintain it as an effective fighting machine in the vast plains of Russia surpassed the capacity of genius itself. Immense stores of provisions had been accumulated at Danzig and other fortresses, but it was not possible to forward them fast enough to provide for the needs of the soldiers. Even before the army reached the Niemen the soldiers began to suffer for food. The machine was destined to break down of its own weight and complexity.

Napoleon expected the Poles of Lithuania to hail him as a deliverer and he planned to turn their enthusiasm into auxiliary troops, and into all sorts of supplies for his advancing army. The movement was to start with a diet at Warsaw, and it was decided before he left Paris what the diet should do and what his attitude should be. Meanwhile he countenanced rumors of a restoration of the old kingdom. The diet assembled at Warsaw and the elder Czartoryski announced the reestablishment of the kingdom of Poland; but, when a delegation appeared before Napoleon at Wilna, he chilled their enthusiasm by declaring that they must show themselves strong enough to conquer and defend their liberties. This could be done only by supporting more vigorously the expedition. He also reminded them that Austria was

CHAP.
XXV
1810-13

The Russian Campaign

The Poles

CHAP.
XXV

1810-13

his ally and nothing should be undertaken which would alarm the Emperor Francis for the safety of Galicia. Already the enthusiasm of the Lithuanians had been changed into indifference or anger because the French troops, often half starved, plundered them as if they were enemies. In his proclamation to his soldiers Napoleon called this the "Second Polish War." The event hardly justified the name.

In the Russian campaign Napoleon's advance lasted from June 23, when his army began to cross the Niemen, until September 14, when he entered Moscow. At the Niemen he was already more than 700 miles from the borders of France, his true base of operations. A large part of his line of communications was exposed on either side, if the formal friendship of Austria or Prussia should be changed into hostility. Moscow lay beyond the plains of Lithuania and old Russia 600 miles as the crow flies, about the distance from Albany to Chicago or from Washington to St. Louis. Between were few cities of importance and the country was poor and sparsely populated. The campaign was begun late, in order that the horses might feed on the fresh grasses. Napoleon had not planned to go beyond the borders of Lithuania the first summer, expecting to follow this campaign by another in 1813 until the endurance of Russia was worn out. He was fully warned against the hazards of the enterprise because the Czar had not concealed his intention to withdraw, if need be, into Asia, rather than sign a peace while his capital or a foot of his territory was held by the enemy. Napoleon had received a more sinister warning, when he insultingly asked Alexander's representative at Wilna which was the road to Moscow. The Russian replied: "As the French say, 'All roads lead to Rome,' so the Russians say, 'All roads lead to Moscow': one may choose; Charles XII took that by way of Pultowa."

The size of Napoleon's army forced the Russians to adopt a more thoroughgoing policy of retreat than they had at first considered. Their scheme of operations had included the retirement of a first army upon elaborate fortifications, a Russian Torres Vedras, at Drissa on the Düna; and, when the enemy followed, a second army further south was to menace his flank and rear. The Russians soon discovered that Napoleon had soldiers enough to surround and overwhelm both armies, and that their only hope lay in diminishing the French army by lengthening still further its line of communications. In fact, the second army barely escaped destruction before it effected a union with the first army. From that moment, however, the size of Napoleon's army was a disadvantage, confirming the Russians in the policy of retreat,

The Road
to Mos-
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Campaign

so that the opportunity of engaging them in a decisive battle ever receded before him. His soldiers were worn out and his horses killed by endless marches, 10,000 horses perishing before the army reached Wilna. Further on, a single corps reported a daily loss of 800 or 900 men from fatigue, disease, and starvation. By the end of July nearly a third of the army had disappeared, and still the day of a decisive battle was in the future. Napoleon supposed the Russians would defend Smolensk, the border city of "Holy" Russia, but they left only a rear guard to delay his entrance. He had originally intended to pause there until 1813, but the hope of forcing the enemy to an issue lured him on along the road to Moscow. The Russians, weary at length of the policy of retreat carried out with such patient resolution by Barclay de Tolly, put the old fighting general Kutusoff in command and barred Napoleon's advance at Borodino. The Grand Army now numbered about 125,000, while the Russians had a little over 100,000. The struggle raged all day on September 7 and closed with the loss to the French of a fifth of their army, while the Russians lost still more. Although the French were victorious, their success was not decisive, because Napoleon refused to use the Imperial Guard with crushing effect at the critical moment.

When the French entered Moscow a few days later they were astonished to find the ancient Russian capital deserted by its inhabitants. Only 15,000 out of 250,000 remained, and those were mostly foreigners and vagabonds. No municipal deputation waited upon the disappointed conqueror. What was worse, before the day was over fires broke out in different quarters of the town. Who set the fires is unknown, although the Russian governor has been accused of ordering them. Released criminals or bandits and French pillagers were quite as likely the culprits. The flames soon held the whole city in their grasp, and lighted the country around so far that persons could read at midnight ten or twelve miles away. A large part of the city was burned and it was impossible to procure supplies from the surrounding district, and yet Napoleon lingered in Moscow for five weeks, deluded by the expectation that Alexander would consent to terms of peace.

Moscow

On October 18 Napoleon began his retreat. His army now counted, including reinforcements, about 100,000. As the Russian army lay across the more southerly roads, he was obliged to return through the region devastated by both armies during the advance. His soldiers were horrified by the spectacle of the thousands of dead lying still unburied on the battlefield of Boro-

The
Retreat

dino. On November 4 the thermometer showed that winter, the cruelest enemy of all, had come. By the middle of the month the army reached Smolensk, but half its numbers had perished. Greater perils still awaited it along the river Beresina, where a Russian army from the south had burnt the bridge Napoleon had planned to use and were holding the western banks of the river. The remnants of the Grand Army would have been captured but for the skilful strategy of Marshal Oudinot, who deceived the Russians as to the place selected for crossing, and the self-sacrificing courage of the French engineers, who stood up to their necks in the icy stream while they constructed two wooden bridges. Nevertheless, before the crossing was accomplished the Russians came up and turned their guns upon the bridges. One broke down under the weight of the panic-stricken crowds, and a fierce conflict of men and horses for the other went on until the French rear guard set fire to it to cover their retreat, leaving on the other side thousands of stragglers. So many perished in the river that ten years afterwards islets or shallows could be seen made up of grewsome masses of human wreckage. What was left of the army struggled on past Wilna to the Niemen, which was crossed the middle of December. The infantry of the Imperial Guard numbered 400 or 500 and the cavalry 600 more, many of them without horses. One battalion which left Smolensk with 31 officers and 300 men was reduced to 14 officers and 10 men. On December 5 Napoleon placed the army under the command of Murat and set out for Paris to save his empire from the consequences of defeat. On December 10 he was at Warsaw, on the 14th at Dresden, and he reached Paris on December 18 about midnight.

Hardly two days had passed since a cloud of anxious dread had settled upon the city with the appearance in the *Moniteur* of the Twenty-ninth Bulletin of the Grand Army. Its paragraphs of misleading description, telling of new triumphs over the Russians and transforming even the crossing of the Beresina into a victory, could not sufficiently veil the few lines of truth, which intimated the frightful extent of the disaster. "This army, so fine on November 6th, was very different after the 14th," so ran the first hint, "almost without cavalry, without artillery, without transports." Further on the bulletin said that the Guard had lost so many horses that it was possible to bring together only four companies of cavalry of 150 men each, in which generals were the captains and colonels were the non-commissioned officers. Who had survived, was the question on everybody's lips. Napoleon did not allow himself to be shaken

in this atmosphere heavy with universal distress; he had lost an army, but not his empire, and another army must be found to reopen the campaign, if not on the Niemen, as far on the road thither as possible. In their own sorrow the sympathetic French felt for his misfortunes and reflected that such a trial "might add to his other qualities more indulgence for the faults of others, more prudence in his plans, more moderation in his acts, and in his love of glory a greater consideration for France." Although all classes were eager for peace, none, save in the south and in some parts of the west, were disloyal to the Emperor. The French were too closely associated with the glories of the Grand Empire to see it destroyed without a struggle. They consoled themselves also with the hope that one more effort would bring the peace they all desired. Napoleon had little sympathy with this sentiment. As soon as he saw new forces gathering about him and felt once more the assurance of victory, he declared that if France was to be worthy of him she must cast away pusillanimous wishes and desire to avenge her offended glory; that the only suitable peace was one which she could command after victory and which would leave her all her conquests. His language showed even those who had zealously coöperated in raising troops that he was the same Napoleon that he had been the year before and that the Russian campaign had taught him nothing. They asked themselves, "When will the war end, if he regains his fortune, and, if he succumbs, what will be the conditions of peace?"

Even before Napoleon's preparations for the new campaign were well begun, his attitude showed how little he was inclined to compromise with his enemies. In a conversation with the Austrian ambassador, on the last day of 1812, the only concession he proposed was the return of Illyria to Austria in case she succeeded in bringing about a peace between France and England. It is true he said that Portugal should be restored to the House of Braganza, but Portugal was already irretrievably lost to him. As to the grand duchy of Warsaw he declared he would not abandon a village of it, adding that if he began by giving up provinces his enemies would soon be asking for kingdoms. His forces, however, were inadequate to defend this Grand Empire. The successes of Wellington in 1812, especially the victory of Salamanca, on July 22, made it impossible to withdraw many of his troops in the Peninsula. On the eastern frontiers of Germany were the remnants of the Grand Army, about 20,000, with 20,000 more on the way, and 17,000 in garrison. The two wings of the army, composed mainly of the Austrian and the Prussian con-

CHAP.
XXV

1810-13

Napoleon's At-
titude

tingents, were still in excellent condition, having escaped the hardships of the campaign. They numbered 66,000, but most of them might soon become enemies. To preserve the Napoleonic hegemony in central Europe a new army must be created.

The effect of the news from Russia upon public sentiment in the dependent States was not decisive. In some quarters those who had grown restive under the Napoleonic yoke saw an opportunity to intrigue or to resume a portion of their lost independence of action. Within the limits of the Rhenish Confederation none stirred at first. The army of Württemberg was reduced in the retreat from 14,000 to 173 officers and 143 men, and when the King was reminded of the obligation to raise his contingent to the required standard he hinted to the French minister that the confederate states were bound only so long as Napoleon could protect them. He changed his tone when he saw what France was doing. Bavaria acted more independently and conceded only a division, retaining the remainder of her troops in camp near Munich.

In Italy it looked as if the situation of 1799 had returned, threatening the collapse of the French power. Murat left the army not long after the departure of Napoleon, and hastened to Naples to save his crown from the disaster which appeared to menace every Napoleonic creation. He was ready to open negotiations with Lord Bentinck in Sicily or with Metternich in Vienna, and hoped to unite all Italy under one crown and to place that crown on his own head. There were many Italians ready to take up the cry, "Italy for the Italians," and to compel the French officials to recross the Alps. Such sentiments found no expression in a popular movement, as the rapidity with which Napoleon reorganized his resources made action dangerous. In Prussia and Austria alone were the consequences of the Russian disaster immediate and portentous.

The attitude of the Prussians was a most serious question, for should they wreak their hatred of the French upon the pitiful remnants of the Grand Army hardly a man would reach the Vistula. Napoleon assumed that Frederick William would remain a faithful ally and as he passed through Dresden on his way to Paris wrote to the King asking him to increase his contingent and hold back the advancing Russians until the French reinforcements should appear. Hardenberg refused, while outwardly holding to the alliance, because he could hardly do otherwise. Aside from the Prussian corps under Yorck, which formed a part of Macdonald's army, the King had no army large enough to attack the French garrisons in the fortresses of the Oder and

the Vistula or in Berlin. At all events, nothing could be done without the coöperation of Austria or of Russia. If Prussia was eventually to join Russia, it must be when the Russians had advanced to the Vistula and the Prussian forces had been increased. Meanwhile the suspicious glances of the French must discover only attitudes of naïve and touching fidelity. Fortunately for Prussia, the French ambassador in Berlin deeply sympathized with the sufferings of Prussia under the Tilsit régime, and was inclined to believe the professions of Hardenberg and the declarations of Frederick William.

The Prussian Court was not fully aware how complete had been the destruction of Napoleon's army, when events occurred in the old kingdom of Prussia which hastened the settlement of the great question. Stein, now adviser of the Czar, learned early in November of the approaching ruin of the French army and he had sought to influence Alexander to adopt a European rather than a narrowly Russian policy. He urged that the object of the war had ceased to be defensive, and that it should be to wrest from Napoleon the resources of Germany and to dissolve the Confederation of the Rhine. He realized that a strong party at the Russian Court thought that the defeat of the Grand Army was enough, while another party would be glad to see a peace negotiated with France at the expense of Prussia and on the basis of gaining the Vistula as the western frontier of Russia. Stein's arguments were reinforced by the advice of Count Nesselrode, a young diplomat who had acquired great influence with Alexander, and who regarded the restriction of France within her "natural" frontiers as the true policy of Russia, guaranteeing the peace of Europe by a restoration of the balance of power. At the same time Alexander resumed his Polish schemes, which he had been obliged to lay aside in 1811, although they could not be mentioned openly, because any hint that the kingdom of Poland was to be restored would throw Austria and Prussia into the arms of Napoleon. Moreover, the old Russian party had no sympathy with the Czar's dream of a Polish kingdom ruled as a constitutional monarchy. If the resources of Germany were to be taken from Napoleon, how was this to be brought about? Stein was ready to make a direct appeal to peoples, ignoring, if need be, princes. Indeed, he did not mean to preserve the sovereignty of the minor princes if they served the cause of France. To one of his correspondents he declared, "I am sorry that your Excellency spies a Prussian in me. . . . I have but one Fatherland, which is called Germany, and since according to the old constitution, I belonged to it alone, and to no

particular part of it, to it alone, and not to any part of it, I am devoted with my whole heart.”¹ The day had not come for such a thoroughgoing program, and yet it was the North German peoples rather than their princes who overthrew the Napoleonic régime.

While Stein urged the Czar to carry the war into Germany the governor of Riga tried to convince General Yorck that Prussia should unite with Russia in the conflict with Napoleon. Yorck was first of all a soldier, with unbending ideas in regard to his duty to his King, and, although he hated the French alliance, he had acted loyally during the campaign, so that Napoleon commended the behavior of the Prussian troops. He replied to the Russian overtures that, if Prussia abandoned the French alliance, she had no assurance in regard to the terms of settlement she might expect from coöperation with Russia. As the days passed he received detailed information of the ruin of the French army. His army of 18,000 troops in excellent condition was a decisive weight in the scale, especially if the Russian army had suffered severely. Late in December Yorck received a letter from the Czar, promising in return for a treaty with Frederick William not to lay down his arms until he had procured for Prussia “an aggrandisement of territory such as to enable her to resume the place among the Powers which she had before the war of 1806.” At the same time Yorck was informed by those acquainted with the situation in the Russian camp that the Czar might go over to the party which advised peace with France on the basis of the Vistula. Yorck saw that the crisis had arisen, provided for in a secret message sent to his corps during the previous summer, which ordered that in case the French were forced to retreat the Prussian corps should retire to Graudenz and defend itself against both sides. Yorck could not do this literally, but he signed a Convention at Tauroggen on December 30 by which his corps was to occupy a neutralized strip of Prussian territory until orders arrived from the King, and which provided, furthermore, that under no circumstances would the Prussians attack the Russians before March 1. This Convention was known at Potsdam by January 2. Young Prince William² vividly recalled in later years the air of satisfaction which overspread the King’s countenance when he announced to him and to his brothers the “*distressing* news that Yorck had capitulated with his corps and that they were prisoners of the Russians.” To the French ambassador both the King and Hardenberg pre-

¹ Seeley, III. 17.

² William I, of Prussia and Germany.

tended great indignation at the conduct of Yorck and agreed to deprive him of command and send him before a court-martial. Perhaps, after all, the King did not relish so brusque an anticipation of his proper policy.

To both Napoleon and his enemies the attitude of Austria was of the greatest importance, not only because of the weight of troops which she could throw into the scale, but also because of her strong central position, the mountain bastions of the Bohemian border menacing either the advance of Napoleon towards the Niemen or rendering easy a blow at the heart of the Rhenish Confederation. The fact that the Emperor Francis was Napoleon's father-in-law and that he had for the campaign of 1812 become Napoleon's ally did not determine Austria's attitude finally. The marriage of 1810 had been conceded to save Austria from part of the consequences of her defeat of the year before, and the alliance of 1812 had been accepted only as the best of three possible lines of conduct. If now the interests of Austria should counsel a withdrawal from the alliance, only a mistaken point of honor could restrain either Metternich or the Emperor, for Napoleon had given them no reason to be delicate in such matters.

When in the summer of 1812 Metternich heard the news of the constant retreat of the Russians and the reported victories of Napoleon he concluded that henceforward Russia was erased from the map of European Powers. At the same time he began to fear a separate treaty between Russia and France. The only way to guard against this was through negotiations for a general pacification. The scheme of a general pacification enabled Austria to decline Napoleon's appeal to the Emperor Francis for effective assistance after the news of disaster replaced the tidings of victory. Napoleon wished Francis to double his auxiliary force and check the advancing Russians in the grand duchy of Warsaw until he could reorganize his own forces. Instead of complying with this request Metternich sent Count Bubna to Paris to represent to Napoleon that the only way to repair the losses of the campaign was through a general pacification. He found that, while Napoleon did not object to an unarmed intervention on the part of Austria, he was wholly bent on recovering his lost prestige and would make no substantial concessions.

It was the aim of Austria to regain an independent position. This was defined by the Emperor Francis as one of armed neutrality, from which Austria might pass into a state of war, either as ally of Russia and Prussia or as an ally of France. The latter contingency he regarded as impossible. The essential char-

CHAP.
XXV

1810-18

Neutrality
of Aus-
tria

acter of the situation, therefore, was a passage from alliance with Napoleon through armed mediation to war against him. Austria was by no means sure that a decisive success of Russians and Prussians would be to her advantage, for a preponderance of Russia would be more dangerous than a preponderance of France, because the preponderance of France was dependent upon the life of a single man of genius. Restrained from immediate action also by her military and financial weakness, Austria's first step was an armistice, on January 30, with the Russians, permitting the withdrawal of the Austrian auxiliary force from Warsaw. To the French the excuse was given that this force must be safeguarded for the coming campaign, but the step was in reality the complement of the Convention of Tauroggen. It compelled the hurried retreat of the French as far as Glogau. Two months later a secret convention with the Russians made possible a withdrawal of the Austrian force to Bohemia, to coöperate with the army assembling there to support the policy of armed mediation.

Napoleon had begun the war with Russia in order to maintain the Continental System. The terrible disaster which overwhelmed his army not only jeopardized the System, but also endangered the Grand Empire. If he defended this with no better judgment than he had shown in defending that, even the French empire might also be imperiled.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE COLLAPSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE

THE campaign of 1813 was in one sense a continuation of the campaign of 1812. A similar enthusiasm inspired the Russian and the German peoples to resistance. And yet there were differences. The Germans had been for years under Napoleonic domination, as the Russians had not. This fact has given the campaign the name of "The War of Liberation," and has made the year 1813 the heroic period of German history. Liberation from the control of Napoleon, however, was not restricted to Germany. His failure to defend successfully on German battlefields his Grand Empire led to its ruin in Holland, Spain, and Italy. Even before the year was over, the frontiers of France drawn at Lunéville were menaced. And the campaign was continued without a pause until April, 1814, when Napoleon was forced to abdicate and the French empire ceased to exist.

CHAP.
XXVI

1813-14

War of
Liberation

When it was understood at Berlin how complete was the destruction of the French army, the cry "Let us free ourselves!" gained increasing force. Early in January the King authorized overtures to Austria for union in a policy of armed mediation. As French troops still occupied Berlin Frederick William was in a precarious position. On January 22 he rode off to Breslau, while Hardenberg explained to the French that he had gone to raise his contingent for the new campaign. A few days later a call for volunteers was issued, without, however, explaining against whom the volunteers were to fight.

Meanwhile Baron vom Stein had entered Königsberg, the old Prussian capital, armed with a commission from the Emperor Alexander, in order to organize the resources of East and West Prussia. According to Stein's plan the representatives of the estates of the two provinces were assembled to authorize the organization of the *Landwehr*. He remained in the background, because he was now a Russian official, and General Yorck stood sponsor for a project drawn up by a disciple of Scharnhorst. Acting through Prussian officials at Königsberg, Stein removed the regulations enforcing the Continental System and raised a loan for Yorck's army. After this was done he returned to the

CHAP.
XXVI

1813-14

Treaty of
Kalisch

Russian headquarters. His action was disliked by the King, who did not wish his hand forced or the embarrassments of the situation increased.

It was not until February 28 that Frederick William, whose thoughts were haunted by the question of the lost Polish provinces, reached an understanding with Alexander. This was embodied in the secret treaty of Kalisch, according to the terms of which Prussia should be restored to a position as strong relatively as that of 1806. The King was not promised the provinces incorporated in the grand duchy of Warsaw, except a strip large enough to connect Silesia and West Prussia. His compensation, therefore, would be found within the limits of Germany, an arrangement far better for Prussia. It was also agreed in the treaty that in the coming campaign Russia should furnish 150,000 men and Prussia 80,000. The object of the alliance, which Austria was invited to join, was to deprive France of control in northern Germany. After waiting two weeks the treaty was published, and a few days later, on March 17, Prussia declared war upon France.

Uprising
of the
Prussians

Frederick William now issued an appeal to his people, couched in the language of real feeling, telling them that there was no escape, that their choice lay between an honorable peace and destruction. Bolder spirits, like the philosopher Fichte, cried out that it was not "Victory or death" which would solve the problem, but "Victory anyhow." Already the call for volunteers had given the people an opportunity to show their feelings. The enthusiasm to enlist was astonishing. Niebuhr wrote from Berlin a month before war was declared that "The crowd of volunteers is as great to-day in front of the town hall, as it is before a baker's shop in a famine." The men "asked eagerly whether it was certain they were to be led against the French, and the officers dared not assure them of it except by hints." A Breslau professor, Heinrich Steffens, was more frank, declaring to his students that the war was against Napoleon, and calling upon them to follow him to the place of enlistment. The tide of popular feeling had risen so high that some feared for the throne of Frederick William if he delayed much longer to give the signal for the national war.

The Prussian declaration of war was followed by the organization of a Landwehr on the principle of universal service. The regular troops had already been reinforced by the addition of the short term men, or *Krümper*, who had been trained for this emergency. The brunt of the fighting in the spring campaign fell upon the regulars, but later in the year the Landwehr fought

so gallantly as to win praise from Yorck, who distrusted all improvised soldiers. The military organization was completed by provision for a *Landsturm*,— what the French had called a *levée en masse*. In case of invasion all able-bodied men were to seize the arms nearest at hand— ax, scythe, or pitchfork— and defend their firesides. If the foe continued to advance, they should not hesitate— so the orders ran— to burn their houses, their supplies, and even their standing grain, to destroy the wells and render the country uninhabitable.

As the soldiers assembled in camps, preparing to march against the French, they cheered each other with old German war songs. The uprising also inspired its own poets, especially Ernest Moritz Arndt and Theodor Körner. Arndt had denounced Napoleonic oppression after the downfall of Prussia so violently that he had been obliged to go into exile. In 1812 he had been one of the confidential advisers of Stein. His stirring appeals were already familiar when the war broke out. Körner was a younger man, at the beginning of his career. His father was a Saxon jurist who had been an intimate friend of Schiller. When the call came for volunteers, Körner was connected with the court theater at Vienna. He gave up his position and enlisted in the Lützow Free Corps. His war songs were written on the march and by the bivouac. One of the most famous was finished on the morning of the battle in which he was killed.

No sooner had Frederick William and Alexander reached an agreement about their own relations than they placed the other German princes in the dilemma of taking the popular side or being deposed. Here again the influence of Stein, eager to prepare the way for a reorganization of Germany, was apparent. A central council of administration, of which he was the head, was formed to govern the states of the Rhenish Confederation. The states which joined in the war should be permitted to send delegates, but Hanover— out of deference for England— was exempted from the council's jurisdiction.

In April, Napoleon once more asked the Emperor Francis to become his active ally, offering Silesia as compensation. Metternich treated the proposal as practically terminating the agreements of 1812 and restoring Austria to an independent position. He intimated plainly to Narbonne, the French ambassador, once minister of war under Louis XVI, that Napoleon should abandon his recent annexations in Germany, restore the Illyrian provinces to Austria, and add the grand duchy of Warsaw to Prussia in order to have a strong barrier state between France and Russia. When Narbonne asked him if he awaited a first victory

CHAP.
XXVI
—
1813-14

Stein in
Germany

Napoleon
and Aus-
tria

of the Allies before announcing such terms, he replied: "You are mistaken; be sure that the day after a victory we shall speak in a still more definite tone." Metternich now announced both to the Allies and to Napoleon the mediation of Austria.

The chance that Prussia could withstand the assaults of Napoleon had already been improved by the signature of a subsidy treaty between England and Sweden, providing that the Crown Prince, Bernadotte, should put 30,000 troops into the German campaign. The unfortunate corollary of this agreement, which confirmed the promise of Norway made to Bernadotte by Alexander the year before, was the adherence of Denmark to the cause of Napoleon, weakening the extreme right of the allied line of advance. The appearance of Bernadotte, an ex-marshal of France, was counted upon to suggest to the French that the coalition did not threaten them, but only the personal domination of Napoleon beyond their frontiers.

All through the winter Napoleon had been working with feverish energy to replace the army which had perished in the Moscow campaign. He called into service young men who should not have been summoned for over a year. He also recalled men who belonged to the conscriptions of the past four years, but who had hitherto been excused from service. Besides men, horses had to be provided, and cannon, muskets, and equipment of all kinds had to be bought or manufactured. To obtain money he ordered the sale of the communal lands, and he even proposed to issue bons, or assignats under a new name, in order to secure an immediate supply of cash equal to the value of the land. By such measures Napoleon brought together at the opening of the campaign 226,000 men, a large part of them untrained recruits. The army lacked a strong body of cavalry, a deficiency which Napoleon had occasion to deplore more than once in the coming weeks.

Napoleon left Paris on April 15 and hastened to Mainz to complete the organization of his army. Neither Prussians nor Russians could be ready to cope with him before the end of May, because their new levies and their reserves were not yet at hand. Nevertheless, as he took the field earlier than that, they did not hesitate to attack him at Gross-Görschen near the historic field of Lützen. The result was a defeat for them, but it was not a Jena, for during the night following nine squadrons of horse charged straight into the French camp and nearly captured Napoleon and his staff. Three weeks later, on May 21, at Bautzen, on the border of Silesia, Napoleon was again victorious, but his lack of cavalry deprived him of the

fruits of victory. His troops were in as desperate a situation as those of the defeated Prussians and Russians. Thousands of men had fallen out of the French ranks long before Bautzen was reached. His generals were weary of the struggle and peace sentiment at Paris had grown to ominous proportions. Such considerations led him on June 4 to agree to an armistice which was to last until July 20. He thought that in the interval he could bring back Austria into the position of a beggarly dependent, grateful for the crumbs which might fall from his imperial table. If diplomacy failed, his resources at the close of the armistice would, he believed, be so great that he could crush all three powers.

During the armistice the only chance of peace was through Napoleon's consent to such terms as his changed circumstances demanded. But he felt it impossible to become simply Emperor of the French. As he said afterward to Metternich, "Your sovereigns born upon the throne may allow themselves to be beaten twenty times and still return to their capitals, but I cannot do so, for I am a soldier parvenu. My domination will not survive the day I shall cease to be strong, and, consequently, to be feared." His Grand Empire, unlike the Consulate, rested primarily on force; and if force passed to his enemies, that Empire was doomed, unless both they and he concluded that compromise was better than a desperate and final struggle.

When Russia made overtures to Austria to join the alliance against Napoleon, Metternich submitted a list of concessions which Austria was ready to demand of Napoleon—the dismemberment of the grand duchy of Warsaw, the cession of Danzig to Prussia, the return of Illyria to Austria, and the independence of the Hanseatic cities in northwestern Germany. Two other conditions, the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine and the restoration of Prussia to the position she held in 1806, Austria would urge by every means short of war. Prussia and Russia in a memorandum drawn up on May 16 had gone much further, agreeing upon the separation of Holland from France, the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the throne of Spain, and the freedom of Italy from French influence. Such a policy was dictated by the need of English subsidies, and England was unwilling to accept a peace which should leave either Holland or Spain under the control of Napoleon. Ten days after the beginning of the armistice both Prussia and Russia signed subsidy treaties with England. Alexander promised not to make peace without England's con-

CHAP.
XXVI
1813-14

Negotia-
tions for
Peace

sent. As Prussia had already agreed with Russia not to sign a separate peace, England appeared to have the final word in the negotiations, putting a serious obstacle in the way of Austrian mediation on the basis of the minimum communicated by Metternich.

The Austrian demand would at least serve to place Napoleon in his true light before France and Europe. Metternich in his *Memoirs*, written many years later, put this interpretation upon the policy of Austria. It is summed up in the assurance he is said to have given Alexander, who feared that Napoleon would accept the Austrian terms: "If he declines," said Metternich, "the truce will come to an end, and you will find us among your allies; if he accepts, the negotiations will most certainly show him to be neither wise nor just, and then the result will be the same." But another interpretation is possible. Metternich was still anxious to guard against a dangerous increase of Russian power. His desire to restore Prussia to her former boundaries was prompted by the need of placing a stronger barrier across the line of Russian advance. If a preliminary treaty were made on the basis of the Austrian minimum, it was unlikely that in the negotiations for a general pacification Napoleon alone would be expected to make further concessions. The pledges which the Allies had made to each other did not form a chain strong enough to resist every sort of strain. Moreover, the English ministers were not incapable of accepting less than their ideal of a sound peace. In instructions to Lord Aberdeen, about to start for Vienna, they said that "a general peace, in order to provide adequately for the tranquillity and independence of Europe, ought . . . to confine France at least within the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine. . . . If, however, the Powers most immediately concerned should determine, rather than encounter the risks of a more protracted struggle, to trust for their own security to a more imperfect arrangement, it has never been the policy of the British Government to dictate to other States a perseverance in war, which they did not themselves recognize to be essential to their own as well as to the common safety."¹ It may well be, therefore, that Metternich was honest in his proposals. He of course desired the ruin of a Grand Empire constructed chiefly at the expense of the Hapsburg power. He was ready to take what he could get, but willing also to accept less than the results a fortunate war might bring, because it was not certain that the war would be fortunate. At all events

¹ Quoted by Rose, II, 301, note.

the negotiations would afford time to complete Austria's preparations for war.

The Allies decided to accept Austrian mediation on the express understanding that Austria would declare war upon Napoleon, if at the expiration of the armistice he should not agree to the minimum proposed.² Metternich's next task was to obtain from him an acceptance of Austrian mediation. An interview took place at Dresden. The discussion lasted nine hours, and at times Napoleon became passionate and abusive. He hinted that Metternich had been bribed by British gold and blurted out that his marriage with Marie Louise had been a foolish blunder. When Metternich reminded him that France was as necessary to him as he to France, and asked what he would do when "this army of boys that you levied but yesterday should be swept away," Napoleon, his features distorted with rage, cried out, "You are no soldier, and you do not know what goes on in the mind of a soldier. I was brought up in the field, and a man such as I am does not concern himself much about the lives of a million men." With that he threw his hat on the floor. A year before Metternich might have courteously picked it up, but he merely said, "Why have you chosen to say this to me within these four walls; open the doors, and let your words sound from one end of France to the other. The cause I represent will not lose thereby." Before Metternich left Dresden he procured from Napoleon a formal renunciation of the alliance of 1812, an acceptance of Austria's mediation, and a verbal promise not to denounce the armistice until August 10. Metternich did not state the conditions upon which Austria would insist, leaving this for the congress which it was proposed to open at Prague for the discussion of preliminaries of peace.

At this juncture the successes of Wellington in Spain, ending in the complete overthrow of the French at Vittoria on June 21, made Metternich less anxious for peace, because the chances of a fortunate war were improved. Wellington's campaign in 1813 consisted of a flanking operation starting from the mountainous region of northeastern Portugal and compelling the French to abandon first the line of the Douro and then of the Ebro. King Joseph hastily left Madrid, followed by crowds of French dependents and countless wagons loaded with the spoils of the Spanish occupation. The French army, commanded by Jourdan, halted at Vittoria. Wellington seized the road to San

CHAP.
XXVI

1813-14

Napoleon
and Met-
ternich

Vittoria

² A treaty was signed at Reichenbach on June 27.

CHAP.
XXVI

1813-14

Sebastian, so that when the French finally gave way they had no escape except by a difficult path over the mountains to Pampeluna. The victors captured thousands of wagons full of valuables, besides a treasure chest containing about twenty-five million francs. The result of the battle was the loss of northern Spain, and King Joseph was ordered into retirement. The news of Vittoria reached Napoleon just after he had accepted Austria's mediation. In spite of his efforts the details were soon known in Dresden and were carried to Metternich and to the camp of the Allies.

Congress
of
Prague

The Congress of Prague was simply a blind. Prussia and Russia waited impatiently for its expiration in order that they might claim from Austria the promised assistance. Napoleon at first would send no one to Prague with powers to negotiate, and tried to reach a separate understanding with Alexander. The first week in August was over before he sent for Austria's terms. Metternich, now convinced that war was advisable, forwarded an ultimatum containing not only the four points of his minimum, but also the two others, with the statement that if they were not conceded by midnight of August 10, Austria would join the Allies. Napoleon made no formal reply until the eleventh, but intimated that he would concede the dissolution of the grand duchy of Warsaw, make Danzig a free city, and return Illyria without Trieste to Austria. Promptly at midnight orders were issued to light alarm fires on the Bohemian frontier, and two days later the Emperor Francis declared war.

End of
the Armis-
tice

When the armistice ended both Napoleon and his enemies were far better prepared for a decisive struggle than they had been in the spring. Napoleon was now strong in cavalry and artillery, and his only lack was in officers for the immense army of nearly half a million which he had assembled. His plan was to defend the line of the Elbe until, advancing by the left, his troops could sweep across Prussia and relieve the garrisons on the Oder. Davout was at Hamburg, next to him stood the "Army of Berlin," thrown forward beyond the Elbe, while Ney and Macdonald were in Silesia. The bulk of Napoleon's troops lay between Dresden and Görlitz in Silesia.

The allied army was somewhat larger than that of the French. Its largest division, about 250,000 men, was assembled under command of Prince Schwarzenberg in Bohemia. With this army were the Emperor Francis, the Czar Alexander, King Frederick William, and their military advisers, including General Moreau. Its position menaced Napoleon's communications with France. Another army, of about 100,000, was stationed in

Silesia under Blücher; and a third, of 127,000, under Bernadotte in northern Germany. According to the plan of operations the army against which Napoleon's main army should advance, with him in command, should fall back, while the other two should push forward and attack his marshals. The final struggle should come only after the arrival of the Russian reserves, and the concentration of the three armies, giving the Allies such a superiority as to make the result certain. Napoleon had the advantage of operating on inner lines, but this would be useless if the Allies persistently avoided a decisive battle and allowed him to wear his soldiers out in forced marches from one field to another.

CHAP.
XXVI

1813-14

Plan
of the
Campaign

The plan of the Allies proved successful. They suffered only one defeat—at Dresden, on August 26—and this when they failed to carry out their plan and persisted in attacking the city although they were aware that Napoleon had returned to it. Their defeat, however, was offset by Napoleon's loss of a whole corps, which was sent to pursue them and was surrounded in the mountains and captured. His possession of the inner lines became a positive disadvantage, for it tempted him to lead his troops first in one direction and then in another, vainly seeking an enemy which vanished before him. On one occasion the Imperial Guard had to march forty leagues in forty-eight hours. Napoleon went from Dresden to Silesia so many times that even the peasants began to jeer at him, calling him the Bautzen messenger. Scarcely a month had passed and 40,000 men were in the hospitals. Of the 400,000 he had on August 10 only 250,000 answered at roll call. Partisan bands began to attack his line of communications. His generals were incapable of stemming the tide of defeat, and even he seemed to have lost the power of decision.

Dresden

As September drew to a close, Schwarzenberg, his army strengthened by the Russian reserves, decided to march upon Leipzig, a move which would seriously threaten Napoleon's communications and force him to abandon the line of the Elbe. At the same time Blücher, leaving a few soldiers in front of Bautzen to mask the movement, began a daring flank march across the front of Napoleon's lines toward the Elbe, intending to unite with Bernadotte and advance upon Leipzig from the north. On October 3 he forced the passage of the river near Wittenberg. The news of these movements disconcerted Napoleon. He still hoped that the armies which were converging upon him might be driven to retreat by threatening to cut them off from Berlin or from Bohemia. After several days of hesitation he realized

CHAP.
XXVI

1813-14

Battle of
Leipzig

that the decisive struggle was to take place at Leipzig. Rumors now reached him of the defection of Bavaria, which signed a treaty with Austria on October 8, promising a contingent of 30,000 troops.

The battle of Leipzig was a series of battles which began on October 14 and ended four days later. Napoleon had little chance of victory except through a failure of the Allies to use their forces effectively. They mustered 300,000, while at most he had 200,000, and many of them half starved and exhausted by weeks of marching over muddy roads and rainsoaked fields. On October 16 Blücher's desperate struggle for the village of Möckern, on the northern side of Leipzig, kept Napoleon from concentrating an army large enough to repel the multitudes under Schwarzenberg, who was advancing from the east and south-east. The day was not exactly a defeat, but it rendered defeat inevitable. Napoleon should have retreated at once, but he resolved to tempt fortune again. The battle of the eighteenth was merely a disastrous repetition of the struggle two days before. Bernadotte filled in the gap between Blücher and Schwarzenberg. The Saxon contingent of Napoleon's army went over to the Allies on the open field. When night came on Napoleon ordered the retreat, and the army streamed into Leipzig through three gates, only to be thrown into utter confusion in the effort to pour out through the single western gate and over the Elster bridge. A temporary bridge which had been thrown across the river broke down, followed by a worse misfortune when a corporal of engineers blew up the regular bridge too soon, cutting off the rear guard and thousands of stragglers. The pursuit was not pushed, although a Bavarian force, supported by Austrians, attempted to bar the route at Hanau. When the Rhine was reached, early in November, only 40,000 troops, and about as many stragglers, were all that were left of the half million which France and her dependent States had offered to stay the tottering structure of Napoleon's Grand Empire.

A momentary prospect of peace came in November at Frankfurt, when Metternich sent through Baron Saint Aignan an informal proposal on the basis of the frontiers of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. He did this with the consent of the representatives of Russia and Prussia, and with no protest from Lord Aberdeen, the English representative. Napoleon's only reply was to suggest a place for the congress; he did not mention the basis. Metternich then drew up a manifesto to the French people, suggesting similar terms, and declaring that "the Allied Powers were not at war with France, but with that

Offers of
Peace

haughtily announced preponderance . . . which has too long been exercised without the boundaries of his [Napoleon's] Empire." Metternich's aim was to dissociate Napoleon's cause from the cause of France and so deprive him of the support of public opinion. The day after his conversation with Saint Aignan he wrote to Caulaincourt, one of Napoleon's diplomatic agents, that "France will never sign a more fortunate peace than that which the Powers will make to-day. . . . New successes may extend their views." And he added, "But the Emperor Napoleon will not make peace. There is my profession of faith, and I shall never be happier than if I am wrong." Before the manifesto was issued its terms were changed, because the new successes had come. The Dutch had risen, compelling the French to withdraw hastily, and that stimulated England to insist that France, on the side of Holland and Belgium at least, should return to her "ancient limits." England did not mean to give up the Dutch colonies taken during the war, and wished to offer Holland compensation on the Continent. She also urged the need of establishing a barrier state north of France strong enough to defend itself. Accordingly, when the manifesto was issued (December 1), its terms were ominously ambiguous, only promising to "the French Empire an extent of territory which France never knew under her kings."

The campaign of 1813 not merely destroyed the power of Napoleon beyond the Rhine, it laid the basis for a reorganization of Germany satisfactory to Austria and in direct opposition to the schemes of Stein and other Prussian leaders. In the Treaties of Teplitz, signed on September 9, confirming the earlier treaties upon which the coalition was founded, there was a clause which provided for the "entire and absolute independence" of the states which lay between the reconstituted frontiers of Austria and Prussia. Hardenberg understood these words to mean independence of French control, but Metternich used them in another sense, which he made plain by guaranteeing to Bavaria full sovereignty over all her territories. The same promise was made to other German princes before the close of the year. In consequence, although the Holy Roman Empire could not be restored, even if the Hapsburgs wished it, Austrian ascendancy in Germany was perpetuated for another generation by strengthening the particularism of the minor states, which were naturally opposed to Prussian schemes of unification.

One after another the members of the Confederation of the Rhine made their peace with the Allies. The States which Napoleon had created in Germany promptly collapsed. King Je-

CHAP.
XXVI

1813-14

Conse-
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CHAP.
XXVI
—
1813-14

rome fled from Cassel and the kingdom of Westphalia was dissolved into its original elements. A similar fate overtook the grand duchy of Berg and the grand duchy of Frankfort. Nor were Napoleon's misfortunes limited to Germany and Holland. In Italy the Austrians drove Prince Eugène behind the Adige and recovered control of part of Venetia and Dalmatia. After the battle of Leipzig Murat had hastened back to Naples not merely to save his throne, but to scheme for a union of Italy under his crown. Wellington had captured Pampeluna and San Sebastian and had crossed the frontier into France. The position was not far different from what it had been in the summer of 1799.

As the news reached Paris of all these misfortunes, men asked whether the Emperor was capable of learning the lesson of his failures. They did not long remain in doubt. He seemed to have lost all sense of what was possible and refused to believe that he must now become a mere king. He told his councilors of state bluntly that they talked of peace too much. "Do you wish," said he, "to descend from the rank where I have placed France and become a simple monarchy? This is what will happen if you lose Holland. We need the mouths of the rivers and this northern barrier. . . ." He found the Legislative Body still less eager to renew the adventure. In a report which they adopted by an overwhelming majority late in December they protested against the attempt to hold in subjection peoples who wished to control their own destinies, and declared that the French were ready to sacrifice themselves to preserve their independence and the integrity of their territory, but for no other object. Such bold language enraged Napoleon and he closed the session. At the New Year's reception he told the deputies that they were simple delegates of departments, while he represented the nation, and asserted that they had done the country more harm than the loss of two battles between Paris and the frontier. This outburst alienated public opinion more than the misfortunes of 1812 and 1813.

Desperate expedients were used to raise money and men for a new campaign. Half of the soldiers who had survived the campaign of Leipzig had perished of typhus fever in December and the army numbered only 50,000. The Senate was ready with its votes of more hundreds of thousands to be slain in other futile struggles. It even voted 300,000 taken from the conscriptions of the last twelve years, chiefly men of family. To sacrifice these older conscripts would be to decimate a whole generation. Fortunately not many responded to the summons. By

Opposi-
tion in
France
to War

January only 63,000 had been assembled, and Napoleon never had more than 90,000 men at any time during the campaign. The men he did obtain he could not equip properly, and many of them had to search the battlefields for muskets.

Money was equally hard to get. The real estate tax was increased fifty per cent. and a quarter of all official salaries was withheld. Government bonds sank to fifty francs and a half. Unable to draw sufficient resources from France and without dependent states upon which to levy tribute, Napoleon was forced to use a large part of his hoarded coin, of which he had 30,000,000 francs left.

The Italian situation became more desperate early in January, when Murat signed a treaty of alliance with Austria, attempting to profit as Bernadotte had done in 1812. Napoleon had already tried to make terms with Pope Pius VII, but the Pope insisted upon returning to Rome as a preliminary. Under the circumstances it was doubtful if Prince Eugène could successfully defend northern Italy.

Napoleon did not leave Paris until January 25, when the Allies had already driven his generals back beyond the Moselle and the Meuse. The Prussians had advanced into the region between the upper Marne and the Seine, hoping to draw after them the Austrians in a movement upon Paris. The Austrians had political reasons for not being in haste, especially the knowledge that Alexander cherished the design of placing Bernadotte on the French throne. Metternich preferred to sign a peace with Napoleon rather than to see a protégé of Russia profit by the common sacrifices. The consequence was that the campaign, which opened on January 29 at Brienne, where Napoleon had once been a student, and closed on March 30 at the gates of Paris, was a strange mixture of warfare, diplomacy, and intrigue. The military operations cannot be understood without taking account of the changing attitudes of Alexander and Metternich upon the fundamental issues of the conflict, nor can the course of diplomacy be followed without weighing the influence of successive victories and defeats.

The brief struggle of 1814 has been called the "most glorious of Napoleon's campaigns," because, undaunted by his scanty means, he displayed a resourcefulness, an energy, and a rapidity of action, which more than once intimidated his opponents, although their numbers were vastly superior. But his victories, however brilliant, were worse than useless, for they only postponed the day of ultimate defeat and encouraged him to persist until defeat meant deposition. The incidents of February fur-

CHAP.
XXVI
1813-14

Campaign
of 1814

CHAP.
XXVI

1813-14

nish unmistakable illustrations of this. Early in the month Napoleon gave Caulaincourt, now his minister of foreign affairs, *carte blanche* to sign a treaty of peace with the Allies at a congress at Châtillon which had grown out of the negotiations begun at Frankfurt. This passing mood was the consequence of his defeat at La Rothière, the first real battle of the campaign. When Caulaincourt asked for definite instructions, Napoleon refused them, for he had meanwhile discovered an opportunity to turn the tables on Blücher, who had split up his army and was marching in fancied security on a road running west between the valleys of the Marne and the Seine. On successive days, February 10, 11, 12, and 14, Napoleon attacked the different sections of the Prussian army, broke them up and inflicted losses of 16,000 men. His success so alarmed the Allies that they thought seriously of peace, but he rejected their terms with scorn. He never had another offer.

The Allies
in Paris

Late in March he formed the plan of moving eastward, in order to threaten the communications of the allied armies with Germany, and compel them to retire to the frontier. Their first thought was to unite and crush him, but they learned that Paris was in a desperate situation and that the British had captured Bordeaux. They accordingly decided to march straight upon the capital. After a battle in the northern suburbs on March 30 the Prussians gained the heights of Montmartre, which commanded the city. Napoleon had discovered his blunder a day or two before, and made extraordinary efforts to regain Paris in time. Finally he drove on ahead of his army, but he only succeeded in reaching a point on the Fontainebleau road ten miles south of the city when he heard the news of the surrender. On March 31 Alexander and Frederick William entered Paris in triumph, while Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau.

Restora-
tion of
the Bour-
bons

Alexander was the most influential personage among the Allies, owing this position to the fact that in 1812 he had compassed the overthrow of the Grand Army and in 1813 had delivered Germany. He was not always able to carry through his schemes, but the initiative appeared to be his. When the question of the throne of France was raised, he was not ready to give the Bourbons his support. They had been proclaimed at Bordeaux and at Lyons, and as the Allies marched through the streets of Paris a small group of royalists had raised the cry "Long live the Bourbons!" But it seemed to the Allies doubtful whether the return of that family would offer guarantees of a stable settlement and a permanent peace. The obstinate resistance of Napoleon had, however, convinced them that it was

useless to negotiate with him unless they were ready to resume the struggle after a brief truce. A regency, with the King of Rome as titular ruler, was a possibility. Bernadotte was in Alexander's mind another possibility. It was the arguments of Talleyrand, Napoleon's ex-minister of foreign affairs, which turned the scale in favor of the Bourbons. Europe, he saw, wished assurance that France would not simply wait for strength to resume the ventures of the past twenty years, and that she had renounced the spirit of domination which had carried her armies far from her ancient frontiers. He believed that the presence of Louis XVIII on the throne would furnish this assurance. The Bourbons were associated with the ancient boundaries which Europe wished again to impose upon France. The spirit of revolutionary propaganda which had driven Louis XVI from the throne and had threatened every other monarchy in Europe was naturally abhorred by his brother. Moreover, under the old law of Europe, the right of Louis XVIII to the succession was complete, so that in him the principle of legitimacy would receive embodiment. Talleyrand also believed that the presence of Louis on the throne would guarantee France against schemes of dismemberment, which Prussia, at least, might entertain, remembering the bitter experiences of 1807. Talleyrand assured Alexander that, if the Allies would agree not to negotiate with Napoleon, the constituted authorities would call Louis XVIII to the throne. Accordingly, a few hours later a proclamation of the Allies was read, declaring that they would not treat with Napoleon nor with any of his family.

The way was now open for the restoration of the Bourbons. On April 1 Talleyrand, as vice-grand-elect, called together the Senate, which proceeded to appoint a provisional government of five members, including, besides Talleyrand, the Abbé de Montesquiou, a staunch royalist who had been a distinguished deputy of the Constituent Assembly. On the following day the Senate formally deposed Napoleon and deprived his family of all rights to the throne, prefacing the act by a long list of accusations of tyranny and cruelty, a public confession of their own cowardice in maintaining silence hitherto. The provisional government issued an appeal to the army, declaring that France had broken the yoke under which all had groaned for years, and releasing the soldiers from their oath of obedience to Napoleon.

Napoleon, on his return to Fontainebleau, was advised by his marshals to retreat towards the Loire. The Empress had already taken refuge at Blois. But, although he had scarcely 40,000 men, and desertion was reaching alarming proportions, he

still hoped to defeat the Allies before Paris, believing that the city would rise in his favor and would render the position of the allied army precarious. This plan was rejected by his marshals, who in sheer weariness resolved to abandon the struggle. Yielding to their arguments and appeals, he signed an abdication in favor of his son and the Empress Regent.

Although the marshals did not wish to continue the struggle, they were unwilling to exchange the empire for a monarchy of the Bourbons. This left the situation obscure, notwithstanding the acts of the Senate and of the provisional government. Both Alexander and Napoleon understood this. Napoleon concluded therefore to send Ney, Macdonald, and Caulaincourt to Paris with the message of abdication, expecting either that Alexander would be influenced by the attitude of the army, and would withdraw his support from the project of restoring the Bourbons, or that the marshals, indignant at the turn of affairs, would return to Fontainebleau ready to fight. Meanwhile, Marmont, who had defended Paris against the Allies, and whose troops lay nearest Paris, had been persuaded by the provisional government to render further resistance impossible by marching his division out of Napoleon's reach and within the lines of the allied army. The interview with Alexander lasted far into the night of April 4 and he seemed to waver. Talleyrand reminded him that the provisional government had taken its attitude because of the assurances of the Allies, and that it was impossible to turn back. Early in the morning word was brought that during the night Marmont's troops had marched to Versailles and were within the allied lines. With Alexander this settled the matter; the army was no longer a decisive factor.

The next day, on the basis of a report made by the provisional government, the Senate adopted a constitution, declaring in its second article that "the French people freely calls to the throne of France Louis-Stanislas-Xavier, brother of the late king. . . ." The principle of the Revolution was thus affirmed, as well as Talleyrand's principle of legitimacy. Other articles provided for the machinery of a representative government somewhat more liberal than that which Louis afterward granted, and safeguarded the interests of those who had profited by the Revolution, including the possessors of nationalized lands or Napoleonic titles. After voting themselves into the new Senate, the senators arranged that Louis should be proclaimed king as soon as he accepted the constitution.

Nothing was left for Napoleon but to make his abdication unconditional; although, had his marshals been willing to follow

him, he might have retired to Orleans and attempted to continue the struggle. With this unconditional abdication in his hands, Caulaincourt negotiated a treaty with the Allies on April 11, according to which Napoleon was to retain his title as Emperor and to receive the island of Elba in full sovereignty as a residence, with an income of two million francs charged on the French budget. The princes of his family were also provided for. He left Fontainebleau on April 20, after taking a pathetic leave of the Old Guard, and set out for Elba.

The rapidity with which his star sank until it disappeared below the horizon might well astonish his contemporaries. When his Grand Army crossed the Niemen in June, 1812, his power seemed boundless. Within two years his dominion was limited to Elba, an island nineteen miles long and six miles wide. But his fall was not so sudden as it appeared; its causes were already at work after the seizure of Spain in 1808, if not after the overthrow of Prussia the year before. Whether it was destiny or simply poor statesmanship, he so exaggerated all that was pernicious in the foreign policy of the Convention and the Directory, that the permanence of his rule was impossible.

CHAP.
XXVI

1813-14

Abdica-
tion of
Napoleon

CHAPTER XXVII

THE RESTORATION IN FRANCE AND IN EUROPE

CHAP.
XXVII

1814-15

Return of
the Bour-
bons

WHEN Napoleon took his departure for Elba a two-fold task confronted the statesmen of France and of Europe. In France the problem was to find a working compromise between the principles of the Revolution and the claims of the Old Régime. A whole generation of Frenchmen had grown up in complete ignorance of the Bourbons, and with the majority of the people it was only weariness of the interminable wars that had reconciled them to the return of their ancient kings. In Europe also effort must be made to reconcile the old and the new. It was impossible to undo all that the Revolution and its imperial successor had accomplished, especially because too many countries or reigning families had profited by the changes.

The first of the Bourbon princes to reach Paris was Charles, Count of Artois, who had left the country immediately after the fall of the Bastille and had never returned. When he entered the city on April 12, he was astonished, moved even to tears, by the enthusiasm of his reception, which at the same time puzzled and disconcerted the leaders of the provisional government. He took advantage of it to avoid committing himself in detail upon the senatorial constitution. His popularity was increased by a phrase put into his mouth by Count Beugnot, minister of the interior, one of Napoleon's ablest administrators—"Nothing is changed, except that there is one Frenchman more." The prince was proclaimed by the Senate lieutenant-general of the kingdom and was entrusted with the government. He declared that he had examined the constitution, and that, while his brother had not authorized him to accept it, he pledged his brother to maintain a representative government, with two chambers, to create an independent judiciary, and to guarantee the liberties of the person, of the press, and of public worship. Louis XVIII would, he declared, preserve ranks and pensions, would regard as irrevocable the sales of public lands, and would disquiet none, not even the regicides, on account of their previous political conduct. When the King reached St. Ouen, near Paris, he issued a declaration repeating these promises, but treating the senatorial constitution as hastily drawn and requiring revision,

which he would give with the assistance of a commission of senators and members of the Legislative Body.

CHAP.
XXVII

1814-15

The
Charter

When the constitution, or Constitutional Charter, was proclaimed a month later, it came as a grant from Louis, "by the Grace of God King of France and Navarre," and was dated "in the nineteenth year of our reign." To deprive the concession of representative government of any semblance of recognizing revolutionary principles, precedents were sought in the "Fields of March" and "Fields of May" of Carolingian times or in the assemblies of the third estate during the Middle Ages. Such absurdities were, perhaps, needed to "save the face" of the restored Bourbons, and should not weigh heavily in any judgment passed on the new constitutional régime.

The new régime preserved the essential conquests of the Revolution, with the exception of the democratic republic, which Napoleon had destroyed. The question, who granted the constitution, was not as important as whether it might serve as an instrument of liberal monarchical government. The event proved that it contained such possibilities. The credit for this, of course, is due primarily to Talleyrand and his associates. If the new government be compared with that which had existed in France since 1802, the Restoration, in spite of its reactionary tendencies, appears as a liberal revolution, for the Napoleonic system had degenerated into an unrestricted autocracy, although most of its acts of administration were enlightened. In two or three features the Charter was distinctly reactionary as compared with the senatorial project. It declared that the Roman Catholic religion was the religion of the State, although freedom of worship was guaranteed, and payment of stipends was promised to ministers of other Christian sects. The initiative in legislation was formally reserved to the King, instead of being shared with the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies, which replaced the Senate and the Legislative Body. A heavy property qualification, the payment of a direct tax of 1000 francs, reduced the number of men eligible to the position of deputy to about 5,000, actually excluding the president of the existing Legislative Body. No one could be a member of the electoral colleges for the selection of deputies unless he paid 300 francs in direct taxes. The organization of electoral colleges and the qualifications of voters was left to be determined by law.

The new royal administration was, like the Charter, mainly a continuation. Of the ministers appointed on April 3 by the provisional government Baron Louis remained at the finances,

The New
Officials

Malouet at the marine, and Dupont at the war office. Talleyrand passed from the provisional government to the ministry of foreign affairs and the Abbé de Montesquiou to the ministry of the interior, while Beugnot, temporarily entrusted with this office, became director general of the police. Dupont a little later yielded his place to Marshal Soult, who had commanded in the south against Wellington. Only about two thousand emigrants received appointments in the various administrative services; and only 37 of them to prefectures or sub-prefectures, although Montesquiou appointed 45 prefects and 160 sub-prefects. The new government was lavish with promises, but preferred trained administrators to rancorous and ignorant partisans.

The government was not so successful in dealing with the far more delicate problem of the army. Since 1795 the army had counted for something in politics, and even Napoleon had to reckon with its attitude. The calamities of the last three years had temporarily diminished its influence, but the return of peace brought back about 120,000 veterans, held as prisoners of war or retained as garrisons of German fortresses. They strengthened the Bonapartist feeling of the men who had followed Napoleon in his last campaign and who detested the white flag of Bourbon France. It was said that rather than surrender their imperial tri-color banners they burned the staff and the silk, mingling the ashes with their wine, while they secreted the eagles in their barracks. When the army was put upon a peace footing, its numbers were reduced for reasons of economy to 200,000. One consequence was the retirement of 12,000 officers on half pay, with little chance of being restored again to the active list. As the half pay of a captain was only 73 francs a month and a lieutenant's pay 44, these officers were in actual distress. The soldiers who were discharged were sent home in rags. Unfortunately, also, the government was not consistently economical, for it reconstituted the military household of the old régime at an expense of twenty millions, at the same time affronting by such a step the Imperial Guard and the National Guard of Paris, each of which expected to be entrusted with the defense of the King. Appointments in the army were demanded by emigrant officers, who insisted that in reckoning seniority their years of absence should be counted, with the result that a man who at the time of his emigration was a captain returned to the army as a brigadier-general. From July 1814 to February 1815, 61 generals of division, 150 brigadiers, and 2,000 superior officers, were appointed in this way.

In its management of the finances the new administration

acted honorably toward the creditors of the Empire, ignoring the clamors of many ultras who demanded at least a partial repudiation of imperial debts. The floating debt of 500 or 600 millions was provided for by the issue of notes bearing interest at eight per cent. and redeemable in three years, with the remainder of the national forests and common lands as security. Although the royalists during the final struggle had freely promised the abolition of the obnoxious indirect taxes, or *droits réunis*, the government was obliged to collect them. At first the discontent manifested itself in riotous attacks upon the collectors and not a few were seriously injured. The success with which the administration carried the country through the period of transition caused the government securities to rise to 78.

Still more perplexing was the problem of French industry, which had enjoyed a special form of protection under the Continental System. It was impossible to enforce laws for the exclusion of English and colonial products when all the frontiers were open because of the invasion of the allied armies. The price of sugar in Paris fell to 38 cents a pound, although the tariff was 44 cents. The new administration did not sympathize with the aims of the Continental System and was ready to abandon it in spite of the advantages which many French manufacturers had drawn from it. Ten days after he entered Paris the Count of Artois, on the advice of the Council of State, established moderate rates on coffee, sugar, cocoa, spices, and dye-stuffs, with a simple weighing charge on raw cotton. The manufacturers raised an outcry, because they had paid more for their supplies of cotton and saw themselves confronted by a loss. Indeed, the ministry was more liberal than either the administrative officers, accustomed to the meddlesome practices of the Continental System, or the manufacturers, who did not dare face competition with the English. They did not believe that a moderate tariff on cotton thread and cloth would be a sufficient protection, and demanded the maintenance of the prohibitions characteristic of Revolutionary and Napoleonic legislation. When a new tariff was adopted by the Chambers in December, they obliged the government to yield not only in regard to cotton, but also as to other products, like the manufactures of iron. Something was to be said on the side of manufacturers who because of the wars of the last two decades were almost a generation behind the English manufacturers in methods of production.

An irritating controversy was raised in regard to the lands formerly owned by the Church and the emigrants. In July two lawyers published a memoir arguing that the sales could be

CHAP.

XXVII

1814-15

The
Finances

Industry

Public
Lands

annulled. Although the Count of Artois, speaking for the King, and the King himself, both in the Declaration of St. Ouen and in the Constitutional Charter, had declared the titles inviolable, the holders were alarmed and anxious to obtain a guarantee from the Chamber of Deputies. The method they chose was by petition, alleging the injury caused by the state of uncertainty. The plan was successful, for the chamber adopted an order of the day reaffirming the principle that titles were unassailable. The question was, however, reopened when the King desired to restore certain unsold lands, notably forests, which had once belonged to the nobles. The minister who proposed the measure appeared to argue that the emigrants had pursued the correct line of conduct and to hint that the King wished to restore all their lands. His speech raised a storm of protest. While the matter was before the Chamber of Peers, Marshal Macdonald suggested that the measure be accompanied by a grant of annuities to those whose lands could not be restored, as well as to the nobles of the Empire who had lost their military endowments with the shrinking of the frontiers of France. This would have anticipated the "milliard"¹ of 1825 and would have set the controversy at rest, but many of the nobles wished all or none. Moreover, the State was too poor to indulge in such generosity to the losers in the strife of the last quarter-century. The principal measure was adopted and restored to the nobles about 850,000 acres.

Public opinion was also alarmed by an ordinance of Beugnot, director-general of police, strictly forbidding all save the most necessary labors on Sunday and festal days, and requiring even inns and restaurants to sell nothing during the hours of religious service. It was said that the Bourbon princes wished to introduce the quiet of the English Sabbath. But the change from the habits of the Empire was too brusque, and a milder set of regulations was substituted by law. The reestablishment of the censorship, opposed by a strong minority in the Chamber of Deputies, threatened the newly recovered liberty of the press. The law permitted the director-general of publications, or any prefect, to require the examination of all except books or learned reports, episcopal allocutions, and the like, before they were printed. Journals must receive authorization. Each printer and publisher must also be officially authorized to pursue his calling, and if he violated the laws his permit could be taken away, a punishment tantamount to financial ruin.

¹ Added to the national debt, the interest being credited to those whose lands had been confiscated during the Revolution.

Fewer blunders would have been made, had regular cabinet councils been held. As it was each minister dealt directly with the King, and his colleagues were often not aware of the decisions until the affair was beyond recall. No wonder the government fell into a condition described by a wit of the day as "paternal anarchy."

CHAP.
XXVII
1814-15

The blunders of the government received a dubious coloring from the personal attitude of the princes and the emigrants. The Count of Artois maintained a separate and opposition court, openly deploring the compromises of the Charter and looking forward evidently to a more complete restoration of the old régime. His repeated protests against the existence of the imperial ornaments in the Tuileries finally exasperated his brother, who retorted that unless such talk ceased he would place Napoleon's bust over his mantelpiece. The old nobility had the air of looking upon the imperial dukes and duchesses, counts and countesses, as upstarts. Marie Antoinette's daughter, the Duchess of Angoulême, treated the Princess of Moskowa, wife of Marshal Ney, and daughter of a *femme de chambre* of the Queen who had committed suicide at the news of the Queen's execution, with a little of the condescension natural toward an old servant of the family. The anniversary of the death of Louis XVI was celebrated by transferring the remains of the unfortunate King and Queen to the crypt of the Basilica of St. Denis, the ancient royal burial-place, and the rumor spread that ardent royalists were planning a massacre of ex-Jacobins as a fitting sacrifice to the shades of the murdered monarchs. The plot was the creation of haunted imaginations, but the danger seemed so imminent that no less a personage than Carnot fortified himself in his apartments and watched all night.

Personal
Jealousies

When the King first returned, men like Carnot and Ney had rallied sincerely to the monarchy, and a large minority of thinking people considered the restoration as the most feasible solution of the problem. The task of the Bourbons was to win the masses of the population, or, at least, to refrain from uniting the elements of an opposition and arousing it to action. In this they failed, and as the summer and autumn wore on their friends grew cold, while their enemies increased. The atmosphere became heavy with plots, even before the landing of Napoleon on the southern coast tumbled over the new régime like a house of cards.

In the management of the difficult relations of France with her late enemies the Bourbon government was astonishingly successful. Louis XVIII took a deep interest in these ques-

CHAP.
XXVII

1814-15

Peace
of Paris

tions and rose to the level of the best French tradition. He did not act like a pretender who had stolen in with the baggage of the allied army. He had the advice of Talleyrand, one of the clearest-sighted and most skilful diplomats of the day. The first task was the modest one of transforming the armistice into a peace, which was done on May 30 by the Treaty of Paris. The treaty naturally included statements concerning the future of territories long a part of France but which the King was now obliged to renounce. Secret articles, accordingly, provided that the Belgian lands should be united to Holland and that the rest of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine should be used to compensate Prussia and other German States. Piedmont, Nice, and Savoy, except a small part which France retained, were restored to the King of Sardinia, while his relations with Genoa were left for later settlement. The remainder of northern Italy was assigned to Austria. In the open articles France abandoned to Great Britain St. Lucia, Tobago, and the Île de France. The French frontier receded to its position on January 1, 1792, with slight rectifications which added a few square miles to the country. Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, annexed in 1791, also remained a part of France. All other questions were referred to a Congress which was to meet at Vienna. Meanwhile, it was expected that the great Powers, which had conducted the war against France, would come to an understanding about the disposition of Saxony and Poland, the most difficult question of all.

Congress
of Vienna

The Congress did not open until September, if, strictly speaking, it may be said to have opened at all. The diplomats of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, formed a plan according to which they should agree upon the solution of problems, should communicate their decision to France and Spain, the other two principal Powers, for comment, should receive the acceptance of these Powers, which could not well be refused, and should then promulgate the decisions as final. Talleyrand did not relish the part of representative of the victim, and, with the King, chose a line of conduct which utilized the inevitable renunciations of France as a means of securing a position of strength and influence. If these renunciations were sincere, the elaborate precautions against danger from France were unnecessary and the only effective bond of union between the Powers was dissolved. The lesser Powers would also discover in France their sole disinterested supporter. Even the greater Powers, now that France was necessarily disinterested, might conclude that her advice and help were worth accepting in the scramble

for territorial advantage. Moreover, a France which had renounced conquest could with plausibility champion the cause of legal claims against a too brutal assertion of the rights of the victor. The presence of Louis XVIII on the throne was an assurance that this policy was genuine and not merely the maneuver of a Machiavellian diplomat.

CHAP.
XXVII
1814-15

When the plan of the four Powers was explained to Talleyrand on September 30 at a conference, he objected to their designation of themselves as "Allies," as if the war had not ceased, and declared that, as the Congress was summoned by eight Powers, four could not undertake its management unless the Congress in general session delegated to them such a representative capacity. Spain, and finally Portugal and Sweden, came to his assistance, and, after three stormy conferences, the control of the proceedings passed into the hands of a committee representing the eight Powers. Talleyrand was content, however, if only five of the eight, the original four and France, made the important decisions. No full session of the Congress was held, and the work was done by committees, was approved by the eight Powers, and was incorporated, on June 9, 1815, in a Final Act, in which all concerned were invited to concur. This method of transacting business did not prevent Vienna from being the scene of brilliant assemblages. All had hastened thither who hoped to gain or who feared to lose. It is said that the entertainment of the guests cost the impoverished Austrian treasury thirty million florins.

The Final
Act

The important questions concerning Saxony and Poland could not be settled without taking account of the agreements of 1813 at Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Teplitz.² None of these had stated specifically what should be done with the grand duchy of Warsaw, beyond the agreement that it should cease to exist as such. Prussia was willing to give up nearly all she had possessed by virtue of the second and third partitions of Poland, if she might receive Saxony as compensation. According to the understanding which both Russia and Prussia had reached in 1813, the King of Saxony, who was a prisoner in Berlin, had forfeited his rights. Both England and Austria feared the consequences of such wholesale aggrandizement of Russia as the plan implied, and Austria did not wish to see Prussian territory in central Germany enlarged, especially on the Bohemian frontier. In order to develop the possibilities of discord by means of this question, Talleyrand proposed the reconstitution of the

Saxony
and
Poland

² See pp. 430, 435, 439.

kingdom of Poland, and Lord Castlereagh, the English representative at the Congress, supported the proposal. Even Prussia was reluctant to satisfy the Czar's extreme desires, and could be counted upon to oppose them, if the other Powers would yield on the question of Saxony. Against this, however, Talleyrand invoked the ancient rights of the minor princes and succeeded in uniting all their representatives in a formal protest. Finally both Metternich and Castlereagh were ready to oppose a veto to the Prussian and Russian solution of the problem, if they were assured of French military support. Talleyrand was authorized to pledge it, and the result was a secret triple alliance, negotiated in January, 1815. For a few days a renewal of the war, with the rôles changed, seemed imminent, but every one realized that it would be an act of folly and would bring Napoleon on the scene at once. Moreover, the suggestion had been made to the King of Prussia and the Czar, that, if the King of Saxony were restored, he might be required to cede a portion of his territories to Prussia, and that Russia might add enough of the grand duchy of Warsaw to connect Silesia and Prussia proper. Alexander's scheme of transforming the grand duchy into a kingdom, separate from Russia, and enlarged, perhaps, at Russia's expense, was also unpalatable to native Russians. The consequence was that the controversy did not come to an open breach and that by February it was considered settled on the basis of the annexation by Prussia of Posen, with the fortress of Thorn, and of Austria's recovery of eastern Galicia, ceded in 1809. The remainder of the grand duchy was transformed into a kingdom of which Alexander should be king.

This settlement implied that Prussia was to find further compensation elsewhere, and the restored King of Saxony was required to cede two-fifths of his kingdom, including Torgau and Wittenberg. By a complicated plan of exchanges Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rügen also came into Prussia's hands. Danzig was restored. The Westphalian lands were also restored, increased by other Westphalian territory, together with Berg. West of the Rhine she gained, besides other lands, nearly all those which had belonged to the electorates of Cologne and Treves before the French conquest. On the whole, her gains were not so valuable in extent of territory as in the exchange of former Polish subjects, who were difficult to assimilate, for Germans of the center and west. Her acquisitions on the Rhine made her the natural defender of Germany against French aggression, a place Austria had long occupied. The scattered situation of Prussia's territories seemed a disadvantage, but it

served to stimulate the energies of her administrators and to quicken the appetite of her rulers for annexations.

CHAP.
XXVII

1814-15

Before the Congress of Vienna met it was agreed that Germany should become a confederation of independent States. Leaders like Stein hoped to use the national movement to unite all Germans in a strong empire, but Metternich saw that such a plan would foster the ambitions of the Hohenzollerns, rather than restore the lost authority of the Hapsburgs, and he defeated it by championing the rights of the minor princes. Among the States which Napoleon had destroyed and which were now reconstituted were Hesse-Cassel and Hanover,—Hanover as a kingdom, with George III of Great Britain as titular monarch. A committee representing the principal German States worked many months on a scheme of federation and agreed only on a makeshift constitution, which gave predominant power to no State and to Austria merely an honorary presidency. The Confederation included thirty-eight States, among them three kingdoms of Napoleonic “promotion”—Württemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony. Hanover owed its royal standing to the fact of these promotions. The kingdom of the Netherlands, which included both Dutch and Austrian Netherlands, was the successor of the kingdom of Holland, another Napoleonic creation.

Germany

The House of Hapsburg did not attempt to recover its former possessions in southern Germany, but on its immediate western frontier it regained a large part of Salzburg, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg. Its greatest gains were in Italy, and were both direct and indirect, including Lombardy and Venetia, which were officially proclaimed the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom—a concession to the idea of nationality. Members of the Hapsburg House ruled in the grand duchy of Tuscany and the duchy of Modena, while the Emperor's daughter, Marie Louise, ex-Empress of the French, received the duchy of Parma. The return of the Pope to his territories was also favorable to the influence of Austria.

Austria

Italy now looked geographically much as it did before Napoleon's first great campaign, except that Venice and Genoa had disappeared. All that was left of his work was the rule of King Joachim Murat and Queen Caroline Bonaparte in Naples, but that was doomed. A glance at boundary lines, therefore, might seem to justify the conclusion that French influence had been like a tidal wave, which seems to sweep away old landmarks, but which when it recedes leaves the countryside quite as before save for the scattered ruins. The history of the later decades of the nineteenth century proves this to be more an appearance than a reality.

Italy

CHAP.
XXVII

1814-15

Sweden
and Den-
mark

The greatest changes in northern Europe, aside from the creation of a new kingdom of Poland and a kingdom of the Netherlands, were in the position of Sweden and Denmark. Sweden had lost Finland as a result of the Tilsit agreements, and now received as compensation Norway, which was taken from Denmark, a State which had remained friendly to Napoleon too long. Sweden offered Swedish Pomerania as partial compensation, but Prussia finally received it, and Denmark was given the duchy of Lauenburg and an indemnity in money. In this way Sweden's connection with the affairs of Germany, begun by the great Gustavus, came to an end.

Great
Britain

Great Britain's gains were all in the colonies. One reason why the English desired to compensate the Dutch by a cession of Belgian lands was to reconcile them to the loss of the Cape, Ceylon, Demerara, and Essequibo, which, with the acquisitions from France and the island of Malta, strengthened the British colonial empire. The immense progress which the English had made toward a control of the world's carrying trade was not bargained for in any treaty nor laid down on any map, and yet it was more important than any territorial cession.

The Slave
Trade

Before the Congress was dissolved the Powers took steps towards the abolition of the African slave trade, one of the deepest blots on Christian civilization. Great Britain and the United States had already prohibited it, and now the representatives of Great Britain urged action by the Congress. The Powers, with the exception of Spain and Portugal, were willing, and on February 8 the declaration was issued, but without setting a definite time at which any Power should make the prohibition effective. As long as the war had continued England had been mistress of the seas and could check the trade almost wholly; but with the return of peace wider action was necessary.

Napo-
leon's
Escape
from Elba


The work of the Congress was still unfinished when news reached Vienna that Napoleon had escaped from Elba and had landed on the southern coast of France. A declaration was issued at once in the name of the eight Powers that he was an enemy to the peace of Europe and as such should be delivered over to public justice. The phrase appears to mean that he was "abandoned to public vengeance," as if he were in the most literal sense an outlaw, whom any one might slay with impunity. The representatives of the four great Powers did not content themselves with phrases, but signed a treaty pledging each to place in the field at once an army of 150,000 men, and Great Britain in addition promised a subsidy of five million pounds towards the expenses of mobilization.


CENTRAL EUROPE

after 1815

English Miles
100 60 0 100

NORTH SEA





Napoleon had been influenced by several considerations in forming his desperate resolve. He had been informed that the Allies were on the verge of war over the Saxony-Poland question, and he also knew of widespread dissatisfaction in France with the Bourbon régime. Rumors had also reached him of a plan, urged upon the Powers, of removing him to the Azores. Later still, hearing that a plot, formed by Fouché for the overthrow of the Bourbons, was ripe, he felt he must act at once, if he was to be the beneficiary of the discontent. Petty reasons also influenced Napoleon's action. The small stock of money which he had brought with him for the support of his establishment and of his little garrison of a thousand men was becoming depleted. The Bourbons had not paid a franc of the annual allowance agreed upon at Fontainebleau. If he were to retain his guards or to possess the money necessary to make one more stake in the great game, he could not afford to wait. In one respect he miscalculated. He heard that by the last of February the Congress would be ended and that the Princes would have set out for their capitals, so that he might count upon delay and uncertain or divided counsels. But his act found them still at Vienna.

Napoleon embarked his followers, of whom 400 were members of his famous Imperial Guard, on February 26, and four days later reached the Golfe de Jouan. He knew that the peasants of Dauphiné hated the Bourbon régime, fearing that the lands which they had purchased would be restored to the emigrants and the Church. Anxious, therefore, to reach Grenoble, but afraid to pass through Provence, where the year before he had barely escaped assassination, he hurried his little army across difficult Alpine paths. Only once was he in serious danger. A battalion was sent out from Grenoble to dispute the approach to the town, and, as the soldiers had given no sign of mutiny, the leaders hoped that they would obey an order to fire. But the sight of Napoleon was too much for such formal loyalty, and with a cry of "Long live the Emperor" they rushed forward, prostrated themselves before him, and touched his clothing, as if to assure themselves that it was in reality he and not a phantom. From Grenoble the imperial eagles "flew to Paris." Generals who were unwilling to share in the adventure had to ride away to save their lives. Ney had promised Louis XVIII that he would bring Napoleon back in an iron cage, but he saw his regiments deserting him, his own life in danger, and, remembering the bitterness of his grievances against the Bourbon Court, went over to Napoleon.

CHAP.
XXVII

1814-15

At the first news of Napoleon's landing the King and his advisers did not think the monarchy in serious danger, but as message after message brought tidings of his astonishing progress Louis XVIII saw that a second exile was inevitable. The peasants and the soldiers were almost everywhere enthusiastic Bonapartists. The middle classes did not share this feeling, because they feared that the return of Napoleon meant a renewal of the war, but they were indifferent to the Bourbon cause, and, moreover, possessed no means of resisting had they been inclined to do so. On the twentieth of March Napoleon was at Fontainebleau without having fired a shot or shed a drop of blood. The evening before towards midnight the royal carriages had drawn up in the courtyard of the Tuileries and Louis XVIII was driven north towards Lille. Some of his advisers urged him to hold that town or Dunkirk, but he was convinced that he was safer across the frontier at Ghent, under the protection of the troops of the Allies.

The transition from the royal to the new imperial government was made without serious difficulty. After a few hours at Fontainebleau Napoleon rode on to Paris. On the night of his arrival several of his former ministers appeared at the Tuileries and resumed their portfolios. Carnot was induced to become Minister of the Interior on the ground that it was a question of defending the country against the foreigner, a service which under altered circumstances he had rendered in 1793 and 1794. Davout became Minister of War and Caulaincourt again assumed the rôle of negotiator of impossible treaties of peace. About a fourth of the prefects were retained. So far as internal administration was concerned the chief trouble was with the mayors, a large number of whom were staunch loyalists. Armed resistance was brief. In the south it centered at Bordeaux, Toulouse, and Nîmes. By April 8, with the capitulation of the Duke d'Angoulême at La Palud, it was over. In May civil war flamed up again in La Vendée, but the death of La Rochejaquelein early in June discouraged resistance.

In one respect Napoleon found the situation completely changed. His appeals to liberal and revolutionary sentiment, in the proclamations issued on the way to Paris, had been taken seriously by those who had welcomed his return. They expected the end of arbitrary government and the introduction of a régime more liberal than that under the Bourbon Restoration. Forced by this sentiment, he caused a constitution to be drawn up, which was the Charter liberalized, and which he published in the *Moniteur* of April 22 under the designation of *Acte Additionnel*, or

supplement to the constitutions of the Empire. In reality only 23 articles of minor importance reproduced any provisions of former imperial constitutions. The Additional Act was to be submitted to the people for approval; but, before they had more than begun voting, public opinion compelled Napoleon to order an election of deputies to the "Chamber of Representatives." When the votes were counted, it was found that only a million and a half thought it worth while to record their votes. The acceptance of the Constitution was proclaimed at a great assembly, called the *Champ de Mai*, held June 1, and immediately afterwards the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Representatives were organized. It turned out that only eighty deputies were thorough-going Bonapartists, while 500 were liberals. Instead of complimenting Napoleon by choosing his brother Lucien for president, the chamber chose the former Girondin Lanjuinais, an uncompromising constitutional liberal. Napoleon was deeply annoyed by the turn of affairs. The discouragements of the situation are said to have had the more fatal effect of destroying his confidence and his power of initiative. After all, the issues of the day would be settled not in debate but on the battlefield, and on June 12 Napoleon set out for the Belgian frontier.

CHAP.
XXVII
—
1814-15

Napoleon had counted upon the help of Murat, with whom he had been negotiating before he left Elba. Murat believed that northern Italy was already seething with discontent over the reactionary measures which princes under Austrian control had introduced, and he thought the occasion ripe for an attempt to unite all Italy under his scepter. In the middle of March he left Naples and moved rapidly northward as far as the Po. His suspicious conduct had led the Austrians to mobilize their army in January, so that they were not taken by surprise. After one or two slight successes he was decisively defeated, and hurried back to Naples. In a few days he realized the hopelessness of his position and fled to France in disguise, once more offering his services to Napoleon. They were refused on the ground that he had spoiled the plan of pacifying the Allies. A few months later he made an attempt to recover his kingdom, but was captured and shot.

Murat

If the task of preparing for the campaign of 1814 was perplexing, the military problem of 1815 might seem insoluble. In one particular the conditions had changed for the better. Peace had brought back to France the prisoners of the recent wars and the garrisons beleaguered in German fortresses. The number of these soldiers, upon a conservative estimate, was 120,000.

The Army
in 1815

CHAP.
XXVII
1814-15

But many of them were weary of war and did not rejoin the colors, so that by June 1 only about 52,000 had reported for duty. The Army of the Restoration on a peace footing numbered 200,000, and this was increased by the time the campaign opened to 284,000. More than half the number were, however, needed to guard the frontier and to watch royalist districts. The quality of the troops was superior to that of any army Napoleon had commanded since Friedland. Wholly composed of Frenchmen, it possessed a spirit and unity which the armies in the days of the Grand Empire had lacked. The men burned to avenge the recent defeats and the officers were spurred on by rage against the supporters of the Bourbon régime. This was not true of the general officers, who realized that they were in a serious predicament, since they had broken their oaths to the King.

The army lacked lieutenants to coöperate with their great captain. Of the famous marshals only Soult, Ney, and Davout were available. To Soult was assigned Berthier's position of chief of staff, an office he had never filled, although he had distinguished himself as commander of an army in the Spanish campaign. Davout was left in command of Paris, while Ney was summoned for service only at the last moment. With him was associated Marshal Grouchy, a brilliant cavalry general, but without experience in independent command, a lack which was to have a disastrous influence on the outcome of the campaign.

War was inevitable, although Napoleon endeavored to gain time by sending messages to the Allied Powers explaining that he accepted the settlement made by the Treaty of Paris. His agents were turned back at the frontiers and France was cut off from the outer world as if she were in quarantine. It was simply a question of time when the armies of the four Allies would pass the frontiers and crush resistance under the weight of numbers. Already a Prussian army of 117,000 under Blücher and a British army of 85,000 under Wellington were assembling on the Belgian frontier. Of the two Wellington's force was less formidable, for it was partly made up of Dutch, Belgians, and Germans who till recently had been subjects of Napoleon. If these armies could be attacked before their concentration was completed, they might be driven back on diverging lines of communication, the Prussians toward the Rhine and the British toward the Channel. Napoleon might then face the larger masses of the Russian and Austrian armies, which were expected on the frontier by the end of June.

The first movements of the campaign promised Napoleon one

of his most brilliant successes. Early on the morning of June 15 he was ready to advance toward the roads which united the Prussian and British armies before they had an inkling of his absence from Paris. By night he had crossed the Belgian frontier, had driven back the outlying Prussian troops, and for the time being at least had rendered impossible any effective coöperation between the two armies. Indeed, it was not until the night was more than half gone that Wellington, at his headquarters in Brussels, received any clear information upon what was going on at the frontier, thirty miles away.

Napoleon had now gained an opportunity to fight a separate battle with the Prussians and he did not believe that the British could assemble a formidable force on his left at Quatre Bras. He directed Ney, therefore, to occupy Quatre Bras on the 16th, and then to sweep around the right of the Prussian army, while he attacked it in front. In this case the victory would be crushing and only the British would remain to be dealt with. He did defeat the Prussians at Ligny, but Ney did not succeed in making the expected flank movement, for by great exertions Wellington hurried up division after division to Quatre Bras until he had troops enough to drive Ney from the field.

The courageous decision of the defeated Prussians to retreat northward, toward Wavre, so that they might keep in touch with Wellington, deprived Napoleon of the fruits of his victory at Ligny. On the morning of June 17 he let slip a chance to crush the British, whose news gatherers did not report the defeat of Blücher until after ten o'clock, and who were waiting at Quatre Bras, within striking distance of Napoleon's main army. A still more serious blunder was his order for the pursuit of the Prussians which was based on the supposition that they had fled eastward. This order was given to Grouchy, who was not a Desaix. The consequence was that by the next day, when the Prussians were already on the march from Wavre to unite with Wellington, Grouchy with 30,000 men was hopelessly distant from the battlefield.

On the evening of June 17 Napoleon had pursued Wellington as far as a ridge two or three miles south of the village of Waterloo. Here the British showed signs of fight, and as Napoleon's army was in no condition for a decisive attack he remained on a parallel ridge less than a mile away. It had been raining hard all the afternoon and the rain continued far into the night, rendering an early morning attack difficult on account of the character of the ground. Napoleon's chief anxiety was lest the British should steal off again; but there was no danger of this,

CHAP.
XXVII

1814-15

Opening
of the
Campaign

Waterloo

for Blücher had promised Wellington the support of two corps, and of the rest of the Prussian army as soon as possible.

In the battle of Waterloo, which took place on the following day, June 18, Napoleon had the advantage of numbers, but Wellington the advantage of position. Wellington's position was strengthened by two groups of farm buildings, which he had hastily fortified, Hougomont in front of his right, and La Haye Sainte in front of the center. He could also move troops behind the ridge from one part of his line to another without exposing them to French artillery fire. Napoleon opened the battle a few minutes before noon by a sharp but futile attack on Hougomont, planning to make his principal effort an hour or two later against the British left. About one o'clock a strange body of soldiers was descried on the hillsides toward the northeast. Although he soon learned that these soldiers were Prussians, Napoleon did not lose his sense of security and set in motion his heavy assaulting columns. The first line of Wellington's troops was made up of Dutch and Belgians, who had already suffered from the fire of the French batteries. They fled as the French columns approached. The "thin red line" of the British regiments behind seemed too light to offer a stubborn resistance. Suddenly across the ridge rode two brigades of British cavalry. They plunged deep into the French columns, scattering them in utter confusion. Napoleon's attention was soon demanded by the advance of the Prussians against his right and Ney took charge of the struggle with Wellington. Ney ordered 5,000 French horsemen to break through the British lines along the ridge west of La Haye Sainte. At one time the horsemen engaged in the attack numbered 10,000, but the British infantry, formed in squares, checker-board fashion, held firm, though torn by artillery fire. The conflict went on until six o'clock, when the cavalry was completely exhausted. By this time the French had captured La Haye Sainte, and their infantry and artillery enfiladed a part of the British line, so that Wellington had difficulty in filling the gaps. The situation of the British would have been precarious had Napoleon not been obliged to use so many troops in checking the Prussians who seriously threatened the rear of his army. About seven o'clock he resolved to make a last effort to break the British line. He formed nine battalions of the Imperial Guard into a column and sent it against the right center. Unfortunately for him it moved too far toward the British right and came into conflict with troops relatively fresh. Decimated by volleys in front and on the flank and charged with the bayonet, part of the battalions broke and others

began sullenly to retire. Just then another Prussian corps fell on the French right, while the first was fighting its way steadily nearer Napoleon's only possible line of retreat. The pressure upon his exhausted troops became unendurable and the army was thrown into a panic. Wellington now ordered a general advance and the French soldiers soon became a mass of terror-stricken fugitives hurrying down the road or through the fields toward Quatre Bras and the French frontier.

For Napoleon the consequences of Waterloo were somber. In order to forestall attempts to depose him, he hurried back to Paris, reaching the city the third morning after the battle. His only chance of remaining in power was to seize the dictatorship; but he hesitated. A few hours passed, and the opportunity was gone. The deputies and the peers declared themselves in permanent session and voted to punish any attempt to interfere with them as treason. On the next day, bowing to the inevitable, Napoleon abdicated in favor of his son. He lingered in Paris and at Malmaison until June 29, when the provisional government informed him that they could no longer assure his safety. The Prussians were rapidly advancing and Blücher had ordered that he be taken dead or alive. To escape this danger he rode toward the coast, hoping to find passage to America. On July 10 as it was impossible to elude the British fleet which was watching the coast he applied for refuge to the captain of the *Bellerophon*, one of the British ships. A few weeks later the Allied Powers decided to regard him as a prisoner and assigned to the British the ungrateful task of acting as his jailers. In October he was landed at St. Helena, and that distant and lonely island remained his dwelling place until his death, on May 5, 1821.

The companions of his adventure also suffered. In the South the hatred of the royalists for them found a vent in the White Terror, with wild mobs and wholesale murders, in the course of which Brune, one of the most distinguished generals of the Revolution and a marshal of the Empire, was assassinated. Nor was the punishment of the men who had cast in their lot with Napoleon left wholly to mobs. The most distinguished victim was Marshal Ney, who was tried for treason before the Chamber of Peers, condemned, and shot. The opportunity was also taken to single out for vengeance the ex-members of the Convention who had voted for the death of Louis XVI and who had adhered to Napoleon in 1815. These men were sent into an exile from which many did not live to return.

For France the consequences were not as serious as might have been feared. Although the Prussians were eager to dis-

CHAP.
XXVII
1814-15

Napo-
leon's
Second
Abdica-
tion

Conse-
quences
of the
Hundred
Days

CHAP.
XXVII

1814-15

member the country, urging the seizure of Alsace and other territory on the frontier, Great Britain and Russia were opposed to any except minor changes in the arrangements of the preceding year. The provisional government at Paris saw in the immediate presence of Louis XVIII a guarantee against dismemberment, and Wellington advised him to reënter the country at once. The leaders of the government recognized his authority at the same time that they arranged the capitulation of Paris. On July 8 the King was in the Tuileries again. As it turned out, all that France lost was a few fortresses and some square miles of territory. She was also required to pay an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs within five years. Meanwhile the north-eastern departments should be occupied by 150,000 allied troops at French expense. The ambassadors of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria received the right to tender their joint advice to the government even upon matters of internal politics. These provisions were embodied in the second Treaty of Paris, of November 20, 1815. The four Powers on the same day agreed to meet from time to time to concert measures for the preservation of the peace of Europe. The experiences of the last two decades made the idea of new revolutions no mere specter of reactionary minds.

The French government of the second Restoration was moved by the same spirit that directed the leaders of the first. Louis XVIII was not inclined to listen to the doctrine of vengeance and tried to profit by the lessons of the Hundred Days. Wellington used the great authority which the victory of Waterloo gave him to counsel moderation. In consequence the first ministry was led by Talleyrand and included Fouché. The elections for the choice of new deputies, however, resulted in a decided victory for the ultras and the chamber was "more royalist than the King." Talleyrand's successor was the Duke de Richelieu, a returned emigrant, who nevertheless persisted in the policy of moderation. In this fashion France after many vicissitudes seemed on the road towards orderly representative government, although with an electorate which numbered scarcely 100,000.

After the coup d'état of 1799 Napoleon had declared, "The Revolution is finished." He meant that its agitations were over and that it was time to enjoy its benefits in peace. The statesmen of the victorious Allies of 1815 thought that they had ended the Revolutionary movement, but in another sense. They were mistaken. They had simply rendered it a service in dissociating it from the ambitions of one man. In the long era of peace which they secured men had time to forget that foreign domina-

tion and military despotism had been the counterpart of reform. The ideal of civil equality and social justice, which the deputies of 1789 had cherished, could now make its appeal with renewed force. The proof of its vitality is recorded in hundreds of great acts of legislation in the later years of the nineteenth century.

CHAP.
XXVII
1814-15

THE END

NOTES ON BOOKS

NOTES ON BOOKS¹

It is proposed to give here some indications of the nature of the printed material available for the study of the subjects treated in the preceding chapters. No attempt will be made to offer a systematic bibliography of the period. How great such a task would be may be inferred from the statement of F. M. Kircheisen in 1908 that in preparing his *Bibliographie du Temps de Napoléon* he had already collected 70,000 titles of books and articles upon the period from 1795 to 1815 alone.

There is as yet no satisfactory bibliography of the French Revolution. P. Caron in his *Manuel pratique de la Révolution française* (1912) gives lists of the collections undertaken by government commissions, historical societies, and individuals. Indications for this, as well as for later periods of modern French history may be found in Caron's *Bibliographie des Travaux publiés de 1866 à 1897 sur l'Histoire de la France depuis 1789* and in its continuation by Brière and Caron, *Répertoire méthodique de l'Histoire moderne et contemporaine de la France*, for the years 1898 following, complete to 1903; additions for 1910 f. printed as supplements of the *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*. The Kircheisen *Bibliographie* of the Napoleonic period was planned to include several volumes, but only two have appeared. Useful, but not annotated, lists are given in volumes VII (1909), VIII (1904), IX (1906) of the *Cambridge Modern History* and in the corresponding volumes of Lavissee et Rambaud, *Histoire Générale*, VII (1896), VIII (1896), IX (1897). For many of the topics belonging to the period from 1763 to 1789 the best suggestions will be found in volumes VIII (2) and IX (1) of Lavissee, *Histoire de France* (1909, 1910). The biographies of Napoleon, especially the German and English editions of Fournier, contain extensive notes upon the bibliography of his career. The material upon certain phases of the period have been discussed in critical articles, of which the following are notable examples: Letacounoux, La question des Subsistances et du Commerce des grains en France au XVIII^e siècle (*Revue d'Histoire Moderne*, VIII, 409-445); Lévy, Histoire intérieure du Premier Empire (*Revue des Études Napoléoniennes*, I, 116-148); Driault, Histoire extérieure du Premier Empire (*Ibid.*, II, 429-453); Dunan, Le Système continental, Bulletin de l'Histoire économique (*Ibid.*, III, 115-146); and Lingelbach, Historical Investigation and the Commercial History of the

¹ It is impossible to refer to the many valuable articles in historical reviews, etc.

Napoleonic Era (*American Historical Review*, XIX, 257-81). More complete information should be sought in bibliographies of the several countries in question; for example, for Germany in Dahlmann-Waitz, *Quellenkunde zur Deutsche Geschichte*. For lists of bibliographies, see Langlois, *Manuel de Bibliographie historique* (1901). Current bibliographical information is given in the numerous reviews for the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period or in the general historical reviews. Of the former may be mentioned: *La Révolution française*, *Annales révolutionnaires*, and *Revue des Études Napoléoniennes*.

A few books may be mentioned which cover the period as a whole, or the larger part of it. A brief treatment, mainly political, is given by Wahl, *Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems im Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution und der Freiheitskriege* (1912). Besides the well known Oncken, *Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreichs und der Befreiungskriege*, 2 vols. (1884, 1889); the volumes of the *Cambridge Modern History* and of the *Histoire Générale* of Lavissee et Rambaud, there is Lindner, *Weltgeschichte*, VII (1910). A work of capital importance, especially for diplomatic history, is Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, 8 vols. (1885-1904). An older but still useful work is H. von Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit von 1789-1800* (4th ed. 1882, vols. I-III translated).

On the several countries, see, for England: Lecky, *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, 8 vols., 1878; *Political History of England, 1760-1801*, by William Hunt (1905); *Political History of England, 1801-1837*, by G. E. Brodrick and J. K. Fotheringham; H. D. Traill, *Social England*, vol. V (1904); for Germany: Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, vols. VIII, IX (1906, 1907); Häusser, *Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zur Gründung des Deutschen Bundes*, 4 vols. (4th ed. 1869); more briefly in Atkinson, *Germany from 1715 to 1815* (1908) or Henderson, *Short History of the German People*, vol. II (1906); for the Netherlands, Blok, *History of the People of the Netherlands*, vol. V (1912); for Russia, Bain's *Slavonic Europe* (Cambridge Historical Series, 1912), or Rambaud, *History of Russia*, vol. II (1878); for Spain, Hume, *Spain, 1479-1788*, and *Modern Spain, 1788-1898* (1906), or at length, Baumgarten, *Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der französischen Revolution* (1861); for Italy, Orsi, *L'Italia Moderna* (1901).

Chapter I. On the conditions in France prior to the Revolution, Taine's *Ancient Régime* (1875) and Tocqueville's *Old Régime and the Revolution* (1856) may still be read with advantage. For a criticism of Taine's historical method, see Aulard's *Taine* (1907). The manner in which Taine subjects a great social structure to analysis is suggestive. Lowell's *Eve of the French Revolution* (1892) presents in a clear and interesting way the various features of the old régime in France. Another excellent, though brief, account will be found in Perkins, *Louis XV*, vol. II.

In French the best account is presented in volume VIII (2) and IX (1) of Lavissee, *Histoire de France*. Another notable account is given in Stryienski, *Le XVIII^e siècle* (1909). A. Wahl, *Vorgeschichte der Französischen Revolution*, 2 vols. (1905) is a fresh and critical treatment of the subject. Much has recently been written on the condition of the peasants in France. The most authoritative statement upon peasant ownership of land is in Loutchisky's *L'état des classes agricoles en France à la veille de la Révolution* (1911). See also his earlier work, *La propriété paysanne en France à la veille de la Révolution*, first translated from Russian in 1912. Another, somewhat antagonistic view is given by Kovalewsky in his *La France économique et sociale à la veille de la Révolution*, 2 vols. (1909 f.). Several of the works which deal with the sale of ecclesiastical lands during the Revolution also discuss peasant ownership in the preceding period; see especially Marion, *Ventes des Biens nationaux pendant la Révolution* (1908). See further, Bloch, *L'Assistance and l'État en France à la veille de la Révolution* (1908).

Among the many instructive books on the condition of the peasantry may also be mentioned: Karéiev, *Les paysans et la question paysanne en France dans le dernier quart du XVIII^e siècle*; Marion, *État des classes rurales dans la généralité de Bordeaux* (1902); Sée, *Les classes rurales en Bretagne du XVI^e siècle à la Révolution* (1906); Babeau, *La vie rurale dans l'ancienne France* (1882). For other references, see Lavissee, IX (1), 246-7 n. Several of the collections of sources for the study of the economic history of the Revolution contain documents bearing directly upon conditions during the last half of the eighteenth century, notably Sagnac et Caron, *Les Comités des droits féodaux et la législation et l'abolition du régime seigneurial* (1907); Bourgin, *La partage des biens communaux* (1908); Gerbaux et Schmidt, *Procès-verbaux des Comités d'agriculture et de commerce* (1906-1910). The reprints of the cahiers presented in 1789, included in the same collection, are similarly valuable. For a summary of such material, see Champion, *La France d'après les cahiers de 1789* (1897). Arthur Young's *Travels in France* remains the most valuable contribution of a contemporary. Dr. Rigby's *Letters from France* should be read as an antidote to the traditionally gloomy statements about the peasants. Among the books on the nobles may be mentioned: De Vaissière, *Gentilshommes campagnards de l'ancienne France* (1903); the first three volumes of Loménie, *Les Mirabeau* (1878 f.), or Fling, *Mirabeau*, vol. I (1908); Dreyfus, *Un Philanthrope d'autrefois, La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt* (1903).

On the condition of the peasants in Prussia and Austria, besides passages in Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, vol. VIII, Knapp, *Bauernbefreiung in den älteren Theilen Preussens*, 2 vols. (1887); Grünberg, *Bauernbefreiung und die Auflösung der gutsherrlich-bäuerlichen Verhältnisse in Böhmen. Mähren, und Schlesien*, 2 vols. (1894); Cavaignac, *La Prusse contemporaine*, vol. I (1891); Goltz,

Geschichte der deutschen Landwirtschaft, 2 vols. (1902-3). For the peasants in Savoy, see Bruchet, *L'Abolition des droits seigneuriaux en Savoie, 1761-1793* (1908), which belongs to the collection upon the economic history of the Revolution.

On direct taxation in France the texts with an historical introduction may be found in Marion, *Les Impôts directs sous l'ancien régime* (1910). See also Stourm, *Les Finances de l'ancien régime et de la Révolution* (1885); Clément, *La Corvées des chemins en France* (1899). For Prussia: Philippson, *Geschichte des Preussischen Staatswesens vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zu den Freiheitskriegen*, 2 vols. (1880-2). Upon England the facts are given in Bastable, *Public Finance* (1892).

The literature upon industry and commerce is growing rapidly. The following may be noted: the standard work of Levasseur, *Histoire des classes ouvrières avant 1789*, vol. II (ed. of 1901); Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, vol. II (revised ed. 1907); Gibbins, *British Industry* (1903); Sombart, *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im 19. Jahrhundert* (1903); Steinhausen, *Geschichte der deutschen Kultur*, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (1913); Martin, *La grande industrie en France sous le règne de Louis XV* (1900); Bonnassieux, *Les Grandes Compagnies de Commerce* (1892); Afanassiev, *Le Commerce des céréales en France au XVIII^e siècle* (1894); D'Avenel, *Histoire économique de la propriété, des salaires, des denrées, etc.*, 4 vols. (1894-1898); Dutil, *L'État économique du Languedoc à la fin de l'ancien régime* (1911); Renard et Dulac, *Evolution industrielle et agricole depuis cent cinquante ans* (1912).

Chapter II. For the laws, see volumes XXII-XXIX of Jourdan, Isambert and Decrusy, *Recueil des anciennes lois françaises*. See also Flammermont et Tourneux, *Remonstrances du Parlement de Paris au XVIII^e siècle*, 3 vols. (1888-1898). Illustrations of the operation of the governmental systems will be found in the books already mentioned, especially Lavissee and Tocqueville for France, and Philippson for Prussia. A good general survey is given by Gasquet, *Précis des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France* vol. I (1885). Useful information will be found in Boiteau, *L'État de la France en 1789* (2nd ed. 1889), and for local administration in Babeau, *La Province sous l'Ancien Régime*, 2 vols. (1894), *La Ville sous l'Ancien Régime* (1884); and in Ardascheff, *Les intendants de province sous Louis XVI*, 3 vols. (1909). On the parlements, see note in Lavissee, IX (1), 186-7. For the central administration, see Viollet, *Le Roi et ses ministres pendant les trois derniers siècles de la Monarchie* (1911). Upon Prussia illustrative matter will be found in the *Life of Stein*, vol. I, by J. R. Seeley, and in *Freiherr vom Stein*, vol. I (1902), by Max Lehmann. The governmental system of England is adequately explained in all of the standard constitutional histories. For Austria and Hungary a serviceable volume is Wolf and Zwiedinek-Südenhorst, *Oesterreich unter Maria Theresia, Joseph II, und Leopold II* (1882-1884).

Chapter III. The sources for this subject are the works which are mentioned, and they are to be found not only in the original editions, but many of them in critical editions. Convenient bibliographical lists are given for chapters 23 and 24 of volume VI of the Cambridge Modern History, and for chapter 1 of volume VII. Abundant suggestions are made in Lavissee for France. Special attention may be called to the following books: Faguet, *Le XVIII^e siècle* (1890); Rocquain, *L'esprit révolutionnaire avant la Révolution* (1878); Lichtenberger, *Le Socialisme au XVIII^e siècle* (1895); Espinas, *La philosophie sociale au XVIII^e siècle et la Révolution*; Rouston, *Les Philosophes et la Société française au XVIII^e siècle* (1906); Leslie Stephen, *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 2 vols. (1896); Francke, *History of German Literature* (new ed. 1913). On the Physiocrats and Economists, see Higgs, *The Physiocrats* (1897); Gide et Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques depuis les physiocrates jusqu'à nos jours* (1909); the biography of the elder Mirabeau, Rae's *Life of Adam Smith*; Schelle, *Vincent de Gournay* (1897) and *Dupont de Nemours et l'école physiocratique* (1888). For the French leaders the biographies in the *Collection des Grands Ecrivains français* are useful: Sorel, *Montesquieu*; Lanson, *Voltaire*, Chuquet, *Rousseau*, and Say, *Turgot*. Morley, *Rousseau*, 2 vols., and *Diderot and the Encyclopædists*, 2 vols. Collins, *Voltaire in England* (1905), and Sée, *Les idées politiques de Voltaire*, *Revue Historique* for 1908, are of special interest. For the clergy in France, see Sicard, *L'ancien clergé de France*, 2 vols. (1893-4). For education, see Compayré, *Histoire critique des doctrines de l'éducation en France*, vol. II, 2nd ed. (1881); for Germany, Paulsen, *Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts* (1885).

Chapter IV. The leading work on Frederick II is Koser, *König Friedrich der Grosse*, 2 vols. (3rd ed. 1904-5). An excellent brief treatment will be found in Wiegand, *Friedrich der Grosse* (1902). See also Reddaway, *Frederick the Great and the Rise of Prussia* (Heroes of the Nations, 1904). Tuttle, *History of Prussia*, vols. III and IV, contains much information in regard to the earlier part of Frederick's reign. Besides Philippon and Cavaignac, already mentioned, see Reimann, *Neuere Geschichte des preussischen Staates*, vol. II (1888). For the towns, see Preuss, *Entwicklung des Deutschen Städtewesens* (1906). For the peasants: Knapp, already cited.

Among the biographies of Joseph II may be mentioned Fournier, *Josef der Zweite* (1885) and Bright, *Joseph II* (1897 brief). Bright's little volume on *Maria Theresa* should be consulted in connection. Much of the Emperor Joseph's correspondence has been published; for example, *Joseph II und Leopold von Toskana. Ihr Briefwechsel von 1781-1790*, edited by A. von Arneth, and *Joseph II und Katharina von Russland. Ihr Briefwechsel*, by the same editor. On the work for the peasants, see Grünberg, already mentioned. See also, Marczali, *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century* (1910). Besides

Wolf und Zwiedinek-Südenhorst, see Mayer, *Geschichte Österreichs*, vol. II (3rd ed. 1909).

For Charles III of Spain, see Rousseau, *Charles III*, 2 vols. (1907). The work of Charles Emmanuel III in Savoy is set forth in the documents, with their historical introduction, Bruchet, already cited. On the colonial system in England, France and Spain, see especially, Egerton, *Short History of British Colonial Policy* (1897); Beer, *British Colonial Policy* (1907), and *The Old Colonial System*, 2 vols. (1912); Deschamps, *Histoire de la Question coloniale en France* (1891); Leroy-Beaulieu, *Histoire de la colonisation*, vol. I (ed. of 1902). For Russia, in addition to the books cited, see Walizewski, *Le Roman d'une Impératrice* (1893) and *Autour d'un Trône: Catherine II, ses collaborateurs, ses amis, ses favoris* (1894). For Italy, briefly in Vernon, *Italy 1494-1790* (1909).

Chapter V. Several of the books noted for chapters 1, 2, and 3 are serviceable for this chapter also. Volume IX of Lavissee, *Histoire de France* should be mentioned, especially Bk. VI, which is an illuminating statement by Lavissee of the "imperfections de l'œuvre monarchique" and a review of the crisis which was the consequence. An older excellent account is that of Chérest, *La Chute de l'Ancien Régime* (1884-7), 3 vols. The story of this period pleasantly written will be found in MacLehose, *Last Days of the French Monarchy* (1901). For the financial side, see, besides Stourm, Gomel, *Les causes financières de la Révolution française*, 2 vols. (1892-3). Necker's own writings are full of interest for this subject.

For the last struggle with the courts see especially Carré, *La fin des parlements* (1912).

The memoir literature and the correspondence are abundant; see especially the memoirs of Mollien, Talleyrand, Mme. de Staël, Ferrières, Mallet du Pan, Malouet, Frénilly, Hardy; Rocheterie et Beaucourt, *Lettres de Marie Antoinette* (1895), vol. I; *Correspondance secrète entre Marie-Thérèse et the comte Mercy-Argenteau*, edited by D'Arneth and Geffroy, 3 vols. (1874); *Correspondance secrète du comte de Mercy-Argenteau avec l'empereur Joseph II et le prince de Kaunitz*, edited by D'Arneth and Flammermont.

Among the useful biographies, it is well to note volumes III and IV of Loménie, *Les Mirabeau*; Say, *Turgot*; Lanzac de Laborie, *Jean-Joseph Mounier*.

Chapter VI. Reference should again be made to Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce* and to Gibbins, *British Industry; Historical Outlines* (3rd ed. 1903). The most detailed and instructive work is, Mantoux, *La Révolution industrielle au XVIII^e siècle: Essai sur les commencements de la grande industrie moderne en Angleterre* (1906). Much interesting information upon the south of France is to be found in Dutil, *op. cit.* See also Levasseur and Bonnassieux, *op. cit.*

On the Treaty of 1786, see Dumas, *Étude sur le traité de commerce de 1786 entre la France et l'Angleterre* (1904), and Rose,

William Pitt, vol. I, chapter 14; see also *Journals and Correspondance of Lord Auckland*, vol. I.

Detailed bibliographies may be found in Mantoux and in Martin, *Histoire de l'industrie en France avant 1789*. For bibliographical notes for Germany, see Dahlmann-Waitz *Quellenkunde*, or the lists in *Handbuch der Wirtschaftskunde Deutschlands*, III.

Chapters VII, VIII, IX, and X. For the study of the subjects touched upon in these chapters important additions have been made to the older collections of printed material; that is, the *Procès-verbaux* of the assemblies, the *Archives parlementaires*, an official collection begun by Mavidal and Laurent, and Buchez et Roux, *Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française*. For a list of the collection upon the economic aspects of the Revolution, bearing especially on the early period, see Caron, *Manuel pratique*, pp. 9-13. Among other valuable series may be noted *Actes de la Commune de Paris pendant la Révolution*, edited by Lacroix, 15 vols.; *Recueil de documents relatifs à la convocation des États Généraux de 1789*, edited by Brette, 3 vols.; *La Société des Jacobins*, edited by Aulard, 6 vols. The text of laws is to be found in Duvergier, *Collection des Lois*, which includes all the laws passed since 1789.

The *Réimpression de l'ancien Moniteur* furnishes material enough for the study of most discussions in the Revolutionary assemblies.

There are several selections from the original material made for the use of students. For legislation the most useful is Cahen et Guyot, *L'Œuvre législative de la Révolution* (1913). A collection of practical utility for college classes is Anderson, *Constitutions and other Select Documents of France*, the early part of which is devoted to the Revolution and to the Napoleonic period. It contains little upon the economic history of the Revolution. Another by Legg, *Select Documents: the Constituent Assembly*, is a history of the first two years, presented in untranslated clippings from contemporary newspapers, decrees, etc. On a different plan is Fling, *Source Problems of the French Revolution* (1913), in which the selections offer material upon a few incidents, in order that students through its critical use may be trained in the historical method. Stephens, *Orators of the French Revolution*, 2 vols., contains typical speeches.

The memoirs and correspondence of the period are rich. The following should be noted: Young, *Travels*; Rigby, *Letters*; Duquesnoy, *Journal*; Morris, *Diary and Letters*, 2 vols.; Vaissière, *Lettres d' "Aristocrates"*; the memoirs of Bailly, Ferrières, Lafayette, Talleyrand (Tr.), Malouet, Pasquier (Tr.), Mme. Campan (Tr.), Thiébauld (Tr.), Bouillé, Frénilly (Tr.), Romilly (English). The *Recollections of Dumont*, especially of Mirabeau, appeared in an English translation in 1832. A new English edition was issued in 1904 under the inappropriate title, *The Great Frenchman and the Little Genevese*. Various volumes of diplomatic correspondence have also been published, including Dorset, *Despatches*, 2 vols.; Gower, *Despatches*; Bailli de Virieu, *Correspondance*; Staël-Holstein, *Correspondance*

diplomatique; Kovalevsky, *I dispacci degli ambasciatori Veneti alla corte di Francia durante la Rivoluzione*.

For the general history of the Revolution, in addition to books previously noted,—Chérest, Sorel (indispensable for the international relations of France), Sybel (valuable for the same reason)—special attention should be called to Aulard, *Political History of the French Revolution* (Miall Tr.), 4 vols. (1910), embodying the results of Professor Aulard's long and fruitful researches. Jaurès, *Histoire Socialiste*, 2 vols., on the period of the Constituent and Legislative Assembly is suggestive (1901, 1902). The eighth volume of Lavissee et Rambaud, *Histoire générale*, represents the best French scholarship on the subject at the time of its publication in 1896. The *Cambridge Modern History*, VIII, is on a similar plan, although it does not deal with as many phases of the movement. The most brilliant brief treatment is in Madelin, *La Révolution* (1913). The two volumes of Stephens, *French Revolution* (1886, 1891), carry the subject as far as the fall of 1793. There are several brief manuals by Gardiner, Mathews, Johnston, Morris, Belloc. See also Acton, *Lectures on the French Revolution*, published in 1910 after the author's death. Taine's three volumes are valuable for the discussion of institutions and the criticism of tendencies, but his method is open to serious objection. MacLehose, *From Monarchy to the Republic in France* (1904) is a clear and interesting presentation of the period from 1789 to 1792. Readers of Carlyle should use the critical editions of Fletcher or Rose. The English translation of Thiers appeared in a fresh dress in 1894, 5 vols.

On the legislative work of the Revolution, see Sagnac, *La législation civile de la Révolution française* (1898). The introduction to Sagnac et Caron, *Les Comités des droits féodaux*, etc., is very important for the study of the abolition of feudalism. On the finances of the Revolution, besides Stourm, the chief work is Gomel, *Histoire financière de l'Assemblée Constituante*, 2 vols. (1896-7). Akin to the subject of taxation is Karmin, *Question du sel pendant la Révolution* (1912). Levasseur, *Histoire des classes ouvrières depuis 1789*, vol. I, has an important review of the assignats. See also Bloch, *Le Papier-monnaie et la Monnaie: Instruction, recueil de textes et notes* (1911). For the religious question the following books are of special interest: Debidour, *Histoire des rapports de l'Église et de l'État en France de 1789 à 1870* (1898); La Gorce, *Histoire religieuse de la Révolution française*, vol. I (1909); Mathiez, *Rome et le Clergé français sous la Constituante* (1911); Pisani, *L'Église de Paris et la Révolution*, 4 vols. (1908-1911). Other aspects of the early Revolution are treated in Forneron, *Histoire générale des Émigrés*, 2 vols. (1884); Daudet, *Histoire de l'Émigration pendant la Révolution française*, 3 vols. (1904-7); Goncourt, *Histoire de la Société française pendant la Révolution* (1889); Carré, already cited. A critical study of the July 14 will be found in Flammarion, *La Journée du 14 Juillet, 1789* (1892). Aulard, *Grands Orateurs de la Révolution* (1914),

includes much of the matter contained in his earlier *Orateurs de l'Assemblée Constituante* (1882).

Among the biographies useful for the period are Loménie or Stern, *Mirabeau*; more popular treatments by Willert and Barthou (Tr.); Mallet, *Mallet du Pan*, and Charavay, *La Fayette*, Clapham (English) or Neton, *Abbé Sieyès*. In regard to Mirabeau's policy the best source is his *Correspondance avec le Comte de la Marck*, 3 vols. (1851), edited by Bacourt.

Chapters XI, XII, XIII, and XIV. It is unnecessary to repeat here the names of the general histories of the Revolution, except to emphasize once more the value of Aulard's analyses of political tendencies and descriptions of governmental changes. Jaurès, *Histoire Socialiste: la Convention*, 2 vols. (1903); Jaurès and Deville, *Histoire Socialiste*, vol. V (1904), contain much interesting matter.

Upon the influence of the Revolution beyond the borders of France, see: Hazen, *American Opinion of the French Revolution* (1897); Dowden, *French Revolution and English Literature* (1897); Legouis, *Early Life of Wordsworth* (1897); Morley, *Burke* (1867); Smith, *English Jacobins* (1881); Lecky, *French Revolution* (chapters from his *History of England*); Lecky, *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, 5 vols. (1892); Francke, *History of German Literature*; Rambaud, *Les Français sur le Rhin* (1873).

For foreign affairs the most important contribution is that of Sorel. See also, Heidrich, *Preussen im Kampfe gegen die französische Revolution bis zur zweiten Teilung Polens* (1908); Haschagen, *Das Rheinland und die französische Herrschaft* (1908); Wittichen, *Preussen und die Revolutionen in Belgien und Lüttich, 1789-1790* (1905); Delhaize, *Domination française en Belgique*, 6 vols. (1908-1912); Rose, *William Pitt and the National Revival*, 2 vols. (1911); Clapham, *Causes of the War of 1792* (1899).

The texts of treaties will be found in Martens, *Recueil des principaux traités d'alliance, de paix*, etc., with its supplements, and in De Clerq, *Recueil des traités de la France*. Parts of them appear translated in Anderson. The most important collection for the study of French foreign, as well as internal, policy is Aulard, *Recueil des actes du Comité de Salut Public*, in 25 vols., nearly completed. Valuable correspondence will be found in the Auckland, Fortescue, Castlereagh, Malmesbury, journals, letters, and papers.

For the changes in the French government after August 10, 1792, the texts are in Mautouchet, *Gouvernement Révolutionnaire: textes* (1912). For reports upon public opinion, see Schmidt, *Tableaux de Paris pendant la Révolution française* (1867). Of similar interest is the series *Paris pendant la Terreur: Rapports des agents secrets du ministre de l'intérieur*, edited by Caron, of which two volumes have been published. For the period after the overthrow of Napoleon, see Aulard, *Paris pendant la Réaction thermidorienne et sous le directoire*, 5 vols. (1898-1902).

Upon notable features of the period the following books should be mentioned: Aulard, *Orateurs de l'Assemblée Législative et de la Convention*, 2 vols. (1885, 1886); Sagnac, *La Chute de Royauté* (1909); Braesch, *La Commune du Dix Aout* (1911); and the older works written from a point of view hostile to the radical revolution, Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*, 8 vols. (1862 f.), with appendices containing valuable documents of which some of the originals were destroyed in the burning of the municipal archives in 1871, and Wallon, *Révolution du 31 mai et le Fédéralisme*, 2 vols. (1886). Lenôtre, *Massacres de Septembre* (1907) reprints several original narratives.

Upon the Revolutionary Tribunal, in addition to the monumental work of Wallon, *Histoire du Tribunal Révolutionnaire*, 6 vols. (1880-82), may be mentioned Campardon, *Le Tribunal Révolutionnaire de Paris*, 2 vols. (2nd ed. 1866) and Lenôtre, *Tribunal Révolutionnaire* (1908). Two books of deep interest are Dunoyer's *Deux Jurés du Tribunal Révolutionnaire* (1909) and Fouquier-Tinville (1913).

The economic history of the period is well treated by Levasseur. A more recent work is Gomel, *Histoire financière de l'Assemblée Législative et de la Convention*, 2 vols. (1902, 1905). Marion, *Vente des biens nationaux*, deals with sales of emigrant, as well as ecclesiastical, lands.

Upon education, see *Procès-verbaux du Comité d'instruction publique de la Convention nationale*, edited by Guillaume, 6 vols. (1890-1907).

On the military side, see the list of the publications of the Section historique de l'État-major de l'Armée in Caron, *Manuel*, pp. 14-17. The principal descriptive work is Chuquet, *Les guerres de la Révolution*, 11 vols. (1886-1893). Mahan, *Sea Power and the French Revolution and Empire*, 2 vols. (1897), deals at length with naval operations.

The memoir and biographical literature of the period is rich. Among the memoirs should be especially noted those of Brissot (Perroud edition), Carnot, Thibaudeau, Durand de Maillane, Lameth, in addition to those previously mentioned. The following additional biographies are important: *Madelin*, *Danton* (others by Beesly, Belloc, etc.); *Madelin*, *Fouché*, 2 vols.; Cahen, *Condorcet*; Chuquet, *Dumouriez*; Lévy, *Jeanbon Saint-André*; Montier, *Lindet*; Lewes or Belloc, *Robespierre*; Bax, *Babeuf*.

Chapters XVI and XVII. On the diplomacy of the period from 1796 to 1802, besides Sorel and Sybel, see Guyot, *Le Directoire et la paix de l'Europe* (1911); Du Teil, *Rome, Naples et le Directoire* (1902); Gaffarel, *Bonaparte et les Républiques italiennes, 1796-1799* (1895); Driault, *Napoleon et l'Europe, 1800-1803* (1909); Bowman, *Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens* (1900); with Rose's *William Pitt*.

On the relations of France with dependent states other than Italy: see, for the Belgian lands, Delhaize, already cited and Lanzac de

Laborie, *Domination française en Belgique*, 2 vols. (1895); for Holland, Blok, vol. V, and Colenbrander, *De Bataafsche Republiek* (1908); for the Rhine country, Rambaud, *Les français sur le Rhin*; for Switzerland, Oechsli, *Geschichte der Schweiz im 19. Jahrhundert*, vol. I (1903).

There are various collections of diplomatic correspondence and documents, for example: Bailleu, *Preussen und Frankreich von 1795-1807*, 2 vols. (1881, 1887); Luckwaldt, *Der Friede von Campo Formio* (1907); Montarlot et Pingaud, *Le Congrès de Rastatt*, 3 vols. (1912-1913); Dunant, *Relations diplomatiques de la France et de la République helvétique* (1902).

The internal history of the Directory is sufficiently described by Aulard and Sorel. Aside from the affair of the 18th Fructidor and the bankruptcy of 1797 its most important features are associated with the history of General Bonaparte.

The two most serviceable biographies of Napoleon are Rose, *Napoleon I*, 2 vols. (1902) and Fournier, *Napoleon I* (last German edition in 3 volumes, 1904, 1906). The earlier edition of Fournier appears in an English version (E. G. Bourne editor) in one volume, the later, translated by A. E. Adams, in 2 volumes. This translation is not an exact version of the original, important notes being reduced or omitted. There is a more detailed study of Napoleon, Sloane, 4 vols. (revised edition, 1910). The briefer treatments are by Ropes, valuable on military questions, Seeley, Johnston, and Fisher. Rose, *Napoleonic Studies* (3rd ed. 1914), should also be noted.

Upon special phases of Napoleon's career the following should be consulted: Masson's volumes upon *Napoléon et sa famille* (1897 ff.); Chuquet, *La Jeunesse de Napoléon*, 3 vols. (1897 ff.); Vandal, *L'Avènement de Bonaparte*, 2 vols. (1902, 1907).

The *Correspondance de Napoléon I* was originally published in 32 vols. in 1858-1870. Supplementary collections have appeared from time to time, edited by Du Casse (1887), Lecestre, 2 vols. (1897), Brotonne (1898, 1903).

Of the memoirs of the period the following are important: Barras, Larevellière-Lépaux, Carnot, Gohier, Talleyrand, Thibaudeau, Miot de Melito, Lucien Bonaparte, Joseph Bonaparte.

Chapter XVII. In addition to works already mentioned which treat various phases of the Consulat — Aulard, Debidour, Vandal, Levasseur, Clapham or Neton — the following should be noted:

Upon the Provisional Consulate: Aulard, *Registre des délibérations du Consulat provisoire* (1894); and his *L'État de la France en l'an VIII et l'an IX* (1897). Upon public opinion during the Consulat, Aulard, *Paris sous le Consulat* (1903 ff.). See the descriptive work of Lanzac de Laborie, *Paris sous Napoleon*, 8 vols. (1905-1913).

The documents for the Concordat will be found in the collection by Boulay de la Meurthe, *Documents sur la négociation de Concordat*, 6 vols. (1891-1905). On the subject see, besides Aulard, Haussonville, *L'Église Romaine et le Premier Empire*, 5 vols. (1868-1869).

For the code, see list of works given in the bibliography of chapter 6, *Cambridge Modern History*, IX. On education: Liard, *L'Enseignement supérieur en France*, 2 vols. (1888-1894). On the press: Le Poittevin, *La liberté de la presse depuis la Révolution* (1901). On the finances: Stourm, *Les finances du Consulat* (1902). On the administrative system much valuable information is given by Dejean, *Un Préfet du Consulat* (1907). Thiers, *The Consulate and the Empire*, should also be consulted upon such matters. See also volume VI of the *Histoire Socialiste* (1905) by Brousse and Thurot. The colonial policy of Napoleon is fully discussed in Henry Adams, *History of the United States*. See also Roloff, *Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons I* (1899); Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale en France de 1789 à 1830* (1908).

Besides the memoirs mentioned for the last two chapters, the following should be noted: Chaptal, Gaudin, Mollien, Beugnot, Pasquier, Mme. de Rémusat, Bourrienne, Roederer, Chateaubriand.

Chapter XVIII. On the character of the literary movement in Germany, see especially Francke, *History of German Literature*. The movement for reform in Prussia may best be studied in connection with the lives of the leading Prussian statesmen and administrators, particularly of Stein; see biographies by Seeley and Lehmann. The peasant reforms are described in Knapp, *Bauernbefreiung im Preussen*, and the general history of Prussia in Philippson. For Bavaria, another typical state, see Doeberl, *Entwicklungsgeschichte Bayerns*, vol. II (1912), with full bibliographical information. On Germany as a whole and the revolutionary changes of 1802-3, see, besides Häusser, Heigel, *Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zur Auflösung des alten Reichs* (1899); Müller, *Der letzte Kampf der Reichsritterschaft um ihre Selbständigkeit* (1910). Upon the work of France Sorel should be consulted. See also Servières, *L'Allemagne française sous Napoléon I* (1904); Fisher, *Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany* (1903); Rambaud, *L'Allemagne française sous Napoléon I* (1874).

Chapters XIX, XX. The events which led to the creation of the Empire are clearly described by Aulard, and in their larger European relations by Sorel. For the conspiracies, see Madelin, *Fouché*; Daudet, *La police et les Chouans sous le Consulat et l'Empire* (1895); Boulay de la Meurthe, *Les dernières années du duc d'Enghien* (1886); Welschinger, *Le duc d'Enghien* (). For the coronation: Masson, *The Coronation of Napoleon*.

For the outbreak of war with England, see Rose, *Napoleon*, and Rose, *Pitt*; Temperley, *Canning*; also *England and Napoleon in 1803, being Despatches of Lord Whitworth*, edited by Browning. Upon Hanover: Ford, *Hanover and Prussia, 1795-1803* (1903); also Thimme, *Die inneren Zustände des Kurfürstentums Hannover, 1806-1813*, 2 vols. (1893 f.).

For the policy of France toward dependent states, see books mentioned for chapters 15, 16.

The campaign of Trafalgar is described fully by Mahan both in his *Sea Power and the French Revolution and Empire* and in his *Life of Nelson*, 2 vols. (1897). See also Desbrière, *La campagne maritime de 1805* (1907).

For the struggle with the Third Coalition, see besides Sorel, Rose, and Fournier, Driault, *Napoleon et l'Europe*, vol. II (Austerlitz: La fin du Saint-Empire, 1911); Zwiedinek-Südenhorst, *Deutsche Geschichte von der Auflösung des alten bis zur Errichtung des neuen Kaiserreichs*, vol. I (1897); Petre, *Conquest of Prussia* (1907), and Petre, *Campaign in Poland* (3rd ed. 1907), both exclusively given to the military operations. For further references on military operations, Kircheisen should be consulted. Two recent books by officers of the French army are of special value in the study of Napoleon's methods as a soldier: Picard, *Préceptes et jugements de Napoléon* (1912) and Vachée, *Napoléon en campagne* (1913).

For the Rhenish Confederation, see works already mentioned, and Bitterauf, *Geschichte des Rheinbundes* (1905). For Poland: Handelsman, *Napoléon et la Pologne* (1909), and Bonnefons, *Un allié de Napoléon: Frédéric-Auguste, premier roi de Saxe*, etc. (1902); Pfister, *König Friedrich von Württemberg und seine Zeit* (1888).

Chapter XXI. The student of the Continental System should consult the critical discussions by Lingelbach and Dunan. Rose has contributed a special chapter to the subject, Cambridge Modern History, IX, chapter 13, and Fisher has explained in *Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany* the effects upon the different German states. See also Rose, *Napoleonic Studies*, VII. A few works of special importance may be noted: Kiesselbach, *Die Kontinentalsperre* (1850); Amé, *Étude économique sur les tarifs de douanes*, 2 vols. (1876); especially Darmstädter, *Studien zur Napoleonischen Wirtschaftspolitik*, in *Vierteljahrsschrift für Social und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 1904, pp. 559-615, and 1905, pp. 112-141. For effects upon single states, see Hitzigrat, *Hamburg und die Kontinentalsperre* (1900), and Schmidt, *Le Grand-Duché de Berg* (1905); Darmstädter, *Das Grossherzogthum Frankfurt, 1800-1813* (1901). On the American phase of the struggle: Henry Adams, *History of the United States*; Channing, *Jeffersonian System*; and Mahan, *Sea Power*, chapters 17-18 on the Warfare against Commerce.

Upon the political and military affairs, in addition to books already mentioned, note Oman, *History of the Peninsular War*, 4 vols. (1902 ff.); *Correspondance du comte de la Forest*, 3 vols. (1905 ff.); Memoirs of Metternich; Strobl von Ravelsberg, *Metternich und seine Zeit*, 2 vols. (1907); Welschinger, *Le Pape et l'Empereur* (1905); Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre I*, 3 vols. (1891-1896).

Chapter XXII. A brief and suggestive treatment will be found in Meinecke, *Das Zeitalter der deutschen Erhebung, 1795-1815* (1906). As the principal impulse came from Stein, his biographies are of special importance. The biography by Lehmann, vol. III, enters fully in the details of the reforms and the difficulties which they encoun-

tered. On the question of the peasants, see Knapp, already cited. Cavaignac, *Prusse contemporaine*, discusses the scope of the reforms from a French point of view. Among other works are: Stern, *Abhandlungen und Aktenstücke der preussischen Reformzeit* (1885); Meier, *Die Reform der Verwaltungsorganisation unter Stein und Hardenberg* (1881); Lehmann, *Scharnhorst*, 2 vols. (1886-87); Delbrück, *Gneisenau*, 2 vols. (1908); Paulsen, *Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts*.

Chapter XXIII. For the study of the scope of reform in Europe it is necessary to consult works on the several states. Many of these have been mentioned in other connections. All that can be done here is to refer to them once more, and to add a few other titles. Austria: Beer, *Zehn Jahre Österreichischer Politik* (1877); Meynert, *Kaiser Franz I—zur Geschichte seiner Regierung und seiner Zeit* (1872). For Russia: Rambaud, *History of Russia* and chapter 21 in *Histoire Générale*, vol. IX. Sweden: briefly in Bain, *Political History of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden from 1513 to 1900* (1903); Pingaud, *Bernadotte, Napoléon. et les Bourbons* (1901). For Great Britain during the period, see the bibliographical list in Cambridge Modern History, IX, ch. 22. Italy: in addition to books cited, Driault, *Napoléon en Italie, 1800-1810* (1906); Johnston, *Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy*, 2 vols. (1904); *Mémoires et Correspondance de Prince Eugène*, 10 vols.; *Lettres et documents pour servir à l'histoire de Joachim Murat* (in course of publication). For Dalmatia: *Mémoires* of Marmont; Pisani, *La Dalmatie de 1797 à 1815* (1893). For Germany as a whole, see Fisher, *Napoleonic Statesmanship*, already cited, with bibliographical suggestions. Among the books which may be mentioned are, for Westphalia, in addition to Thimme, Goecke, *Das Königreich Westfalen* (1888); Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Königreichs Westfalen* (1893). For Berg and Frankfurt, see Schmidt and Darmstädter, already mentioned. For the South German States: Doeberl, cited; Bitterauf, *Bayern als Königreich* (1906); Schneider, *Württembergische Geschichte* (1890); Weech, *Badische Geschichte* (1896). In regard to the work of Monteglas: Laubmann und Doeberl, *Denkwürdigkeiten des grafen Maximilian Joseph von Montgelas über die innere Staatsverwaltung Bayerns nebst einer Einleitung über die Entstehung des modernen Staates in Bayern von M. Doeberl* (1908).

Chapter XXIV. For an analysis of the character of Napoleonic institutions, see Taine, *Modern Régime*, 2 vols., a work not completed at the time of the author's death. An excellent review of the principal characteristics of the imperial period is contributed by Professor Pariset to the Cambridge Modern History, IX, chapter 5. To books already mentioned may be added: Campardon, *Liste des membres de la noblesse impériale* (1889); Courtois, *Histoire des banques en France* (1881); Gautier, *Mme. de Staël et Napoléon* (1902); *Mémoires de Baron Fain* (1908). It is from Baron Fain's memoirs that the clearest account can be gained of Napoleon's methods of work.

Other memoirs valuable for the period may be mentioned again: Talleyrand, Pasquier, Ségur, Méneval, Chaptal, Mollien. Much interesting light is thrown on the situation by the volumes of Lanzac de Laborie on *Paris sous Napoléon*, already mentioned. To the books dealing with the relations of Napoleon and the Pope may be added Madelin, *La Rome de Napoléon* (1906).

Chapters XXV, XXVI, and XXVII. An early and long popular narrative of the Russian campaign is by Ségur, *Histoire de Napoléon et de la Grande Armée pendant l'année 1812*, first published in 1824 and republished many times. English translation in 1825. For an English treatment, see George, *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia* (1899). See also Osten-Sacken, *Der Feldzug von 1812* (1901). Among the many memoirs recounting the experiences of the retreat that of Sergeant Bourgogne, *Memoirs* (Tr., 1899) is especially vivid.

Upon the literary movement which preceded the uprising of Germany, see Francke or Meinecke. Sorel discusses in great detail the diplomatic campaign, but his judgments of Metternich's policy are open to question. See Fournier's explanations as well as those of Rose. Petre's *Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany* (1912) gives a clear account of the military incidents. A sequel is his *Napoleon at Bay* (1913). The best account of Napoleon's overthrow in 1814 is Houssaye, *1814* (1888). Of the extensive literature of the subject the following may be mentioned: Oncken, *Österreich und Preussen im Befreiungskriege*, 2 vols. (1876, 1879); Metternich-Klinckowström, *Österreichs Teilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen* (1887); Browning, *Fall of Napoleon* (1907); Henderson, *Blücher* (1912).

For the Congress of Vienna the principal authority is Sorel, vol. VIII (1904). See also Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe*, vol. I (1891), and Ward's description in chapters 19 and 21 of the *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. IX. The published correspondence of diplomats present is considerable, of which an interesting example is *Correspondance inédite du prince de Talleyrand et du roi Louis XVIII pendant le congrès de Vienne*, edited by Pallain (1881).

For the Hundred Days and Waterloo the best work is Houssaye, *1815*, 3 vols. (1893, 1898, 1905). See also Lettow-Vorbeck and Voss, *Napoleon's Untergang*, 2 vols. (1904-6). Ropes, *Waterloo* (1892), contains an extensive bibliography of the campaign and careful discussions of disputed problems. It is accompanied by a special atlas.

Of the literature of the Saint Helena episode it is enough to cite Rosebery, *The Last Phase* (1900), and Seaton, *Sir Hudson Lowe and Napoleon* (1898). Fisher in chapter 24 of the *Cambridge Modern History* gives an excellent summary of the events and explains the writings which started the controversy. Fournier, Rose, and other biographers of Napoleon have also treated this phase of Napoleon's career.

INDEX

INDEX

- Aberdeen, Lord, 434, 438.
 Aboukir, battle of, 255.
 Aboukir Bay, naval battle of, 253.
 Acre, siege of, 254.
Acte additionel, 458-9.
 Addington, Henry, ministry of, 265.
 Agriculture, French, 10, 222, 406.
 Alembert, D', 40.
 Alexander I, Czar of Russia, succeeds his father, 265; and German reorganization, 295, 296, 305; strained relations with Bonaparte, 306, 309, 315, 317-8; enters Third Coalition, 318; war with France, 323, 324, 325, 330, 331, 336; Peace of Tilsit, 337-8; interview at Erfurt, 354-5; subsequent relations with Napoleon, 359, 367, 368; as a ruler, 384-5; in war of 1812, 414 f.; agreements with Prussia, 426, 430, 431; with Austria, 434, 435; campaign in France, 441; at Paris, 442-4; Congress of Vienna, 453-4.
 Alsace, 20, 155.
 Amiens, Peace of, 265-6.
 Ancona, French seizure of, 243, 328.
 Angoulême, Duchess of, 451.
 Duke of, 458.
 Annates, payment of, 102, 132.
 Ansbach, neutrality of, 323.
 Arkwright, Richard, 77, 80, 85.
 Armed neutrality, the, 68, 264-5, 343.
 Army, French, reorganized, 117; in 1792, 169; universal service introduced, 204, 215; new methods of fighting, 237-8, 321; deterioration of, 358; at the Restoration, 448.
 Prussian, 332-4; reform of, 377-8.
 Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 331, 431.
 Artois, Count of, 70, 137, 147, 446.
 Aspern-Essling, battle of, 358.
 Assignats, 129 f., 178, 204, 206, 221, 227, 245.
 Auerstädt, battle of, 334.
 Augereau, General, 245, 259, 305.
 Augsburg, 14, 79, 296.
 August 4, decrees of, 101.
 Augustus III, of Poland, 59.
 Austerlitz, battle of, 324-5.
 Austria, peasantry of, 11; under Maria Theresa and Joseph II, 51-55; relations with Revolutionary France, 152-3; with Prussia, 157; origin of French war, 161 f., 167; conduct of the war, 179, 187-8, 203-4, 215, 322; Third Partition of Poland, 234; campaign of 1796-7, 236 f.; Treaty of Campo Formio, 246; Second Coalition, 255-7; campaign of 1800, 261-3; Peace of Lunéville, 263; policy in reorganization of Germany, 292 f.; Empire proclaimed, 315; Third Coalition, 317 f.; Peace of Pressburg, 326; war of 1809, 354, 357 f.; condition of, 383-4; alliance with France in 1812, 415, 417; becomes neutral, 427-8, 429; prepares to join allies, 431 f.; war with Napoleon, 436 f.; policy at Congress of Vienna, 452 f.
 Avignon, annexation of, 162, 163, 243.
 Babeuf, 227-8.
 Baccicchi, Pascal, 389.
 Baden, 155, 236, 295, 296, 299, 396.
 Bailly, 98, 99, 143, 146, 208.
 Bamberg, bishopric of, 293, 296.
 Bank of Discount, 74, 88, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131.
 Bank of England, 31.
 Bank of France, 275, 405-6, 407.
 Bank, land, in Prussia, 51, 369.
 Bankruptcy in France, 73, 245.
 Bar, Confederation of, 60.
 Barclay de Tolly, 421.
 Barère, 110, 219, 220, 224.
 Barnave, 108, 208.
 Barras, 218, 226, 259, 260.
 Bartenstein, Treaty of, 336.
 Barthélemy, 244.
 Basel, Peace of, 234.
 Bastille, fall of, 98.
 Batavian Republic, 250, 263, 304-5; *see* United Netherlands, Kingdom of Holland.
 Bautzen, battle of, 432.
 Bavaria, 61, 170, 236, 291, 293, 294, 295, 296, 326, 397-8, 424, 438, 455.
 Baylen, Capitulation of, 353.
 Bayonne, 351.
 Beaumont, 63.
 Beccaria, 46-47.
 Belgians, 188-9, 196, 391; *see* Netherlands, Austrian.
 Benevolent Despots, 48 f.; in France, 62 f.
 Bentham, 385.
 Beresina, crossing of, 422.
 Berg, 328, 364, 395.
 Berlin, 4; Napoleon in, 334-5; Decree, 335, 340, 346; University founded, 379-80.
 Bernadotte, 258, 328; becomes Prince Royal of Sweden, 385, 417-8, 432.
 Berne, 251.
 Berthier, intendant, 98.
 General, 138, 250, 262, 328, 419.
 Berthollet, 83, 231, 254, 280.
 Beugnot, 392, 446, 448.
 Billaud-Varenne, 180, 182, 209, 213, 216, 220, 224.
 "Black" Cardinals, 412.
 Blücher, 437, 438, 442, 460-463.
 Bologna, 241.
 Bonaparte, Elise, 327-8, 389.
 Jerome, 328, 335, 337, 391, 395-6, 439-40.
 Joseph, 302, 314, 318; King of Naples, 327, 391, 393; King of Spain, 351 f., 393, 394, 418, 435-6.
 Louis, 314, 328, 348, 360.
 Lucien, 260, 328.
 Napoleon, *see* Napoleon.

- Pauline, 389.
 Bohemia, 294.
 Boisgelin, Archbishop, 133, 140, 141.
 Bordeaux, 202, 203.
 Borghese, Prince, 388-9.
 Borodino, battle of, 421.
 Bouillé, Marquis de, 138, 140, 143, 144, 146.
 Boulogne, Camp, 308, 319-20.
 Boulton, Matthew, 83.
 Bourbons, restoration of, 442 f., 446 f., 464; *see under* Louis XVI, etc.
 Brandenburg, 294.
 Bremen, 290, 309.
 Brest, 175, 319, 320.
 Breteuil, Baron de, 140, 144, 163.
 Brethren of the Christian Schools, 409.
 Brienne, Loménie de, 72, 74, 88, 92, 141. battle at, 441.
 Brissot, 102, 149, 165, 166, 183.
 Brumaire, coup d'état of, 259-261.
 Brune, General, 169, 257, 463.
 Brunswick, Duke of, 173, 179-80, 184-5, 332, 334, 335; the younger, 359. Manifesto of, 173.
 Brussels, 158.
 Bubna, Count, 427.
 Buffon, 40.
 Burke, Edmund, 91, 107, 151.
 Busaco, battle of, 357.
 Buzot, 183.
 Cadoudal, Georges, 311-2.
 Cagliostro, 71.
 Cahiers, the, 91, 92.
 Calas, Jean, 35.
 Calendar, Republican, 210-11, 275-6, 315.
 Calonne, 70, 71, 93.
 Cambacères, 284, 314.
 Camperdown, battle of, 247.
 Campo Formio, Treaty of, 246.
 Canals, in England, 84.
 Canning, George, 336.
 Cape, The, 234, 336, 456.
 Capri, 393.
 Carnot, Lazare, 209, 220, 224, 236, 237, 244, 313, 451, 458.
 Carrier, 209, 219.
 Carron iron works, 82.
 Cartwright, Edmund, 81.
 Castlereagh, 454.
 Catherine II, of Russia, 57, 59, 60, 61, 170, 192-3, 239.
 Caulaincourt, 439, 444, 445, 458.
 Cens, 6.
 Ceylon, 234, 266, 456.
 Chamber of Peers, 447.
 Chamber of Deputies, 447.
 Champ de Mars, Massacre of, 146.
 Championnet, 256.
 Chaptal, 231, 269, 280, 281.
 Charles III, of Spain, 48, 55, 56; IV, 309, 349, 350, 351.
 Charles, Archduke, 236, 239, 251, 256, 318, 321, 323, 358, 359.
 Chateaubriand, 278, 413.
 Châteaux, war on the, 100, 121.
 Chatillon, Congress of, 442.
 Chaumette, 180, 184, 200.
 Chénier, M. J., 180.
 Cherasco, armistice of, 238, 239.
 Church of England, 36.
 Church, French, 33-5, 38, 39, 40; during the Revolution, 101, 102, 127-8, 132-6, 139-43, 165-6, 178-9, 210-12, 229-30; the Concordat, 275-8; during the Empire, 315, 409-12; at the Restoration, 447.
 German Catholic, 35-6, 53-4; effect of the secularizations of 1803 upon, 297-8.
 Cintra, Convention of, 353, 354.
 Cisalpine Republic, 242, 246, 249, 256, 410.
 Cispadane Republic, 242, 246.
 Cities, reorganization of, French, 110-11; Prussian, 374-5.
 Civil Code, French, 281-3; adopted elsewhere, 391.
 Civil Constitution of the Clergy, 133, 135, 139, 165.
 Clavière, 70, 167, 171.
 Coalbrookdale, 82.
 Coalition, Second, 256 f.; Third, 315 f.
 Cobbett, 385.
 Coblenz, 148.
 Codes, 281-3, 391, 403.
 Colbert, 15, 25, 43.
 Collet d'Herbois, 209, 212, 216, 218, 220, 224.
 Cologne, electorate of, 297, 454.
 Colonial policy, English, 28; French, 117, 271-273.
 Commerce, treaty of, between England and France, 85; under the Empire, 406-7; *see* Continental System.
 Committee of General Defense, 199.
 Committee of General Security, 208, 215, 223.
 Committee of Public Safety, 199, 202, 203, 207, 209-10, 211, 213, 215, 219, 223, 341.
 Commune of Paris, 110; Revolutionary, 175 f., 201-2, 207, 210, 216, 220.
 Company of the Indies, 63.
Compte Rendu, of Necker, 69, 70.
 Comtat Venaissin, 135, 162.
 Concordat, of 1516, 134; of 1802, 276-7.
 Condé, Prince of, 137, 147, 148, 163.
 Condillac, Abbé de, 33, 40.
 Condorcet, 177, 183, 230-1.
 Confederation of the Rhine, 329-30, 337, 396, 439.
 Conscription, origin, 204.
 Constituent Assembly, 95 f.; *see also* National Assembly.
 Constitutions, French, 103 f., 110 f., 148; of 1793, 202; of 1795, 224-5; of the year VIII, 267 f.; of the year X, 283-5; imperial, 313-4, 404.
 Continental System, 340 f., 397, 399, 407, 408, 415, 418, 449.
Contract, the *Social*, Rousseau's, 41.
 Convention, National, 183 f.
 Conventuals, ex-, 244, 269.
 Corday, Charlotte, 207.
 Cordeliers Club, 139, 146, 212.
 Corsica, 209.
 Corvée, royal, 10, 65, 66, 68, 73.
 Cort, Henry, 82.
 Corunna, battle at, 356.
 Council of Elders, 226.
 Council of Five Hundred, 226.
 Council of State, 268, 269-70, 277, 280, 284.
Courrier de Provence, 110.
 Courts, *see* Parlements; reorganization in France, 116.
 Couthon, 209, 216.
 Crimea, annexed to Russia, 61.
 Crompton, Samuel, 80, 84.
 Custine, 93, 185-6.
 Cuvier, 413.
 Czartoryski, 60.
 Dalberg, Elector of Mainz, 329, 331.
 Dalmatia, 241, 246, 330.
 Danton, 146, 175, 181, 183, 184, 189, 198, 199, 203, 212, 213.

- Danzig, 192, 433, 436.
 Darby, Abraham, 81, 82.
 Dauphin, the, 176, 223.
 David, 403.
 Davout, Marshal, 169, 334, 419, 436, 458.
 Decrès, 269.
 Declaration of Rights, 101, 102, 105, 115, 134.
 De Grasse, 66.
 Delaunay, 98.
 Delessart, minister of foreign affairs, 164, 166, 170.
 Delessert, Benjamin, 366.
 Departments, French, 111, 210, 225, 271.
 Demerara, 456.
 Denmark, 264, 338, 346, 432, 456.
 Desaix, General, 169, 262-3.
 Desmoulins, 97, 158, 212.
 Diamond Necklace Affair, 71.
 Diderot, 40, 57.
 Directory, creation of the, 225-227; policy of, 240-1, 248 f.; overthrow, 257-60.
 Domain, Prussian, 31, 369.
 Domestic System of manufacture, 80.
 Dresden, 435, 437.
Droits réunis, 405, 449.
 Ducos, Roger, 259, 260, 261.
 Dumouriez, General, 167, 171, 172, 180, 187, 189, 197-8.
 Duplay, 208.
 Dupont, General, 353.
 Dupont de Nemours, 43, 44, 70, 93.
 Duport, Adrien, 108, 109.
 Dutch, *see* United Provinces, United Netherlands, Holland.
 East India Company, 58.
 École, Normale, 231.
 Economists, the, 43.
 Eden, William, Lord Auckland, 85, 86.
 Edinburgh Review, 385.
 Education, 230-1, 278-9, 379-80, 408-9.
 Eglantine, Fabre d', 180, 213.
 Egypt, Expedition to, 251-5, 265, 266, 306.
 Elba, 44, 456-7.
 Elector, the Great, 50.
 Emigrants, from France and their treatment, 138, 147, 164, 178, 200, 223, 279, 448, 449-50.
 Émile, by Rousseau, 42, 46.
 Encyclopedia, the, 40.
 Enghien, Duke d', 312-3.
 England, peasantry in, 13-4; traders of, 18; government of, 27-9; financial system, 31-2; Industrial Revolution in, 74 f.; attitude of towards French Revolution, 151; Nootka Sound Affair, 153-4; and the Declaration of Pillnitz, 162; war with France, 190-1, 192, 203; later condition of, 235-6, 247; conflict with the Armed Neutrality, 264; Peace of Amiens, 265-6, 305 f.; menaced with invasion, 310, 319-20; relations with Third Coalition, 318, 327, 337 f.; Continental System, 340 f.; intervention in Spain and Portugal, 353 f.; progress in, 385-6; and Coalition of 1813, 433-4; in Congress of Vienna, 453 f.; Waterloo campaign, 460 f.
 Erfurt, The Interview at, 354.
 Etruria, kingdom of, 263, 303, 350.
 Eugène de Beauharnais, 318, 393, 395, 419.
 Expilly, Abbé, 140.
 Eylau, battle of, 336.
 Factory Acts, 386.
 Farmers-General, 30.
 Febronius, 35.
 Federation of July 14, 1790, 137.
 Ferdinand VII, of Spain, 350, 351, 433, 434.
 Ferrara, 241.
 Fersen, Count de, 144.
 Fesch, Cardinal, 314, 329.
 Feudalism, in France, 4 f.; in Germany, 11 f.; abolished in Savoy, 56; abolition of in France, 101-2; 118-21, 178, 206-7; in Alsace, 155-6; in Austrian Netherlands, 190; in Prussia, ch. 22; in Napoleonic Europe, ch. 23.
 Feuillants, the, 147, 163.
 Fichte, 235, 379, 430.
 Finances, of the old régime, 29-31; of Revolutionary France, 125 f., 178, 204-5; of the Directory, 245; of the Consulate, 273-4; of the Empire, 404-5; of the Restoration, 449; of England, 247, 265.
 Finland, 337, 338-9, 355.
 Flesselles, 97, 98.
 Floreal, 22nd, 257.
 Förster, Georg, 186.
 Fouché, 209, 258, 279, 313, 402, 457.
 Foulon, 98.
 Fouquier-Tinville, 200, 214, 219.
 France, *see under specific titles*, Feudalism, Peasantry, etc.
 Franche Comté, 20.
 Francis, II, of the Holy Roman Empire, I, of Austria, accession, 167, 169, 173; *see* Austria, for relations with France; German policy of, 292 f.; becomes Emperor of Austria, 315; renounces title as Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 330; marriage alliance with Napoleon, 360; as a ruler, 383-4.
 Frankfurt, 14, 173, 296, 363, 438.
 Frederick the Great, 14, 26, 27, 39, 48, 49, 60.
 Frederick William I, 12, 26.
 Frederick William II, 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 167, 185, 192-3, 289.
 Frederick William III, 289-291, 315, 323, 327, 332, 333, 334, 336, 367 f., 376, 416, 417, 424 f.; *see also under* Prussia.
 Fréron, 218.
 Frey, 374.
 Friedland, battle of, 337.
 Friends of the Constitution, 109, 147; *see* Jacobin Club.
 Fructidor, 18th, 245.
 Fulton, Robert, 280-1.
 Galicia, 60, 415, 420.
 Gallicans, the, 133.
 Gaudin, 269, 274, 406.
 Genêt, 196.
 Geneva, 251.
 Genoa, 242, 303, 321.
 Gensonné, 149.
 Gentz, 152, 331.
 George III, of England, 28, 58, 235, 261, 315, 318.
 Germany, population of, 4; peasantry of, 11; social structure of, 14; guilds in, 16; religious controversy in, 35-6; intellectual life of, 44-6; industrial revolution in, 85; effect of the French Revolution upon, 152, 154-7, 163-5, 167; coronation of the Emperor Francis II, 173; French invasion of, 185-

- 7, 188, 189; the Empire declares war, 192; French attempts at annexation, 197, 232; effects of the Peace of Basel, 234; dangers from Peace of Campo Formio, 246; Congress of Rastadt, 248-9; consequences of Peace of Lunéville, 263, 292-300; conditions in before 1803, 286-92; results of the Peace of Pressburg, 326; the Confederation of the Rhine, 329-30; consequences of Treaty of Tilsit, 337-8; effect of the Continental System upon, 348-9, 360, 363, 364, 365; Napoleonic influence in, 387 f.; War of Liberation, 429 f.; changes in, made at the Congress of Vienna, 453 f.; *see also under* Austria, Bavaria, Prussia.
- Girondins, the, 149, 165, 166, 167, 174, 176, 177, 182, 183, 184, 189, 192, 196, 200, 201-2, 207-8, 221.
- Gneisenau, 377.
- Gobel, Bishop, 141, 142, 211.
- Godoy, 309, 349, 350, 351.
- Goethe, 14, 235, 287, 355.
- Gournay, Marquis de, 16, 43, 63.
- Grain trade, 62, 63, 65, 71, 73.
- Grand Empire, The, 325 f.
- Great Britain, *see under* England.
- "Great Fear," The, 100.
- Grégoire, Bishop, 141, 142, 147, 211, 229, 230.
- Gross-Gorschen, battle of, 432.
- Grouchy, Marshal, 460-1.
- Guadet, 149.
- Guilds, 15, 16, 66, 68, 121, 281.
- Guillotine, the, 116.
- Gustavus III, of Sweden, 159; IV, 385.
- Hamburg, 14, 79, 296, 308, 349, 436.
- Hanau, battle at, 438.
- Hanover, Electorate of, 308, 330, 338, 455.
- Hapsburgs, *see* Austria.
- Hardenberg, 298, 335, 368, 370, 371, 376, 378-82, 416, 424, 425, 426, 439.
- Hargreaves, James, 80, 85.
- Haugwitz, 323, 324, 425-6, 332, 333, 335.
- Hébert, 180, 184, 201, 207, 212, 213.
- Heligoland, 348-9.
- Helvetic Republic, 251, 263; *see* Switzerland.
- Herder, 45, 46, 287, 288.
- Heriot, 11.
- Hertzberg, 153, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161.
- Hesse-Cassel, 294, 297, 331, 338, 455.
- Hesse-Darmstadt, 155.
- Hoche, General, 223, 245, 247.
- Hofer, Andreas, 359.
- Holbach, Baron d', 40.
- Holland, 318, 360, 389, 433, 434, 439, 452, 455.
- Holy Roman Empire, 19, 59, 291 f., 329, 330.
- Hontheim (Febronius), 35.
- House of Commons, 27-8.
- Huguenots, the, 35, 73, 139.
- Humboldt, 379.
- Hungary, 4, 53, 54, 158, 159.
- Huntsman, Samuel, 83.
- Illyrian Provinces, 359, 394, 423, 433, 434, 436.
- Impressment question, 345.
- Indies, Council of the, 56.
- Indulgents, the, 213.
- Industrial Revolution, the, 76 f.
- Industry, history of, 15-17, 66, 76 f., 122, 205-6, 222, 280-1, 380, 398, 406-7.
- Infernal Machine plot, 311.
- Inquisition, the, 56, 356.
- Institute, 230, 231, 279.
- Intendants, the, 25, 271.
- Invalides, Hôtel des, 97.
- Inventions, 76 f.
- Ionian Islands, 246, 251.
- Iron industry, 81 f., 281.
- Isnard, 164, 165, 221.
- Istria, 241, 246.
- Italy, 46-7, 56; Bonaparte in, 237 f.; consequences of Peace of Campo Formio, 246; French rule in, 249-50, 255-6; campaign of 1800 in, 261-4; under the Consulate, 301-3, 309; kingdom of, 318, 320, 321; changes after Austerlitz, 326, 327-8; industry of, 364; Napoleonic influence upon, 387 f.; collapse of Napoleonic rule in, 440, 441, 459; conclusions upon at Congress of Vienna, 452, 455.
- Jacobin Club, 109, 145, 147, 150, 167, 168, 171, 172, 174, 202, 207, 208, 212, 217, 219-20.
- Jacquart, 280.
- Jales, Camp of, 148.
- Jansenist controversy, 34.
- Jassy, Peace of, 159.
- Jefferson, Thomas, 273, 345, 347.
- Jena campaign, 333-4.
- Jesuits, 34, 49, 56, 58.
- Joseph II, of Austria, 20, 48, 51 f., 60, 61, 153, 159.
- Josephine, the Empress, 315, 359, 360.
- Joubert, 256.
- Jourdan, General, 169, 236, 259, 435.
- Judicial reform in France, 115.
- Junot, General, 350, 353.
- Jury system, 116, 403.
- Kainarji, Peace of, 60.
- Kalisch, Treaty of, 430, 453.
- Kalkreuth, Marshal, 367.
- Kant, 46, 152, 286, 374.
- Kay, John, 79.
- Kellerman, General, 180, 184, 185.
- Klopstock, 45, 152, 179.
- Knights, Imperial, the, 299-300.
- Körner, Theodor, 431.
- Kosciusko, 179, 195, 217.
- Kraus, Professor, 289.
- Krümpfer system, 378.
- Kurakin, 416.
- Kutusoff, 421.
- Lafayette, Marquis de, 67, 93, 98, 99, 101, 102, 104, 105, 113, 115, 120, 143, 146, 164, 166, 175, 177-8, 284.
- Lameth, Charles and Alexander de, 93, 109.
- Lands, Public, in France, 128-132, 178, 200, 277, 279, 449-50.
- Landsturm, 431.
- Landwehr, 429.
- Lanjuinais, 221, 227, 459.
- Lannes, General, 169.
- Laplace, 231, 413.
- La Rochejaquelein, 198, 458.
- La Rothière, 442.
- Lavoisier, 231.
- Law, *see* Code.
- Le Bas, 216.
- Lebrun, 314.
- Legion of Honor, 279-80.
- Legislative Assembly, 148 f., 176 f.

- Legislative Corps, 268, 277, 280, 440.
 Leipzig, 363; battle of, 438.
 Leopold, of Austria, 53, 56, 140, 156,
 159, 161, 163, 165, 166, 167.
 Lessing, 45, 46.
 Lettres de cachet, 90, 282.
 Libel plot, 311.
 Liège, 156-7, 159.
 Ligny, battle of, 461.
 Ligurian Republic, 242, 303, 321.
 Lindet, Robert, 209, 215, 228.
Lit de justice, 64.
 Liverpool, 79.
 Local government in France, 24, 271; in
 Prussia, 27, 374-5.
 Lodi, battle of, 238.
 Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, 455.
 Lorient, 63.
 Lorraine, 20.
 Louis XIV, of France, 4, 20, 24, 43, 45,
 67, 155, 163.
 XV, 24, 34, 39, 43, 61, 62, 63, 64.
 XVI, 34, 43, 61, 62, 67, 72, 88, 114,
 143, 144-145, 161, 163, 167, 171 f.,
 191-2.
 XVII, 176, 223.
 XVIII, 144, 197, 223, 277, 443, 444,
 446 f., 457-8, 464.
 Louis, Baron, 360, 447.
 Louise, Queen of Prussia, 333, 338, 380.
 Louisiana, 265, 272-3.
 Louverture, Toussaint, 272.
 Louvet, 221.
 Lübeck, 296, 407.
 Lunéville, Peace of, 263, 286, 292.
 Lützen, battle of, 432.
 Luxemburg, 158, 232.
 Lycées, 231, 409.
 Lyons, 202, 209, 408.
 Mably, Abbé, 33.
 Macadam, 84.
 Macdonald, Marshal, 424, 436, 444, 450.
 Machinery, introduction of, 76 f., 280,
 365.
 Mack, General, 321-2.
 Mackintosh, Sir James, 151.
 Madison, President, 361.
 Madrid, 55, 351, 353, 354, 356, 435.
 Mainz, 186, 197, 204, 232, 248.
 Malesherbes, 37.
 Malisset, 63.
 Mallet du Pan, 107, 171.
 Malouet, 112, 448.
 Malta, 251, 256, 264, 265, 266, 305-6,
 307, 318, 456.
 Mandat, commander of the Paris Na-
 tional Guard, 175, 176.
 Mandats, 227.
 Mantua, 239.
 Marat, 110, 181, 184, 200, 201, 207.
 Marck, Count de la, 113, 163.
 Marengo, battle of, 262-3.
 Maria Theresa, of Austria, 46, 51, 59.
 Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, 71,
 143, 144, 148, 166, 171, 172, 208.
 Marie Louise, Empress, 360, 443, 444,
 455.
 Marmont, Marshal, 394, 444.
Marseillaise, the, 174.
 Marseilles, 174, 202, 203.
 Masséna, General, 257, 262, 356, 357.
 Maupéou, Chancellor, 64.
 Maurepas, Count de, 64, 67, 69.
 Maury, Abbé, 109.
 Maximum legislation, 200-1, 205-6, 221.
 Melzi, Count, 302, 303.
 Merlin, of Douai, 93.
 Metternich, Count, 417, 427 f., 431 f.,
 438 f., 454 f.
 Milan, 240, 241, 262; Decree, 347.
 Miollis, General, 352, 410.
 Mirabeau, Count de, 92, 95, 108, 113,
 114, 120, 125, 126, 128, 154, 162.
 Modena, 240, 241, 246, 295, 455.
 Molasses Act, 18.
 Mollien, 406.
 Monastic Orders, 54, 129, 133, 291.
 Monge, 254, 280.
Moniteur, the, 110.
 Montagnards, the, 183, 224.
 Montesquieu, 37, 62.
 Montesquiou, Abbé de, 443, 448.
 General, 93, 187.
 Montgelas, 291, 397-8.
 Montmorin, 85, 114, 132, 144, 154, 171.
 Moore, Sir John, 356.
 Moreau, General, 169, 236, 239, 259, 260,
 262, 263, 312, 313, 436.
 Morris, Gouverneur, 92, 93.
 Moscow, 420 f.
 Mounier, 93, 105, 109.
 Municipal reform, 111, 374-5.
 Münster, bishopric of, 293-4, 295, 296,
 297, 298.
 Murat, Joachim, 226, 301, 302, 314, 323;
 grand duke of Berg, 328, 336;
 king of Naples, 352, 393, 395, 419,
 422, 424, 440, 455, 459.
 Nantes, 209.
 Naples, kingdom of, 255-6, 264, 327, 389-
 90, 410, 440, 455, 459.
 Napoleon Bonaparte, spectator at assault
 of the Tuileries, 176; defends the
 Convention, 226; closes the Club
 of the Panthéon, 228; first cam-
 paign in Italy, 237-9; exacts war
 contributions, 240; his Italian pol-
 icy, 240-4, 246; expedition to
 Egypt, 251-5; overthrows the
 Directory, 259-60; one of the pro-
 visional consuls, 261; First Consul,
 261; campaign of Marengo, 261-3;
 makes peace with England, 265;
 as First Consul, 267 f.; Consul for
 Life, 283-4; policy in Germany,
 293 f.; his foreign policy as First
 Consul, 301 f.; plots against, 310-
 3; proclaimed Emperor, 313; cor-
 onation, 314-5; War of the Third
 Coalition, 317 f.; at Vienna and
 Austerlitz, 323-5; makes his brother
 King of Naples, 327; claims to
 be successor of Charlemagne, 328-
 9; organizes the Confederation of
 the Rhine, 329; crushes Prussia,
 333-4; negotiates Treaty of Tilsit
 with Alexander I, 337-8; his Con-
 tinental System, 340, 342 f.; seiz-
 ure of Spain, 349 f.; interviews
 Alexander at Erfurt, 354-5; de-
 feats Austria, 358-9; marries the
 Archduchess Marie Louise, 360;
 his influence upon dependent states,
 387 f.; his methods as a ruler,
 400-403; imperial policy in France,
 403 f.; his quarrel with Pius VII,
 410-2; break with Alexander, 416;
 victor at Borodino, 421; retreat
 from Moscow, 421 f.; efforts to or-
 ganize a new army, 423-4, 432;
 campaign of 1813-14, 432 f.; abdi-
 cation, 445; return from Elba,
 456-8; the Hundred Days, 458-63;
 St. Helena, 463.
 Narbonne, Count de, 163, 166, 431.
 Nassau-Usingen, Duke of, 299.
 National Assembly, organized, 94, 95;

- achievements, 107; called the Constituent Assembly, 118.
 National Guard, organized, 99; federation of, 137.
 National Library, 231.
 "Natural Limits," doctrine of the, 188-9.
 Necker, first ministry, 68-9; second ministry, 88, 90, 94, 96, 110, 123, 125, 126, 129, 138.
 Neerwinden, battle of, 197.
 Nelson, 247, 252, 253, 255, 256, 264, 319-20, 322-3.
 Netherlands, the Austrian, 55, 158, 187-90, 196-8, 232, 455.
 Ney, Marshal, 334, 419, 444, 457, 460, 461, 462, 463.
 Nice, 195, 452.
 Niebuhr, 380, 430.
 Nile, battle of the, 253.
 Nimes, 139, 202.
 Nobility, in France, 4-6; in Prussia, 12; imperial, 402.
 Non-jurors, the, 165, 178-9, 229.
 Nootka Sound affair, 153.
 Norway, 417, 418, 456.
 Nuremberg, 296.
 Oldenburg, duchy of, 366, 414, 415.
 Orange, Prince of, 233.
 Orders in Council, 346, 418.
 Organic Articles, 277, 315.
 Orleans, Duke of, 208.
 Pacca, Cardinal, 411.
 Pache, 189.
Pacte de Famine, 63.
 Paine, Thomas, 151, 191.
 Palm, 331.
 Panic of 1810, 407-8.
 Panthéon, Club of the, 228.
 Paris, government of, 25; elects deputies to the States General, 91; revolt in, 95-8; improvises a government, 98-100; insurrection of October 5, 104-5; new municipal law, 111; *see also* Revolutionary Commune; organized during the Consulate, 271.
 Treaty of, 452; Second Treaty of, 464.
 Parma, duchy of, 240, 387.
 Parthenopean Republic, 256, 264.
 Parties, in France, during the Revolution, 109.
 Patterson, Elizabeth, first wife of Jerome Bonaparte, 328.
 Paul, Czar of Russia, 239, 253, 303.
 Peace of Amiens, 265-6, 305-307, 342.
 Peasantry, under the old régime, 4, 6 f., 11, 13, 50-1, 52-3, 55; abolition of feudal dues of, in Savoy, 56-7; work of the Revolution for, in France, 101-2, 118-21, 178, 206-7; in Alsace, 155-6; in Austrian Netherlands, 190; in Prussia, 290-1, 369-373, 381-2; in the Napoleonic states, ch. 23.
 Physiocrats, the, 10, 43, 53, 123.
 Pichegru, 312, 313.
 Piedmont, annexed, 303; reforms in, 388-9; disposition of in 1814, 452.
 Pillnitz, Declaration of, 162, 163, 166.
 Pitt, William, 85, 86, 153, 191, 235, 265, 327.
 Pius VI, 135, 250.
 VII, 264, 276, 314-5, 328-9, 352, 409-12, 441.
 Penal code, 47, 55, 116, 385, 403.
 Pétion, 147, 174, 180.
 Poland, first Partition of, 59; revolution in, 160; Second Partition, 193, 204; Third Partition, 217, 234; Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 337, 391, 398-9, 414, 415, 419-20; final disposition of, 453-4.
 Poniatowski, Stanislas, 60.
 Portalis, 282.
 Portugal, 309, 338, 350, 354, 356-7, 423, 456.
 Prague Congress, 436.
 Prefects, 271.
 Preliminaries of Leoben, 241, 242, 246.
 Preliminaries of London, 265, 342.
 Press, liberty of, 36, 283, 413.
 Pressburg, Treaty of, 326.
 Price, Richard, 151.
 Prina, 302, 303, 392.
 Privy Council, 284-5.
 Provence, Count of, 70, 144, 148, 162, 163; *see* Louis XVIII.
 Provincial assemblies, 20, 69-70, 72-3.
 Prussia, under Frederick II, 11-13, 26-7, 48-51; policy at the opening of the Revolution, 152-3, 157-8; and the Polish Revolution, 160-1; unites in Declaration of Pillnitz, 162; at war with France, 167, 179-80, 184-5, 203-4; Treaty of Basel, 234; share in Poland, 192-3, 217, 234; reference to, in Treaty of Campo Formio, 246; joins the Armed Neutrality, 264; share in the reorganization of Germany, 292 f.; attempts at reform, 289-91; intervention in 1805, 323, 325-6; crushed by Napoleon, 330 f.; reorganization of, ch. 22; in 1812, 416-7; policy after Napoleon's defeat, 424 f.; declares war upon France, 430; campaign of 1813-4, 430 f.; share in the work of Congress of Vienna, 453 f.; gains, 454; in the Waterloo campaign, 460 f.
 Pyramids, battle of, 252.
 Quatre Bras, battle of, 461.
 Quebec Act, 58.
 Quesnay, 43.
 Quiberon affair, 223.
 Quimper, bishopric of, 140.
 Raynal, Abbé, 33, 62.
 Rastadt Congress, 248, 292.
 Rapinat, 251.
 Reason, Worship of, 211-12.
Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke, 151, 152.
 Regicides, 192, 226, 463.
 Regency, announced by the Count of Provence, 148.
 Reggio, 241.
 Reichenbach, conference at, 159; Treaty of, 453.
 Reichsdeputation, 294.
 Reign of Terror, 207, 218.
 Religion, *see* Church.
 Representatives on mission, 199.
 Republicanism in France, 145-146, 177, 184.
 Reubell, 226, 233.
 Revolutionary Army, 207, 209, 213.
 Revolutionary Tribunal, 199, 200, 201, 208, 214, 219.
Révolutions de Paris, newspaper, 110.
 Rhenish Confederation, 329-30, 337, 396, 424, 431, 433, 434.
 Richard-Lenoir, 407.

- Richardson, 44, 45.
Rights of Man, Paine, 151.
 Rivoli, battle of, 243.
 Rodney, 68.
 Roebuck, 82, 83.
 Roederer, 392.
 Rohan, Cardinal de, 71.
 Roland, 167, 171, 177, 208.
 Romantic movement, 41, 288.
 Rome, 240, 250-1, 412; *see also* Pius VI and VII.
 Romilly, Samuel, 99, 107, 308, 385.
 Robespierre, Augustin, 216.
 Maximilien, 109, 114, 122, 134, 147, 180, 182, 184, 201, 202, 203, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213-7, 218.
 Rosetta Stone, 254.
 Rousseau, 3, 37, 41, 44, 46.
 Rumbold, Sir George, 315.
 Russia, under Catherine II, 57-8; share in Partition of Poland, 59-60; annexes the Crimea, 60-1; war with the Turks, 157, 159; Second Partition of Poland, 161, 170, 192-3; Third Partition of Poland, 217, 234; a member of the Second Coalition, 255-7, 261-2; joins the Armed Neutrality, 264-5; intervention in German affairs, 295; renewed hostility to France, 306, 317-8; in the Third Coalition, 321 f.; war in Poland and Prussia, 336-7; Tilsit, 337-8; annexes Finland, 338-9; condition during Alexander's reign, 384-5; invasion of 1812, 420 f.; conflict at the Congress of Vienna, 453 f.
- Saint-André, 209.
 Saint-Etienne, Rabaut, 89.
 Saint-Just, 216.
 St. Helena, Island of, 463.
 St. Ouen, Declaration of, 446, 450.
 St. Vincent, Cape, battle of, 247.
 Salamanca, battle of, 423.
 Saliceti, 240.
 Salonica, 349.
 Salt tax, 9, 22, 122-3, 405.
 Salzburg, 61, 246, 296, 297, 455.
 Santo Domingo, 117, 118, 205, 265, 271-2.
 Sardinia, kingdom of, 56, 195, 237, 249, 256, 303, 452.
 Savary, General, 351.
 Savoy, 56-7, 187, 188-9, 452.
 Saxony, 161, 294, 331, 333, 337, 365, 438, 453-4, 455.
 Scharnhorst, 289, 377-9, 416, 417.
 Schill, Colonel, 359, 382.
 Schiller, 235, 287.
 Schleiermacher, 235, 288, 331.
 Schlözer, 152.
 Schön, 289, 370, 373.
 Schönbrunn, Treaty of, 359.
 Schools, *see* Education.
 Schwarzenberg, 436, 437, 438.
 Sébastiani, Colonel, 306.
 Senate, French, 269, 284, 440, 443, 444, 446.
 September Massacres, 181-3.
 Serfdom, *see* Peasantry.
 Servan, 171.
 Shuttle, the Flying, 79.
 Sieyès, Abbé, 89, 95, 101, 113, 220, 226, 233, 257-66, 267, 269.
 Siméon, 391.
 Simplon Road, 303, 393.
 Sistova, Treaty of, 159.
 Slave Trade, 36, 79, 385, 456.
 Smeaton, 82.
- Smith, Adam, 44, 289.
 Smolensk, 421, 422.
 Smuggling, 18, 348-9.
 Soult, Marshal, 169, 448, 456, 460.
 Spain, under Charles III, 55-6; Nootka Sound affair, 153-4; war with France, 192, 235; war with England, 236, 247; relations with Napoleon, 309, 322; Napoleon's seizure of, 349 f.; colonies open to English trade, 360-1; French policy in, 394; French defeats in, 418, 433, 434; final settlement, 456.
 Stadion, 383-4.
 Stadtholder, of the United Provinces, 74.
 Staël, Mme. de, 223, 413.
 States General, organization of, 89; opened, 92.
 Steffens, 430.
 Stein, Baron vom, 11, 289, 298, 332-3, 335, 368 f., 425-6, 429, 431, 455.
 Stock, government, in France, 245, 274-5, 406, 441, 449.
 Suvóroff, 256.
 Sweden, 75, 264, 338, 385, 417-8, 432, 456.
 Swiss Guard, 175, 176, 180.
 Switzerland, 251, 303-304, 364, 391.
- Taille, the, 66.
 Taine, 6, 9, 40.
 Talleyrand, 70, 93, 113, 125, 128, 137, 141, 142, 251, 252, 269, 272, 402, 412, 443, 444, 447, 448, 452 f.
 Tallien, 180, 218-9.
 Target, 89.
 Targovitz, Confederation of, 170.
 Tariff, barriers, 22; in 1786, 86; of 1791, 124; during the Continental System, 341 f., 362; at the Restoration, 449.
 Tauroggen, Convention of, 426.
 Taxation, under the old régime, 8-10, 13, 21, 22, 31, 32, 53, 58; French attempts to reform, 62, 66, 71-2; changes made by the Revolution, 102, 122-4; failure to collect, 204; reforms under the Consulate, 273-4; during the Empire, 404-5; English, 386.
 Tennis Court affair, 94.
 Teplitz, treaties at, 439, 453.
 Textile machinery, 79 f., 280, 365.
 Tithe, the, 7, 102, 127.
 Thomson, 44, 45.
 Thorn, 192, 454.
 Thouret, 93.
 Tilsit, Peace of, 337-8, 346, 367, 385.
 Tippoo, the Sultan of Mysore, 254.
 Tolentino, Treaty of, 243, 250.
 Torres Vedras, Lines of, 356.
 Toulon, 202, 203.
 Trafalgar, battle of, 322-3.
 Treilhard, 93.
 Trent, bishopric of, 295.
 Treves, Electorate of, 186, 297, 454.
 Tribunal of August 17, 180; *see also* Revolutionary Tribunal.
 Tribunate, the, 268, 280, 284, 404.
 Tronchet, 93, 282.
 Trudaine, 44.
 Tuileries, Louis XVI at, 105; mob in, 172; attack upon, 176.
 Turgot, 43, 44, 62, 64-7, 70, 71, 93, 121.
 Turks, the, 60, 61, 159, 337, 354, 415, 418.
 Tuscany, 56, 263, 295, 303, 350, 387, 455.
 Tyrol, 359, 455.

- Ulm, capture of, 321-2.
 United Irishmen, Society of the, 151.
 United Netherlands, United Provinces, 74, 192, 233, 250; *see* Batavian Republic, Holland.
 United States, and France, 67-8, 195-6; the Louisiana question, 272-3; consequences of the warfare upon neutral commerce, 343 f., 361, 362; growth of manufactures, 365; War of 1812, 418-9.
 Valais, 303.
 Valtelline, 242.
 Varennes, Flight to, 144.
 Vendéan troubles, 198, 223, 458.
 Vendémiaire, 13th, 225-6.
 Venice, 241, 242, 243, 246, 326, 393.
 Verdun, 181, 185.
 Vergennes, 85.
 Vergniaud, 149, 165, 166, 176, 183.
 Versailles, Treaty of, 85.
 Vienna, Treaty of, 359; Congress of, 452-6.
Vieux Cordelier, 212.
 Villeneuve, Admiral, 319-20.
 Vittoria, battle of, 435.
 Voltaire, 37, 38, 49, 57.
 Walpole, Sir Robert, 32.
 War of Liberation, 429 f.
 Warsaw, 217; Grand Duchy, 337, 359, 370, 398-9, 433, 434, 436, 453-4.
 Washington, George, 179, 196.
 Waterloo, battle of, 461-2.
 Watt, James, 77, 83.
Wealth of Nations, Smith, 44, 289.
 Weimar, 287.
 Wellesley, Governor General, 254.
 Wellesley, Sir Arthur, 353, 356; *as* Wellington, 356, 418, 423, 438, 440, 460-3.
 Wesley, John, 36, 44.
 Westphalia, kingdom of, 338, 390, 392, 395-6, 440.
 White Terror, 463.
 Whitefield, George, 36.
 Whitworth, Lord, 306.
 Wieland, 45, 287, 355.
 Wilkinson, John, 82.
 Winckelmann, 45.
 Wittenberg, 454.
 Wolf, F. A., 288, 380.
 Wordsworth, 107, 307-8.
 Workmen, 16, 121-2, 281.
 Worms, 148, 185, 197.
 Worship of Reason, 141.
 Würmser, Marshal, 239.
 Würzburg, 296.
 Württemberg, duchy of, 155, 236, 294, 296, 297, 299; kingdom, 326, 396-7, 424, 455.
 Yorck, General, 424, 426, 429.
 Young, Arthur, 5, 7, 10, 21, 95, 107, 108, 170.
 Zürich, battle of, 257.

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BY

EDWARD MASLIN HULME

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO

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- Vincent of Beauvais, 119 & n. 3,
162, 223, 239; *Speculum Historiale*, 223
- Viterbo, 212, 261
- Volo, Gulf of, 112
- Wādī Sabu, 411 n. 3
- Wahégins, 190
- Waldemar IV, K. of Danes, 332 n. 1
- Waleran de Warvin, 204 n. 1
- Wales, 5, 44
- Wallachia, 195, 206, 218, 435, 440,
444 & n. 2, 447, 451, 455
- Walsingham, 333
- Walter de Maundy, 333 n. 6
- Walter de Ruppes, Flemish knight,
441
- Warwick, Earl of, 339
- Wenzel, Duke of Pomerania, 184
- Wey. *Vide* William
- Widdin, 389 n. 2, 390, 393 n. 1,
435, 443, 444 n. 1
- Wilhelm von Boldensele, 160-1,
162, 168; *Hodoeporicon ad T.S.*,
161, 169
- William Fotheringay, 408 n. 3, 421
n. 1
- William Occam, 9
- William de la Pole, Lord of Castle
Ashby, 339 & n. 3
- William of Tripoli, 247 n. 1
- William Wey, 212, 215-19; royal
brief to —, 216 n. 2; *Itineraries*
of —, 215-16 nn.
- Wiltshire, 216
- Wurtemberg, 220
- Wyclif, 9, 188, 189
- Yalbogha al-Khaṣṣikī, 329 n. 5, 352,
371 n., 372 & nn., 375 & n. 1
- Ya'qūb, Jewish envoy to Pierre de
Lusignan at Alexandria, 368-9,
369 n. 2
- Ya'qūb, Turkish general, 464
- Yerakites, 329
- Yon de Cholet, 421 n. 1
- York, Duke of, 143, 152
- Ypres, 462
- 'Ysini', 170
- Zaccharia. *Vide* Benito and Mar-
tino
- Zaitūn, 251 n. 7, 254
- Zanta, 461
- Zara, 198, 212
- Zealand, 147
- Zeno. *Vide* Pietro
- Zuchio (Morea), 387
- Zwailah Gate (Cairo), 476
- Zwornik, 464

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
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